Faltering Economy squeezes the American Dream

Economy squeezes the American Dream

By David J. Lynch, USA TODAY

Work
hard, play by the rules and tomorrow will be better than today. That
implicit promise has been at the core of the American Experience
through good times and bad.

But now,
whipsawed by plummeting home values, $4-a-gallon gas, rising food
prices and gyrating financial markets, Americans increasingly fear that
the national bargain has unraveled, that their once-steady march toward
affluence has derailed. In a new USA TODAY poll, 54% of those surveyed
say their standard of living is no better today than five years ago.

“Fewer
Americans now than at any time in the last half century believe they're
moving forward in life,” concluded a recent report by the Washington,
D.C.-based Pew Research Center.

The USA TODAY
respondents were more upbeat about the prospects for improvement in the
next five years, but only 45% expect their children to live better than
they do.

“I don't think it is going to be as
easy for them. They're going to have to pay back a tremendous debt
load. … I just don't see the opportunities being there,” says Matt
Gwynne, 63, a retired executive in Angier, N.C.

So is the American Dream dead? Well, it's at least wounded.

Today's economic malaise caps a prolonged period during which the typical American lost ground.

From
the end of the 2001 recession through last year, median household
income fell almost every year even as the economy expanded and
individual workers became more productive. The most recent official
data indicate that in 2006, half of all families made more than $58,407
and half made less. That compares with an inflation-adjusted peak of
$59,398 in 2000.

This financial stall marked
the first time since World War II that the typical family was worse off
at the end of an economic expansion than at the start, according to the
Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a left-of-center think tank in
Washington, D.C.

“This is the first business
cycle on record where the median family income failed to recover its
previous peak,” EPI economist Jared Bernstein says. “It's been a
uniquely disappointing cycle from the perspective of the median-income
family.”

And that was before a financial
crisis emerged last year from a remote corner of the U.S. housing
market to stalk every worker, firm and family. Friday's nearly
400-point plunge in the Dow, triggered by a sharp rise in oil prices,
only underscored a gathering unease about the future.

Suddenly,
a nation that confidently had binged on McMansions, huge SUVs and
flat-screen TVs faces a future of smaller dwellings, shrunken cars and
painful credit card debt repayment.

A shift toward small

Economists
cite numerous culprits for the financial fizzle: weaker unions unable
to resist pressures on wages, more intense global competition and a
mismatch between a growing demand for skilled workers and slowing
growth in the typical worker's years of schooling.

Anecdotal
evidence of compressed living standards isn't difficult to find. In
2007, the median American home was almost 50% larger than the typical
family dwelling a generation earlier in 1975. Tomorrow's homes are
likely to be smaller, not larger, as the easy credit that made suburban
palaces affordable is no more.

Likewise, the
ever-larger vehicles Americans drove in recent years owed their
swaggering existence to a now-bygone era of cheap oil — $12 a barrel in
1998. With a barrel of oil now costing nearly $140 and gas prices at $4
a gallon, consumers have abruptly ended their decade-long love affair
with behemoths such as the nearly three-ton Ford Expedition (twice the
weight of May's best-selling Honda Civic).

Underscoring
the new reality, General Motors last week announced it's closing four
truck plants, boosting production of fuel-sipping sedans and
considering selling its iconic Hummer brand. Executives industrywide
are scrambling to retool for what they say is a permanent shift in the
American lifestyle.

“There's a tremendous
change in this market going on. A tremendous shift from light trucks,
pickups, heavy SUVs toward more compact passenger cars. … The times of
having cheap energy are over. Mobility will get more expensive for all
of us,” says Stefan Jacoby, 50, CEO of Volkswagen of North America.

In
Reno, information technology professional Bob Ryczko, 36, is so
concerned about the future that he's decided not to marry or have
children. Despite a base salary of about $130,000, Ryczko expects to be
worse off a year from now because of fast-rising food and energy costs.

It's
not as if there were no economic problems in the late 1970s and early
1980s, when Ryczko was growing up in Buffalo. Oil prices surged after
the Iranian oil embargo in 1979 and the subsequent 1981-82 recession
was the most severe since the 1930s.

