Not Crushed, Merely Ignored (on the recent killings in Kashmir) by Tariq Ali

Tariq Ali

The London Review of Books

Not Crushed, Merely Ignored

Tariq Ali on the recent killings in Kashmir

A Kashmiri lawyer rang me last week in an agitated state. Had I heard about the latest tragedies in Kashmir? I had not. He was stunned. So was I when he told me in detail what had been taking place there over the last three weeks. As far as I could see, none of the British daily papers or TV news bulletins had covered the story; after I met him I rescued two emails from Kashmir informing me of the horrors from my spam box. I was truly shamed. The next day I scoured the press again. Nothing. The only story in the Guardian from the paper’s Delhi correspondent – a full half-page – was headlined: ‘Model’s death brings new claims of dark side to India’s fashion industry’. Accompanying the story was a fetching photograph of the ill-fated woman. The deaths of (at that point) 11 young men between the ages of 15 and 27, shot by Indian security forces in Kashmir, weren’t mentioned. Later I discovered that a short report had appeared in the New York Times on 28 June and one the day after in the Guardian; there has been no substantial follow-up. When it comes to reporting crimes committed by states considered friendly to the West, atrocity fatigue rapidly kicks in. A few facts have begun to percolate through, but they are likely to be read in Europe and the US as just another example of Muslims causing trouble, with the Indian security forces merely doing their duty, if in a high-handed fashion. The failure to report on the deaths in Kashmir contrasts strangely with the overheated coverage of even the most minor unrest in Tibet, leave alone Tehran.

On 11 June this year, the Indian paramilitaries known as the Central Reserve Police Force fired tear-gas canisters at demonstrators, who were themselves protesting about earlier killings. One of the canisters hit 17-year-old Tufail Ahmad Mattoo on the head. It blew out his brains. After a photograph was published in the Kashmiri press, thousands defied the police and joined his funeral procession the next day, chanting angry slogans and pledging revenge. The photograph was ignored by the mainstream Indian press and the country’s celebrity-trivia-obsessed TV channels. As I write, the Kashmiri capital, Srinagar, and several other towns are under strict military curfew. Whenever it is lifted, however briefly, young men pour out onto the streets to protest and are greeted with tear gas. In most of the province there has been an effective general strike for more than three weeks. All shops are closed.

An ugly anti-Muslim chauvinism accompanies India’s violence. It has been open season on Muslims since 9/11, when the liberation struggle in Kashmir was conveniently subsumed under the war on terror and Israeli military officers were invited to visit Akhnur military base in the province and advise on counter-terrorism measures. The website India Defense noted in September 2008 that ‘Maj-Gen Avi Mizrahi paid an unscheduled visit to the disputed state of Kashmir last week to get an up-close look at the challenges the Indian military faces in its fight against Islamic insurgents. Mizrahi was in India for three days of meetings with the country’s military brass and to discuss a plan the IDF is drafting for Israeli commandos to train Indian counterterror forces.’ Their advice was straightforward: do as we do in Palestine and buy our weapons. In the six years since 2002 New Delhi had purchased $5 billion-worth of weaponry from the Israelis, to good effect.

Demonstrations against Indian security forces escalated in early June this year when it was revealed in the extra-alert Kashmiri press that three young men – Mohammed Shafi, Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Riyaz Ahmad – had been executed in April by Indian army officers. A colonel and a major were suspended from duty, a rare enough event, suggesting that their superiors knew exactly what had taken place. The colonel claimed that the young men were separatist militants who had been killed in an ‘encounter’ near the Line of Control (the border between Indian-controlled and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir). This account is regarded by local police as pure fiction.

An Amnesty International letter to the Indian prime minister in 2008 listed his country’s human rights abuses in Kashmir and called for an independent inquiry, claiming that ‘grave sites are believed to contain the remains of victims of unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, torture and other abuses which occurred in the context of armed conflict persisting in the state since 1989. The graves of at least 940 persons have reportedly been found in 18 villages in Uri district alone.’ A local NGO, the International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian-Administered Kashmir (IPTK), states that extrajudicial killings and torture are a commonplace in the valley and that Western institutions don’t even try to do anything about this for fear of damaging relations with New Delhi. The figures provided by the IPTK are startling. It claims that the Indian military occupation of Kashmir ‘between 1989-2009 has resulted in 70,000+ deaths’. The report disputes claims that these killings are aberrations. On the contrary, they are part of the occupation process, considered as ‘acts of service’, and leading to promotion and financial reward (bounty is paid after claims made by officers are verified). In this dirty and enduring conflict, more than half a million ‘military and paramilitary personnel [more than the number of US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan combined] continue to act with impunity to regulate movement, law and order across Kashmir. The Indian state itself, through its legal, political and military actions, has demonstrated the existence of a state of continuing conflict within Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.’

Public opinion in India is mute. The parties of the left prefer to avoid the subject for fear that political rivals will question their patriotism. Kashmir is never spoken of, and has never been allowed to speak. With its Muslim majority it wasn’t permitted a referendum in 1947 to determine which of the two countries it wished to be part of. In 1984, when Indira Gandhi was the Indian prime minister, I asked her why she had not taken advantage of the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 (when Kashmiris had watched with horror how the Pakistan army treated their coreligionists) and allowed a referendum. She remained silent. I pointed out that even Farooq Abdullah, the chief minister of Kashmir, was convinced that India would win if a democratic election were held. Her face had clouded. ‘He’s completely untrustworthy.’ I had to agree, but her refusal to contemplate the Kashmiri self-determination promised by her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, was troubling. These days the very suggestion seems utopian.

The Abdullah dynasty continues to hold power in Kashmir and is keen to collaborate with New Delhi and enrich itself. I rang a journalist in Srinagar and asked him about the current chief minister, Omar Abdullah, a callow and callous youth whose only claim to office is dynastic. ‘Farooq Abdullah,’ he told me, ‘is our Asif Ali Zardari when it comes to corruption. Now he’s made his son chief minister so that he can concentrate on managing his various businesses.’ The opposition isn’t much better. Some Kashmiris, the journalist said, call Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the effective leader of the opposition, and his cronies ‘double agents. That is, they are taking money from Pakistan and India.’ He is the 12th ‘mirwaiz’, the self-appointed spiritual leaders of the Muslims in the Kashmir Valley, and is adept at playing both sides. ‘Mirwaiz’s security outside his house is provided by the Indian state,’ a friend in Srinagar told me, ‘his wife is Kashmiri American, he lives very comfortably (without any source of income) and he is engaged in secret talks with India, news of which is constantly leaked. Furthermore, he also makes an annual pilgrimage to Pakistan to keep that channel open as well. He hangs out with “separatists” in Kashmir who are open to being used by both India and Pakistan, for a good price of course. The Indian authorities do not have to do much to crush Kashmiris while there are people like Mirwaiz. So, all in all, our leadership is working against us. India has always used this to its advantage.’

