Deleuzian Interrogations: A Conversation with Manuel DeLanda, John Protevi and Torkild Thanem

Deleuzian Interrogations: A Conversation
with Manuel DeLanda, John Protevi and
Torkild Thanem
……
This conversation explores some of the connections between Deleuzian
philosophy, organization theory and work by DeLanda and Protevi, and it
springs out of questions initially posed by Torkild Thanem to DeLanda and
Protevi as well as questions posed by Protevi to DeLanda. Working through
these connections carries some sense of tension. Deleuzian philosophy is a fairly
recent arrivant on the scene of organization theory. Moreover, both DeLanda
and Protevi are outsiders to organization theory, and they both “in their own
distinctive ways” critically rethink and reconstruct Deleuzian philosophy. But
sometimes tension stimulates creativity.

Thanem: Deleuze’s writings (and especially his work with Guattari) remains
marginalized within philosophy proper. What kinds of questions does Deleuzian
thinking enable philosophers to address?
Protevi: First of all, Torkild, let me say I’m very pleased to be asked by Tamara
to partake in this conversation, especially as it includes Manuel DeLanda, from
whose work I’ve learned so much.
DeLanda: Thanks, John. It is rewarding to know I am having some influence on
your generation. As for the question, Deleuze’s main contribution to philosophy,
it seems to me, is to have rescued realism (as an ontological stance) from the
oblivion in which it has been for a century or more. In some philosophical circles
to say that the world exists independently of our minds is tantamount to a capital
crime. Non-realist philosophers (from positivists to phenomenologists) have
created a straw man to kick around: the naive realist, who thinks we have
unmediated access to the external world and who holds a correspondence theory
of truth. So the key move here was to create a viable alternative form of realism
to deprive non-realists of that easy way out. Similarly, when it comes to defend
the autonomy of non-human entities (atoms, molecules, cells, species) the crucial
manoeuvre is to account for their mind-independent identity without bringing
essences into the picture. To take the most obvious example, the real identity of a
hydrogen atom is usually treated by realists (like Bhaskar, for example) as
founded in the possession of an essence, having one proton in its nucleus, given
that if we add another proton it loses its identity and becomes helium. Deleuze’s
process ontology, however, cannot afford to do that. The identity of any real
entity must be accounted for by a process, the process that produced that entity,
in this case, the “manufacturing” processes within stars where hydrogen and
other atoms are produced. When it comes to social science the idea is the same:
families, institutional organizations, cities, nation states are all real entities that are
the product of specific historical processes and whatever degree of identity they
have it must be accounted for via the processes which created them and those
that maintain them.

Protevi: The question of realism is indeed an important one for philosophers to
debate. I wonder if Manuel would like to say something about how he sees the relation

between realism and materialism, since Deleuze and Guattari tend to use
the latter term to describe their work rather than realism?

DeLanda: Well, I cannot imagine a materialist philosophy which is not also realist.
On the other hand, someone who believes that god and the devil exist
independently of our minds is also a realist but clearly not a materialist. The only
problem with the term “materialism” is that not only matter but also energy and
physical information are needed to account for self-organizing phenomena and
the processes which fabricate physical entities. Also, some forms of materialism
may imply reductionism (of the mind to matter, for example) and that is not at all
implied by the term “realism”.
Protevi: Good. I’d certainly agree that fitting materialism into the contrast of
realism and idealism is important. I’d also say that while materialism is often
contrasted with idealism, you could also say that the foil for Deleuze and
Guattari’s materialism is dualism, specifically a spiritualist dualism. So their
materialism is a monism (another way of putting this is to say they demand
immanence rather than transcendence). Spiritualist dualisms have, because of an
impoverished concept of matter as chaotic or passive, too hastily had recourse to
a “hylomorphic” schema in which an organized transcendent agent is
responsible for all production. The problem is how to account for the ordered
and creative nature of bodies and assemblages, for if matter is chaotic, it can’t
account for order, but if it’s passive, it can’t account for creativity. Deleuze and
Guattari’s materialism avoids the forced choice of matter’s chaos or spirit’s
transcendent ordering by calling attention to the self-ordering potentials of matter
itself, as outlined in the researches of complexity theory (as Manuel point out
above, you have expand the sense of “matter” to include the energy and
information of “material systems”). Deleuze and Guattari can thus account for
order and creativity in the world without the heavy ontological price of a dualism
or the unacceptable phenomenal price of the denial of creativity as illusory, as in
“God’s eye view” spiritualist transcendent determinism.
Thanem: During the past decade or so the philosophical thought of Deleuze and
his joint work with Guattari has become increasingly noticed by non-philosophers
across the humanities and social sciences, a trend exemplified by this special issue

of a management journal on Deleuze and Organization Theory. As Deleuze
commentators who may be seen to inhabit the margins of philosophy, how
would you like to comment on the spread of Deleuzian philosophy outside
philosophy?
Protevi: I’m all for it! And I’m sure Deleuze and Guattari would be pleased too,
given their insistence on the “toolbox” character of their work together. Just on
a personal level, working on Deleuze in a French Studies department has freed
me up in many ways, and I suspect my experience is not uncommon in this
regard. First of all, I?m free of the moribund but still powerful ?analytic vs.
continental? philosophy split at a couple of levels. In the micropolitics of North
American philosophy departments someone working on Deleuze is seen as a
“continental” philosopher and so is lumped together with phenomenologists and
post-phenomenologists (Heideggerians, Levinasians, Derrideans, etc.) and
expected to vote with them on hiring and tenure decisions, curriculum
construction, examination questions, and all the daily politics that go on in
academic departments. Being free of all that, and hence free to pursue the
Deleuze and science connection, I find myself actually having more in common
with the “analytic” philosophers in the Philosophy Department of my school.
(There is a deeply entrenched suspicion of science on the part of many
phenomenologists and post-phenomenologists, which is verbally expressed along
the lines of the Heideggerian mantra “science doesn’t think”, but which I suspect
is also tied in with the trauma of the McCarthy era purges in American
philosophy departments, as detailed in John McCumber’s Time in the Ditch.) As
Manuel’s Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, which is largely addressed
to analytic philosophers, shows, the time has come for us to redraw the map of
philosophy along realist vs. anti-realist lines instead of “continental vs. analytic”.
Christopher Norris has been arguing for this for some time now in fact.
DeLanda: Although I have never done any serious study of the propagation of
Deleuzian thought, in my own experience his ideas have had no influence
whatsoever outside literary criticism and cultural studies departments. Since these
two fields are dominated by non-realists (social constructivists, idealists, postmodern
semioticians and so on) it follows that they probably have no real
understanding of Deleuze. For many years the only book of his these people read

was management journal on Deleuze and Organization Theory. As Deleuze
commentators who may be seen to inhabit the margins of philosophy, how
would you like to comment on the spread of Deleuzian philosophy outside
philosophy?

Protevi: I’m all for it! And I’m sure Deleuze and Guattari would be pleased too,
given their insistence on the “toolbox” character of their work together. Just on
a personal level, working on Deleuze in a French Studies department has freed
me up in many ways, and I suspect my experience is not uncommon in this
regard. First of all, I?m free of the moribund but still powerful ?analytic vs.
continental? philosophy split at a couple of levels. In the micropolitics of North
American philosophy departments someone working on Deleuze is seen as a
“continental” philosopher and so is lumped together with phenomenologists and
post-phenomenologists (Heideggerians, Levinasians, Derrideans, etc.) and
expected to vote with them on hiring and tenure decisions, curriculum
construction, examination questions, and all the daily politics that go on in
academic departments. Being free of all that, and hence free to pursue the
Deleuze and science connection, I find myself actually having more in common
with the “analytic” philosophers in the Philosophy Department of my school.
(There is a deeply entrenched suspicion of science on the part of many
phenomenologists and post-phenomenologists, which is verbally expressed along
the lines of the Heideggerian mantra “science doesn’t think”, but which I suspect
is also tied in with the trauma of the McCarthy era purges in American
philosophy departments, as detailed in John McCumber’s Time in the Ditch.) As
Manuel’s Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, which is largely addressed
to analytic philosophers, shows, the time has come for us to redraw the map of
philosophy along realist vs. anti-realist lines instead of “continental vs. analytic”.
Christopher Norris has been arguing for this for some time now in fact.

