Future Bodies: Discipline, Control, the Yoga of Resistance


Michel Foucault

When the task of disciple is simultaneously intended to improve its utility for production, here are some riffs on Foucault’s: Discipline & Punish. Historical context is primary and Foucault’s archaeological method helps uncover the rupture within the Enlightenment whose legacy still haunts us, as Deleuze observes, because they have now morphed into technologies of control.

In the European tradition Foucault traces the disciplining of the body back to medieval Monastic exercises, which were intended to facilitate renunciation of the world. These exercises were transformed when adopted by the socio-political regimes of the 17th & 18th century, (especially military, pedagogical, and industrial) into a method for maintaining control over the actions of the bodies it governed through disciplining processes. These disciplining practices have co-evolved with technology and are in fact technologies in themselves albeit inner technologies) to become ever more omnipresent as tools of surveillance and control.  Going forward it will be the omnipresence of ubiquitous technologies (bio-technical/computational/networked) that will largely determine the environmental parameters in which our future bodies must structurally couple.

Resistance to the virus of docility, to the infection of the gaze, to the insertion of disciplining technologies is often the unintended consequences of the mechanisms of control themselves but, as William Gibson says, “the street finds its own use for things”. The future is a random other; what we know as the internet today has evolved from technology first designed for survival after a nuclear holocaust.

Activism whose interests lie in discovering alternative, non coercive paths to human development would be well served to find patterns created by resistances to, and ruptures from, the paradigms of control and technological will organizing the human resources of the planet. Such an activism proceeds by both locating those ruptures in the paradigms of organizational control and cultivating resistance practices to them in ones own life and community. One such practice to resist the disciplining machinery of global socio-economic power exchanges is yoga. Although the aim of yoga is to achieve a frictionless flow between individual and cosmos, the many and the one, a yoga such as Sri Aurobindo’s integral yoga whose concern is not merely a transcendental urge but an immanent concern for the world, is a unique resistance form because its own monastic traditions of psycho/physiological practices, established well before the body was appropriated by the exercises of technoscience, allows one to leverage the silence of ones own embodiment as a method of resisting external regimes of control. Aurobindo’s yogic practice was part and parcel of his resistance to the colonialist occupation of India.
rc..



I picked up this astute comment from a new media blog:

“The focus of yogic teachings locates one’s body, emotions, thoughts, and the mind in constant interrelated state. The ultimate goal of yoga, therefore, is self-discipline of one’s own body in order to control one’s own mind, and eventually in harnessing its full power within. Docility and state discipline does the exact opposite of this process, taking the body away from the individual and controlling it through an organized system. As a result, the mind is also coerced into subjugation to the same powers. In that sense, the system of “control” that Deleuze proposes is a natural progression of the system of discipline, to adapt to a more fluid society and to discipline the mind and the body on a more flexible level. New means of discipline in their contemporary fluidity, just as in Foucault’s argument, are a result of new inventions, while even further inventions come out of the resulting forms of discipline………… ”

Here is Foucault from Discipline and Punish on the intellectual and political origins of the systems which seek to control the body:

Docile bodiesThe classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body – to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces. The great book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on two registers: the anatomico-metaphysical register, of which Descartes wrote the first pages and which the physicians and philosophers continued, and the techno-political register, which was constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body. These two registers are quite distinct, since it was a question, on the one hand, of submission and use and, on the other, of functioning and explanation: there was a useful body and an intelligible body. And yet there are points of overlap from one to the other. La Mettrie’s L’Homme-machine is both a materialist reduction of the soul and a general theory of dressage, at the center of which reigns the notion of ‘docility’, which joins the analyzed body to the manipulated body. A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved. The celebrated automata, on the other hand, were not only a way of illustrating an organism, they were also political puppets, small-scale models of power: Frederick II, the meticulous king of small machines, well-trained regiments and long exercises, was obsessed with them. …………………


And now from Spark Notes some commentary on Foucault’s notion of docile bodies which were produced by the systems of discipline originating in the 18th century:

Docile Bodies SummaryFoucault begins with the ideal of the soldier in the seventeenth century. He is easily recognizable in body and action. The classical age discovered the body as the target of power. The docile body is subjected, used, transformed and improved. Eighteenth century projects of docility represented a new scale of control. The economy of the body became important. The modality of control implies uninterrupted, constant coercion, which is exercised according to a codification that partitions time and space. These methods are the disciplines, ways of controlling the operations of the body which imposed a relation of docility-utility. The disciplines had always existed in monasteries and armies, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they became a general formula of domination. A policy of coercion that acts on the body was formed. The human body entered a machinery that explored and rearranged it. A political anatomy and a mechanics of power were slowly born. We cannot write the history of different disciplinary institutions, merely map a series of detailed examples.“The art of distributions.” Discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space, and employs several techniques: one) Discipline sometimes requires enclosure in a protected place, e.g. a school, factory, or barracks. two) Disciplinary machinery works on the principle of partitioning space; it is always cellular. three) The rule of functional sites would gradually code a space that architecture left at the disposal of several sites. four) In discipline, the elements are interchangeable because each is identified by its place in a series. The key unit is the rank or place in a classification. Rank begins to define the distribution of individuals in educational space.“Control of activity.” One) the timetable is an old inheritance, suggested by monastic communities. The division of time in disciplinary authorities increased. two) The temporal elaboration of the act. Time penetrates the body with all the meticulous controls of power. three) The correlation of body and gesture. Disciplinary power imposes the best relation between gesture and the overall position of the body. In the correct use of the body, nothing must remain useless. four) Body-object articulation. Discipline defines each of the relationships between body and the object (e.g. a rifle) it manipulates. five) Exhaustive use. The traditional timetable forbids men to waste time. Discipline provides a positive economy, and poses the principle of ever-expanding use of time. The “natural body,” which is manipulated by authority and classified, supercedes the mechanical body.“The organization of geneses.” As the eighteenth century progressed, different arrangements of time were evident; new technology developed in the classical period for regulating time, bodies and forces. The Disciplines were machinery for adding up and capitalizing time, in four different ways: one) by dividing duration into successive and parallel segments, each of which ends with a specific time. two) By organizing these segments according to an analytical plan. three) By finalizing these temporal segments with an examination to decide if a subject has reached the required level. four) By drawing up a series of series, and subdividing each series again. Dividing activities into series makes detailed control and intervention possible.Disciplinary methods reveal a linear, evolutive time. But at the same time a social time of a serial cumulative type existed, giving an idea of evolution in terms of “genesis”. The two great discoveries of the eighteenth century were the progress of society and the genesis of individuals linked to new technologies of power. At the center of the seriation of time was the procedure of exercise, a technology by which one imposes a repetitive or difficult task on the body. Exercise has a long history: it is found in military, religious, and universal practice as ritual or ceremony. Exercises became tasks of increasing complexity that marked the acquisition of knowledge and good behavior. Exercise was initially a way of organizing time towards salvation, but it became part of a political technology of the body.“The Composition of forces.” The military unit became a machine of many parts; there was a need to create smaller units out of a mass. This was similar to the idea of creating a productive force that was greater than its elements. Discipline became the art of composing forces to obtain an efficient machine. This demands explanation: one) the individual body becomes an element that is placed, moved and articulated. The soldier or body is inserted into a larger machine. two) The time of the individual unit is adjusted to the time of others. three) A carefully measured combination of forces requires a precise command of forces. The leader needs to signal in various ways to his charges.Discipline creates individuality out of the bodies that it controls. It is cellular, organic and genetic. It has four techniques: it draws up tables, it prescribes movements, it imposes exercises and arranges tactics. The highest form of disciplinary practice is war as strategy. Strategy makes it possible to understand warfare as a way of conducting politics between states. The classical age sees the birth of strategy between states, but also the creation of a strategy by which bodies within states were controlled. This was a military dream of society, which referred not to a contract or the state of nature but to the cogs of a machine. While jurists and philosophers looked to the contract to explain the creation of society, the technicians of discipline created procedures for the individual and collective coercion of bodies.AnalysisAgain, the body is the subject of attention. Now, however, the body is not subject to torture but to forces of discipline and control. Foucault analyzes various technologies that control and affect the body.Docility is achieved through the actions of discipline. Discipline is different from force or violence because it is a way of controlling the operations and positions of the body. The link to the idea of academic “disciplines” such as the human sciences is intended, and becomes important later. The fact that Foucault finds the roots of discipline in monasteries and armies is important. Monastic rules, which regulate the behavior of monks, and drill exercises in the army both emphasize self-control and obedience to rules, but from differing starting points. When Foucault talks of their extension over time, he does not suggest that everyone eventually became monks or soldiers. Instead, he argues that institutions like prisons, schools and hospitals acted like machines for transforming and controlling people in this period. To do this, they fixed individuals in time and space. Foucault thinks of these institutions in terms of machines and living organisms, hence the reference to political anatomy.The organization of individuals in space works according to certain rules. The whole process works within a larger space, such as the prison, which is divided into parts or cells. Discipline depends on the idea of a series, such as a line of pupils, or a rank of soldiers.The control of time is equally important. Foucault again traces the regulation of time back to monastic life. The idea that people are held in a series is preserved, only this time they are controlled by a timetable like that discussed at the beginning of section one. Foucault’s idea of a “positive economy” is hard to grasp. It essentially means that modern timetables aim to cram more and more activity into a day.Time also has broader effects. These effects are related to the technology of time that includes both machines like clocks and the political technology that regulates the individual’s time. The disciplines are not machines for calculating time in the same way as clocks, but rather ways of regulating time as the individual experiences it. Time is divided up like space. The convict’s day is divided into one-hour segments, for example, according to a detailed plan. The control of space and time is essential to Foucault’s disciplinary system because they are the most basic elements of human life. Regulating them affects the way in which people act and think; it is a particularly deep and effective strategy.Foucault begins with time and space as the individual experiences them, but he places this time within a large context. He argues that a wider type of time existed, in which everyone moved; he also argues that the eighteenth century invented the idea of the progress of society. Foucault is talking about the Enlightenment, an eighteenth century philosophical movement that was concerned with reason and human progress. He is unusual in that he links this movement, represented by writers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Kant, to the development of prisons, timetables and other technologies. However, it is important to Foucault that philosophical texts and timetables are part of the same structures of power.Like the timetable, exercise derives from the practices of monasteries, and is yet another way of regulating the body through activity. Prayer, which was aimed at salvation, and military drills are examples of this original form of exercise. The key shift came when the purpose of exercise changed from the benefit of the individual to control. Unlike silent prayer, the “exercise yard” of a prison does not necessarily benefit the prisoners, Foucault would argue.The final element that Foucault analyzes is the idea of the body as part of a machine. This is a development of the division of space and time. Now, however, the body becomes a cog in a machine. Foucault does not argue that groups of people never existed before the classical period, but that the idea of arranging and controlling them was new. The power that arranges people, however, makes them into individual units. It seems like a contradiction in terms, but for Foucault the “individual” could exist only when massive groups were created. The group was not created from individuals, but vice versa. The idea of creating the individual as an object of knowledge becomes important later. Creating the individual out of the group contradicts the common philosophical view about the creation of society. This view argued that society came from a contract or agreement between men. Foucault reveals his opinion of modern society here: that you cannot choose to enter it through a contract, and that it controls you absolutely through technology and power.