Yet,
simply by working hard at what Ryczko calls “blue-collar jobs” — his
dad was a printer, his mom worked for the local phone company — his
parents put two kids through college and on the path to a better life.

Now,
with swollen health care premiums, college tuition rising twice as fast
as the rate of inflation and food and energy growing more expensive by
the day, duplicating his parents' accomplishment seems impossible.

“Even in my 20s, everything seemed to be very obtainable,” Ryczko says.

“Now
with the economy, oil prices and everything, it's just very difficult
for Americans to stay in the middle class. We're getting squeezed out.”

Widespread angst over this “middle-class squeeze” has animated the presidential campaign.

In
November, likely Democratic nominee Sen. Barack Obama identified an
urgent need “to reclaim” the American Dream, saying, “Today, the cost
of that dream is rising faster than ever before. While some have
prospered beyond imagination in this global economy, middle-class
Americans — as well as those working hard to become middle class — are
seeing the American Dream slip further and further away.”

Last
week, Arizona Sen. John McCain, Obama's presumptive Republican rival
this fall, acknowledged widespread economic anxieties but struck an
upbeat note.

“We've always believed our best days are ahead of us,” he said. “I believe that still.”

A pinch on the middle class

Writer
James Truslow Adams was the first to coin the term “American Dream,”
writing in 1931 that it was “that dream of a land in which life should
be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each
according to ability or achievement.”

Amid
the darkest days of the Depression, with the unemployment rate then
heading toward 20%, Adams' ideal seemed more illusion than aspiration.

However, once the nation had escaped the clutches of economic collapse and world war, his vision was realized.

In
a period that economists now refer to as the golden age, rich and poor
alike prospered. From the end of World War II in 1945 to 1973, those at
the bottom of the income charts actually advanced a bit faster than
those at the top, in what Harvard University economists Claudia Goldin
and Lawrence Katz labeled “growing together.”

In recent years, however, most of the economic gains have gone to those at the top.

The
richest one-tenth of American families — those with incomes above
$104,700 in 2006 — accounted for almost half (49.7%) of all income that
year, according to economist Emmanuel Saez of the University of
California, Berkeley.

That represented the
highest share since 1917, higher even than at the stock market peak
before the crash of 1929, says Saez, who studied income tax and Census
data since 1913.

His analysis shows that the
richest of the rich — the top 1% of American families making at least
$382,600 — have garnered especially large gains. From 1993 to 2006,
those families captured about half of the nation's overall growth. From
2002 to 2006, they received about three-quarters of total growth.

Saez's
research helps explain the seeming contradiction between the
well-documented middle-class frustration with working harder just to
stay in place and the American economy's continued growth.

The
U.S. economy last year was almost 18% larger than in 2000, according to
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. But the typical American family, whose
income dipped slightly over that period, saw no evidence of it.

There's
no doubt that over the long term, the typical American's living
standards have improved dramatically. Compared with the 1970s,
Americans have higher incomes, bigger homes, fancier cars and better
health care.

An explosion of digital
technologies, even just since 1990, has introduced a wealth of
communication and entertainment products whose benefits aren't readily
apparent from sterile income statistics. More than 30 million Americans
traveled to another country in 2006, twice as many as in 1990.

In 2007, Brink Lindsey's The Age of Abundance
celebrated the emergence of this era of mass prosperity. The Cato
Institute analyst notes that items that were considered luxuries in
middle-class homes in the early 1970s — dishwashers, clothes dryers and
air conditioners — now are routinely found in households that are below
the poverty line, which for a family of four is less than $21,200
annual income.

“On the 'stuff' front, people are doing better than ever,” he says.

But
Americans have long taken for granted the idea of continual
improvement. That — and the postwar notion of shared prosperity — is
what's now at risk.

“The problem I see is more stagnation than out-and-out decline,” Bernstein says. “But stagnation is a huge problem.”

A more serious problem

For some, the problem is more serious than stagnation; it's the very real prospect of sliding back.