DeLanda: Although I have never done any serious study of the propagation of
Deleuzian thought, in my own experience his ideas have had no influence
whatsoever outside literary criticism and cultural studies departments. Since these
two fields are dominated by non-realists (social constructivists, idealists, postmodern
semioticians and so on) it follows that they probably have no real
understanding of Deleuze. For many years the only book of his these people read several levels of emergence is crucial.

Protevi: Yes, “emergence” is the biggest question in social science
(methodological individualism, structure/agency, Luhmann’s differentiation of
social structures, and so on). You could say that Deleuze and Guattari bring a
political dimension to bear in their encounter with complexity theory so that they
thematize the question of emergence above the subject to the level of social
(tribal, gang, institutional, urban, State) machines. (Actually, here Manuel’s work
is indispensable, as Deleuze and Guattari themselves tend to jump straight to the
“socius”, which would mean the “State” level in analysing “capitalism”). But
they also show the importance of complementing the move above the subject
with one moving “below” the subject to a multiplicity of “agents” (a move
known in cognitive science as the “society of mind” thesis). Deleuze and
Guattari enable us to connect the two moves, above and below the subject. Here
the question of emergence as the constraint of lower level components and the
concomitant enabling of system level behaviour comes to the fore.

Read the rest of the article here

 

The Seven Quartets of Becoming by Debashish Banerji

The Seven Quartets of Becoming

This book breaks serious new ground in Sri Aurobindo studies. The Record of Yoga is kind of like the Finnegan’s Wake of 20th Century spiritual writing. That is “the Wake” is a tremendous achievement and one of the most important literary works of the 20th century but there is no way to understand it without an interpretive key. The same holds true for the Record of Yoga which is one of the most important spiritual diaries written in the past century.

Not only has the author done an enormous service by providing keys to decode the Record of Yoga that detail Sri Aurobindo’s yogic practice that he defines in his diaries known as the Record of Yoga but, he does this by making it accessible by referencing Sri Aurobindo’s other major works such as The Synthesis of Yoga and The Life Divine. For example:

” Comparing the scheme outlined in the Record of Yoga with The Synthesis of Yoga we find that first three and the last of the quartets of the Record (samata, sakti, vijana, siddhi) are elaborated in the section of the Yoga of Self Perfection in The Synthesis of Yoga.”

Perhaps more importantly the author does not write to simply address followers of Sri Aurobindo but has done an even greater service by attempting to make the Record available to a wider audience by drawing comparisons with the work of several of the most renown philosophers of the late 20th Century including Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and especially Gilles Deleuze who figures most prominently in his analysis of the Record of Yoga.

Contemporary philosophy or theory is now in a post-metaphysical stage given the myriad of problems associated with ideologies that have been spun from worn out metaphysical creeds throughout the 20th century. It is a stroke of genius to analyze Sri Aurobindo’s yoga by employing  the language of Gilles Deleuze because of its relevance to contemporary thought.  Given the fact that The Record of Yoga and Sri Aurobindo’s many other important texts were written close to 1o0 years ago and thus are cloaked in the language of metaphysical idealism, that although appropriate for the times, now represent a discourse largely removed from the necessities of our Post-Metaphysical Age, Banerji has performed an invaluable service for contemporary scholars, theologians as well as followers of integral yoga. Because of the seemingly incommensurable discursive gap between Aurobindo and Deleuze one would never gleam the similarities if someone as skilled as Banerji has not attempted his comparison.

Although Gilles Deleuze was a materialist philosopher his materialist outlook reconciles well with an immanent metaphysics that has many parallels in the yoga of Sri Aurobindo, especially given Aurobindo’s insistence on the transformation of the material world rather than the transcendence of it.

In fact the work will be useful for Deleuze scholars who may uncover a non-reductive praxis for clearing new lines of flight that consciousness may follow toward the unlimited finitude of the Plane of Immanence

The book is dedicated to Richard Hartz who completed the Herculean task of making the diaries of Sri Aurobindo available for the first time and who served as an important guide to the text for Banerji. It is Banerji’s genius however, to have offered an interpretation of the text that both renews Sri Aurobindo’s relevance for 21st century intellectual culture and also provides the follower of Aurobindo’s yoga with an exegesis of the Record of Yoga that enables them to comprehend this extremely important text.

From the Book:

Groomed in a modern academic tradition and post-Enlightenment ideals of creative freedom and social critique, Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) turned his attention to yoga and the limits of consciousness in its ability to relate to and transform nature. In the process, he documented scrupulously his experiments and experiences based on a synergistic existential framework of practice.

 Debashish Banerji correlates the approach to yoga Sri Aurobindo took in his diaries with his later writings, to derive a description of human subjectivity and its powers. Banerji constellates Sri Aurobindo’s approach with transpersonal psychology and contemporary lineages of phenomenology and ontology, to develop a transformative yoga psychology redefining the boundaries and possibilities of the human and opening up lines of self-practice towards a wholeness of being and becoming.

Both scholar and Yogi, Aurobindo (1872-1950) carefully documented the unfolding of spiritual consciousness starting shortly after his deep revelatory experiences while in prison in 1908. His observations were recently published in a two volume set, The Record of Yoga. Debashish Banerji has analyzed this work and offers a detailed, clear, systematic and inspirational interpretation of how the Yoga of Sri Aurobindo may be understood and practiced.

– From the `Foreword’ of

Prof. Christopher Key Chapple

Doshi Professor of Indic and Comparative Theology Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, (USA)

Book Contents

  An Incalculabe Yoga — The Seven Quartets — Revolutionary Impulse — Psychology and its Alter-disciplines — Yoga Psychology and the Integral Movement — Experimental Psychologies —  Post-metaphysical Philosophies —   Postmodernism — The Deleuzian Century — Interlocutors — Objectives1. Integral Yoga Psychology and the Quartet of PerfectionContemporary Social Relevance — The Divine Life: Integral Being and Becoming — The Seven Quartets — The Quartet of Perfection or of Yoga — The Two Traditions — Shuddhi, the Starting Point —  Yoga Philosophy: Vedanta — Samkhya — The Instrument and the Cause,  Karana and Karana — Shuddhi or Purification —  Purification of the Life energy (Prana-shuddhi) — The Mental Instrument — Mukti or Liberation — Bhukti or Enjoyment2. The Quartet of Peace The Progression of Equality — Equality and the Purusha — The Passive Disciplines of Equality — Titiksha — Udasinata: Being Seated Above — Nati — Active Disciplines of Equality — Rasa — Bhoga — Transforming Pain to Bliss — Priti — Ananda — Shanti — Sukham — Hasya3. The Quartet of Power

A Different Relation between Soul and Nature — Gendered Considerations — Relationship with the Divine Mother — Rooted Traditions — The Siddhis of the Shakti Catushtaya —  Viryam: Soul Force and the Fourfold — Personality — The Soul Force of Knowledge —  The Soul Force of Power — The Soul Force of Harmonious Interchange —  The Soul Force of Loving Service — Shakti or Divine Power — Embodying the Divine Shakti — Faith and the Divine Shakti