Toward a Theory of Phantasmal Media: An Imaginative Cognition- and Computation-Based Approach to Digital Media D. Fox Harrell (C Theory)

Toward a Theory of Phantasmal Media: An Imaginative Cognition- and Computation-Based Approach to Digital Media

D. Fox Harrell

Introduction

To move beyond this tendentiously posed opposition, a meaningful distinction between these different ways of knowing–the improvisational and the compositional–must inevitably turn upon the axis of interaction. Improvisation must be open–that is, open to input, open to contingency–a real-time and (often enough) a real-world mode of production. … If we do not need to define improvised ways of producing knowledge as a subset of composition, then we can simply speak of an improvising machine as one that incorporates a dialogic imagination.
– George E. Lewis, “Too Many Notes: Computers, Complexity and Culture in Voyager,” 2000. [1]

Computational media hold the power to improvisationally and dynamically combine formal manipulation of meaningful elements in new ways, at the same time as responding to user interaction. There is always a mixture between human interpretation of meaning, and the limited symbolic ways that machines encode meaning. This balance between computationally manipulable structure and ghostly, subjective human meaning is at the heart of the expressive potential of computing. This perspective on how computing can express evocative imaginative content does not attempt to define any singular vision for how expressive computational narrative, poetry, virtual worlds, social networking platforms, or any related forms should be realized. Rather, it is a perspective on how this interplay between human meaning and machine structuring of information can be the basis for poignant, specific, novel, and creative forms of expression. Computation must exhibit humility about its limitations for capturing the elusive world of human imagination with its blurry boundaries between the conscious and unconscious aspects of meaning, between clearly expressible discourse and affect, between sensory perception and mental imagery.

Yet, humble computing can still intervene beautifully when its ability to structure, change, and respond to information and input is orchestrated with sensitive consideration of the slippery process of human interpretation and experience. So, rather than providing a perspective on computational expression based on defining eventual future forms, the focus here is on various ways that humans negotiate interplays of structure and subjectivity. It is a cross-medial perspective that finds parallels in the balance between orchestrated form and improvised chaos (and political forthrightness) of Charles Mingus’s compositions such as in his “Original Fables of Faubus,” and the balance between richly lyrical poetic content and a rigid experimental structure in Vladimir Nabokov’s novel Pale Fire. [2, 3] The aesthetic potential of computing technologies noted here is inspired by the parallels between a concern for lush prose coexisting with procedurally structured form as in Italo Calvino’s novel If on a winter’s night a Traveler and the co-habitation of romantic melodies with highly theorized twelve-tone compositional techniques in the classical works of Alban Berg. [4, 5] Jean Toomer’s book Cane is an inspiration point as its lyrical portrait of the rural south in the United States jumps from poetry to prose with abandon, and is rooted in a multiply marginalized perspective. [6] Similarly, Samuel R. Delany’s interweaving of 1980s anxieties of HIV/AIDS with a swords and sorcery world in “Tale of Plagues and Carnivals” is influential as contemporary social concerns drive the development of an experimental narrative form. [7] Especially, the forms of computational expression envisioned here are informed by works in which subjective meaning can emerge from experimental content structure as in Akira Kurosawa’s famous film Rashomon, which is based on Ryunosuke Akutagawa’s 1922 short story “In a Grove.” [8, 9] The tale of a brutal rape and murder is told and retold from a variety of perspectives: from the vantage point of the victims, the perpetrator, and a by-stander. Meaning is constructed through the concrete knowledge that the event did take place and the shifting, conflicting reports of the event given by the characters. The conflicts between the different points of view are used to create an emergent statement about the human condition and the absence of truth as exemplified in the following dialogue from Rashomon:

Priest: If men don’t trust one another, then the earth becomes a hell.
Commoner: Right. The world’s a kind of hell.
Priest: No! I don’t want to believe that!
Commoner: No one will hear you, no matter how loud you shout. Just think. Which one of these stories do you believe?
Woodcutter: None makes any sense.
Commoner: Don’t worry about it. It isn’t as if men were reasonable.

Figure 1: Kurosawa’s Rashomon is a film where the meaningful difference between multiple narratives adds poignancy.

Like the emergent statement regarding truth in the world from Rashomon, in the hands of a careful author of an expressive computational system, the use of “meaningful difference” between instances of output to allow a global meaning to emerge from repeated execution of the system can be a hallmark of the phantasmal media forms.

This perspective of the expressive potential of computational media bears with it a set of understood risks. It is more intangible, more difficult to define than describing a singular well-known form such as Hollywood cinema, a set of related endeavors like generative art, or even a lofty cultural vision like virtual reality (VR)-based interactive narrative. Rather, it is an approach to thinking about computational media and their future, it is a world view that centralizes culture and content, and is both a prescription and invitation for others to engage this world view. However, this world view is not unfounded, it is based in accounts of cognition, transmedial art traditions, computer science, and cultural theory, synthesizing and reconciling concerns from each. The world view here is both descriptive and prescriptive, it catches glimpses of what computational media can be through existing literature, video games, computational arts, and research, but it also outlines a vision of the future for a powerful new form of expression. It must be a vision that is both coherent and open ended. Finally, this perspective must be open enough so as not to exclude relevant computational media practices.

Rendering this vision of computational expression tangible requires new terminology. The name given to ideal examples of the type of meaning making systems considered in this article is phantasmal media. The term “phantasmal” may summon, for some readers, mental pictures of ghosts, spooks, apparitions, and specters. Yet here it does not refer to those supernatural entities, but rather to the human capacity to construct any other mental images both consciously and unconsciously. The focus is on two related perspectives on the phantasmal. Regarding the first perspective, that phantasmata are conscious mental images, thinkers such as W. J. T. Mitchell have argued that they are closely related to visual images and verbal images as well. [10] Such mental images comprise a range of meaning phenomena. They are imaginative meanings, but crucially are not restricted to language. They can refer to embodied sensations, cultural contexts, and more abstract ideas. Certainly, all of our engagements with media artifacts are accompanied by the mental work of interpretation. Yet, the focus of the concept of phantasmal media is a type of work that often concentrates (primarily through interactive and generative multimedia) on creating narrative and poetic mental imagery to express artistic and critical statements about the world.

see rest of article at C Theory

A Life Of Its Own: Where Will Synthetic Biology Lead Us? by Michael Specter

A Life of Its Own

Where will synthetic biology lead us?

by Michael Specter

The first time Jay Keasling remembers hearing the word “artemisinin,” about a decade ago, he had no idea what it meant. “Not a clue,” Keasling, a professor of biochemical engineering at the University of California at Berkeley, recalled. Although artemisinin has become the world’s most important malaria medicine, Keasling wasn’t an expert on infectious diseases. But he happened to be in the process of creating a new discipline, synthetic biology, which—by combining elements of engineering, chemistry, computer science, and molecular biology—seeks to assemble the biological tools necessary to redesign the living world.

Scientists have been manipulating genes for decades; inserting, deleting, and changing them in various microbes has become a routine function in thousands of labs. Keasling and a rapidly growing number of colleagues around the world have something more radical in mind. By using gene-sequence information and synthetic DNA, they are attempting to reconfigure the metabolic pathways of cells to perform entirely new functions, such as manufacturing chemicals and drugs. Eventually, they intend to construct genes—and new forms of life—from scratch. Keasling and others are putting together a kind of foundry of biological components—BioBricks, as Tom Knight, a senior research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who helped invent the field, has named them. Each BioBrick part, made of standardized pieces of DNA, can be used interchangeably to create and modify living cells.

“When your hard drive dies, you can go to the nearest computer store, buy a new one, and swap it out,” Keasling said. “That’s because it’s a standard part in a machine. The entire electronics industry is based on a plug-and-play mentality. Get a transistor, plug it in, and off you go. What works in one cell phone or laptop should work in another. That is true for almost everything we build: when you go to Home Depot, you don’t think about the thread size on the bolts you buy, because they’re all made to the same standard. Why shouldn’t we use biological parts in the same way?” Keasling and others in the field, who have formed bicoastal clusters in the Bay Area and in Cambridge, Massachusetts, see cells as hardware, and genetic code as the software required to make them run. Synthetic biologists are convinced that, with enough knowledge, they will be able to write programs to control those genetic components, programs that would let them not only alter nature but guide human evolution as well.

No scientific achievement has promised so much, and none has come with greater risks or clearer possibilities for deliberate abuse. The benefits of new technologies—from genetically engineered food to the wonders of pharmaceuticals—often have been oversold. If the tools of synthetic biology succeed, though, they could turn specialized molecules into tiny, self-contained factories, creating cheap drugs, clean fuels, and new organisms to siphon carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

In 2000, Keasling was looking for a chemical compound that could demonstrate the utility of these biological tools. He settled on a diverse class of organic molecules known as isoprenoids, which are responsible for the scents, flavors, and even colors in many plants: eucalyptus, ginger, and cinnamon, for example, as well as the yellow in sunflowers and the red in tomatoes. “One day, a graduate student stopped by and said, ‘Look at this paper that just came out on amorphadiene synthase,’ ” Keasling told me as we sat in his office in Emeryville, across the Bay Bridge from San Francisco. He had recently been named C.E.O. of the Department of Energy’s new Joint BioEnergy Institute, a partnership of three national laboratories and three research universities, led by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. The consortium’s principal goal is to design and manufacture artificial fuels that emit little or no greenhouse gases—one of President Obama’s most frequently cited priorities.

Keasling wasn’t sure what to tell his student. “ ‘Amorphadiene,’ I said. ‘What’s that?’ He told me that it was a precursor to artemisinin, an effective anti-malarial. I had never worked on malaria. So I got to studying and quickly realized that this precursor was in the general class we were planning to investigate. And I thought, Amorphadiene is as good a target as any. Let’s work on that.”

Malaria infects as many as five hundred million of the world’s poorest people every year and kills up to a million, most of whom are children under the age of five. For centuries, the standard treatment was quinine, and then the chemically related compound chloroquine. At ten cents per treatment, chloroquine was cheap and simple to make, and it saved millions of lives. By the early nineties, however, the most virulent malaria parasite—Plasmodium falciparum—had grown largely resistant to the drug. Worse, the second line of treatment, sulfadoxine-pyrimethanine, or SP, also failed widely. Artemisinin, when taken in combination with other drugs, has become the only consistently successful treatment that remains. (Reliance on any single drug increases the chances that the malaria parasite will develop resistance.) Known in the West as Artemisia annua, or sweet wormwood, the herb that contains artemisinic acid grows wild in many places, but supplies vary widely and so does the price.