Growing up in Sunnyvale, Calif., Dale Keller had no illusions about the difficulties of maintaining a middle-class lifestyle.

His
father worked for Wonder Bread for 35 years, but five years before
retirement was downsized out of his job as human resources director and
sent to manage a bakery.

“There will be no middle class the way we're going in this country,” he warned his son.

So after graduating from Golden Gate University in San Francisco, Keller anticipated a career path that would twist and turn.

He
navigated more than two decades' worth of corporate upheavals before
accepting in July 2006 a $150,000-a-year marketing position with a
Pennsylvania manufacturer of automated train control systems.

Four
months later, the company opted to leave the business to concentrate on
more promising areas. After 24 years in the industry, Keller was out of
work.

His bad fortune came just as the
economy began to feel the first aftershocks from the housing collapse.
After almost two years, he still can't find anything that pays much
more than half of his former salary. And employers won't hire him for
those jobs, fearing he'd eventually grow dissatisfied and leave.

“I'm one of those who've fallen through the cracks. I don't know what to do,” he laments.

“It's like your train's derailed, and you can't get it back on the tracks.”

So now Keller, 46, lives in Canonsburg, south of Pittsburgh, and wonders how long his savings will hold out.

He's
tried to support his wife, whose health problems keep her from working,
and 9-year-old daughter by trading currencies and stocks from home.

It's not working, Keller says.

“I'm in a squeeze,” he says. “And I'm just praying to God I can make it through.”

This
story is the first in an occasional series examining how Americans and
the U.S. economy are not advancing, particularly in relation to foreign
competitors.



Find this article at:


http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-06-08-dream_N.htm

Investor: Clean Tech Is Only Hope for the Collapsing Economy

Investor: Clean Tech Is Only Hope for the Collapsing Economy


By Alexis Madrigal


Email

03.17.08 | 5:00 PM



Eric Janszen's new book will discuss the painful structural changes he
says are coming to the U.S. economy.
Courtesy Eric Janszen

As the mortgage and financial crisis continues to notch more victims,
the question on many economists' minds is not whether a recession will
happen, but how deep it will get and how long it will last. But one
prominent voice thinks the high-flying finance industry isn't going to
bounce back — and that we'll need to look elsewhere to set the U.S.
economy back on firm footing.

Eric Janszen is an angel investor and founder of the contrarian market website iTulip.com, which The New York Times credited with “accurately predicting that the [internet] bubble would pop.”
Now Janszen believes the American economy needs a fundamental
restructuring away from its foundations in finance, insurance and real
estate. His prescription: a new bubble based on green technologies.

In a widely discussed Harper's article in February, “The Next Bubble: Priming the Markets for Tomorrow's Crash,”
Janszen argued that clean tech is the only sector that could create
enough “fictitious value” to replace the losses from the housing
bubble, if only temporarily.

Neither a clean-tech skeptic nor a booster, he wrote, “Given the
current state of our economy, the only thing worse than a new bubble
would be its absence.”

Wired.com recently spoke with Janszen to discuss the state of the
economy, his plan to pay for alternative energy with a tariff on oil,
and how running fiber to your home is good energy policy.

Wired: Though you focus on clean tech, you are making
a broader argument about the U.S. economy and its reliance on the
finance industry. How is the economy now bubble-based?

Eric Janszen: The elevator pitch is that we've gone
through a series of asset-price inflations that started back in 1995.
What really kicked the whole series off were some changes that the Feds
made to the U.S. banking system to get us out of the recession that we
were in during the early 1990s. That facilitated the beginnings of a
growth in credit that supported the two bubbles: internet and real
estate.

Wired: And you argue that the next step is a clean-tech bubble that could create $20 trillion of fictitious wealth?

Janszen: It's not really a bubble. I think of it as a
legitimate use of the way that our economy works and [how] our
financial markets function now. The alternative title for the Harper's
piece was “The Good Bubble.” Clean tech could be an extremely efficient
use of capital.