The Zardari government is silent on the issue of Kashmir and there has been little media reaction in Pakistan to the recent killings. For the ruling elite Kashmir is just a bargaining counter. ‘Give us Afghanistan and you can have Kashmir’ is the message currently emanating from the bunker in Islamabad. Zardari, it’s worth recalling, is the only Pakistani leader whose effigy has been burned in public in Indian Kashmir (soon after becoming president he had seriously downplayed Kashmiri aspirations). The Pakistani president and his ministers are more interested in business deals than in Kashmir. At the moment this suits Washington perfectly, since India is regarded as a major ally in the region and the US doesn’t want to have to justify its actions in Kashmir. Pakistan’s indifference also suggests that Indian allegations that recent events in Kashmir were triggered by Pakistan are baseless. Pakistan virtually dismantled the jihadi networks it had set up in Kashmir after the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan not long after 9/11. Islamabad, high on the victory in Kabul, had stupidly assumed that they could repeat the trick in Kashmir. Those sent to infiltrate Indian Kashmir were brutal and mindless fanatics who harmed the Kashmiri case for self-determination, though some young people, tired of the patience exhibited by their elders, embraced the jihad, hoping it would bring them freedom. They were wrong.

As Indian politicians stood on the battlements of the Red Fort in Delhi to celebrate Independence Day in August 2008, Kashmiris began a mass campaign of civil disobedience. More than a hundred thousand people marched peacefully to the UN office in Srinagar. They burned effigies, chanted ‘Azadi, azadi’ (‘freedom’) and appealed to India to leave Kashmir. The movement was not crushed. It was merely ignored. Nothing changed. Now a new generation of Kashmiri youth is on the march. They fight, like the young Palestinians, with stones. Many have lost their fear of death and will not surrender. Ignored by politicians at home, abandoned by Pakistan, they are developing the independence of spirit that comes with isolation and it will not be easily quelled. It’s unlikely, however, that the prime minister of India and his colleagues will pay any attention to them. And just to show who’s master, the Indian army flag-marched through the streets of Srinagar on 7 July in an awesome show of strength.

8 July

The dead are:

11 June: Tufail Ahmad Mattoo, 17, killed in teargas fire in Srinagar.

19 June: Rafiq Ahmad Bangroo, 27, beaten by members of the Central Reserve Police Force near his home in old Srinagar on 12 June, died of his injuries.

20 June: Javed Ahmad Malla, 26, died when mourners, returning from Bangroo’s burial, attacked a CRPF bunker, causing its occupants to open fire.

25 June: Shakeel Ganai, 17, and Firdous Khan, 18, killed when the CRPF fired at protesters in Sopore.

27 June: Bilal Ahmad Wani, 22, died following CRPF fire in Sopore.

28 June: Tajamul Bashir, 20, killed in Delina; Tauqeer Rather, 15, killed in Sopore.

29 June: Ishtiyaq Ahmed, 15, Imtiyaz Ahmed Itoo, 17, and Shujaat-ul-Islam, 17, died after being shot by police in southern Anantnag.

5 July: Muzaffar Ahmad Bhat, 17, died in CRPF custody in Srinagar.

6 July: Fayaz Ahmad Wani, 18, shot by the CRPF during Bhat’s funeral procession in Srinagar; Fancy Jan, 25, the first woman to die, killed when a bullet hit her as she watched events from a window in her house; Abrah Ahmad Khan, 16, killed during protests over Wani’s death.

Whither Maoists? By Saroj Giri

Whither Maoists?

By Saroj Giri

Abstract

Congress heavy-weight Digvijay Singh’s attack on the pro-corporate and hawkish Home Minister Chidambaram’s approach to the ‘Maoist problem’ seems to strengthen civil society initiatives calling for talks and dialogue. However in declaring that the Maoists are not really against corporate interests and are integrated in business as usual at the local level, Singh revealed attempts at a liberal-left appropriation of Maoists, in order to settle scores with the Chidambaram faction. If Operation Civil Society is the name for such an appropriation, then this might prove as dangerous for Maoists as Operation Green Hunt. This means that unless they are able to advance the (class) struggle into new areas and new classes, it might be difficult for their ‘correct line’ to stop them from going the way of the Nepali Maoists. Physical liquidation of the Andhra model might be replaced by democratic liquidation.

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“The sheen of Maoist political ideology seems to be wearing off… do we have an instance where Maoists have stopped mining operations in affected areas or have taken up the cause of the tribals for higher wages or better living and working conditions for them? If they have done so sometimes, the issue has been resolved amicably after some deal was struck.”
– Digvijay Singh criticizing Chidambaram’s hawkish approach to Maoists.

They are no enemies… We must talk to our Naxal (Maoist) friends
– Congress leader Keshava Rao in the Rajya Sabha.

The recent guerrilla action killing 76 CRPF jawans seems to show that the Maoists are not only here to stay but can also hit back and unnerve the state machinery. Its fall-out seems even graver now that dissensions within the Congress on the Maoist question are out in the open. A Congress heavy-weight like Digvijay Singh publicly taking on another heavy-weight the Home Minister, perhaps with the tacit consent of Sonia and Rahul Gandh, is not a trivial matter. If they want, Maoists thus have good reasons now to gleefully applaud themselves for inciting ‘contradictions within the ruling classes’. But is there need for a serious concern here?

Indeed the Maoists today seem to stand on the cusp of a major transformation in terms of their strengths and capacities, as they have over the past two years catapulted onto the national scene like never before. So far they had only a more spectacular presence, portrayed as engaging in dramatic acts of kidnapping, blocking the Rajdhani Express or carrying out armed actions, jailbreaks and so on. Similarly, the Prime Minister portrayed the Maoists in dramatic, spectacular, almost hysterical, terms as the largest internal security threat in the country.