4. The Quartet of Knowledge 

Three Forms of Knowledge: Adhibhautika, Adhidaivika, Adhyatmika — Four Forms of Knowledge in Supermind: Vijnana, Prajnana, Samjnana, Ajnana — The Intuitive Mind —  The Goals of the Quartet of Knowledge — Cognitive Knowledge: Jnana of Thought —  Cognition: The Lower Doublet — Drishti and Shruti: The Higher — Doublet of Cognition —  Knowledge of Time — Bridging Time and Eternity — Purification of the Sense Mind –   Other Means Towards Trikaladrishti — Siddhis: Justification, Dangers and Use — The Eight Occult — Powers (Ashta-siddhi) — The Powers of Knowledge — The Powers of Will — The Mother’s Yoga of the Cells — Powers of Being — Ontological Identity with the States of Brahman

5. The Quartet of the Body 

Body and Spirit — Freedom from Disease — Awakened Body Consciousness — Stages to Arogya — Physical Immortality — Supermind and the Mind of the Cells —  The Mystic Body and Physical Transformation — Freedom from Laws of Matter — The Physical Pranas —  Stages of Utthapana — Beauty  — Bliss

6. The Quartet of Being 

Non-Dual Seeing and the Vision of Reality — Mind and The Problem of Duality — An Evolutionary Being-in-Becoming — The One and the Infinite — The Passive Brahman — The Active Brahman —  Extending the Oneness — Knowledge — Correspondences —  Bliss, Impersonal and Personal — Transcendental Empiricism

7. The Quartet of Action

Personal Gods and an Integral Karma-Yoga — Krishna — Kali — Purusha and Prakriti — Krishna-Kali and the Delight of Becoming — Work — Choice of Work — Stages Towards True Choice —  Surrender to the Divine Shakti — Kama — Identity in Difference

8. Attitudes of Self-Discipline

Attitudes of Self-Discipline — Resolution and Sincerity — Aspiration — Constant Remembrance — Equality — Purification — Replacements — Faith — Quiet Mind and the Discipline of Speech —  Surrender — The Triple Dasyam

9. The Conditions of Being and Knowledge 

Intuition and Identity — Purusha — Integral Realisation of Brahman — Plurality of Life — Bliss as Origin: Impersonal and Personal — The Divine Master — Evidence of the Senses — The Intuitive Faculties — Purification of the Mental Instrument

10. Power and Enjoyment 

The Goals of Magic — Karma and the Law of Oneness — Delight of Action — The Four Cosmic Powers — Personal Law of Becoming — Adesha and Karma for Sri Aurobindo — Karma and the Four Shaktis —  Capacities of Remote Knowledge and Power — Empiricism of the Records —  Bliss — Krishna-Darshana — Samata

 

 

Wisława Szymborska

Wisława Szymborska

A miracle (what else can you call it):
the sun rose today at three fourteen
a.m.
and will set tonight at one past eight

A miracle that’s lost on us:
the hand actually has fewer than six
fingers
but still it’s got more than four.

A miracle, just take a look around:
the inescapable earth.

An extra miracle, extra and ordinary:
the unthinkable
can be thought.

Click for More Poems

from: The Guardian

When Wisława Szymborska, who has died aged 88, received the Nobel prize for literature in 1996, the Swedish Academy stated the following in its citation: “Her poetry … with ironic precision, allows the historical and biological context to come to light in fragments of human reality.” This aptly sums up the work of a poet whose life spanned the history of Poland in the 20th century and whose detached engagement allowed her to rise above the often turbulent atmosphere of everyday politics.

She was born in Kórnik, western Poland, and moved with her family when she was eight to Kraków, where she went to school and attended the Jagiellonian University, studying Polish literature and sociology. She made her poetic debut in 1945 in the Kraków newspaper Dziennik Polski, but she had to wait until 1952 for her first collection. Subsequently, she regarded this and the collection that followed in 1954, which have been described as socialist realist in style, as largely irrelevant to her later work, although there were indications in them of the ideas she would develop in Wołanie Do Yeti (Calling Out to Yeti, 1957).


Szymborska was an intellectual poet – someone “who thinks about the world through poetry”, according to the critic Jerzy Jarzebski – but also one whose style is not too obscure for the general reader. Her poems are often humorous descriptions of serious or delicate situations. I particularly like her Cat in an Empty Apartment, voicing the views of an offended cat whose owner fails to return, beginning with the line: “Die – you can’t do that to a cat.” Many years ago in Kraków, when I met Szymborska, she was cradling a cat in her lap and I still own a photograph of the scene.

Szymborska’s many awards included the Kallenbach prize from the Koscielski Foundation (1990) and the Goethe prize (1991). When she won the Nobel prize, she announced that she would distribute the money to social projects, and also observed that two other Polish poets, Zbigniew Herbert and Tadeusz Rózewicz, might have been chosen, for they equally deserved it. Last year she received the Order of the White Eagle, one of the highest Polish official decorations. Several of Szymborska’s books have been translated into English, the best selection being View With a Grain of Sand (1995).

• Wisława Szymborska, poet, born 2 July 1923; died 1 February 2012

Re-membering the Posthuman Within/Across Sustainability Paths Anita Girvan

Re-membering the Posthuman Within/Across Sustainability Paths
Anita Girvan

Read this article at Rhizomes

[1] I would like to begin this paper unconventionally by briefly describing two recent experiential vignettes. I hope the reader will indulge this as not a departure from the point, but as a point of departure, to situate the themes that follow.

Vignette One: “Wii” Boxing

Recently at a friend’s house, my family had our first encounter with Wii (notably pronounced “we”), Nintendo’s home game console. After the kids had finished a game of ‘tennis’, one of the hosts enjoined my partner and me to ‘box’ each other. Hesitantly, we agreed and were given the handheld devices that detect motion in three dimensions. This was a far cry from the Pacman and Donkey Kong of my day which required the mastering of a joystick-button combination. All my partner and I had to do was to stand side by side (not facing each other as in traditional boxing) facing the TV, and box in the air. We began swinging and ducking furiously trying to make each of our little animated girl characters (the avatars of the host kids) knock the other one out. Curiously, after one of the avatars had been knocked out, we did not know which one of us had been victorious, since we were not sure to which avatar our remote controller corresponded, but this was actually, dare I say, fun in some strange way! After our match ended, and still being a little unsure of who had won, we noticed that we were both quite warm – it actually had felt like we had exercised. This was yet another difference from Pacman and Donkey Kong. We mused at how great it was that kids could be in front of the TV and get exercise. We also noted how strange it was that our kids were ‘playing’ baseball inside in front of a TV instead of outside. The usual trite comments/ evaluations beginning “In my day…” emerged. I began reflecting more on the particular case of virtual boxing with/against/beside my partner. The inevitable evaluative parental questions emerged followed by a questioning of the reductive tendencies of such evaluations and a feeling of the inadequacy of certain frames of thought: Should I be doing this (in front of my kids)? Is this act endorsing some kind of domestic violence? We would surely not let the kids do it – is this not promoting violence in children? What are the implications of this simulated violence? What is this act enabling or foreclosing? Is it easy to render a decision about what this act is at all? Is Baudrillard’s explication of the contemporary historical moment as ‘simulation and simulacra’ sufficient to explain all of these conflicting thoughts and sensations, or do we need some other terms and concepts to describe these liminal encounters?