My editors over at Harper's wanted to make this thing
as controversial as possible. My forthcoming book goes deeper into the
issue of how we're going into the period of time where the FIRE –
finance, insurance and real estate — economy is in a steep decline.
Within a year or so, it's going to be very obvious that resuscitating
it in its old form will be impossible.

What's going to be necessary are some structural changes to the economy that are longer-term and somewhat more painful.

Wired: What kind of structural changes are you talking about?

Janszen: Reduction of dependency on debt financing to
stimulate the economy. Over the last seven years, every new job that
has been created has resulted in $1.8 million of new public- and
private-sector debt. That's obviously not sustainable. That's way too
inefficient. It used to be about 50 cents of new debt was required to
generate $1 in gross-domestic-product growth. Now it's $9 for $1 of GDP
growth.

Wired: How bad do you think the U.S. economy is going to get?

Janszen: It's going to surprise people. The impact
that housing is having on our credit system is just starting to be
felt. It's not clear, in the absence of the concerted effort to make
investments in the clean-tech sector, what geographies or sectors are
going to pull the U.S. out of the recession.

What tends to happen is that policymakers survey this scene and say:
“What are we going to do to get people working?” The focus on one
sector of the economy can drag us out.

Wired: You propose several prospective sectors to do
that, including health care and biotechnology, but toss them out. Why
is clean tech different?

Janszen: Alternative energy and infrastructure is the
only area of the economy that is scalable and politically expedient. I
mean infrastructure in economic terms, so [that includes] roads,
bridges, communications and the energy infrastructure.

Wired: You don't mention carbon dioxide emissions, anthropogenic global warming or the environment a single time in the Harper's
article. Do you believe that there is the need for alternative energy
because of environmental realities, or are economics or politics
driving these investments?

Janszen: My own feeling, when I look at what would be
entailed in digging tar sands up so we can keep driving big cars, is
that I'd do everything I could to prevent that.

The first order of business is conservation. Real political
leadership means putting together long-term interest ahead of short,
and it's clearly in the long-term interest to look at the environment.

Wired: Is it possible to have an energy policy that promotes alternative energy without promoting a bubble?

Janszen: Absolutely. The whole mechanism of financing
these speculative bubbles needs to change. What'll happen is that we'll
revert back to how markets should operate. Capital will be much more
risk-averse.

Wired: What do you see as the nascent financing and
credit vehicles that could come up with the trillions of dollars needed
to finance clean tech without creating a bubble?

Janszen: One way to do it is to put a floating tariff
on the price of oil and gradually raise the price up to $200 or $300 a
barrel. As long as you do it gradually, the economy can respond to it.
That's the beauty of our system. It has responded very calmly to an
increase from $20 to $100. The economy hasn't collapsed. It's
definitely slowing, but it's not wrecking it. You could create a
process that gradually forced a lot of relatively painless transition
without wrecking the economy.

Wired: What types of infrastructure changes would be part of that transition?

Janszen: Transportation. The big capital-intensive
effort is high-speed rail. You need government to get its act together
to pull something off.

I'm also proposing public-private corporations that have the deep
pockets of government but the obligations to shareholders of a private
corporation. There are going to be market mechanisms, so you don't end
up years late and billions of dollars over budget.

Another part of it is energy infrastructure. It's an archaic system
with a lot of coal power. I'm suggesting a lot of nukes, but modern
ones — pebble-bed reactors.

Communications is also a big part of it. If the high-level objective is
to reduce the energy intensity of the U.S. economy, why don't we run fiber-optic cable to everyone's house? That will support applications to allow people to stop commuting.

It has to be a comprehensive, well-thought-out plan. We have to use less energy, period.


The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next? – Washington Post



washingtonpost.com



The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next?

By Kevin Phillips
Sunday, May 18, 2008; B03

Back in August, during the panic over mortgages, Alan Greenspan offered reassurance to an anxious public. The current turmoil, the former Federal Reserve Board
chairman said, strongly resembled brief financial scares such as the
Russian debt crisis of 1998 or the U.S. stock market crash of 1987. Not
to worry.