However, with Digvijay Singh’s recent article, ‘Re-think counter-Maoist strategy’, attacking Chidambaram and his pro-corporate ‘law and order’ approach, there are signs that a more cool-headed and concrete appraisal of the Maoist phenomenon is taking place in the ruling circles. That is, it will be terribly mistaken to regard this as just a Singh versus Chidambaram spat – for sure, that is all that might be visible to those like us outside the charmed circles of power, but there are indications that much is happening.

What is emerging is such a ‘realist’ thinking: now that the Maoists do not seem to be fizzling out anytime soon, nor getting decimated by Operation Green Hunt or military actions, they might be as well be engaged with, if not accepted, as a stakeholder of power, at least as a structure of command, control and power which the dominant ruling classes must reckon with. Such a ‘sane’ appraisal of the Maoist presence seems clear from Singh’s piece. Further, Congress leader K Keshava Rao announces in the Rajya Sabha, post-CRPF massacre, that Naxals are no enemies and we must talk to “our Naxal friends”. What is needed is a ‘political process’: thus former Chief Minister of Chattisgarh Ajit Jogi points out in support of Singh that “there are three aspects to the Maoist problem: the socio-economic, the law and order side and the political process”. It is important to note that ‘political process’ is the new addition to this discourse.

This is already in addition to Mani Shankar Aiyar’s extremely vocal statements against the hawkish approach and ‘1000 per cent’ support to Singh’s article. Further, Rahul Gandhi and Sonia Gandhi seem to be tacitly even if ambiguously supporting these voices. The two Gandhis have either avoided saying anything much on the Maoists or have pointed out lack of development and just government policies as the real problem – what also seems in line with the Congress’s aam admi approach.

With this soft stance towards Maoists emerging from within the ruling party, the possibility of talks increases. But what can also be expected is the machinations and maneuvers of all kinds of vested interests taking a progressive, liberal-left stance in favour of talks and dialogue with the government. To start with, one must notice that Singh’s appraisal of the Maoists is not just the vintage socio-economic approach pitted against the law and order approach attributed to Chidambaram. Crucially, Singh claims that the Maoists are not really against corporate interests and it is in portraying such a less-than-revolutionary face of the Maoists that he is able to challenge the need and rationale of Operation Green Hunt against them and argue for talks instead.

The aam admi faction seems to portray, fashion, appropriate Maoists in ways that allow them to take on the hawkish faction – a mere ruling class game, at one level. But is there a tacit suggestion here that talks can materialise under pain of, one way or the other, rendering Maoists less-than-revolutionary? If the Maoists are really serious about talks should they then strike a tacit deal, ‘a gentleman’s agreement’ with the pro-talk, aam admi faction within the Congress? Flipping the question around, is this faction piggy-riding on the Maoists to settle their scores with the hawkish faction? In any case, at a slight stretch, it seems not utterly futile to ask: is Operation Civil Society silently at work scripting what could be a ‘democratic liquidation’ of the Maoists? It is an ungrateful question but also an ungrateful task, my task here, exploring it.

The political terrain

Marking the present politico-ideological terrain is of course the fact that Singh’s views echo Congress’s, as in Sonia and Rahul Gandhi’s ‘progressive’ aam admi agenda of reaching out to the poor. Also Singh’s opposition to Chidambaram’s line would find approval among a large section of what the media has termed the jholawalas, lefties and NGOs. Chidambaram, on the other hand, is presented as alienating the Congress from the aam admi and instead playing along with hawkish upper middle class jingoism who are all for a strong state and free rein to corporate interests. We cannot then overlook this terrain constituted by the contention between the two factions within the Congress mobilising different social bases, ‘the masses and the classes’, for their political power. Thus, the same Congress-led government see-saws between the pro-corporate Special Economic Zone Act and the ‘pro-people’ Employment Guarantee Act: carrot-and-stick policy.

The internal composition and particular configuration of the social basis of political power within the ruling Congress today is to a very large extent determined by this contention and tension between the two factions. It is within this context of the murky waters of interests and counter-interests, the machinations of power blocs, played out currently as corporate vs. aam admi approaches, that the Maoist comes to be cognized by those in power. However the corporate versus aam admi divide cuts across parties beyond the Congress and then gets translated state-wise in regional Maoist-affected contexts in slightly changed idioms. Recent Lok Sabha debates were marked by every party accusing the other of colluding with the Maoists: Singh himself wrote BJP is colluding, BJP says Congress colluded in Andhra, Mamata of course saying Maoists are same as CPIM, CPIM in turn accusing Trinamool of colluding, Shibu Soren and Nitish Kumar too colluding and apparently unwilling to implement Operation Green Hunt so on. Muddling waters further Arun Jaitley insinuates that Mamata Banerjee and Mani Shankar Aiyar are ‘half-Maoists’ and ‘consultants to insurgents’ sitting in the House. It is as though all these parties have to displace their own hidden illegality onto the Maoists, to be able to present themselves as constitutional, legal and legitimate in the first place!

Factional enframing of the Maoists

That is, the conflict and competition between these two factions within the ruling bloc means that the Maoist gets portrayed in different ways by each of them. Now the first kind of enframing coming from Chidambaram faction that the Maoists are out to violently overthrow the India state, and are against the very idea of India, is clearly applauded by large sections of the upper middle classes. The BJP fully backs this up and so do large sections within the Congress. Arun Jaitley was overly shrill in the Lok Sabha calling upon the Congress to rally behind the Home Minister and his hard approach towards the Maoists. What is it about the Maoists that allows such a hawkish approach to be adopted by a large section of the ruling classes? And here we know that this shows that the Maoists are indeed true to their political ideology, leading the struggle for a ‘violent’ overthrow of the Indian state and the establishment of communism. This means that the Maoists are indeed to a large extent on the path of protracted people’s war – testified therefore by the Indian’s state antagonistic and repressive actions against them. Or, for the more skeptical, they are at least arraigned against corporate interests and waging some kind of a struggle, perhaps a class struggle.

While then this first enframing follows from Maoist revolutionary politics, the second seems to offer a different picture – of Maoists who have lost the sheen of their political ideology. The second enframing is of course the left-liberal one propounded by Singh, Mani Shankar Aiyar and in fact large sections of liberal civil society and democratic rights groups. And here we have Singh himself in his article.