Vignette Two: Walking a path of Sustainability

In walking between classes one day on my university campus, I made a diagonal cut across the quadrangle of green space in front of the library. As I stepped from the unyielding pavement onto the turf of spongy grass, I immediately felt ‘different’ and a number of conflicting thoughts/feelings arose. Firstly, the softness of the surface beneath my feet made me want to remove my shoes and socks in order to more proximally feel this sponginess. Then, I remembered the university’s sustainability poster that lists ways in which members of the university community can ensure a sustainable campus. This poster stipulated that we must stay on the marked (human) paths to protect plants, etc. The patterns of human movement in/around this grassy, treed area were particularly interesting to observe. As ‘good’ eco-citizens, we (though not I in that moment) were sticking to the paths of concrete on campus. On the one hand, I felt these efforts toward sustainability were commendable, but on the other hand, I was deeply troubled in that moment by walking on this particular (concrete) path to sustainability. What does it mean to insist that humans stay only on concrete where animals and plants are (generally) not?

[2] The above 2 vignettes may seem unrelated; however, they share certain characteristics that enable a line of thought that framed these two moments as the conjoined twins of a contemporary network of problematics characterized by code, liminality and complexity. Although some may think these ‘straw cases’, I will take license from recent theories of affect that suggest apprehending the world involves not only the traditionally conceived cognition of a singular human subject, but the complex interaction of bodies- feelings-thoughts (Brennan, 2004; Ahmed, 2004; Woodward, 2009). The dynamic surfaces of interaction within both experiences outlined above, led me to think about how the code – of the computer, and of the human path – in each instance was creating certain liminal encounters. These liminal encounters at/across the boundaries of ‘human-human’, ‘human-nature’, and ‘human-computer’ presented ontological quandaries and even greater epistemological conundrums. There are no easy ways to account for these en-coded liminal experiences let alone make a simple judgment or think through what was at stake. Perhaps attempting to think through these digital and ecological surfaces may help to de-code or at least, more accurately, flesh out the complexity of the experience.

How digitality and informatics can inform ecological thought

[3] This paper will focus primarily on the second vignette as an example of the liminal encounters en-coded within sustainability practice; however, some of the foundational theory I present emerges from scholars working in digital theory. Rather than positing a reductively-conceived ‘technology’ as the hubristically human-made enemy of sustainability as does some ecological thought (Zerzan, 2005), I would like to follow up on insights from these liminal experiences which suggest that thinking ecology and digitality in tandem may enable productive critical thought. Rubbing these two seemingly disparate theoretical pursuits together in what Slavov Žižek calls a “short circuit” could produce a generative shift from a purely ecological perspective (2006). This move, however, is more than simply rhetorical; attention to contemporary biopolitical networks reveals that digitality/informatics and ecology/biology are already highly entwined. Eugene Thacker’s The Global Genome highlights the “intersection of biology and informatics” within biotechnology:

If biology is really just pattern code and sequence, then how does this fact change the conventional property relations surrounding biological materiality? How has our understanding of the relationship between organism and environment changed in light of recent networked forms of information? (2005, p. xvi)

Although Thacker’s focus is on genomics, these questions also resonate within ecological thought. Given that our very conceptions of organism and environment have changed in light of informatics, how can theories of digitality enter into productive dialogue with ecological thought? This paper will work through the question within the themes of liminality, code and complexity through the work of Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway. In exploring these themes through particular biopolitical (Foucault, 1978) encodifications within practices of sustainability, we can critically attend to the complex mediations that matter. Finally, I will propose the work of Deleuze and Guattari and others who engage with their geophilosophical cartography as the source of an alternative perspective through which to theorize and practice dynamic, complex assemblages that go beyond the nature/culture divide.

Liminal encounters of the posthuman kind(s): digital and ecological

[4] Katherine Hayles begins exploring notions of liminality and embodiment in her book, How We Became Posthuman (1999). She describes the origins of the notion, posthuman, within the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics in the U.S. in the 1940s and 1950s. The kinds of technologies developed and imagined by Norbert Wiener and his colleagues created some fundamental shifts in perspectives on what constitutes human: “cybernetics intimates that body boundaries are up for grabs” (p. 85). Hayles notes that there has been a tendency to abandon the body altogether within some visions of the digital posthuman, which involve an uploading of consciousness in a quest for individual immortality; however, she offers a more hopeful and inclusive perspective in the concluding chapter of her book:

Although some current versions of posthuman point toward the antihuman and the apocalyptic, we can craft others that will be conducive to the long-range survival of humans and of the other life forms, biological and artificial, with whom we share the planet and ourselves. (p. 291)

Although Hayles does not develop this perspective outlined in the last paragraph of her book, she clearly gestures toward the relevance of the notion within ecological thought. She also leaves raw potential by suggesting in her concluding remarks that “we have always been posthuman” (p. 291). Embedded within this concept of posthuman is the recognition that the category ‘human’ and the biological entity to which it refers have always been constituted by transcutaneous mergings of an extra-human order. Whether we consider the extension of a stone-age human’s appendage through the grasp of a hunting tool; the mobile entity constituted by a bipedal organism mounted on a quadripedal organism; the ocular-solar/celestial interaction of Earthly human navigation, or the human ingestion of other species of plants and animals for sustenance – the inscription of ‘human’ has always been marked by liminal encounters. Clearly, within the last century, the speed and kinds of cross-boundaried experiences present novelty; this ‘quickening’ has enabled a critical engagement with the monadic categories of the human species and of the individual human (subject) that appear problematic not only within digitality and informatics, but also within ecological thought.

[5] Donna Haraway’s work attends to the material and semiotic en-codifications of nature within the situated knowledge of science. She highlights the ways in which “nature’s discursive constitution as ‘other’” (2004 p. 64) has produced narratives of reification and possession. For Haraway, the concept of nature suggests “something we cannot do without, but can never ‘have’” (p 64). Attention to the fallacy of the human/nature binary seems so trite that it need not be mentioned yet again; however, despite a general feeling of the inappropriateness of this binary, it persists in unexpected places (contingently in this paper). Even within the discourse of sustainability which disavows the notion that ‘human’ is outside of ‘nature’, there is still an effort to keep the ‘human’ outside within practices of sustainability. “Perhaps to give confidence in its essential reality, immense resources have been expended to stabilize and materialize nature, to police its/her boundaries” (Haraway, 200 p. 64). Instead of proposing an outright dismissal of the ever-present binary, perhaps we should first attend to how this binary is constituted and how it functions as an executable code in ecological and digital instances.

[6] While the biopolitics of ecological science as practice have received critical attention within the past decade (Darier, 1999; Rutherford, 1999; Smith, 2009), many institutional practices of sustainability still seem to constitute the authority of ecological science and create the conditions for docile bodies that adhere to the navigational paths ascribed to them. Ecosystem theory does aim to account for complex interactions within a given biome; however, certain Linnaean and Darwinian foundational concepts yet limit this science to the study of bounded organisms constituted through somewhat stable taxonomies. This system has an incredible explanatory power and allows for certain remarkable understandings of ‘life’; however, when given univocal authority in practice, ecological science involves the disciplining of life in both an epistemological and a regulatory sense.