Depending so heavily on artemisinin, while unavoidable, has serious drawbacks: combination therapy costs between ten and twenty times as much as chloroquine, and, despite increasing assistance from international charities, that is too much money for most Africans or their governments. Artemisinin is not easy to cultivate. Once harvested, the leaves and stems have to be processed rapidly or they will be destroyed by exposure to ultraviolet light. Yields are low, and production is expensive.

Although several thousand Asian and African farmers have begun to plant the herb, the World Health Organization expects that for the next several years the annual demand—as many as five hundred million courses of treatment per year—will far exceed the supply. Should that supply disappear, the impact would be incalculable. “Losing artemisinin would set us back years, if not decades,” Kent Campbell, a former chief of the malaria branch at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and director of the Malaria Control Program at the nonprofit health organization PATH, said. “One can envision any number of theoretical public-health disasters in the world. But this is not theoretical. This is real. Without artemisinin, millions of people could die.”

Keasling realized that the tools of synthetic biology, if properly deployed, could dispense with nature entirely, providing an abundant new source of artemisinin. If each cell became its own factory, churning out the chemical required to make the drug, there would be no need for an elaborate and costly manufacturing process, either. Why not try to produce it from genetic parts by constructing a cell to manufacture amorphadiene? Keasling and his team would have to dismantle several different organisms, then use parts from nearly a dozen of their genes to cobble together a custom-built package of DNA. They would then need to construct a new metabolic pathway, the chemical circuitry that a cell needs to do its job—one that did not exist in the natural world. “We have got to the point in human history where we simply do not have to accept what nature has given us,” he told me.

By 2003, the team reported its first success, publishing a paper in Nature Biotechnology that described how the scientists had created that new pathway, by inserting genes from three organisms into E. coli, one of the world’s most common bacteria. That research helped Keasling secure a $42.6-million grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Keasling had no interest in simply proving that the science worked; he wanted to do it on a scale that the world could use to fight malaria. “Making a few micrograms of artemisinin would have been a neat scientific trick,” he said. “But it doesn’t do anybody in Africa any good if all we can do is a cool experiment in a Berkeley lab. We needed to make it on an industrial scale.” To translate the science into a product, Keasling helped start a new company, Amyris Biotechnologies, to refine the raw organism, then figure out how to produce it more efficiently. Within a decade, Amyris had increased the amount of artemisinic acid that each cell could produce by a factor of one million, bringing down the cost of the drug from as much as ten dollars for a course of treatment to less than a dollar.

Amyris then joined with the Institute for OneWorld Health, in San Francisco, a nonprofit drugmaker, and, in 2008, they signed an agreement with the Paris-based pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Aventis to make the drug, which they hope to have on the market by 2012. The scientific response has been reverential—their artemisinin has been seen as the first bona-fide product of synthetic biology, proof of a principle that we need not rely on the whims of nature to address the world’s most pressing crises. But some people wonder what synthetic artemisinin will mean for the thousands of farmers who have begun to plant the wormwood crop. “What happens to struggling farmers when laboratory vats in California replace farms in Asia and East Africa?” Jim Thomas, a researcher with ETC Group, a technology watchdog based in Canada, asked. Thomas has argued that there has been little discussion of the ethical and cultural implications of altering nature so fundamentally. “Scientists are making strands of DNA that have never existed,” Thomas said. “So there is nothing to compare them to. There are no agreed mechanisms for safety, no policies.”

Keasling, too, believes that the nation needs to consider the potential impact of this technology, but he is baffled by opposition to what should soon become the world’s most reliable source of cheap artemisinin. “Just for a moment, imagine that we replaced artemisinin with a cancer drug,” he said. “And let’s have the entire Western world rely on some farmers in China and Africa who may or may not plant their crop. And let’s have a lot of American children die because of that. Look at the world and tell me we shouldn’t be doing this. It’s not people in Africa who see malaria who say, Whoa, let’s put the brakes on.”

Artemisinin is the first step in what Keasling hopes will become a much larger program. “We ought to be able to make any compound produced by a plant inside a microbe,” he said. “We ought to have all these metabolic pathways. You need this drug: O.K., we pull this piece, this part, and this one off the shelf. You put them into a microbe, and two weeks later out comes your product.”

That’s what Amyris has done in its efforts to develop new fuels. “Artemisinin is a hydrocarbon, and we built a microbial platform to produce it,” Keasling said. “We can remove a few of the genes to take out artemisinin and put in a different gene, to make biofuels.” Amyris, led by John Melo, who spent years as a senior executive at British Petroleum, has already engineered three microbes that can convert sugar to fuel. “We still have lots to learn and lots of problems to solve,” Keasling said. “I am well aware that makes some people anxious, and I understand why. Anything so powerful and new is troubling. But I don’t think the answer to the future is to race into the past.”

For the first four billion years, life on Earth was shaped entirely by nature. Propelled by the forces of selection and chance, the most efficient genes survived, and evolution insured that they would thrive. The long, beautiful Darwinian process of creeping forward by trial and error, struggle and survival, persisted for millennia. Then, about ten thousand years ago, our ancestors began to gather in villages, grow crops, and domesticate animals. That led to stone axes and looms, which in turn led to better crops and a varied food supply that could feed a larger civilization. Breeding of goats and pigs gave way to the fabrication of metal and machines. Throughout it all, new species, built on the power of their collected traits, emerged, while others were cast aside.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, our ability to modify the smallest components of life through molecular biology had endowed humans with a power that even those who exercise it most proficiently cannot claim to fully comprehend. Human mastery over nature has been predicted for centuries—Bacon insisted on it, Blake feared it profoundly. Little more than a hundred years have passed, however, since Gregor Mendel demonstrated that the defining characteristics of a pea plant—its shape, its size, and the color of the seeds, for example—are transmitted from one generation to the next in ways that can be predicted, repeated, and codified.

Since then, the central project of biology has been to break that code and learn to read it—to understand how DNA creates and perpetuates life. The physiologist Jacques Loeb considered artificial synthesis of life the goal of biology. In 1912, Loeb, one of the founders of modern biochemistry, wrote that there was no evidence that “the artificial production of living matter is beyond the possibilities of science,” and declared, “We must either succeed in producing living matter artificially, or we must find the reasons why this is impossible.”

In 1946, the Nobel Prize-winning geneticist Hermann J. Muller attempted to do that. By demonstrating that exposure to X rays can cause mutations in the genes and chromosomes of living cells, he was the first to prove that heredity could be affected by something other than natural selection. He wasn’t entirely sure that people would use that information responsibly, though. “If we did attain to any such knowledge or powers there is no doubt in my mind that we would eventually use them,” Muller said. “Man is a megalomaniac among animals—if he sees mountains he will try to imitate them by pyramids, and if he sees some grand process like evolution, and thinks it would be at all possible for him to be in on that game, he would irreverently have to have his whack at that too.”

The theory of evolution explained that every species on earth is related in some way to every other species; more important, we each carry a record of that history in our body. In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick began to make it possible to understand why, by explaining how DNA arranges itself. The language of just four chemical letters—adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine—comes in the form of enormous chains of nucleotides. When they are joined, the arrangement of their sequences determines how each human differs from all others and from all other living beings.

By the nineteen-seventies, recombinant-DNA technology permitted scientists to cut long, unwieldy molecules of nucleotides into digestible sentences of genetic letters and paste them into other cells. Researchers could suddenly combine the genes of two creatures that would never have been able to mate in nature. As promising as these techniques were, they also made it possible for scientists to transfer viruses—and microbes that cause cancer—from one organism to another. That could create diseases anticipated by no one and for which there would be no natural protection, treatment, or cure. In 1975, scientists from around the world gathered at the Asilomar Conference Center, in Northern California, to discuss the challenges presented by this new technology. They focussed primarily on laboratory and environmental safety, and concluded that the field required little regulation. (There was no real discussion of deliberate abuse—at the time, there didn’t seem to be any need.)

Looking back nearly thirty years later, one of the conference’s organizers, the Nobel laureate Paul Berg, wrote, “This unique conference marked the beginning of an exceptional era for science and for the public discussion of science policy. Its success permitted the then contentious technology of recombinant DNA to emerge and flourish. Now the use of the recombinant DNA technology dominates research in biology. It has altered both the way questions are formulated and the way solutions are sought.”

Decoding sequences of DNA was tedious. It could take a scientist a year to complete a stretch that was ten or twelve base pairs long. (Our DNA consists of three billion such pairs.) By the late nineteen-eighties, automated sequencing had simplified the procedure, and today machines can process that information in seconds. Another new tool—polymerase chain reaction—completed the merger of the digital and biological worlds. Using PCR, a scientist can take a single DNA molecule and copy it many times, making it easier to read and to manipulate. That permits scientists to treat living cells like complex packages of digital information that happen to be arranged in the most elegant possible way.

Using such techniques, researchers have now resurrected the DNA of the Tasmanian tiger, the world’s largest carnivorous marsupial, which has been extinct for more than seventy years. In 2008, scientists from the University of Melbourne and the University of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, in Houston, extracted DNA from tissue that had been preserved in the Museum Victoria, in Melbourne. They took a fragment of DNA that controlled the production of a collagen gene from the tiger and inserted it into a mouse embryo. The DNA switched on just the right gene, and the embryo began to churn out collagen. That marked the first time that any material from an extinct creature other than a virus has functioned inside a living organism.

It will not be the last. A team from Pennsylvania State University, working with hair samples from two woolly mammoths—one of them sixty thousand years old and the other eighteen thousand—has tentatively figured out how to modify that DNA and place it inside an elephant’s egg. The mammoth could then be brought to term in an elephant mother. “There is little doubt that it would be fun to see a living, breathing woolly mammoth—a shaggy, elephantine creature with long curved tusks who reminds us more of a very large, cuddly stuffed animal than of a T. Rex.,” the Times editorialized soon after the discovery was announced. “We’re just not sure that it would be all that much fun for the mammoth.”

The ultimate goal, however, is to create a synthetic organism made solely from chemical parts and blueprints of DNA. In the mid-nineties, Craig Venter, working at the Institute for Genomic Research, and his colleagues Clyde Hutchison and Hamilton Smith began to wonder whether they could pare life to its most basic components and then use those genes to create such an organism. They began modifying the genome of a tiny bacterium called Mycoplasma genitalium, which contained four hundred and eighty-two genes (humans have about twenty-three thousand) and five hundred and eighty thousand letters of genetic code, arranged on one circular chromosome—the smallest genome of any cell that has been grown in laboratory cultures. Venter and his colleagues then removed genes one by one to find a minimal set that could sustain life.