He makes three points. One, he challenges the narrow approach of the Home Minister, who “is treating it purely as a law and order problem without taking into consideration the issues that affect the tribals”, issues of “governance and livelihood” and instead “converting the serene and calm environment of Bastar into a battlefield”. Interestingly, another Congress leader Amaresh Mishra, close to Singh, had written elsewhere how “the Congress’s reformist agenda however was not liked by a powerful lobby of upstart corporate interests”, clearly pointing fingers at the Chidambaram lobby. Second, Singh presents an ambiguous picture of the Maoist approach towards corporates, and towards mining and other activities. There is no “instance where Maoists have stopped mining operations in affected areas”. And if at all the Maoists raised issues of wage increase for tribals or better living conditions, “the issue has been resolved amicably after some deal was struck”. Third, Singh calls for focusing primary attention on the plight of the tribals on issues related to governance and development, land and resources, and the need for benign policies in order to undercut the Maoist base.

While the contention between these two corporate factions in the Congress is evident, what is interesting is how this contention not only centres around working out the right approach in countering the Maoists but also offers a new appraisal of the latter. This new liberal-left appraisal does not just say that Maoists cannot be treated as a law and order problem and must be treated as primarily if not exclusively a socio-economic problem – implement PESA, Forest Rights Act and so on. It says something more and this is new: it says that the Maoists are not against corporate interests and in fact are quite well integrated in the local economy and business as usual wherever they are strong. “The sheen of their political ideology seems to be wearing off” as they facilitate business as usual. Thus “traders, forest contractors, industrialists and mining companies carrying on their business without a problem, in fact, quite merrily, in the Naxalite dominated areas. The Maoists, simply, are collecting protection fees.” In fact, after the massacre of CRPF jawans, when you would imagine that corporates are going to run for their lives from Maoist areas, Tata Steel MD H. M. Nerurkar calmly tells this about their steel venture in Chattisgarh: “We are not dropping the project on account of the naxal problem.”

Now there are two aspects to this issue of Maoists not being seen by sections within the ruling circles to be as radical as the ideological claims they make. One is of course the actual activities of the Maoists and their relationship with corporates in the different areas they are strong in. This is one which needs empirical verification which we cannot do here. The other aspect is the imperatives of the ruling parties that drive them to view Maoists as such, as fulfilling a particular role and function which is in consonance with the internal needs of the particular faction – and the liberal-left faction cannot present itself as going soft on a force which is openly against corporate capital. Thus here the liberal-left faction enframes the Maoist as not inimical to the overall corporate interests and business, except for the tax and levies they charge.

Liberal-left allied to corporate capital

What we see is that the liberal-left approach cannot of course break from the dominant order of corporates and big capital. So it somehow has to present the case of tribal upliftment and addressing socio-economic issues without antagonizing corporate capital. Thus it cannot advocate adopting a socio-economic approach to the Maoist problem, in the face of the ongoing corporate-backed military strategy of Chidambaram, without assuring that Maoists are not against corporates as such and that they arise out of the issue of alienation of tribals from their land and resources.

Now such a liberal-left approach aligned finally with big capital is nothing new. Right since the days of so-called Nehruvian socialism large sections of the left, often including the CPI and later the CPIM, have played second fiddle or openly facilitated the depredations of capital in the country. Post-liberalisation of course we see the CPIM at the vanguard of implementing some of the most aggressive policies of capital and the state. On the other hand, it can be argued that NREGA and a host of other social policies including the Forest Rights Act were all designed to contain social discontent and cushion the effects of market globalization as much as to garner votes through populist policies.

What is new then about this liberal-left in the light of the strong Maoist presence, as also of so many other movements against corporate plunder today, is that the ‘social discontent’ which pro-poor policies are trying to ‘ameliorate’ or ‘contain’ has now taken a distinct form, gone out of hand and getting articulated as a political force, as in fact counter-veiling power. Since now this power, the Maoists, do not seem to be petering out soon or decimated whenever the powers that be so desire, they are now being cognized by the liberal-left as a force to be engaged with. In cognizing the Maoists as such, it is imperative on the liberal-left to portray and appropriate them in ways that suit its own interests – hence as not inimical to corporate interests. Earlier, the Expert Committee on Left Wing Extremism of the Planning Commission too carried on such an approach of trying to enframe Maoists as some kind of less-than-revolutionary, radical social democrats (ok sometimes with a gun!) out there to seek justice. But then this means that there is here also a veiled suggestion to the Maoists as to what they should do if they want to endear themselves to the pro-talk, liberal-left faction, how they should in fact dilute their political ideology and so on. Will this have any impact on the Maoists, leading them to act as less-than-revolutionary?

Revolutionary movements at the service of reformist ones?

Thus if rendering the Maoists less-than-revolutionary is the hidden basis on which the talks and dialogue are to take place then one must raise certain questions about Operation Civil Society. Do scrapping Chidambaram’s hawkish policy and then talks and dialogue only mean the possibility of democratic liquidation of the Maoists, wearing off of their political ideology and so on? Do those opposing Operation Green Hunt do so thinking, as it seems Rahul Gandhi and Digvijay Singh and Mani Shankar Aiyar do, that Maoists dilute their political ideology in practice and can definitely be contained through socially oriented policies – and in turn be made the reason why more such policies be brought about, strengthening thereby the left-wing of capital and the state.

The more Operation Green Hunt fails to decimate the Maoists and the more Maoists are able to expand and proliferate, the more assertive the liberal-left is going to get, proffering their approach and solution. No wonder Singh’s article comes after the massacre of the CRPF jawans, when it seemed like Operation Green Hunt is not taking off. The Maoist presence and Chidambaram’s failure to eliminate it will clearly bring cheers to the liberal-left and allow them great leverage within the corridors of power. If this happens of course this might mean a larger realignment within the ruling bloc in favour of more people-oriented policies and applying some restraint on private capital and economic reforms – thanks to the Maoist presence!

On the other hand, objectively speaking the Indian state and ruling classes have lost touch with vast masses of people, particulary adivasis so that Maoists came to be the only credible force, to fill up what CPI leader from Bastar Manish Kunjam called a ‘political vacuum’ (Frontline, April 24 – May 7, 2010). Now apart from the subjective intentions of the Maoists the point is that objectively speaking big capital and the state in India today might look to the Maoists as facilitating this mediation between the tribals and the corporates – unless big capital is willing to go for an all out extermination of the tribals and capture the land and resources. This is the context in which we must understand ruling class parties accusing each other of being soft on the Maoists to secure electoral victories in Maoist areas – the Congress is supposed to be soft on Maoists to secure electoral gains in states like Chattisgarh with a BJP government. This only means that one way or another these parties are forced to deal with the fact that the Maoists are the only credible force with mass support in certain areas of sharp struggle against corporate capital.