[7] Using a Foucauldian perspective to examine ecology and governmentality, Paul Rutherford critically examines how “modern thinking about the natural environment is characterized by the belief that nature can be managed or governed through the application of the scientific principles of ecology” (1999, p.37). Indeed as Foucault’s notion of biopower suggests, the scientific principles of ecology constitute the very ‘life’ that requires and enables management and administration (Foucault, 1978) Such administration of life is evident not only on campuses with sustainability objectives, but also within managed forest parks that are newly deemed to have value through the practices of protective demarcations. One has only to walk through dedicated ‘park’ spaces within the Pacific Northwest region of North America to embody an ontological divide between human and old growth tree. While two decades ago, a ‘human’ could walk up to and touch these trees, within the park spaces, most trees are now off limits. This practice registers the entry of life into history of these trees; as populations to be administered, they are now protected by /from ‘humans’ through the restriction of humans to marked paths. The institutionalized management practices informed by ecological science seem to require this further reduction of complexity; the resulting effect is an inscription of the very binary code that ecological thought expressly challenges. Another by-product of these particular management practices, is the configuration of what Haraway identifies as a kind of “museumification of nature (2004). Like exhibits in the museums of natural history described by Haraway, these encodifications of ecosystems begin to enact an outdoor diorama for the gaze of ‘human’ visitors to an increasingly alienated and alienating ‘nature’. This may be deemed necessary, but the implications of these increasing material-semiotic inscriptions of a binary code need critical attention. Not only do these inscriptions constitute troubling exclusionary future trajectories of separation, they are enabled by a past constitutive exclusion. As Haraway reminds us:

Efforts to preserve “nature” in parks remain fatally troubled by the ineradicable mark of the founding expulsion of those who used to live there, not as innocents in a garden, but as people for whom the categories of nature and culture were not the salient ones. (p. 64)

Many recent studies have demonstrated how this ‘founding expulsion” is often iteratively re-enacted in present eco-system preservation practices through the subjugation of traditional ecological knowledge to the power of ecological science (Shaw, 2004; Magnusson & Shaw, 2003; Nadasdy, 2003).

Code: Computational and Ecological Matters

[8] In My Mother was a Computer (2005), Hayles extends the notion of posthuman by accounting for the contemporary epoch as the Regime of Computation: “Computation does not merely simulate the behavior of complex systems; computation is envisioned as the process that actually generates behavior in everything from biological organisms to human social systems” (p. 19). For Hayles, this regime, the “context in which code takes shape within the worldview of computation” (p. 30) describes an historical moment that is the successor to postmodernism. Two particular traits of the digital code differentiate this system/ worldview from the worldviews of both speech and writing in Hayles’ theory. The first trait is the (in)tolerance of ambiguity and the second is executability.

[9] Hayles first highlights that all three worldviews – speech, writing and code – make meaning through differential relations; however, within the first two worldviews, meaning is often generated in ambiguous and indeterminate ways. In a digital code-centric worldview, difference generates meaning at the level of binary code of zeros and ones. At the binary level “the system can tolerate little if any ambiguity” (p. 45). Hayles goes on to admit that slight ambiguity exists within “noise” produced in the voltage trail off- errors; however, these are “rectified into unambiguous signals of one and zero before they enter the bit stream … no matter how sophisticated the program … all commands must be parsed as binary code to be intelligible to the machine” (p. 45).

[10] The other trait that differentiates code from speech and writing pertains to executability. In some instances, language has a degree of performativity, but not to the same extent as computer code:

Code that runs on a machine is performative in a much stronger sense than that attributed to language. When language is said to be performative, the kinds of actions it “performs” happen in the minds of humans, as when someone says “I declare this legislative session open”…Granted, these changes in minds can and do result in behavioral changes, but the performative force of language is nonetheless tied to the external changes through complex chains of mediation. By contrast, code running in a digital computer causes changes in machine behavior… (p. 50)

Unlike other language, computer code is always “executable language” that causes immediate changes in the behavior of a machine.

[11] For the purposes of critical reflexivity, I would like to suggest the inscription of the human/nature bounded sustainability path as ‘code’. While many obvious differences remain between these two forms of code, three key similarities emerge. Firstly, as previously mentioned, the binary code of zeros and ones of the computer system is suggestive of the binary code of humans and natures within the navigational system of a marked path. Secondly, because of this system of binary intelligibility, there is little tolerance of ambiguity. The stakes are not the same for a computer system and for a concrete path, and one can still be read as ‘human’ even if one steps off of the path; however, diverging from the path marks a systemic transgression of the code. This transgression is not tolerated at least at the level of norms and discourse of sustainability, if not yet policed by juridico-political mechanisms. Lastly, this path can be equated with ‘code’ through a form of executability. Like the computer system in which code executes behavioral changes in the computer system, so does a navigational path produce behavioral changes. I do not mean to reductively insinuate that there is never room for “desire paths” – the paths named by French architect Gaston Bachelard referring to the shortest lines from ‘point A to point B’ eroded by human navigation practices; however, observation of human navigational behavior and the lack of desire paths in this instance on campus reveals that humans are generally executing the binary code within a computational regime of sustainability. As Hayles suggests, in the regime of computation, ‘code’ can be understood not simply as a computer language or a metaphorical extension of that language, but additionally, as the very site of life-making in the digitally and analogically entangled world. “In the worldview of code, materiality matters” (2005, p. 43).

Intermediation, Complexity and Embodied Emergence

[12] Hayles offers the term intermediation as a way of describing the “complex and entangled interactions” of the worldviews of code, speech and writing (2005, p. 31). Although her research focuses on the dynamics of narratives in literature, and digitality and the materializing effects of the intermediation of code, speech and writing, the notion of intermediation appropriately describes liminal encounters of the ecological kind as well:

An important aspect of intermediation is the recursivity implicit in the coproduction and coevolution of multiple causalities. Complex feedback loops connect humans and machines, old technologies and new, language and code, analog processes and digital fragmentations. Although these feedback loops evolve over time and thus have a historical trajectory that arcs from one point to another, it is important not to make the mistake of privileging any one point as the primary locus of attention, which can easily result in flattening complex interactions back into linear causal chains. (p. 31)

Fundamental to this understanding of intermediation is the recognition of the constitutive complexity within entangled systems and networks. As earlier noted, Hayles highlights the propensity within cybernetics to focus on information at the expense of the body. In attending to the intermediation within complex networks, she returns to the importance of embodiment. The particular configurations and material properties of liminal encounters – their embodiments – have a recursive impact and world-making potential.

[13] Haraway similarly draws attention to embodiments as sites of intermediation and complexity within biological frames. She highlights the mediating effects of the social and political aspects of embodiments as well as the biological:

Organisms are biological embodiments …[that] emerge from a discursive process… Always radically historically specific, always lively, bodies have a different kind of specificity and effectivity; and so invite a different kind of engagement and intervention. (p. 67)

Haraway’s work reveals the locus of intervention in material-semiotic relations. Her theoretical attention to material-semiotic figurations is co-productive with Hayles’ account of the intermediation within dynamic relations of information and embodiment where the semiotic maps onto information and meaning and the material maps onto embodiment. Both theorists attempt to recover complexity by emphasizing dynamic relations and emergence.

[14] With her focus on digital systems, Hayles has a keen interest in how emergence characterizes complex systems. In systems theory, emergence describes the appearance of behaviors within the system that arise not from elements of the system, but from the intermediation of those elements in unpredictable ways. Hayles also describes ‘second-order’ emergence which “arises when a system develops a behavior that enhances its ability to develop adaptive behaviors – that is, when it evolves the capacity to evolve” (p. 198). Hayles’ recent research suggests this second order emergence at work within the regime of computation. She highlights evidence among recent generations who have grown up ‘plugged in’ digitally, that latent brain capacities are being awakened and developed. Those who were formed partly within the silicon schools of the computer game-world may especially have greater capacities in the area of spatial awareness (Hayles, 2008). This change has marked an unprecedented kind of accelerated biophysical adaptation to/within digital environments. If this digital code is having such an unanticipated material-biological impact, then we must take seriously the implications within the complex digital-social-ecological entanglements that will materialize the world from iterative feedback loops. Recombinant digital-ecological regimes enact changing virtualities.