Venter called the experiment the Minimal Genome Project. By the beginning of 2008, his team had pieced together thousands of chemically synthesized fragments of DNA and assembled a new version of the organism. Then, using nothing but chemicals, they produced from scratch the entire genome of Mycoplasma genitalium. “Nothing in our methodology restricts its use to chemically synthesized DNA,” Venter noted in the report of his work, which was published in Science. “It should be possible to assemble any combination of synthetic and natural DNA segments in any desired order.” That may turn out to be one of the most understated asides in the history of science. Next, Venter intends to transplant the artificial chromosome into the walls of another cell and then “boot it up,” thereby making a new form of life that would then be able to replicate its own DNA—the first truly artificial organism. (Activists have already named the creation Synthia.) Venter hopes that Synthia and similar products will serve essentially as vessels that can be modified to carry different packages of genes. One package might produce a specific drug, for example, and another could have genes programmed to digest carbon in the atmosphere.

In 2007, the theoretical physicist Freeman Dyson, after having visited both the Philadelphia Flower Show and the Reptile Show in San Diego, wrote an essay in The New York Review of Books, noting that “every orchid or rose or lizard or snake is the work of a dedicated and skilled breeder. There are thousands of people, amateurs and professionals, who devote their lives to this business.” This, of course, we have been doing in one way or another for millennia. “Now imagine what will happen when the tools of genetic engineering become accessible to these people.”

It is only a matter of time before domesticated biotechnology presents us with what Dyson described as an “explosion of diversity of new living creatures. . . . Designing genomes will be a personal thing, a new art form as creative as painting or sculpture. Few of the new creations will be masterpieces, but a great many will bring joy to their creators and variety to our fauna and flora.”

Biotech games, played by children “down to kindergarten age but played with real eggs and seeds,” could produce entirely new species—as a lark. “These games will be messy and possibly dangerous,” Dyson wrote. “Rules and regulations will be needed to make sure that our kids do not endanger themselves and others. The dangers of biotechnology are real and serious.”

Life on Earth proceeds in an arc—one that began with the big bang, and evolved to the point where a smart teenager is capable of inserting a gene from a cold-water fish into a strawberry, to help protect it from the frost. You don’t have to be a Luddite—or Prince Charles, who, famously, has foreseen a world reduced to gray goo by avaricious and out-of-control technology—to recognize that synthetic biology, if it truly succeeds, will make it possible to supplant the world created by Darwinian evolution with one created by us.

“Many a technology has at some time or another been deemed an affront to God, but perhaps none invites the accusation as directly as synthetic biology,” the editors of Nature—who nonetheless support the technology—wrote in 2007. “For the first time, God has competition.”

“What if we could liberate ourselves from the tyranny of evolution by being able to design our own offspring?” Drew Endy asked, the first time we met in his office at M.I.T., where, until the summer of 2008, he was assistant professor of biological engineering. (That September, he moved to Stanford.) Endy is among the most compelling evangelists of synthetic biology. He is also perhaps its most disturbing, because, although he displays a childlike eagerness to start engineering new creatures, he insists on discussing both the prospects and the dangers of his emerging discipline in nearly any forum he can find. “I am talking about building the stuff that runs most of the living world,” he said. “If this is not a national strategic priority, what possibly could be?”

Endy, who was trained as a civil engineer, spent his youth fabricating worlds out of Lincoln Logs and Legos. Now he would like to build living organisms. Perhaps it was the three well-worn congas sitting in the corner of Endy’s office, or the choppy haircut that looked like something he might have got in a tree house, or the bicycle dangling from his wall—but, when he speaks about putting together new forms of life, it’s hard not to think of that boy and his Legos.

Endy made his first mark on the world of biology by nearly failing the course in high school. “I got a D,” he said. “And I was lucky to get it.” While pursuing an engineering degree at Lehigh University, Endy took a course in molecular genetics. He spent his years in graduate school modelling bacterial viruses, but they are complex, and Endy craved simplicity. That’s when he began to think about putting cellular components together.

Never forgetting the secret of Legos—they work because you can take any single part and attach it to any other—in 2005 Endy and colleagues on both coasts started the BioBricks Foundation, a nonprofit organization formed to register and develop standard parts for assembling DNA. Endy is not the only scientist, or even the only synthetic biologist, to translate a youth spent with blocks into a useful scientific vocabulary. “The notion of pieces fitting together—whether those pieces are integrated circuits, microfluidic components, or molecules—guides much of what I do in the laboratory,” the physicist and synthetic biologist Rob Carlson writes in his new book, “Biology Is Technology: The Promise, Peril, and Business of Engineering Life.” “Some of my best work has come together in my mind’s eye accompanied by what I swear was an audible click.”

The BioBricks registry is a physical repository, but it is also an online catalogue. If you want to construct an organism, or engineer it in new ways, you can go to the site as you would one that sells lumber or industrial pipes. The constituent parts of DNA—promoters, ribosome-binding sites, plasmid backbones, and thousands of other components—are catalogued, explained, and discussed. It is a kind of theoretical Wikipedia of future life forms, with the added benefit of actually providing the parts necessary to build them.

I asked Endy why he thought so many people seem to be repelled by the idea of constructing new forms of life. “Because it’s scary as hell,” he said. “It’s the coolest platform science has ever produced, but the questions it raises are the hardest to answer.” If you can sequence something properly and you possess the information for describing that organism—whether it’s a virus, a dinosaur, or a human being—you will eventually be able to construct an artificial version of it. That gives us an alternate path for propagating living organisms.

The natural path is direct descent from a parent—from one generation to the next. But that process is filled with errors. (In Darwin’s world, of course, a certain number of those mutations are necessary.) Endy said, “If you could complement evolution with a secondary path, decode a genome, take it off- line to the level of information”—in other words, break it down to its specific sequences of DNA the way one would break down the code in a software program—“we can then design whatever we want, and recompile it,” which could permit scientists to prevent many genetic diseases. “At that point, you can make disposable biological systems that don’t have to produce offspring, and you can make much simpler organisms.”

Endy stopped long enough for me to digest the fact that he was talking about building our own children. “If you look at human beings as we are today, one would have to ask how much of our own design is constrained by the fact that we have to be able to reproduce,” he said. In fact, those constraints are significant. In theory, at least, designing our own offspring could make those constraints disappear. Before speaking about that, however, it would be necessary to ask two essential questions: What sorts of risk does that bring into play, and what sorts of opportunity?

The deeply unpleasant risks associated with synthetic biology are not hard to imagine: who would control this technology, who would pay for it, and how much would it cost? Would we all have access or, as in the 1997 film “Gattaca,” which envisaged a world where the most successful children were eugenically selected, would there be genetic haves and have-nots and a new type of discrimination—genoism—to accompany it? Moreover, how safe can it be to manipulate and create life? How likely are accidents that would unleash organisms onto a world that is not prepared for them? And will it be an easy technology for people bent on destruction to acquire? “We are talking about things that have never been done before,” Endy said. “If the society that powered this technology collapses in some way, we would go extinct pretty quickly. You wouldn’t have a chance to revert back to the farm or to the pre-farm. We would just be gone. ”

Those fears have existed since humans began to transplant genes in crops. They are the central reason that opponents of genetically engineered food invoke the precautionary principle, which argues that potential risks must always be given more weight than possible benefits. That is certainly the approach suggested by people like Jim Thomas, of ETC, who describes Endy as “the alpha Synthusiast.” But he also regards Endy as a reflective scientist who doesn’t discount the possible risks of his field. “To his credit, I think he’s the one who’s most engaged with these issues,” Thomas said.

The debate over genetically engineered food has often focussed on theoretical harm rather than on tangible benefits. “If you build a bridge and it falls down, you are not going to be permitted to design bridges ever again,” Endy said. “But that doesn’t mean we should never build a new bridge. There we have accepted the fact that risks are inevitable.” He believes the same should be true of engineering biology.

We also have to think about our society’s basic goals and how this science might help us achieve them. “We have seen an example with artemisinin and malaria,” Endy said. “Maybe we could avoid diseases completely. That might require us to go through a transition in medicine akin to what happened in environmental science and engineering after the end of the Second World War. We had industrial problems, and people said, Hey, the river’s on fire—let’s put it out. And, after the nth time of doing that, people started to say, Maybe we shouldn’t make factories that put shit into the river. So let’s collect all the waste. That turns out to be really expensive, because then we have to dispose of it. Finally, people said, Let’s redesign the factories so that they don’t make that crap.”

Endy pointed out that we are spending trillions of dollars on health care and that preventing disease is obviously more desirable than treating it. “My guess is that our ultimate solution to the crisis of health-care costs will be to redesign ourselves so that we don’t have so many problems to deal with. But note,” he stressed, “you can’t possibly begin to do something like this if you don’t have a value system in place that allows you to map concepts of ethics, beauty, and aesthetics onto our own existence.

“These are powerful choices. Think about what happens when you really can print the genome of your offspring. You could start with your own sequence, of course, and mash it up with your partner, or as many partners as you like. Because computers won’t care. And, if you wanted evolution, you can include random number generators.” That would have the effect of introducing the element of chance into synthetic design.

Although Endy speaks with passion about the biological future, he acknowledges how little scientists know. “It is important to unpack some of the hype and expectation around what you can do with biotechnology as a manufacturing platform,” he said. “We have not scratched the surface. But how far will we be able to go? That question needs to be discussed openly, because you can’t address issues of risk and society unless you have an answer.”

Answers, however, are not yet available. The inventor and materials scientist Saul Griffith has estimated that powering our planet requires between fifteen and eighteen terawatts of energy. How much of that could we manufacture with the tools of synthetic biology? Estimates range between five and ninety terawatts. “If it turns out to be the lower figure, we are screwed,” Endy said. “Because why would we take this risk if we cannot create much energy? But, if it’s the top figure, then we are talking about producing five times the energy we need on this planet and doing it in an environmentally benign way. The benefits in relation to the risks of using this new technology would be unquestioned. But I don’t know what the number will be, and I don’t think anybody can know at this point. At a minimum, then, we ought to acknowledge that we are in the process of figuring that out and the answers won’t be easy to provide.

“It’s very hard for me to have a conversation about these issues, because people adopt incredibly defensive postures,” Endy continued. “The scientists on one side and civil-society organizations on the other. And, to be fair to those groups, science has often proceeded by skipping the dialogue. But some environmental groups will say, Let’s not permit any of this work to get out of a laboratory until we are sure it is all safe. And as a practical matter that is not the way science works. We can’t come back decades later with an answer. We need to develop solutions by doing them. The potential is great enough, I believe, to convince people it’s worth the risk.”