Thus in terms of the internal composition of the ruling bloc today there is a possibility of talks and dialogue between the Maoists and the government, in fact of reconciliation too. However as we saw the enframing horizon within which such dialogue and reconciliation is envisioned clearly means co-opting the Maoist challenge in order to revive and refuel the old Nehruvian left ideals in the times of corporate globalization. No wonder arch-Nehruvian Aiyar declared his ‘one thousand percent’ support to Singh’s critique of Chidambaram. Social movements and civil society groups too have become more vocal demanding proper implementation of PESA, Panchayats, gram sabhas, different progressive Acts.

What is interesting and a paradox if you like, is that the Maoist movement far from rekindling a radical left or Marxist imagination consonant with the Naxalbari legacy, has instead fuelled and activated generally welfarist, left-of-centre sections – and in fact increased their bargaining power vis-à-vis those favouring corporate capital and a strong state. Is Maoist revolutionary subjectivity at the service of reformist movements? Prachanda’s promised fusion between people’s war and peoples movement in Nepal too turned out to be people’s war sacrificed towards a broad and vague peoples movement to the advantage of otherwise popularly hated, mainstream political parties. Bhoodan movement and the Gandhian movement itself got a new lease of life after Independence when it presented itself as a response or ‘humane solution’ to the Telegana armed uprising. This question of the subsumption of radical, revolutionary, ‘violent’ movements into infusing life and legitimacy in the existing order, with the ‘official left’ playing the intermediary, comprador role has to posed again today. Perhaps it is a problem of articulation, perhaps it is more substantive than that, or perhaps it is a sign of the overall logic of society, state and politics today – this needs more understanding.

Coming back to the present situation: the Maoists physically are not doing too bad confronting the military heat of Operation Green Hunt and the hawks within the Home Ministry; but what they seem not yet fully aware of is this ideological streamlining and sequestration of their subjectivity, twisted to rejuvenate the progressive ideals of the self-same Constitution and the progressive legislation ‘the sham of Indian democracy’ has churned out in no small quantities. If they realize, Maoists are today reeling under both Operation Green Hunt and Operation Civil Society! There is a however a tendency among the Maoists to be a bit too jubilant whenever civil society hotshots shower recognition and praise on them.

Now whether Maoists, in the face of conciliatory gestures and proposals from the liberal-left, will slowly come to some kind of an understanding with the Indian state or it will continue with its revolutionary aim and objective of New Democratic Revolution is a question we cannot settle here. What we can do is reflect on this model of armed struggle inflected and refracted in and through contradictions within the ruling circles and the calls and possibilities for talks and dialogue through some kind of civil society intervention and mediation. This way we can perhaps see that the ability of sections of the ruling classes to enframe the Maoists in ways that help reconfigure and renew the legitimacy of dominant power, might be a fall-out of a particular way of doing armed struggle.

Armed struggle ‘model’?

At the risk of oversimplification, let me outline the realist (definitely not the Marxist) account of armed struggle of the Maoists.
As pointed out by several writers, Maoists started work in areas where the Indian state is weakest or hardly has any presence as in Dandakaranya, where there exists intense exploitation and oppression by agents of the state like Forest Department officials or by private contractors and traders. Maoists then, what has been narrated better by other writers, took up struggle for wage increase, higher prices for forest produce from traders, against women’s oppression and landlordism and so on.

In most cases Maoists soon gain a lot of popularity. They become a major power network there, running people’s courts, collecting taxes, levies on local contractors and traders. In any case, the Maoists soon gain real power on the ground, which becomes counter-power to the dominant order. They are able to challenge the armed might of the state too. Once this is achieved, the key point is whether this power allows Maoists to further radicalize the struggle and eventually build up towards a total replacement of the existing state order and society. Or, with this not happening, whether it starts negotiating with the already established dominant state order. Of course there are no binaries like that – for negotiations can be a step towards intensifying the struggle through strategic retreat. In any case, no matter what the objective, Indian Maoists are, as of today, keen to negotiate or go for talks and do not seem to be able to take the movement to a higher level. And this seems to be following on the features of a traditional armed struggle model.

In this model, the state response is of course to initially overlook them, if they have not become a credible threat yet to the ruling order, to business as usual and the authority of the state and parliamentary political process. The same was the case when the Maoists launched their people’s war in 1996 in Nepal: they were totally marginal to national politics. In fact this was the approach of the Indian state till recently. But then once they start being seen as a threat and also expanding, there are two kinds of responses. To physically eliminate them, particularly if the ruling order is not itself split from within and is internally cohesive in its approach. Or, as we saw with the liberal-left approach, to simultaneously befriend them if the internal dissensions within the ruling bloc mean that this threat can be used to buttress the claims of this one faction against the other faction.

In this realist account of the model of armed struggle, then, the rebels first establish themselves as a major power network (as a revolutionary force); the state and established order then try to dislodge them; if they cant, then there is a tendency to accommodate them; talks and negotiations begin, figuring out possible outcomes and compromise positions. But even though Maoists have emerged as a structure of power, not easily dislodged, the government today is not readily willing to negotiate and is putting strong conditionalities like ‘abjure violence’ and so on. This has of course to do with corporate capital’s strong linkages with the state. Companies like Vedanta, Arcelor Mittal, Tata Steel, Essar are openly and brazenly promoted by the Indian state.

More importantly, the government today feels that it does not lose its democratic legitimacy in making ‘war on its own people’. And that has to do with the upper middle class support base which is cheering on Chidambaram to go ahead and finish off the Maoists. Calls for using maximum force to finish off the ‘anti-national’ Maoists, egging on Chidambaram to go on no-holds barred, were on full display in the aftermath of the killing of 76 security personnel in Dantewada. On this count, negotiations are still not so much on the cards for the Indian state.

The other reason is also of course that precisely due to such a nature of the upper middle classes and intense corporate hegemony even among the lower classes, radical resistance among urban workers is extremely sporadic and falls short of acquiring a critical mass. And if they are unable to expand, Maoists might be more willing to go for talks and negotiations as a way out of being restricted in limited areas or expanding in sociologically homogeneous areas (forest areas, or among adivasis only) – thereby reinforcing the armed struggle model. It is the confidence and continued legitimacy of the state and its policies among the upper middle classes that allows it to ignore the Maoists as a legitimate force even when Digvijay paints them as not so dangerous, well integrated in business as usual, collecting taxes from local traders, contractors and businesses and so on.