Read the rest of this article at Rhizomes Journal

Between Roses in Mumbai by Katherine Boo

Between Roses in Mumbai

Katherine Boo

From The New York Review of Book

Midnight was closing in, the one-legged woman was grievously burned, and the Mumbai police were coming for Abdul and his father. In a slum hut by the international airport, Abdul’s parents came to a decision with an uncharacteristic economy of words. The father, a sick man, would wait inside the trash-strewn, tin-roofed shack where the family of eleven resided. He’d go quietly when arrested. Abdul, the household earner, was the one who had to flee.

Abdul’s opinion of this plan had not been solicited, typically. Already he was mule-brained with panic. He was sixteen years old, or maybe nineteen—his parents were hopeless with dates. Allah, in His impenetrable wisdom, had cut him small and jumpy. A coward: Abdul said it of himself. He knew nothing about eluding policemen. What he knew about, mainly, was trash. For nearly all the waking hours of nearly all the years he could remember, he’d been buying and selling to recyclers the things that richer people threw away.

Now Abdul grasped the need to disappear, but beyond that his imagination flagged. He took off running, then came back home. The only place he could think to hide was in his garbage.

He cracked the door of the family hut and looked out. His home sat midway down a row of hand-built, spatchcock dwellings; the lopsided shed where he stowed his trash was just next door. To reach this shed unseen would deprive his neighbors of the pleasure of turning him in to the police.

He didn’t like the moon, though: full and stupid bright, illuminating a dusty open lot in front of his home. Across the lot were the shacks of two dozen other families, and Abdul feared he wasn’t the only person peering out from behind the cover of a plywood door. Some people in this slum wished his family ill because of the old Hindu–Muslim resentments. Others resented his family for the modern reason, economic envy. Doing waste work that many Indians found contemptible, Abdul had lifted his large family above subsistence.

The open lot was quiet, at least—freakishly so. A kind of beachfront for a vast pool of sewage that marked the slum’s eastern border, the place was bedlam most nights: people fighting, cooking, flirting, bathing, tending goats, playing cricket, waiting for water at a public tap, lining up outside a little brothel, or sleeping off the effects of the grave-digging liquor dispensed from a hut two doors down from Abdul’s own. The pressures that built up in crowded huts on narrow slumlanes had only this place, the maidan, to escape. But after the fight, and the burning of the woman called the One Leg, people had retreated to their huts.

Now, among the feral pigs, water buffalo, and the usual belly-down splay of alcoholics, there seemed to be just one watchful presence: a small, unspookable boy from Nepal. He was sitting, arms around knees, in a spangly blue haze by the sewage lake—the reflected neon signage of a luxury hotel across the water. Abdul didn’t mind if the Nepali boy saw him go into hiding. This kid, Adarsh, was no spy for the police. He just liked to stay out late, to avoid his mother and her nightly rages.

It was as safe a moment as Abdul was going to get. He bolted for the trash shed and closed the door behind him.

Inside was carbon-black, frantic with rats, and yet relieving. His storeroom—120 square feet, piled high to a leaky roof with the things in this world Abdul knew how to handle. Empty water and whiskey bottles, mildewed newspapers, used tampon applicators, wadded aluminum foil, umbrellas stripped to the ribs by monsoons, broken shoelaces, yellowed Q-tips, snarled cassette tape, torn plastic casings that once held imitation Barbies. Somewhere in the darkness, there was a Berbee or Barblie itself, maimed in one of the experiments to which children who had many toys seemed to subject those toys no longer favored. Abdul had become expert, over the years, at minimizing distraction. He placed all such dolls in his trash pile tits-down.

Avoid trouble. This was the operating principle of Abdul Hakim Husain, an idea so fiercely held that it seemed imprinted on his physical form. He had deep-set eyes and sunken cheeks, a body work-hunched and wiry—the type that claimed less than its fair share of space when threading through people-choked slumlanes. Almost everything about him was recessed save the pop-out ears and the hair that curled upward, girlish, whenever he wiped his forehead of sweat.

A modest, missable presence was a useful thing in Annawadi, the sumpy plug of slum in which he lived. Here, in the thriving western suburbs of the Indian financial capital, three thousand people had packed into, or on top of, 335 huts. It was a continual coming-and-going of migrants from all over India—Hindus mainly, from all manner of castes and subcastes. His neighbors represented beliefs and cultures so various that Abdul, one of the slum’s three dozen Muslims, could not begin to understand them. He simply recognized Annawadi as a place booby-trapped with contentions, new and ancient, over which he was determined not to trip. For Annawadi was also magnificently positioned for a trafficker in rich people’s garbage.

Abdul and his neighbors were squatting on land that belonged to the Airports Authority of India. Only a coconut-tree-lined thoroughfare separated the slum from the entrance to the international terminal. Serving the airport clientele, and encircling Annawadi, were five extravagant hotels: four ornate, marbly megaliths and one sleek blue-glass Hyatt, from the top-floor windows of which Annawadi and several adjacent squatter settlements looked like villages that had been airdropped into gaps between elegant modernities.

“Everything around us is roses” is how Abdul’s younger brother, Mirchi, put it. “And we’re the shit in between.”

In the new century, as India’s economy grew faster than any other but China’s, pink condominiums and glass office towers had shot up near the international airport. One corporate office was named, simply, “More.” More cranes for making more buildings, the tallest of which interfered with the landing of more and more planes: it was a smogged-out, prosperity-driven obstacle course up there in the over-city, from which wads of possibility had tumbled down to the slums.

Every morning, thousands of waste-pickers fanned out across the airport area in search of vendible excess—a few pounds of the eight thousand tons of garbage that Mumbai was extruding daily. These scavengers darted after crumpled cigarette packs tossed from cars with tinted windows. They dredged sewers and raided dumpsters for empty bottles of water and beer. Each evening, they returned down the slum road with gunny sacks of garbage on their backs, like a procession of broken-toothed, profit-minded Santas.

Abdul would be waiting at his rusty scale. In the hierarchy of the undercity’s waste business, the teenager was a notch above the scavengers: a trader who appraised and bought what they found. His profit came from selling the refuse in bulk to small recycling plants a few miles away.

Abdul’s mother was the haggler in the family, raining vibrant abuse upon scavengers who asked too much for their trash. For Abdul, words came stiff and slow. Where he excelled was in the sorting—the crucial, exacting process of categorizing the purchased waste into one of sixty kinds of paper, plastic, metal, and the like, in order to sell it.

Of course he would be fast. He’d been sorting since he was about six years old, because tuberculosis and garbage work had wrecked his father’s lungs. Abdul’s motor skills had developed around his labor.

“You didn’t have the mind for school, anyway,” his father had recently observed. Abdul wasn’t sure he’d had enough schooling to make a judgment either way. In the early years, he’d sat in a classroom where nothing much happened. Then there had been only work. Work that churned so much filth into the air it turned his snot black. Work more boring than dirty. Work he expected to be doing for the rest of his life. Most days, that prospect weighed on him like a sentence. Tonight, hiding from the police, it felt like a hope.

The smell of the One Leg’s burning was fainter in the shed, given the competing stink of trash and the fear-sweat that befouled Abdul’s clothing. He stripped, hiding his pants and shirt behind a brittle stack of newspapers near the door.

His best idea was to climb to the top of his eight-foot tangle of garbage, then burrow in against the back wall, as far as possible from the door. He was agile, and in daylight could scale this keenly balanced mound in fifteen seconds. But a misstep in the dark would cause a landslide of bottles and cans, which would broadcast his whereabouts widely, since the walls between huts were thin and shared.