I wondered how much of this was science fiction. Endy stood up. “Can I show you something?” he asked, as he walked over to a bookshelf and grabbed four gray bottles. Each one contained about half a cup of sugar, and each had a letter on it: A, T, C, or G, for the four nucleotides in our DNA. “You can buy jars of these chemicals that are derived from sugarcane,” he said. “And they end up being the four bases of DNA in a form that can be readily assembled. You hook the bottles up to a machine, and into the machine comes information from a computer, a sequence of DNA—like T-A-A-T-A-G-C-A-A. You program in whatever you want to build, and that machine will stitch the genetic material together from scratch. This is the recipe: you take information and the raw chemicals and compile genetic material. Just sit down at your laptop and type the letters and out comes your organism.”

We don’t have machines that can turn those sugars into entire genomes yet. Endy shrugged. “But I don’t see any physical reason why we won’t,” he said. “It’s a question of money. If somebody wants to pay for it, then it will get done.” He looked at his watch, apologized, and said, “I’m sorry, we will have to continue this discussion another day, because I have an appointment with some people from the Department of Homeland Security.”

I was a little surprised. “They are asking the same questions as you,” he said. “They want to know how far is this really going to go.”

Scientists skipped a step at the birth of biotechnology, thirty-five years ago, moving immediately to products without first focussing on the tools required to make them. Using standard biological parts, a synthetic biologist or biological engineer can already, to some extent, program living organisms in the same way a computer scientist can program a computer. However, genes work together in ways that are staggeringly complex; proteins produced by one will counteract—or enhance—those made by another. We are far from the point where scientists might yank a few genes off the shelf, mix them together, and produce a variety of products. But the registry is growing rapidly—and so is the knowledge needed to drive the field forward.

Research in Endy’s Stanford lab has been largely animated by his fascination with switches that turn genes on and off. He and his students are attempting to create genetically encoded memory systems, and his current goal is to construct a cell that can count to two hundred and fifty-six—a number derived from the mathematics of Basic computer code. Solving the practical challenges will not be easy, since cells that count will need to send reliable signals when they divide and remember that they did.

“If the cells in our bodies had a little memory, think what we could do,” Endy said the next time we talked. I wasn’t quite sure what he meant. “You have memory in your phone,” he explained. “Think of all the information it allows you to store. The phone and the technology on which it is based do not function inside cells. But if we could count to two hundred, using a system that was based on proteins and DNA and RNA—well, now, all of a sudden we would have a tool that gives us access to computing and memory that we just don’t have.

“Do you know how we study aging?” Endy continued. “The tools we use today are almost akin to cutting a tree in half and counting the rings. But if the cells had a memory we could count properly. Every time a cell divides, just move the counter by one. Maybe that will let me see them changing with a precision nobody can have today. Then I could give people controllers to start retooling those cells. Or we could say, Wow, this cell has divided two hundred times, it’s obviously lost control of itself and become cancer. Kill it. That lets us think about new therapies for all kinds of diseases.”

Synthetic biology is changing so rapidly that predictions seem pointless. Even that fact presents people like Endy with a new kind of problem. “Wayne Gretzky once said, ‘I skate to where the puck is going to be.’ That’s what you do to become a great hockey player,” Endy told me. “But where do you skate when the puck is accelerating at the speed of a rocket, when the trajectory is impossible to follow? Whom do you hire and what do we ask them to do? Because what preoccupies our finest minds today will be a seventh-grade science project in five years. Or three years.

“We are surfing an exponential now, and, even for people who pay attention, surfing an exponential is a really tricky thing to do. And when the exponential you are surfing has the capacity to impact the world in such a fundamental way, in ways we have never before considered, how do you even talk about that? ”

For decades, people have invoked Moore’s law: the number of transistors that could fit onto a silicon chip would double every two years, and so would the power of computers. When the I.B.M. 360 computer was released, in 1964, the top model came with eight megabytes of main memory, and cost more than two million dollars. Today, cell phones with a thousand times the memory of that computer can be bought for about a hundred dollars.

In 2001, Rob Carlson, then a research fellow at the Molecular Sciences Institute, in Berkeley, decided to examine a similar phenomenon: the speed at which the capacity to synthesize DNA was growing. He produced what has come to be known as the Carlson curve, and it shows a rate that mirrors Moore’s law—and has even begun to exceed it. The automated DNA synthesizers used in thousands of labs cost a hundred thousand dollars a decade ago. Now they cost less than ten thousand dollars, and, most days, at least a dozen used synthesizers are for sale on eBay—for less than a thousand dollars.

Between 1977, when Frederick Sanger published the first paper on automatic DNA sequencing, and 1995, when the Institute for Genomic Research reported the first bacterial-genome sequence, the field moved slowly. It took the next six years to complete the first draft of the immeasurably more complex human genome, and six years after that, in 2007, scientists from around the world began mapping the full genomes of more than a thousand people. The Harvard geneticist George Church’s Personal Genome Project now plans to sequence more than a hundred thousand.

In 2003, when Endy was still at M.I.T., he and his colleagues Tom Knight, Randy Rettberg, and Gerald Sussman founded iGEM—the International Genetically Engineered Machine competition—whose purpose is to promote the building of biological systems from standard parts. In 2006, a team of Endy’s undergraduate students used BioBrick parts to genetically reprogram E. coli (which normally smells awful) to smell like wintergreen while it grows and like bananas when it is finished growing. They named their project Eau d’E Coli. By 2008, with more than a thousand students from twenty-one countries participating, the winning team—a group from Slovenia—used biological parts that it had designed to create a vaccine for the stomach bug Helicobacter pylori, which causes ulcers. There are no such working vaccines for humans. So far, the team has tested its creation on mice, with promising results.

This is open-source biology, where intellectual property is shared. What’s available to idealistic students, of course, would also be available to terrorists. Any number of blogs offer advice about everything from how to preserve proteins to the best methods for desalting DNA. Openness like that can be frightening, and there have been calls for tighter control of the technology. Carlson, among many others, believes that strict regulations are unlikely to succeed. Several years ago, with very few tools other than a credit card, he opened his own biotechnology company, Biodesic, in the garage of his Seattle home—a biological version of the do-it-yourself movement that gave birth to so many computer companies, including Apple.

The product that he developed enables the identification of proteins using DNA technology. “It’s not complex,” Carlson told me, “but I wanted to see what I could accomplish using mail order and synthesis.” A great deal, it turned out. Carlson designed the molecule on his laptop, then sent the sequence to a company that synthesizes DNA. Most of the instruments could be bought on eBay (or, occasionally, on LabX, a more specialized site for scientific equipment). All you need is an Internet connection.

“Strict regulation doesn’t accomplish its goals,” Carlson said. “It’s not an exact analogy, but look at Prohibition. What happened when government restricted the production and sale of alcohol? Crime rose dramatically. It became organized and powerful. Legitimate manufacturers could not sell alcohol, but it was easy to make in a garage—or a warehouse.”

By 2002, the U.S. government intensified its effort to curtail the sale and production of methamphetamine. Previously, the drug had been manufactured in many mom-and-pop labs throughout the country. Today, production has been professionalized and centralized, and the Drug Enforcement Administration says that less is known about methamphetamine production than before. “The black market is getting blacker,” Carlson said. “Crystal-meth use is still rising, and all this despite restrictions.” Strict control would not necessarily insure the same fate for synthetic biology, but it might.

Bill Joy, a founder of Sun Microsystems, has frequently called for restrictions on the use of technology. “It is even possible that self-replication may be more fundamental than we thought, and hence harder—or even impossible—to control,” he wrote in an essay for Wired called “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us.” “The only realistic alternative I see is relinquishment: to limit development of the technologies that are too dangerous, by limiting our pursuit of certain kinds of knowledge.”

Still, censoring the pursuit of knowledge has never really worked, in part because there are no parameters for society to decide who should have information and who should not. The opposite approach might give us better results: accelerate the development of technology and open it to more people and educate them to its purpose. Otherwise, if Carlson’s methamphetamine analogy proves accurate, power would flow directly into the hands of the people least likely to use it wisely.

For synthetic biology to accomplish any of its goals, we will also need an education system that encourages skepticism and the study of science. In 2007, students in Singapore, Japan, China, and Hong Kong (which was counted independently) all performed better on an international science exam than American students. The U.S. scores have remained essentially stagnant since 1995, the first year the exam was administered. Adults are even less scientifically literate. Early in 2009, the results of a California Academy of Sciences poll (conducted throughout the nation) revealed that only fifty-three per cent of American adults know how long it takes for the Earth to revolve around the sun, and a slightly larger number—fifty-nine per cent—are aware that dinosaurs and humans never lived at the same time.

Synthetic biologists will have to overcome this ignorance. Optimism prevails only when people are engaged and excited. Why should we bother? Not just to make E. coli smell like chewing gum or fish glow in vibrant colors. The planet is in danger, and nature needs help.

The hydrocarbons we burn for fuel are believed to be nothing more than concentrated sunlight that has been collected by leaves and trees. Organic matter rots, bacteria break it down, and it moves underground, where, after millions of years of pressure, it turns into oil and coal. At that point, we dig it up—at huge expense and with disastrous environmental consequences. Across the globe, on land and sea, we sink wells and lay pipe to ferry our energy to giant refineries. That has been the industrial model of development, and it worked for nearly two centuries. It won’t work any longer.

The industrial age is drawing to a close, eventually to be replaced by an era of biological engineering. That won’t happen easily (or quickly), and it will never solve every problem we expect it to solve. But what worked for artemisinin can work for many of the products our species will need to survive. “We are going to start doing the same thing that we do with our pets, with bacteria,” the genomic futurist Juan Enriquez has said, describing our transition from a world that relied on machines to one that relies on biology. “A house pet is a domesticated parasite,” he noted. “ It is evolved to have an interaction with human beings. Same thing with corn”—a crop that didn’t exist until we created it. “Same thing is going to start happening with energy,” he went on. “We are going to start domesticating bacteria to process stuff inside enclosed reactors to produce energy in a far more clean and efficient manner. This is just the beginning stage of being able to program life.”