Generalising the struggle or perpetuating power?

The key question for the Maoists is this: how can they transcend the traditional armed struggle model and go ahead with their political goals, intensifying the class struggle and so on? Are the janatam sarkar and the revolutionary peasant committees headed towards an alternative political power or are they only excellent but interim ways of organizing production and consumption at the local level only?

Thus it seems clear that if the Maoists are not able to expand their struggle in new areas, new classes and precipitate a larger crisis for the Indian state, the traditional armed struggle model would invariably set limits on it. Talks and dialogue in themselves are neither good nor bad: what is important is the larger dynamic of the struggle, of the ability to generalize the struggle and precipitate a wider crisis for the state – something much more pertinent given that the present government does not really derive legitimacy from the masses in Dantewada or Lalgarh but from the urban middle classes. From what one can see, Maoists seem to be pinning much hope on the initiatives by the intelligentsia and urban civil society groups, rather than mobilizing masses in urban areas, drawing thereby a line of generalization to the ‘base struggle’ in Dantewada, Lalgarh and elsewhere.

In Nepal, even after the Maoists spread to almost 70 per cent of the country, they still could not figure out how to expand to urban areas, particularly among the middle classes. It was only after they entered into the Nov 2005 12-point agreement with the seven political parties that they started expanding in urban areas – but that was only after they suspended their people’s war. So the question: how does one expand the people’s war among urban workers and the middle class? While Indian Maoists have more or less rightly critiqued the Nepali Maoists, they do not seem to have answers to such questions, to the real problems that the path of protracted people’s war encounters. The choice is between generalizing the struggle or eventually getting suckered in the flows of capital and state power.

After all, if the Maoists are not dynamically expanding in new areas, among new classes and winning new allies (for example the nationality movements and anti-caste struggles), there is always a chance that their present revolutionary base areas would get enmeshed in the larger circulation of quantities and masses which is global capitalism today – liberated zones can start wilting from within. Of course this might sound a bit too pessimistic today when the movement exudes a lot of revolutionary energy if not dynamism. Hence we can put it this way: Maoists today seem poised between either generalizing the struggle, advancing the class struggle to new heights, or lapsing into dominant, constituted, ossified (local) power, albeit rendering the dominant system progressive and humane in the process. Without an advancing class struggle, civil society initiatives, if taken a bit too seriously, for all their good intentions, cannot but push Maoists towards the latter, now also buttressed by liberal-left voices within the ruling party.

The liberal-left or civil society opposition to Operation Green Hunt and towards talks and dialogue is a double-edged sword as it tends to piggy-ride on the Maoist movement to establish its own agenda vis-à-vis the dominant neoliberal Chidambaram lobby – best exemplified in the catch-all expression ‘peace with justice’. Thus for example the choice offered between Operation Green Hunt or the (liberal-left) socio-economic approach, through effective implementation of PESA/Forest Rights Act and so on, is a false choice. While the possibility of a physical liquidation of the Andhra model remains, a new threat of democratic liquidation too can become a possibility. Unless Maoists are able to break their dalliance with civil society and advance their struggle to newer classes and urban areas, they might badly succumb.

Invisible hand

Lastly, let us come back to the attempted liberal-left appropriation of Maoists, against the hawkish pro-corporate faction, particularly in Singh’s article. While this is ‘ruling class contradiction’, we must not however fail to point out that, from a revolutionary standpoint, there is a truth contained in Singh’s assertion that Maoists are violent and do threaten the state but are not against business as usual, not against corporate interests. Indeed, Maoist politics is marked by the juxtaposition of a highly revolutionary, antagonistic relationship towards the state and its apparatus, including its political process of legitimization (boycott elections), with a highly ambiguous relationship to private trade and business at the local level. This is of course the difficult question of state versus capital, of state versus commodity production – where state is easily located and identified while capital and commodity production are diffuse, decentred and cannot be a target for revolutionary action. It is easier to confront the state and target it as a structure of oppression than be able to see how the market, private trade and exchange ‘spontaneously’ produces inequalities of power and wealth. The invisible hand of the market is sometimes far more instrumental in forestalling revolutions than the visible hand of the state.

Surely, the Maoists need to get a grasp of this problem, which has historically existed right since the days of Lenin when after capture of state power the Bolsheviks swung between War Communism (banning private trade and money) and the New Economic Policy (allowing a quantum of private trade and free market) in 1919-21. The Cultural Revolution in turn showed us that the old state and old classes might go but the existing conditions of production, in particular the wage system and the operation of the law of value (the capitalist market) in turn ‘spontaneously’ generates a new bourgeoisie, well… as Mao pointed out, from within the Communist Party.

Undoubtedly, Maoist practice particularly the experience of the janatam sarkars must be one way or another encountering this problem and must have tried to address it. The Maoists of course cannot shy away from actively relating to the trade and business (including looting banks) in areas under their control. However, to view it as only a local practical exigency (we all need money, don’t we?) and not relating it to the course of the overall revolutionary process can prove dangerous.

4/28/10

Dr. Saroj Giri received his M.Phil and Ph.D in Political Science from the Centre for Political Science at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi, where he was actively part of the political debates and activities which form the crucible in which learning takes place in the dynamic campus environment of JNU. He has been a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi since 2005, and has had articles and papers published in a variety of international magazines and journals. He will be presenting his first paper as a part of the “Changes Over Time” panel of the Rebel Governance Conference.

Why the Taliban is winning in Afghanistan by William Dalrymple

Why the Taliban is winning in Afghanistan

by
William Dalrymple

The New Statesman

As Washington and London struggle to prop up a puppet government over which Hamid Karzai has no control, they risk repeating the blood-soaked 19th-century history of Britain’s imperial defeat.

In 1843, shortly after his return from Afghanistan, an army chaplain, Reverend G R Gleig, wrote a memoir about the First Anglo-Afghan War, of which he was one of the very few survivors. It was, he wrote, “a war begun for no wise purpose, carried on with a strange mixture of rashness and timidity, brought to a close after suffering and disaster, without much glory attached either to the government which directed, or the great body of troops which waged it. Not one benefit, political or military, has Britain acquired with this war. Our eventual evacuation of the country resembled the retreat of an army defeated.”