But in the background, one could hear the groans and
feel the tremors as larger political and economic tectonic plates
collided. Nine months later, Greenspan's soothing analogies no longer
wash. The U.S. economy faces unprecedented debt levels, soaring
commodity prices and sliding home prices, to say nothing of a weak
dollar. Despite the recent stabilization of the economy, some
economists fear that the world will soon face the greatest financial
crisis since the 1930s.

That analogy is hardly a perfect fit;
there's almost no chance of another sequence like the Great Depression,
where the stock market dove 80 percent, joblessness reached 25 percent,
and the Great Plains became a dustbowl that forced hundreds of
thousands of “Okies” to flee to California. But Americans should worry
that the current unrest betokens the sort of global upheaval that
upended previous leading world economic powers, most notably Britain.

More
than 80 percent of Americans now say that we are on the wrong track,
but many if not most still believe that the history of other nations is
irrelevant — that the United States is unique, chosen by God. So did
all the previous world economic powers: Rome, Spain, the Netherlands
(in the maritime glory days of the 17th century, when New York was New
Amsterdam) and 19th-century Britain. Their early strength was also
their later weakness, not unlike the United States since the 1980s.

There
is a considerable literature on these earlier illusions and declines.
Reading it, one can argue that imperial Spain, maritime Holland and
industrial Britain shared a half-dozen vulnerabilities as they peaked
and declined: a sense of things no longer being on the right track,
intolerant or missionary religion, military or imperial overreach,
economic polarization, the rise of finance (displacing industry) and
excessive debt. So too for today's United States.

Before we
amplify the contemporary U.S. parallels, the skeptic can point out how
doomsayers in each nation, while eventually correct, were also
premature. In Britain, for example, doubters fretted about becoming
another Holland as early as the 1860s, and apprehension surged again in
the 1890s, based on the industrial muscle of such rivals as Germany and
the United States. By the 1940s, those predictions had come true, but
in practical terms, the critics of the 1860s and 1890s were too early.

Premature
fears have also dogged the United States. The decades after the 1968
election were marked by waves of a new national apprehension: that U.S.
post-World War II global hegemony was in danger. The first, in 1968-72,
involved a toxic mix of global trade and currency crises and the
breakdown of the U.S. foreign policy consensus over Southeast Asia.
Books emerged with titles such as “Retreat From Empire?” and “The End
of the American Era.” More national malaise followed Watergate and the
fall of Saigon. Stage three came in the late 1980s, when a resurgent
Japan seemed to be challenging U.S. preeminence in manufacturing and
possibly even finance. In 1991, Democratic presidential aspirant Paul Tsongas observed that “the Cold War is over. . . . Germany and Japan won.” Well, not quite.

In
2008, we can mark another perilous decade: the tech mania of 1997-2000,
morphing into a bubble and market crash; the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks; imperial hubris and the Bush administration's bungled 2003
invasion of Iraq. These were followed by OPEC's
abandoning its $22-$28 price range for oil, with the cost per barrel
rising over five years to more than $100; the collapse of global
respect for the United States over the Iraq war; the imploding U.S.
housing market and debt bubble; and the almost 50 percent decline of
the U.S. dollar against the euro since 2002. Small wonder a global
financial crisis is in the air.

Here, then, is the unnerving
possibility: that another, imminent global crisis could make the
half-century between the 1970s and the 2020s the equivalent for the
United States of what the half-century before 1950 was for Britain.
This may well be the Big One: the multi-decade endgame of U.S.
ascendancy. The chronology makes historical sense — four decades of
premature jitters segueing into unhappy reality.

The most
chilling parallel with the failures of the old powers is the United
States' unhealthy reliance on the financial sector as the engine of its
growth. In the 18th century, the Dutch thought they could replace their
declining industry and physical commerce with grand money-lending
schemes to foreign nations and princes. But a series of crashes and
bankruptcies in the 1760s and 1770s crippled Holland's economy. In the
early 1900s, one apprehensive minister argued that Britain could not
thrive as a “hoarder of invested securities” because “banking is not
the creator of our prosperity but the creation of it.” By the late
1940s, the debt loads of two world wars proved the point, and British
global economic leadership became history.