Technology in a Global World by Andrew Feenberg

< src="http://www.sciy.org/success.jpg"> <><>< size=2>(Photo Courtesy: Andrew Feenberg)<>
<1>< href="http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/techglobe.htm">Technology in a Global World<> <1>
<>in <>Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology<>, edited by Robert Figueroa and Sandra Harding (New York: Routledge Publishing Co., 2003). <>
<><>< href="http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/feenberg/">Andrew Feenberg<><> <>
<>Japan has always been the test case for the universality of Western culture. The Japanese were the first non-Western people to modernize successfully. They built a powerful economy based on Western science and technology. Yet their society remains significantly different from the Western models it imitates. These differences are not merely superficial vestiges of a dying tradition, but show up in the very structure of Japanese science and technology. Is Japan different enough to qualify as an “alternative modernity”? Does it refute or confirm the claims of universalism? These are the questions Japan raises for us today. An early response to these questions comes from Japan itself. In the 1930s the founder of modern Japanese philosophy, Kitaro Nishida, proposed an innovative theory of multi-cultural modernity. In this chapter, I will consider the Japanese case and introduce Nishida's remarkable theory, one of the first attempts to grasp the philosophical implications of globalization. <>
<>I <>
<>The department store was introduced into Japan in late Meiji by the Mitsui family. They called their store Mitsukoshi. The store was successful and expanded until it was as large as the Western department stores it imitated.1 <>
<>However, in one respect the Japanese store was quite different from its models: Mitsukoshi had tatami mat floors. This made for some unique problems. Japanese consumers did not usually remove their shoes to enter the small traditional stores in which they were accustomed to shop. Instead, they walked on paving or platforms near the entrance and faced counters behind which salesmen standing on tatami mats hawked their wares. One can still find a few such stores today. Although Mitsukoshi’s tatami mat floors were also unsuitable for shoes, customers had to enter the store to shop. And enter they did, sometimes many thousands each day. <>
<>At the entrance a check room took charge of customers’ shoes and handed them slippers to use on the fragile floors of the store. As the number of customers grew so did the strain on this system. One day 500 shoes were misplaced and the historian of Tokyo, Edward Seidensticker, speculates that this disaster may have slowed acceptance of Western methods of distribution until after the Earthquake when wooden floors were finally introduced. <>
<>This story tells us something we should know by now about technology: it is not merely a means to an end, a neutral tool, but reflects culture, ideology, politics. In this case, two very different nationally specific techniques of flooring came into conflict as an apparently unrelated change occurred in shopping habits. Neither wooden nor tatami mat floors can be considered technically superior, but each does have implications for the understanding of “inside” and “outside” in every area of social life, including, of course, shopping. It eventually became clear at Mitsukoshi that Western methods of distribution required Western floors. <>
<>The conflict between these flooring techniques has long since been resolved in favor of Western methods in most public spaces in Japan except traditional restaurants, inns, and temples where one still removes ones shoes before entering. Nevertheless, the tatami mat conserves a powerful symbolic charge for the Japanese and many homes have both “washitsu” — Japanese style rooms, and “yoshitsu” — Western style rooms. This duality has come to seem emblematic of Japan’s cultural eclecticism. Globalization there has largely meant conserving aspects of traditional Japanese technique, arts and crafts, and customs alongside an ever growing mass of Western equivalents. At first it seemed that a Western branch had been grafted onto the Japanese tree. Today, one may well ask if it is not a Japanese branch surviving precariously on a tree imported from the West. <>
<>This story illustrates the idea of nationally specific branching development. Branching is a general feature of social and cultural development. Ideas, designs, and customs circulate easily, even among primitive societies, but they are realized in quite different ways as they travel. Although technical development is constrained to some extent by a causal logic, design in this domain too is underdetermined and a variety of possibilities are explored at the inception of any given line of development. Each design corresponds to the interests or vision of a different group of actors. In some cases the differences are quite considerable and several competing designs coexist for an extended period. In modern times, however, the market, political regulations, or corporate dominance dictate a decision for one or another design. Once the decision is consolidated, the winning branch is black boxed and placed beyond controversy and question. <>
<>It is precisely this last step which did not take place in the relations between national branches of design until quite recently. Poor communications and transport meant that national branches could coexist for centuries, even millennia, without much awareness of each other and without any possibility of decisive victory for one or another design. Globalization is the process of intensified interaction between national branches, leading to conflicts and decisions such as the one illustrated in the Mitsukoshi story. <>
<>However, conflict and decision is not the only consequence of a globalized world. Here is a second story that illustrates a different pattern I call “layered” development.2 <>
<>Shortly after the opening of Japan to the world, the Satsuma domain hired a British band master named William Fenton to train the first Japanese military band. Fenton noticed the lack of a Japanese national anthem and set about creating one. He identified a poem, which is still sung as the lyrics of the Japanese national anthem, and set it to music. This unofficial anthem had its debut in 1870, but it was nearly unsingable and quickly fell into disuse. <>
<>The need for an anthem was especially pressing in the Navy. Japanese officers were embarrassed by their inability to sing their own anthem at flag ceremonies at sea. The Navy therefore invited court musicians to train the Navy band in traditional Japanese music in hopes that among the performers a composer would be found. But the process was too slow and the Navy finally asked the court musicians themselves to supply it with suitable compositions. The results were again disappointing. The court musicians came up with a piece in a traditional mode arranged for performance by a traditional ensemble, hardly the sort of thing one would have ready and waiting in a stateroom on a Navy ship! <>
<>Around this time, Fenton was replaced by a German bandmaster named Franz Eckert. Herr Eckert rose to the occasion. He arranged the anthem supplied by the court for a Western band, making suitable modifications for playability. In 1880, Japan finally had its current national anthem. <>
<>This story is quite different from the Mitsukoshi one. Like flooring, music had developed in Japan and the West along different branches, however, the Japanese national anthem is neither Japanese nor Western but draws on both traditions. The relations between traditions in this case are quite complex. The very idea of a national anthem is Western. An anthem is a self-affirmation that implies the existence of others before whom the national self is affirmed. But there were no others for Japan during its long 250 years of isolation in a world unto itself. With the opening of the country, self-affirmation became an issue and an anthem was needed. But how could the anthem affirm Japan unless it reflected Japanese musical style? Hence the composition had to be Japanese. This was easier said than done since the anthem was to be performed by Western instruments at Western inspired ceremonies. Thus an original Japanese compositional layer had to be overlaid with a further Western layer in the final stage. <>
<>Here we do not have rooms of different styles side by side, but a true synthesis. The merging of traditions takes place in a layering process that is characteristic also of many types of social, cultural, and technological development. Often several branches can be combined by layering the demands of different actors over a single basic design. In the process what appeared to be conflicting conceptions turn out to be reconcilable after all. The anthem sounds Japanese played by a brass band. Similarly, modern Japanese politics, literature, painting, architecture, and philosophy emerged in Meiji out of a synthesis of native and Western techniques and visions. <>
<>Layering should not be conceived on the model of political compromise, although it does build alliances between groups with initially different or even hostile positions. Political compromise involves trade-offs in which each party gives up something to get something. In technological development, as in musical composition, indeed, wherever creative activities have a technical basis of some sort, alliances do not always require trade-offs. Ideally, clever innovations get around obstacles to combining functions and the layered product is better at everything it does, not compromised in its efficiency by trying to do too much. This is what the French philosopher of technology, Gilbert Simondon, calls “concretization.”3 It is this layering process which gives rise to global technology, combining many national achievements in a single fund of world invention. <>
<>II <>
<>Branching and layering are two fundamental developmental patterns. Their relations change as globalization proceeds. Elsewhere I have described two styles of design corresponding to different stages in this process. What I call “mediation centered design” characterizes the earlier stage, in which each nation develops its technology relatively independently of the others.4 Of course, ideas do travel, but the overwhelming weight of particular national traditions insures that they will be incorporated into devices differently in different contexts. These differences are owing in large part to nationally specific ethical and aesthetic mediations that shape design. Thus each design “expresses” the national background against which it develops. <>
<>Globalization imposes a very different pattern which I call “system centered design.”5 The globalizing economy develops around an international capital goods market on which each nation finds the elements it requires to construct the technologies it needs. This market moves building blocks such as gears, axles, electric wires, computer chips, and so on. These can be assembled in many different patterns.6 <>
<>The capital goods market is such a tremendous resource that once interchange between nations intensifies, no one attempts to bypass it. But when design is based on the assembly of prefabricated parts, it can no longer so easily accommodate different national cultures. Instead of expressing a cultural context, products tend more and more to be designed to fit harmoniously into the pre-existing system of parts and devices available on the capital goods market. Accommodation to national culture still occurs, of course, but it shares the field with a systematizing imperative that knows no national boundaries. Meanwhile, national culture expresses itself indirectly, in the contribution it makes to innovation on the capital goods markets themselves. I would like to develop these two consequences of globalization. <>
<>The shift toward system centered design has implications for the role of valuative mediations in the structure of modern, globalized technology. Traditional technologies generally fit well together. Japanese tatami mat floors, traditional architecture, eating and sleeping habits, shoes, all are of a piece. As such, they express a definite choice of way of life, a valuative framework rooted in Japanese culture. However, on purely technical terms, the links between the artifacts involved are relatively loose. It is true that houses need entryways in which to leave shoes, that futons must be spread on tatami mats, and so on, but adapting each of these artifacts to the others is not very constraining. The wide margin for choice makes it easy for cultural mediations to install themselves in technical design. Indeed, traditional crafts do not distinguish clearly between cultural and technical constraints. There is a “right way” to make things, and it conforms to both. <>
<>The globalization of technology changes all this. When design is system based, it must work with very tightly coupled systems of technical elements. Electric wires and sockets cannot be designed independently of the appliances that will use the electricity. Wheels, gears, pulleys, and so on come in sizes and types fixed by decisions made in their place of origin. A device using them must accommodate the results of those decisions. <>
<>System centered design thus imposes many constraints at an early stage in the design process, constraints that originate in the core countries of the world system. These constraints are imposed on peripheral nations participating in the globalizing process without regard for their national cultures. Furthermore, the very availability of certain types of capital goods reflects the national technological evolution and priorities of the core countries, not those of later recipients. Thus the effect of globalization is to push cultural constraints to the side, if not to eliminate them altogether. The products that result appear to be culturally “neutral” at first sight, although in fact they still embody cultural assumptions which become evident with wide use in peripheral contexts. <>
<>The computer is an obvious example. For us Westerners, the keyboard appears to be technically neutral. But had computers been invented and developed first in Japan, or any other country with an ideographic language, it is unlikely that keyboards would have been selected as an input device for a very long time. Just as the FAX machine prospered first in Japan, so computers would probably have been designed early with graphical or voice inputs of some sort. The arrival of Western computers in Japan was an alienating encounter with the West, a challenge to the national language. Considerable cleverness had to be invested in domesticating the keyboard to Japanese usages. <>
<>These observations indicate the weakness of national culture in a globalizing technological system, however, there is another side to the story. Countries far from the core, such as Japan was until quite recently, may not contribute as much as core countries, but they do contribute something. And these contributions will be marked by their national cultural background. In the case of Japan, the magnitude of these contributions has grown to the point where they are a significant factor for the original core countries. Global technology contains a Japanese layer and so exhibits a true globalizing pattern, not simply core/periphery relations of dependence. <>
<>It is difficult to give examples of this feedback from national culture to capital goods’ markets. A cultural impulse realized technically looks just like any other technical artifact. Still, a cultural hermeneutics ought to be able to find the cultural traces in the technical domain. <>
<>Perhaps miniaturization could be cited as a specific contribution reflecting Japanese culture. At least this is the argument of O-Young Lee, whose book Smaller Is Better: Japan’s Mastery of the Miniature, argues that the triumph of Japanese microelectronics is rooted in age old cultural impulses.7 The impulse to miniaturize evident in bonzai, haiku poetry, and other aspects of Japanese culture, appears in technical artifacts too. Lee cites the early case of the folding fan. Flat fans invented in China arrived in Japan very early. The folding fan, which seems to have been invented in Japan in the middle ages, was exported from there to China, inaugurating a familiar pattern. The basic technology of the transistor radio and the videotape recorder both came from the US, but the miniaturization of the devices, which was essential to their commercial success, took place in Japan, from which they are exported back to the US. <>
<>Of course, once capital goods markets are flooded with miniaturized components, every country in the world can make small products without cultural afterthoughts. But if Lee is right, the origin of this trend would lie in a specific national culture. In a sense, aspects of that culture are communicated worldwide through the technical specifications of its products. <>
<>III <>
<>In the first part of this paper I have illustrated a thesis about the globalization of technology with stories about Japan. In the remainder of this paper I will try to draw out the implications of this thesis for the major contribution of Japanese philosophy to the understanding of globalization, Nishida’s pre-War theory of the global world. <>
<>The context of Nishida’s argument was the growing self-assertion of Japan in the early 20th Century. For many Japanese this was primarily a matter of national expansion but for intellectuals like Nishida the stakes were still higher, world cultural leadership. These two aspects of Japan’s economic and military rise were connected but not identical. On the one hand, Japan had become powerful enough to conquer its neighbors. On the other hand, this very fact showed that Japan, an Asian nation, could participate fully in cultural modernity, assimilating Western achievements and turning them to its own purpose. Nishida argued on this basis that Asia could finally take its place in the modern world as the cultural equal, or even superior, of the West.8 <>
<>The link between Nishida’s position and Japanese imperialism is thus complex and controversial. I have already contributed to that debate in several articles and will return briefly to this topic in the conclusion of this paper.9 However, my main interest here lies elsewhere, in the parallel I find between the structure of technological globalization as I have explained it above and Nishida’s conception of a “global world (<>sekaiteki sekai<>).”10 I will show that the contrast between branching and layering underlies this conception, although Nishida misses the technological implications of his approach. <>