It is difficult to imagine the current military adventure in Afghanistan ending quite as badly as the First Afghan War, an abortive experiment in Great Game colonialism that slowly descended into what is arguably the greatest military humiliation ever suffered by the west in the Middle East: an entire army of what was then the most powerful military nation in the world utterly routed and destroyed by poorly equipped tribesmen, at the cost of £15m (well over £1bn in modern currency) and more than 40,000 lives. But nearly ten years on from Nato’s invasion of Afghanistan, there are increasing signs that Britain’s fourth war in the country could end with as few political gains as the first three and, like them, terminate in an embarrassing withdrawal after a humiliating defeat, with Afghanistan yet again left in tribal chaos and quite possibly ruled by the same government that the war was launched to overthrow.

Certainly it is becoming clearer than ever that the once-hated Taliban, far from being swept away by General Stanley McChrystal’s surge, are instead regrouping, ready for the final act in the history of Hamid Karzai’s western-installed puppet government. The Taliban have now advanced out of their borderland safe havens to the very gates of Kabul and are surrounding the capital, much as the US-backed mujahedin once did to the Soviet-installed regime in the late 1980s. Like a rerun of an old movie, all journeys by non-Afghans out of the capital are once again confined largely to tanks, military convoys and helicopters. The Taliban already control more than 70 per cent of the country, where they collect taxes, enforce the sharia and dispense their usual rough justice. Every month, their sphere of influence increases. According to a recent Pentagon report, Karzai’s government has control of only 29 out of 121 key strategic districts.

Just recently, on 17 May, there was a suicide attack on a US convoy in the Dar-ul Aman quarter of Kabul, killing 12 civilians and six American soldiers; the following day, there was a daring five-hour-long grenade and machine-gun assault on the US military headquarters at Bagram Airbase, killing an American contractor and wounding nine soldiers, so bringing the death toll for US armed forces in the country to more than 1,000. Then, over the weekend of 22-23 May, there was a series of rocket, mortar and ground assaults on Kandahar Airbase just as the British ministerial delegation was about to visit it, forcing William Hague and Liam Fox to alter their schedule. Since then, a dozen top Afghan officials have been assassinated in Kandahar, including the city of Kandahar’s deputy mayor. On 7 June, the deadliest day for Nato forces in months, ten soldiers were killed. Finally, it appears that the Taliban have regained control of the opium-growing centre of Marjah in Helmand Province, only three months after being driven out by McChrystal’s forces amid much gung-ho cheerleading in the US media. Afghanistan is going down.

Already, despite the presence of huge numbers of foreign troops, it is now impossible – or at least extremely foolhardy – for any westerner to walk around the capital, Kabul, without armed guards; it is even more inadvisable to head out of town in any direction except north: the strongly anti-Taliban Panjshir Valley, along with the towns of Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, are the only safe havens left for westerners in the entire country. In all other directions, travel is possible only in an armed convoy.

This is especially true of the Khord-Kabul and Tezeen passes, immediately to the south of Kabul, where as many as 18,000 British troops were lost in 1842, and which are today again a centre of resistance against perceived foreign occupiers. Aid workers familiar with Afghanistan over several decades say the security situation has never been worse. Ideas much touted only a few years ago that Afghanistan might become a popular tourist destination – a Switzerland of central Asia – now seem to be dreams from a distant age. Lonely Planet’s guidebook to Afghanistan, optimistically published in 2005, has not been updated and is now once again out of print.

The present war is following a trajectory that is beginning to feel unsettlingly familiar to students of the Great Game. In 1839, the British invaded Afghanistan on the basis of sexed-up intelligence about a non-existent threat: information about a single Russian envoy to Kabul was manipulated by a group of ambitious and ideologically driven hawks to create a scare – in this case, about a phantom Russian invasion – thus bringing about an unnecessary, expensive and entirely avoidable war.

Initially, the hawks were triumphant – the British conquest proved remarkably easy and bloodless; Kabul was captured within a few weeks as the army of the previous regime melted into the hills, and a pliable monarch, Shah Shuja, was successfully placed on the throne. For a few months the British played cricket, went skating and put on amateur theatricals as if on summer leave in Simla; there were discussions about making Kabul the summer capital of the Raj. Then an insurgency began and that first heady success slowly unravelled, first among the Pashtuns of Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. It slowly gained momentum, moving northwards until it reached Kabul, so making the British occupation impossible to sustain.

What happened next is a warning of how bad things could yet become: a full-scale rebellion against the British broke out in Kabul, and the two most senior British envoys, Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William Macnaghten, were assassinated, one hacked to death by a mob in the streets, the other stabbed and shot by the resistance leader Wazir Akbar Khan during negotiations. It was on the retreat that followed, on 6 January 1842, that the 18,000 East India Company troops, and maybe half that many again Indian camp followers, were slaughtered by Afghan marksmen waiting in ambush amid the high passes, shot down as they trudged through the icy depths of the Afghan winter. After eight days on the death march, the last 50 survivors made their final stand at the village of Gandamak. As late as the 1970s, fragments of Victorian weaponry and military equipment could be found lying in the screes above the village. Even today, the hill is said to be covered with the bleached bones of the British dead.

One Englishman lived to tell the tale of that last stand (if you discount the fictional survival of Flashman) – an ordinary foot soldier, Thomas Souter, wrapped his regimental colours around him to prevent them being captured, and was taken hostage by the Afghans who assumed that such a colourfully clothed individual must command a high ransom. It is a measure of the increasingly pertinent parallels between the 19th-century war and today’s that one of the main Nato bases in Afghanistan was recently named Camp Souter after that survivor.

In the years that followed, the British defeat in Afghanistan became pregnant with symbolism. For the Victorian British, it was the country’s greatest imperial disaster of the 19th century. It was exactly a century before another army would be lost, in Singapore in 1942. Yet the retreat from Kabul also became a symbol of gallantry against the odds: William Barnes Wollen’s celebrated oil painting The Last Stand of the 44th Regiment at Gundamuck – showing a group of ragged but doggedly determined British soldiers standing encircled behind a porcupine of bayonets, as the Pashtun tribesmen close in – became one of the best-known images of the era, along with Remnants of an Army, Elizabeth Butler’s image of the wounded and bleeding army surgeon William Brydon, who had made it through to the safety of Jalalabad, arriving before the city walls on his collapsing nag.