In the United States,
the financial services sector passed manufacturing as a component of
the GDP in the mid-1990s. But market enthusiasm seems to have blocked
any debate over this worrying change: In the 1970s, manufacturing
occupied 25 percent of GDP and financial services just 12 percent, but
by 2003-06, finance enjoyed 20-21 percent, and manufacturing had
shriveled to 12 percent.

The downside is that the final four or
five percentage points of financial-sector GDP expansion in the 1990s
and 2000s involved mischief and self-dealing: the exotic mortgage boom,
the reckless bundling of loans into securities and other innovations
better left to casinos. Run-amok credit was the lubricant. Between 1987
and 2007, total debt in the United States jumped from $11 trillion to
$48 trillion, and private financial-sector debt led the great binge.

Washington
looked kindly on the financial sector throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
providing it with endless liquidity flows and bailouts. Inexcusably,
movers and shakers such as Greenspan, former treasury secretary Robert Rubin and the current secretary, Henry Paulson,
refused to regulate the industry. All seemed to welcome asset bubbles;
they may have figured the finance industry to be the new dominant
sector of economic evolution, much as industry had replaced agriculture
in the late 19th century. But who seriously expects the next great
economic power — China, India, Brazil — to have a GDP dominated by
finance?

With the help of the overgrown U.S. financial sector,
the United States of 2008 is the world's leading debtor, has by far the
largest current-account deficit and is the leading importer, at great
expense, of both manufactured goods and oil. The potential damage if
the world soon undergoes the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s
is incalculable. The loss of global economic leadership that overtook
Britain and Holland seems to be looming on our own horizon.

Kevin
Phillips is the author, most recently, of “Bad Money: Reckless Finance,
Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism.”

© 2008 The Washington Post Company




Carbon Dioxide & Methane Rise Sharply In 2007


Carbon Dioxide & Methane Rise Sharply In 2007

The 2007 rise in global carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations is tied
with 2005 as the third highest [annual rise] since atmospheric measurements began in
1958. The red line shows the trend together with seasonal variations.
The black line indicates the trend that emerges when the seasonal cycle
has been removed. (Credit: NOAA)

ScienceDaily (Apr. 24, 2008)
— Last year alone global levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide, the
primary driver of global climate change, increased by 0.6 percent, or
19 billion tons. Additionally methane rose by 27 million tons after
nearly a decade with little or no increase. NOAA scientists released
these and other preliminary findings today as part of an annual update
to the agency’s greenhouse gas index, which tracks data from 60 sites
around the world.

The burning of coal, oil, and gas, known as fossil fuels, is the
primary source of increasing carbon dioxide emissions. Earth's oceans,
vegetation, and soils soak up half of these emissions. The rest stays
in the air for centuries or longer. Twenty percent of the 2007 fossil
fuel emissions of carbon dioxide are expected to remain in the
atmosphere for thousands of years, according to the latest scientific
assessment by the International Panel on Climate Change.

Viewed another way, last year’s carbon dioxide increase means 2.4
molecules of the gas were added to every million molecules of air,
boosting the global concentration to nearly 385 parts per million
(ppm). Pre-industrial carbon dioxide levels hovered around 280 ppm
until 1850. Human activities pushed those levels up to 380 ppm by early
2006.

The rate of increase in carbon dioxide concentrations accelerated
over recent decades along with fossil fuel emissions. Since 2000,
annual increases of two ppm or more have been common, compared with 1.5
ppm per year in the 1980s and less than one ppm per year during the
1960s.

Methane levels rose last year for the first time since 1998. Methane
is 25 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, but
there’s far less of it in the atmosphere—about 1,800 parts per billion.
When related climate affects are taken into account, methane’s overall
climate impact is nearly half that of carbon dioxide.

Rapidly growing industrialization in Asia and rising wetland
emissions in the Arctic and tropics are the most likely causes of the
recent methane increase, said scientist Ed Dlugokencky from NOAA’s
Earth System Research Laboratory.