<>Nishida argues that until modern times, the world had what he calls a “horizontal” structure, that is it consisted of nations lying side by side on a globe that separated rather than united them. The concept of “world” was necessarily “abstract” during the long period that preceded the modern age. By this Nishida means that “world” was a concept only, not an active force in the lives of nations. This condition was unusually prolonged in the case of Japan, which remained disconnected from growing world commerce and communication until the 1860s. <>
<>International commerce transformed this horizontal world by bringing all the nations into intense contact with each other. The result was the emergence of what Nishida calls a “vertical” world, a world in which nations struggle for pre-eminence. Every nation now participates actively in the life of its neighbors, and even quite remote nations, through war, trade, and the movement of people and ideas. But there is no harmonious fusion here but rather a hardening of identities that leads ultimately to war. In this context, nationalism emerges as a survival response to the threat of foreign domination. <>
<>Nishida has several other terminologies for this shift that sound rather odd to our contemporary ears but which are ultimately suggestive. Perhaps the best way to understand his approach is as a dialectic of conceptual frameworks, each one inadequate by itself to describe social reality, but able to do so all together in a mutually correcting system of categories. The complexity of Nishida’s argument is supposed, therefore, to correspond to the actual difficulty of thinking global sociality. <>
<>Nishida develops the contrast of horizontal and vertical world further in terms of the relation of the “many” to the “one” in space and time. The many nations dispersed in space enter into interaction in the modern world. Interaction in history implies more than the mechanical contact of externally related things. Each nation must “express” itself in the world in the sense of enacting the meanings carried in its culture. This can lead to conflict as nations attempt to impose their perspective on all the others. But interaction also requires commonality. Two completely alien entities cannot interact. At each stage in modern history a common framework is supplied by a dominant nation that defines itself as a unifying “world” for all the others. The unification involves the imposition of a general form on the struggle of the particular nations. Nishida gives the example of Great Britain’s imposition of the world market on the 19th Century (Nishida 1991, 24). The many conflicting nations are thus bound together at a deeper level in one world. <>
<>The passage from the many to the one is also reflected in the relations of space and time. The dispersal of the nations in space, their “manyness,” is complemented by the simultaneity of their co-existence in a unifying temporal dimension. The struggles of the nations have an outcome which is this unity. Thus in modern times, geography is subordinated to history. The unifying nation represents time for this world and as such loses itself in the process of unification it imposes. Britain is absorbed into the world market it creates and becomes the scene on which the world economy operates. The particularity of the nation, Britain, is transcended by the universal order it institutes and for which it stands. <>
<>The mechanical and the organic form yet another terminological couple Nishida explores. The mechanical world is made of externally related things dispersed in space. Mechanically related things can properly be called individual. Their multiplicity forms an “individual many” (<>kobutsuteki ta<>) (Nishida 1991, 29-31). The organic world consists of wholes oriented toward a telos in time. The whole is thus a subject of action, a “holistic one” (<>zentaiteki ichi<>) (Nishida 1991, 37-38). Society is not adequately described as mechanical because it forms a whole, and yet it is not organic because its members are fully independent individuals, not a herd. The undecidability of the mechanical and the organic gestures toward the originality of the social world, which cannot be represented by either concept because it embraces both. <>
<>Nishida introduces the concept of “place” (<>basho<>) in a final attempt to conceptualize this “self-contradictory” globalized world. Place in Nishida’s technical sense of the term is the “third” element or medium “in” which interacting agents meet. Had they nothing in common, they could not meet and interact. But what is it that holds them together? A separate entity would itself require a place to interact with the actors. The <>basho<> is thus not something external to the interaction but a structure of the interaction itself. This structure arises as each actor “negates itself” to become the “world” for the other, i.e. the place of the interaction (Nishida 1991, 30). <>
<>It is not easy to interpret this obscure formulation. It seems to mean that in acting, the self becomes an object for the other; it is encountered in the other’s path. But the self is not just any object, but the environment to which the other must react in asserting itself as subject. As the other reacts, it defines itself anew and so its identity depends on the action of the self. But the determination of the other by the self is only half the cycle; the action of the other has an equivalent impact on the self. Interaction is the endless switching of these roles, a circulation of self-transforming realizations (<>jikaku<>) achieved through contact with an other self .12 <>
<>Nishida has two ways of talking about the role of place in the modern world. Sometimes he writes as though the globalizing nation serves as the “place” of interaction for the other nations of the world, the scene of interaction. This place can be imposed by domination or freely consented as cultural supremacy, the difference Nishida assumes between England in the past and Japan in the future (Nishida 1991, 99, 77; Nishida 1965c, 373, 349). At other times, he claims that the modern age is about the emergence of global place in the form of a world culture of national encounter.13 Nishida does not see any contradiction between these two discourses because he assumes that Japanese culture is a kind of “emptiness” capable of welcoming all cultures. But as we will see, this ambiguity turns out to be quite important. <>
<>On the basis of this analysis, Nishida asserts the importance of all modern cultures. Western dominance is only a passing phase, about to give way to an age of Asian self-assertion. The destiny of the human race is to fruitfully combine Western and Eastern culture in a “contradictory self-identity.” This concept refers to a synthesis of (national) individuality and (global) totality in which the emerging world culture is supposed to consist. <>
<>There is a sense in which this global world constitutes a single being which changes through an inner dynamic. Thus the world “determines itself.” But the identities of the particular nations are not lost in this unified object. The resulting world culture will not replace national cultures. Something more subtle is involved. Nishida writes, “A true world culture will be formed only by various cultures preserving their own respective viewpoints, but simultaneously developing themselves through global mediation” (Nishida 1970, 254). World culture is a pure form, a “place” or field of interaction, and not a particularistic alternative to existing national cultures. They persist and are a continuing source of change and progress. The process of self-determination is thus free in the sense of being internally creative; it is not determined by extrinsic forces or atemporal laws. There is nothing “outside” the world that could influence or control it. Even the laws of natural science must be located inside the world as particular historically conditioned acts of thought (Nishida 1991, 36). <>
<>Here is a passage in which Nishida describes the global world as he envisages it: “Every nation/people is established on a historical foundation and possesses a world-historical mission, thereby having a historical life of its own. For nations/peoples to form a global world through self-realization and self-transcendence, each must first of all form a particular world in accordance with its own regional tradition. These particular worlds, each based on a historical foundation, unite to form a global world. Each nation/people lives its own unique historical life and at the same time joins in a united global world through carrying out a world historical mission” (Nishida 1965a, 428; Arisaka 1996, 101-102). <>
<>However, this cosmopolitan argument culminates strangely in the claim that Japan is the center of the unifying tendency of global culture. Just as Britain unified the world through the world market in the spirit of utilitarian individualism, leading to endless competition and strife, so Japan will unify the world around its uniquely accommodating spiritual culture, leading to an age of peace. Japan will be the “place” on which the world will move beyond the limits of the West to become truly global. Japan can lead the world spiritually because its unique culture corresponds to the actual structure of the global world: “It is in discovering the very principles of the self-formation of the contradictory self-identical world at the heart of our historical development that we should offer our contribution to the world. This comes down to practicing the Imperial Way and is the true meaning of ‘eight corners under one roof’” (<>hakkoo ichiu<>) (Nishida 1991, 70). <>
<>The vagueness of this conclusion is disturbing. Nishida explicitly condemns imperialism and argues that Japan cannot be the place of world unity if it acts as a “subject” in conflict with other nations. Instead, it must “negate itself” and become the “world” for all other nations (Nishida, 1991, 70, 77). Yet, he also recognizes the fatal inevitability of world conflict and seems to accept Japan’s role within that context, as in this statement from his speech to the emperor: “When diverse peoples enter into such a world historical (<>sekaishiteki<>) relation, there may be conflicts among them such as we see today, but this is only natural. The most world historical (<>sekaishiteki<>) nation must then serve as a center to stabilize this turbulent period.”14 And, as we see above, he employs ultra-nationalist slogans with abandon, apparently in the hope of being able to instill new meaning into them. The least that one can say is that his efforts were naive and lent backhanded support to an imperialistic system that conflicted fundamentally with his own philosophical premises. <>
<>But just as one can seriously question the depth of the connection between Nazism and Heidegger’s thought, if not his actions, similar doubts arise around Nishida’s nationalism. There is no clear logical connection between his claims about Japan and his conception of global unity. At least the British gave the world the world market around which to unify. What does Japan have to offer? What mediation does it provide that qualifies it as the center of the new age? <>
<>So far as I can tell, Nishida was not bothered by this question, although he should have been. He claims that Japan is the archetype of global unity through its ability to assimilate both Eastern and Western culture, but while this is indeed admirable, it is not clear how it qualifies Japan as the place of global unity. For that one would think that Japan would have to do something more positive on the world stage than simply to exist as a model. Nishida does announce the world historical significance of the liberation of Asia from Western imperialism. Yet this is certainly not the equivalent of the world market as a unifying force. In the end this question remains unanswered.15 <>
<>IV <>
<>Despite these problems, I do not think this should be the last word on Nishida’s theory of globalization. Once its nationalistic excrescence is removed, the structure of the theory is truly interesting. Nishida’s basic claim is that the world has moved from a horizontal to a vertical structure, from indifferent co-existence in space to mutual involvement in time in a conflictual but creative process of global unification. The emerging unity does not efface national differences but incorporates them into an evolving world culture that is best defined as a “place” of encounter and dialogue. An common underlying framework makes possible the communication of nations amidst their conflicts. <>
<>This claim precisely parallels the analysis of the passage from branching to layered development presented in the first part of this paper. The various branches of technology in a spatially dispersed world finally meet in the global world of modern times. There they assert themselves and come into conflict, but there they also inform each other with ideas and inventions drawn from diverse national traditions. The outcome, global technology, forms a sort of “place” in Nishida’s sense, a scene on which the encounter between nations proceeds with global cultural consequences, but without eliminating the originality and difference of the constitutive national cultures. The layering process in which each culture expresses itself while at the same time contributing to a single fund of invention is thus precisely congruent with Nishida’s conception of world culture. <>
<>Nishida comes close to making some such connection. He understands that historical action is inextricably intertwined with technical creation. He explains that “Culture includes technique” (Nishida 1991, 61). Technique is an expression of a people’s spirit as it interacts with the environment, and through that interaction forms itself (Nishida 1991, 57; Nishida 1965c, 328). “We create things through technique and in creating them we create ourselves” (Nishida 1991, 33, Nishida 1965c, 297). Although Nishida did not do so, one can build on these observations and carry them a step further by relating this social conception of technique to his notion of global cultural interaction in the 20th Century. <>
<>Nishida himself was witness to this process as it unfolded in Japan. He was surrounded by rapid social, cultural, and technological change, which he welcomed, and which he believed could become the medium for the expression of an authentic Japanese spirit. He rejected the ultra-nationalist insistence on keeping the Japanese branch pure in the age of global interaction and insisted that Japan should enter the world scene and move forward. In this he was the theorist of his moment in history, a moment in which Japan appeared to be successfully combining Eastern and Western styles in every domain of life. Nishida lived these events intensely. Perhaps he lost his shoes at Mitsukoshi. Surely, he sang the national anthem, and was swept along with his generation by the syncretic modernization of Japan’s government, cities, schools, and cultural production. I conjecture that this background underlay his conception of the global world and his confidence in the future. If only he had realized how small a role national politics would ultimately play in that world compared with the force of global technology! <>
<>
<>Acknowledgements I want to thank Yoko Arisaka and Mayuko Uehara for generous help with translations and interpretation of Nishida. They have corrected many misunderstandings; those that remain are my own. <>
<>Notes <>
<>1. The full account of this story is to be found in Edward Seidensticker. Low City, High City (New York: Knopf, 1983). <>
<>2. The account below is drawn from William Malm, “The Modern Music of Meiji Japan.” In Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture, ed., Donald Shively (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971). For more on layering, see Andrew Feenberg, Alternative Modernity, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995a), chap. 9; hereinafter cited in text. <>
<>3. Gilbert Simondon, Du Mode d’Existence des Objets Techniques (Paris: Aubier. 1958), chap. 1. <>
<>4. I formerly called this “expressive design” (Feenberg, 1995a: 225). <>
<>5. I formerly called this “system congruent design” (Feenberg, 1995a: 225). <>
<>6. For more on the capital goods market, see Nathan Rosenberg, “Economic Development and the Transfer of Technology: some Historical Perspectives.” Technology and Culture 11 (1970). Junichi Murata has developed the significance of Rosenberg’s analysis for philosophy of technology. See Junichi Murata, “Creativity of Technology–An Origin of Modernity?” In Technology in a Global World, eds. Robert Figueroa and Harding, Sandra (New York: Routledge, 2002). <>
<>7. O-Young Lee, Smaller is Better: Japan’s Mastery of the Miniature (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1984). <>
<>8. Kitaro Nishida, La Culture Japonaise en Question. Trans. Pierre Lavelle (Paris: Publications Orientalistes de France. 1991); hereinafter cited in text. <>
<>9. Andrew Feenberg, “The Problem of Modernity in the Philosophy of Nishida.” In Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism, eds. Heisig, John and John. Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995b); Andrew Feenberg, “Experience and Culture: Nishida's Path to the 'Things Themselves',” Philosophy East and West, 49(1) (January 1999): 28-44. <>
<>10. This exposition is based primarily on Nishida 1991. <>
<>11. See also Kitaro Nishida, “Nihonbunka no mondai” (“The Problem of Japanese Culture”), Nishida Kitaro Zenshu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten), 1965c), vol. 12, 291-292, 294; hereinafter cited in text. <>
<>12. See, for example, Nishida 1970, 78-79, 134-135; Ohashi, Ryosuke “The World as Group-Theoretical Structure,” unpublished manuscript, 1997. <>
<>13. Kitaro Nishida, “Sekai Shin Chitsujo no Genri” (“The Principle of New World Order”). In Nishida Kitaro Zenshu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965a), vol. 12, 428; hereinafter cited in text. Yoko Arisaka, “The Nishida Enigma,” Monumenta Nipponica 51 (spring 1996), 101-102; hereinafter cited in text. <>
<>14. “Rekishi Tetsugaku ni Tsuite” (“On the Philosophy of History”). In Nishida Kitaro Zenshu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965b), vol. 12, 270-271. <>
<>15. For an analysis of the debate over Nishida’s politics and one of the principal texts under dispute, see Arisaka 1996. For a variety of positions, see John Heisig, and John Maraldo, eds. Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. <>