To Abdul’s right, disconcertingly, came quiet snores: a laconic cousin newly arrived from a rural village, who probably assumed that women burned in the city every day. Moving left, Abdul felt around the blackness for a mass of blue polyurethane bags. Dirt magnets, those bags. He hated sorting them. But he recalled tossing the bundled bags onto a pile of soggy cardboard—the stuff of a silent climb.

He found the bags and flattened boxes by the side wall, the one that divided his shed from his home. Hoisting himself up, he waited. The cardboard compressed, the rats made rearrangements, but nothing metal clattered to the floor. Now he could use the side wall for balance as he considered his next step.

Someone was shuffling on the other side of the wall. His father, most likely. He’d be out of his nightclothes now, wearing the polyester shirt that hung loose on his shoulders, probably studying a palmful of tobacco. The man had been playing with his tobacco all evening, fingering it into circles, triangles, circles again. It was what he did when he didn’t know what he was doing.

A few more steps, some unhelpful clanking, and Abdul had gained the back wall. He lay down. Now he regretted not having his pants. Mosquitoes. The edges of torn clamshell packaging, slicing into the backs of his thighs.

The burn-smell lingering in the air was bitter, more kerosene and melted sandal than flesh. Had Abdul happened across it in one of the slumlanes, he wouldn’t have doubled over. It was orange blossoms compared with the rotting hotel food dumped nightly at Annawadi, which sustained three hundred shit-caked pigs. The problem in his stomach came from knowing what, and who, the smell was.

Abdul had known the One Leg since the day, eight years back, that his family had arrived in Annawadi. He’d had no choice but to know her, since only a sheet had divided her shack from his own. Even then, her smell had troubled him. Despite her poverty, she perfumed herself somehow. Abdul’s mother, who smelled of breast milk and fried onions, disapproved.

The Annawadi slum, with the Hyatt hotel in the background, February 2009

In the sheet days, as now, Abdul believed his mother, Zehrunisa, to be right about most things. She was tender and playful with her children, and her only great flaw, in the opinion of Abdul, her eldest son, was the language she used when haggling. Although profane bargaining was the norm in the waste business, he felt his mother acceded to that norm with too much relish.

“Stupid pimp with the brain of a lemon!” she’d say in mock outrage. “You think my babies will go hungry without your cans? I ought to take down your pants and slice off what little is inside!”

This, from a woman who’d been raised in some nowhere of a village to be burqa-clad, devout.

Abdul considered himself “old-fashioned, 90 percent,” and censured his mother freely. “And what would your father say, to hear you cursing in the street?”

“He would say the worst,” Zehrunisa replied one day, “but he was the one who sent me off to marry a sick man. Had I sat quietly in the house, the way my mother did, all these children would have starved.”

Abdul didn’t dare voice the great flaw of his father, Karam Husain: too sick to sort much garbage, not sick enough to stay off his wife. The Wahhabi sect in which he’d been raised opposed birth control, and of Zehrunisa’s ten births, nine children had survived.

Zehrunisa consoled herself, each pregnancy, that she was producing a workforce for the future. Abdul was the workforce of the present, though, and new brothers and sisters increased his anxiety. He made errors, paid scavengers dearly for sacks of worthless things.

“Slow down,” his father had told him gently. “Use your nose, mouth, and ears, not just your scales.” Tap the metal scrap with a nail. Its ring will tell you what it’s made of. Chew the plastic to identify its grade. If it’s hard plastic, snap it in half and inhale. A fresh smell indicates good-quality polyurethane.

Abdul had learned. One year, there was enough to eat. Another year, there was more of a home to live in. The sheet was replaced by a divider made of scraps of aluminum and, later, a wall of reject bricks, which established his home as the sturdiest dwelling in the row. The feelings that washed over him when he considered the brick divider were several: pride; fear that the quality of the bricks was so poor the wall would crumble; sensory relief. There was now a three-inch barrier between him and the One Leg, who took lovers while her husband was sorting garbage elsewhere.

In recent months, Abdul had had occasion to register her only when she clinked past on her metal crutches, heading for the market or the public toilet. The One Leg’s crutches seemed to be too short, because when she walked, her butt stuck out—did some switchy thing that made people laugh. The lipstick provided further hilarity. She draws on that face just to squat at the shit-hole? Some days the lips were orange, other days purple-red, as if she’d climbed the jamun-fruit tree by the Hotel Leela and mouthed it clean.

The One Leg’s given name was Sita. She had fair skin, usually an asset, but the runt leg had smacked down her bride price. Her Hindu parents had taken the single offer they got: poor, unattractive, hardworking, Muslim, old—“half-dead, but who else wanted her,” as her mother had once said with a frown. The unlikely husband renamed her Fatima, and from their mismating had come three scrawny girls. The sickliest daughter had drowned in a bucket, at home. Fatima did not seem to grieve, which got people talking. After a few days she reemerged from her hut, still switchy-hipped and staring at men with her gold-flecked, unlowering eyes.

There was too much wanting at Annawadi lately, or so it seemed to Abdul. As India began to prosper, old ideas about accepting the life assigned by one’s caste or one’s divinities were yielding to a belief in earthly reinvention. Annawadians now spoke of better lives casually, as if fortune were a cousin arriving on Sunday, as if the future would look nothing like the past.

Abdul’s brother Mirchi did not intend to sort garbage. He envisioned wearing a starched uniform and reporting to work at a luxury hotel. He’d heard of waiters who spent all day putting toothpicks into pieces of cheese, or aligning knives and forks on tables. He wanted a clean job like that. “Watch me!” he’d once snapped at their mother. “I’ll have a bathroom as big as this hut!”

The dream of Raja Kamble, a sickly toilet-cleaner who lived on the lane behind Abdul’s, was of medical rebirth. A new valve to fix his heart and he’d survive to finish raising his children. Fifteen-year-old Meena, whose hut was around the corner, craved a taste of the freedom and adventure she’d seen on TV serials, instead of an arranged marriage and domestic submission. Sunil, an undersized twelve-year-old scavenger, wanted to eat enough to start growing. Asha, a fightercock of a woman who lived by the public toilet, was differently ambitious. She longed to be Annawadi’s first female slumlord, then ride the city’s inexorable corruption into the middle class. Her teenaged daughter, Manju, considered her own aim more noble: to become Annawadi’s first female college graduate.

The most preposterous of these dreamers was the One Leg. Everyone thought so. Her abiding interest was in extramarital sex, though not for pocket change alone. That, her neighbors would have understood. But the One Leg also wanted to transcend the affliction by which others had named her. She wanted to be respected and reckoned attractive. Annawadians considered such desires inappropriate for a cripple.

What Abdul wanted was this: a wife, innocent of words like pimp and sisterfucker, who didn’t much mind how he smelled; and eventually a home somewhere, anywhere, that was not Annawadi. Like most people in the slum, and in the world, for that matter, he believed his own dreams properly aligned to his capacities.

The police were in Annawadi, coming across the maidan toward his home. It had to be the police. No slumdweller spoke as confidently as this.

Abdul’s family knew many of the officers at the local station, just enough to fear them all. When they learned that a family in the slum was making money, they visited every other day to extort some. The worst of the lot had been Constable Pawar, who had brutalized little Deepa, a homeless girl who sold flowers by the Hyatt. But most of them would gladly blow their noses in your last piece of bread.

Abdul had been bracing for this moment when the officers crossed his family’s threshold—for the sounds of small children screaming, of steel vessels violently upended. But the two officers were perfectly calm, even friendly, as they relayed the salient facts. The One Leg had survived and had made an accusation from her hospital bed: that Abdul, his older sister, and their father had beaten her and set her on fire.