”We’re on the lookout for the first sign of a methane release from
thawing Arctic permafrost,” said Dlugokencky. “It’s too soon to tell
whether last year’s spike in emissions includes the start of such a
trend.”

Permafrost, or permanently frozen ground, contains vast stores of
carbon. Scientists are concerned that as the Arctic continues to warm
and permafrost thaws, carbon could seep into the atmosphere in the form
of methane, possibly fueling a cycle of carbon release and temperature
rise.

Adapted from materials provided by National Oceanic And Atmospheric Adminstration.


Recipes for Disaster (NYT Sunday Book Review)

Published: April 20, 2008

Bear Stearns had just imploded when I found myself chatting with a
surprisingly merry investment banker. While his clients panicked over
their “risk exposure” in this time of $100 oil, evaporating credit
markets and melting ice caps, he thought much could be gained. In fact,
all the real titans he knew were doubling down. His clients faced a
choice. Did they want to be dinosaurs or cockroaches? Did they want to
do nothing while the world crumbled, or did they want to scuttle and
flit, gobbling up the morsels of growth that bubble up even in bad
times?



Jonathon Rosen

For a certain brand of writer,
a third possibility is eminently more appealing, one in which the
ecological devastation of American-style capitalism sets off The Crisis
that will at last devour titans, dinosaurs and cockroaches alike. While
our immediate crises always have a way of looking like The Crisis, they
have until now petered out. In light of the present crisis (as of now,
still small “c”), however, two eco-millenarian novels — an old one
called “Ecotopia,” by Ernest Callenbach, and a new one, WORLD MADE BY HAND (Atlantic Monthly, $24),
by James Howard Kunstler — are worth a look, particularly if you are
considering doubling down once more before the end times.

Literary
utopias tend to emerge when an appropriate niche opens up. The niche
that suited “Ecotopia” in the early 1970s and the one that now
accommodates “World Made by Hand” have certain similarities. Shortages
and unrest in the Middle East foreshadow the end of oil. A brewing
recession gives rise to doubts about our economic fundamentals. An
unpopular president wages an unpopular war. And across the country, a
growing eco-consciousness raises hope that a different system might
replace classic, marauding American economic progress.

“Ecotopia,”
like “World Made by Hand,” is set in a not-too-distant decade where, as
Callenbach puts it in a kind of wonky, Harper’s-of-the-future prose,
“the burden of outlays for an enormous arms establishment caused a
profound long-term decline in the world competitiveness of American
civilian industry,” and where energy crises have “bred economic
disruption and price gouging.” But the novel is redolent with the
optimism of the baby-boom generation in full swinger mode. A
Pennsylvania-born writer who became an editor at the University of
California Press and part of Berkeley’s eco-futurist scene, Callenbach
combined the change-or-die message of science fiction films like
“Soylent Green” with the free-love attitudes of the Haight to produce a
tale of paradise regained. Self-published in 1975 and reprinted in 1977
by Bantam, “Ecotopia” went on to sell nearly a million copies.

The
novel opens with William Weston, a journalist for The New York
Times-Post, receiving an unprecedented assignment: to visit the nation
of Ecotopia 20 years after “independence.” Comprising what was once
Oregon, Washington and Northern California, Ecotopia seceded after
defeating the economically doomed United States in a Vietnam-style
“helicopter war.” Secessionist movements are also afoot in the Great
Lakes region and the Southeast, yet Ecotopians look at the likely end
of the United States as an opportunity. As Weston writes in his
increasingly sympathetic dispatches, Ecotopians realized just in time
that “economic disaster was not identical with survival disaster for
persons — and that, in particular, a financial panic could be turned to
advantage if the new nation could be organized to devote its real
resources of energy, knowledge, skills and materials to the basic
necessities of survival.”