David Hockney’s iPhone Passion by Lawrence Weschler (NY Review of Books)


David Hockney's iPhone Passion

By Lawrence Weschler

See the related podcast and the accompanying audio slide show.

After two decades of regularly finding himself caught up in all sorts of seemingly extraneous side-passions (photocollages, operatic stage design, fax extravaganzas, homemade photocopier print runs, a controversial revisionist art-historical investigation, and a watercolor idyll), David Hockney, now age seventy-two, has finally taken to painting once again, doing so, over the past three or four years, with a vividness and a sheer productivity perhaps never before seen in his career. This recent body of work consists almost entirely of seasonal landscapes of the rolling hills, hedgerows, tree stands, valley wolds, and farm fields surrounding the somewhat déclassé onetime summer seaside resort of Bridlington, England, on the North Sea coast, where he now lives. Some are intimately scaled but many are among the largest, most ambitious canvases of his entire career.

The paintings have been widely exhibited—in London (at the Tate and the Royal Academy), in Los Angeles, a broad overview in a small museum in Germany this past summer—though not yet in New York, a situation that will be rectified in late October by a major show, his first there in ten years, slated to take up both the uptown and downtown spaces at PaceWildenstein.[1] The buildup toward these shows has found Hockney busier than ever (he is still in the process of completing a dozen fresh canvases as I write), but not so busy that he hasn't managed to become fascinated by yet another new (and virtually diametrically opposite) technology, one that he is pursuing with almost as much verve and fascination: drawing on his iPhone.

ockney first became interested in iPhones about a year ago (he grabbed the one I happened to be using right out of my hands). He acquired one of his own and began using it as a high-powered reference tool, searching out paintings on the Web and cropping appropriate details as part of the occasional polemics or appreciations with which he is wont to shower his friends.

But soon he discovered one of those newfangled iPhone applications, entitled Brushes, which allows the user digitally to smear, or draw, or fingerpaint (it's not yet entirely clear what the proper verb should be for this novel activity), to create highly sophisticated full-color images directly on the device's screen, and then to archive or send them out by e-mail. Essentially, the Brushes application gives the user a full color-wheel spectrum, from which he can choose a specific color. He can then modify that color's hue along a range of darker to lighter, and go on to fill in the entire backdrop of the screen in that color, or else fashion subsequent brushstrokes, variously narrower or thicker, and more or less transparent, according to need, by dragging his finger across the screen, progressively layering the emerging image with as many such daubings as he desires.[2]

Over the past six months, Hockney has fashioned literally hundreds, probably over a thousand, such images, often sending out four or five a day to a group of about a dozen friends, and not really caring what happens to them after that. (He assumes the friends pass them along through the digital ether.) These are, mind you, not second-generation digital copies of images that exist in some other medium: their digital expression constitutes the sole (albeit multiple) original of the image.

The flood of images has more or less resolved itself into three streams. To begin with, portraits, and mainly self-portraits at that—perhaps playing on the way that an iPhone's blackened screen, when off, already functions as a sort of Claude Lorrain–style darkened glass, reflecting back a ghostly image of the user's face. (Intriguingly, the reflected face in the blackened screen is approximately twice the size of the same face if one turns the iPhone around to snap a photographic self-portrait. “But that's how it always is with photography,” Hockney points out. “It inevitably pushes the world away. That's just one of its many problems.” Hockney's drawings, as it were, bring the face back to full scale.)

Early on, however, Hockney became much more interested in bunches of cut flowers and plants ranged in brick pots, ceramic vases, and glass jars. These became the occasion for his extensive investigations into the types of effects possible in this new medium. “Although the actual drawing, when I do it, goes quite quickly,” he explains, “some days it might be preceded by hours and hours of thinking through just how one might achieve a certain play of light, texture, or color.” Indeed, the range of results is dazzlingly various, colorful, and instantaneously evocative.

Increasingly, over the past several months, it is the summer dawn, rising over the seabay outside his bedroom window, that has been capturing Hockney's attention. “I've always wanted to be able to paint the dawn,” Hockney explains.

After all, what clearer, more luminous light are we ever afforded? Especially here where the light comes rising over the sea, just the opposite of my old California haunts. But in the old days one never could, because, of course, ordinarily it would be too dark to see the paints; or else, if you turned on a light so as to be able to see them, you'd lose the subtle gathering tones of the coming sun. But with an iPhone, I don't even have to get out of bed, I just reach for the device, turn it on, start mixing and matching the colors, laying in the evolving scene.
He has now accomplished dozens of such sequential studies, sending them out in real time, so that his friends in America wake to their own account of the Bridlington dawn—two, five, sometimes as many as eight successive versions, sent out minutes apart, one after the next.

 
Drawings by David Hockney, made with the Brushes application on his iPhone, 2009.
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David Hockney's iPhone Passion