Later, Abdul would recall the officers’ words penetrating the storeroom wall with a fever-dream slowness. So his sister Kehkashan was being accused, too. For this, he wished the One Leg dead. Then he wished he hadn’t wished it. If the One Leg died, his family would be even more screwed.

To be poor in Annawadi, or in any Mumbai slum, was to be guilty of one thing or another. Abdul sometimes bought pieces of metal that scavengers had stolen. He ran a business, such as it was, without a license. Simply living in Annawadi was illegal, since the airport authority wanted squatters like himself off its land. But he and his family had not burned the One Leg. She had set herself on fire.

Abdul’s father was professing the family’s innocence in his breathy, weak-lunged voice as the officers led him out of the house. “So where is your son?” one of them demanded loudly as they stood outside the storeroom door. The officer’s volume was not in this instance a show of power. He was trying to be heard over Abdul’s mother, wailing.

Zehrunisa Husain was a tear-factory even on good days; it was one of her chief ways of starting conversations. But now her children’s sobbing intensified her own. The little Husains’ love for their father was simpler than Abdul’s love for him, and they would remember the night the police came to take him away.

Time passed. Wails subsided. “He’ll be back in half an hour,” his mother was telling the children in a high-pitched singsong, one of her lying tones. Abdul took heart in the words be back. After arresting his father, the police had apparently left Annawadi.

Abdul couldn’t rule out the possibility that the officers would return to search for him. But from what he knew of the energy levels of Mumbai policemen, it was more likely that they would call it a night. That gave him three or four more hours of darkness in which to plan an escape more sensible than a skulk to the hut next door.

He didn’t feel incapable of daring. One of his private vanities was that all the garbage sorting had endowed his hands with killing strength—that he could chop a brick in half like Bruce Lee. “So let’s get a brick,” replied a girl with whom he had once, injudiciously, shared this conviction. Abdul had bumbled away. The brick belief was something he wanted to harbor, not to test.

His brother Mirchi, two years younger, was braver by a stretch, and wouldn’t have hidden in the storeroom. Mirchi liked the Bollywood movies in which bare-chested outlaws jumped out of high windows and ran across the roofs of moving trains, while the policemen in pursuit fired and failed to hit their marks. Abdul took all dangers, in all films, overseriously. He was still living down the night he’d accompanied another boy to a shed a mile away, where pirated videos played. The movie had been about a mansion with a monster in its basement—an orange-furred creature that fed on human flesh. When it ended, he’d had to pay the proprietor twenty rupees to let him sleep on the floor, because his legs were too stiff with fear to walk home.

As ashamed as he felt when other boys witnessed his fearfulness, Abdul thought it irrational to be anything else. While sorting newspapers or cans, tasks that were a matter more of touch than of sight, he studied his neighbors instead. The habit killed time and gave him theories, one of which came to prevail over the others. It seemed to him that in Annawadi, fortunes derived not just from what people did, or how well they did it, but from the accidents and catastrophes they dodged. A decent life was the train that hadn’t hit you, the slumlord you hadn’t offended, the malaria you hadn’t caught. And while he regretted not being smarter, he believed he had a quality nearly as valuable for the circumstances in which he lived. He was chaukanna, alert.

My eyes can see in all directions” was another way he put it. He believed he could anticipate calamity while there was still time to get out of the way. The One Leg’s burning was the first time he’d been blindsided.

What time was it? A neighbor named Cynthia was in the maidan, shouting, “Why haven’t the police arrested the rest of this family?” Cynthia was close to Fatima the One Leg, and had despised Abdul’s family ever since her own family garbage business failed. “Let’s march on the police station, make the officers come and take them,” she called out to the other residents. From inside Abdul’s home came only silence.

After a while, mercifully, Cynthia shut up. There didn’t seem to be a groundswell of public support for the protest march, just irritation at Cynthia for waking everyone up. Abdul felt the night’s tension finally thinning, until steel pots began banging all around him. Startling up, he was confused.

Golden light was seeping through the cracks in a door. Not the door of his storeroom. A door it took a minute to place. Pants back on, he seemed to be on the floor of the hut of a young Muslim cook who lived across the maidan. It was morning. The clangor around him was Annawadians in adjacent huts, making breakfast.

When and why had he crossed the maidan to this hut? Panic had ripped a hole in his memory, and Abdul would never be certain of the final hours of this night. The only clear thing was that in the gravest situation of his life, a moment demanding courage and enterprise, he had stayed in Annawadi and fallen asleep.

At once, he knew his course of action: to find his mother. Having proved himself useless as a fugitive, he needed her to tell him what to do.

“My eyes can see in all directions” was another way he put it. He believed he could anticipate calamity while there was still time to get out of the way. The One Leg’s burning was the first time he’d been blindsided.

What time was it? A neighbor named Cynthia was in the maidan, shouting, “Why haven’t the police arrested the rest of this family?” Cynthia was close to Fatima the One Leg, and had despised Abdul’s family ever since her own family garbage business failed. “Let’s march on the police station, make the officers come and take them,” she called out to the other residents. From inside Abdul’s home came only silence.

After a while, mercifully, Cynthia shut up. There didn’t seem to be a groundswell of public support for the protest march, just irritation at Cynthia for waking everyone up. Abdul felt the night’s tension finally thinning, until steel pots began banging all around him. Startling up, he was confused.

Golden light was seeping through the cracks in a door. Not the door of his storeroom. A door it took a minute to place. Pants back on, he seemed to be on the floor of the hut of a young Muslim cook who lived across the maidan. It was morning. The clangor around him was Annawadians in adjacent huts, making breakfast.

When and why had he crossed the maidan to this hut? Panic had ripped a hole in his memory, and Abdul would never be certain of the final hours of this night. The only clear thing was that in the gravest situation of his life, a moment demanding courage and enterprise, he had stayed in Annawadi and fallen asleep.

At once, he knew his course of action: to find his mother. Having proved himself useless as a fugitive, he needed her to tell him what to do.

“Go fast,” said Zehrunisa Husain, upon issuing her instructions. “Fast as you can!”

Abdul grabbed a fresh shirt and flew. Across the clearing, down a zigzag lane of huts, out onto a rubbled road. Garbage and water buffalo, slum-side. Glimmerglass Hyatt on the other. Fumbling with shirt buttons as he ran. After two hundred yards he gained the wide thoroughfare that led to the airport, which was bordered by blooming gardens, pretties of a city he barely knew.

Butterflies, even: he blew past them and hooked into the airport. Arrivals down. Departures up. He went a third way, running beside a long stretch of blue-and-white aluminum fencing, behind which jackhammers blasted, excavating the foundations of a glamorous new terminal. Abdul had occasionally tried to monetize the terminal’s security perimeter. Two aluminum panels, swiped and sold, and a garbage boy could rest for a year.

He kept moving, made a hard right at a field of black and yellow taxis gleaming in a violent morning sun. Another right, into a shady curve of driveway, a leafy bough hanging low across it. One more right and he was inside the Sahar Police Station.

Zehrunisa had read her son’s face: this boy was too anxious to hide from the police. Her own fear, upon waking, was that the officers would beat her husband as punishment for Abdul’s escape. It was the eldest son’s duty to protect a sick father from that.

Abdul would do his duty, and almost, almost gladly. Hiding was what guilty people did; being innocent, he wanted the fact stamped on his forehead. So what else to do but submit himself to the stamping authorities—to the law, to justice, concepts in which his limited history had given him no cause to believe? He would try to believe in them now.

A police officer in epauletted khaki was splodged behind a gray metal desk. Seeing Abdul, he rose up, surprised. His lips, under his mustache, were fat and fishlike, and Abdul would remember them later—the way they parted a little before he smiled.