And devote they do. After a few hard
years of transition, life in Ecotopia is pretty awesome. Cutting-edge
comforts like plastic hairbrushes and drip-dry polyester shirts are
missing, but the workweek is only 20 hours. Labor is rewarding and
communal, and involves things like replanting forests, studying the
language of whales, creating modular homes and, if you happen to be
black, making and exporting music from the hub neighborhood of “Soul
City.” A normally depressing thing like a hospital stay is livened up
by a massage (with a happy ending). And if you are lucky enough to
connect with an Ecotopian woman (though not much luck is required), you
might find yourself doing it in the hollowed-out burl of a giant
redwood. But don’t get the wrong impression: Ecotopian couples are
“generally monogamous,” Weston reports, “except for four holidays each
year, at the solstices and equinoxes, when sexual promiscuity is
widespread.”

In short, it is a lot of fun to live in Ecotopia — much more fun
than dwelling in the mournful Hudson Valley town of Union Grove, the
setting of “World Made by Hand.” While “Ecotopia” is a 1970s West Coast
idea lab where a square can learn to “get it,” Union Grove (a ringer
for its creator’s hometown, Saratoga Springs) is a contemporary East
Coaster’s torture chamber designed to sock it to shortsighted,
petroleum-guzzling Americans. Indeed, despite a stint at Rolling Stone
in the early ’70s, Kunstler has remained steadfastly un-Californian
throughout a career that has produced scathing critiques of modern
suburbia like “The Geography of Nowhere” and his popular blueprint for
surviving the end of oil, “The Long Emergency.” In 1999, Kunstler went
long on Y2K, predicting “loss of comfort and modern convenience,”
possibly escalating into disease and chaos. But that bad bet hasn’t
dampened his bearish enthusiasm. On his blog, he greeted 2008 by
asking, “Has there ever been a society so exquisitely rigged for
implosion?” Unlike Callenbach, who imagined a society actively choosing
a sustainable alternative in the face of crisis, Kunstler seems to
believe change will come only after The Crisis rams it down our
collective throats.

“World Made by Hand” follows
the life of a very depressed former software executive named Robert
Earle during a single globally warmed summer. Union Grove is a
beachhead of civilization after things have fallen apart. Terrorist
bombs have taken out Washington and Los Angeles, oil is long gone from
the town, and a powerless federal government may or may not be bunkered
in Minnesota. The only thing that comes over the radio during rare
bursts of electricity is the raving of preachers relishing in the
punishment of a wrathful god. The loss of oil has robbed people of
ancillary technologies like antibiotics and rubber, as well as certain
pieces of vocabulary. Women, who have reverted to “Little House on the
Prairie” mode, are once again referred to as “handsome,” and any
enterprise of note tends to be called an “outfit.”

Some people
hang themselves in basements in despair. Others turn hobbies into
trades, as Robert does with carpentry and violin playing. And Robert is
among the lucky ones. Union Grovers with no source of power do nothing
but work. “A plain majority of the townspeople were laborers now,”
Kunstler writes. “Nobody called them peasants, but in effect that’s
what they’d become.”

Kunstler is not immune to faith in social
transformation, as Robert’s conversion from isolated tradesman to
community-minded leader of men and handsome women attests. But he
thinks it must be forced on us. In a telling (and well-imagined) motif,
Robert often finds himself dreaming of speeding surreally over the
landscape. When he wakes up, he realizes he wasn’t dreaming of flying
but of driving. Message: Our selfish, oil-assisted present will have to
fade into a dream before sustainable communal life becomes a reality.

I
would prefer to live in Ecotopia, but the verisimilitude of Kunstler’s
world leads me to think the future is Union Grove. Thirty years from
now, it will be interesting to see if that little town seems
excessively sad, richly luxurious or spot on. But for now, I’m hedging
my bets. Where I live, one block east of ground zero, I’ve started
keeping a compost bin and am thinking about adding a micro wind
generator. Two blocks south, the damaged former Deutsche Bank building
comes down floor by floor. To the north, the Freedom Tower has just
emerged aboveground and may one day be full of investment bankers.
Recently, though, I’ve started looking at that plot through Kunstler’s
eyes. It gets good sunlight, and it occurs to me it would make a hell
of a bean field.

Paul Greenberg is a W. K. Kellogg Foundation food and society policy fellow. He is writing a book on the future of fish.