For the Afghans, the British defeat of 1842 became a symbol of freedom from foreign invasion. It is again no accident that the diplomatic quarter of Kabul is named after the general who oversaw the rout of the British in that year: Wazir Akbar Khan.

For south Asians, who provided most of the cannon fodder – the foot soldiers and followers killed on the retreat – the war ironically became a symbol of possibility: although thousands of Indians died on the march, it showed that the British army was not invincible and a well-planned insurgency could force them out. Thus, in 1857, the Indians launched their own anti-colonial uprising, the Great Mutiny (as it is known in Britain) or the first war of independence (as it is known in India), partly inspired by what the Afghans had achieved in 1842.

This destabilising effect on south Asia of the failed war in Afghanistan has a direct parallel in the blowback that is today destabilising Pakistan and the tribal territories of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata). Here the Pakistani Taliban are once more on the march, rebuilding their presence in Swat, and are now surrounding Peshawar, which is almost daily being rocked by bombs, while outlying groups of Taliban are again spreading their influence into the valleys leading towards Islamabad. Across much of the North-West Frontier Province – roughly a fifth of Pakistan’s territory – women have now been forced into the burqa, music has been silenced, barbershops are forbidden to shave beards and more than 125 girls’ schools have been blown up or burned down.

A significant proportion of the Peshawar elite, along with the city’s musicians, have decamped to the relatively safe and tolerant confines of Lahore and Karachi, while tens of thousands of ordinary people from the surrounding hills of the semi-autonomous Fata tribal belt, and especially the Bajaur Agency (or tribal area), have fled from the conflict zones blasted by US Predator drones and strafed by Pakistani helicopter gunships to the tent camps ringing the provincial capital.

The Fata, it is true, have never been fully under the control of any Pakistani government, and have always been unruly, but the region has been radicalised as never before by the rain of shells and cluster bombs that have caused huge civilian casualties and daily add a stream of angry foot soldiers to the insurgency. Elsewhere in Pakistan, anti-western religious and political extremism continues to flourish, as ever larger numbers of ordinary Pakistanis are driven to fight by corruption, predatory politics and the abuse of power by Pakistan’s feudal elite, as well as the military aggression of the drones. Indeed, the ripples of instability lapping out from Afghanistan and Pakistan have reached even New York. When CIA interrogators asked Faisal Shahzad why he tried to let off a car bomb last month in Times Square, he told them of his desire to avenge those “innocent people being hit by drones from above”.

The route of the British retreat of 1842 backs on to the mountain range that leads to Tora Bora and the Pakistan border, an area that has always been a Taliban centre. I had been advised not to attempt to visit the area without local protection, and so last month I set off for the mountains in
the company of a regional tribal leader who was also a minister in Karzai’s government. He is a mountain of a man named Anwar Khan Jegdalek, a former village wrestling champion who made his name as a Hezb-e-Islami mujahedin commander in the jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s.

It was Anwar Khan Jegdalek’s ancestors who inflicted some of the worst casualties on the British army of 1842, something he proudly repeated several times as we drove through the same passes. “They forced us to pick up guns to defend our honour,” he said. “So we killed every last one of those bastards.” None of this, incidentally, has stopped Anwar Khan Jegdalek from sending his family away from Kabul to the greater safety of Northolt, Middlesex.

He drove himself in a huge 4×4, while a pick-up full of heavily armed Afghan bodyguards followed behind. We left Kabul – past the blast walls of the Nato barracks built on the very site of the British cantonment of 170 years ago – and headed down a corkscrewing road into the line of bleak mountain passes that links Kabul with the Khyber Pass.

It is a dramatic and violent landscape: fault lines of crushed and tortured strata groaned and twisted in the gunpowder-coloured rock walls rising on either side of us. Above, the jagged mountain tops were veiled in an ominous cloud of mist. As we drove, Anwar Khan Jegdalek complained bitterly of western treatment of his government. “In the 1980s when we were killing Russians for them, the Americans called us freedom fighters,” he muttered, as we descended through the first pass. “Now they just dismiss us as warlords.”

At Sorobi, where the mountains debouche into a high-altitude ochre desert dotted with encampments of nomads, we left the main road and headed into Taliban territory. A further five trucks full of Anwar Khan Jegdalek’s old mujahedin fighters, all brandishing rocket-propelled gren ades and with faces wrapped in keffiyehs, ­appeared from a side road to escort us.

At the crest of Jegdalek village, on 12 January 1842, 200 frostbitten British soldiers found themselves surrounded by several thousand Pashtun tribesmen. The two highest-ranking British soldiers, General Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton, went off to negotiate but were taken hostage. Only 50 infantrymen managed to break out under cover of darkness. Our own welcome was, thankfully, somewhat warmer. It was my host’s first visit to his home since he had become a minister, and the proud villagers took their old commander on a nostalgia trip through hills smelling of wild thyme and rosemary, and up on to mountainsides carpeted with hollyhocks, mulberries and white poplars. Here, at the top of the surrounding peaks, lay the remains of Anwar Khan Jegdalek’s old mujahedin bunkers and entrenchments. Once the tour was completed, the villagers fed us, Mughal style, in an apricot orchard: we sat on carpets under a trellis of vine and pomegranate blossom as course after course of kebabs and mulberry pulao was laid in front of us.

During lunch, as my hosts casually pointed out the various places in the village where the British had been massacred in 1842, I asked them if they saw any parallels between that war and the present situation. “It is exactly the same,” said Anwar Khan Jegdalek. “Both times the foreigners have come for their own interests, not for ours. They say, ‘We are your friends, we want democracy, we want to help.’ But they are lying.”

“Whoever comes to Afghanistan, even now, they will face the fate of Burnes, Macnaghten and Dr Brydon,” said Mohammad Khan, our host in the village and the owner of the orchard where we were sitting. The names of the fighters of 1842, long forgotten in their home country, were still known here.

“Since the British went, we’ve had the Russians,” said an old man to my right. “We saw them off, too, but not before they bombed many of the houses in the village.” He pointed at a ridge of ruined mud-brick houses.

“We are the roof of the world,” said Mohammad Khan. “From here, you can control and watch everywhere.”

“Afghanistan is like the crossroads for every nation that comes to power,” agreed Anwar Khan Jegdalek. “But we do not have the strength to control our own destiny – our fate is always determined by our neighbours. Next, it will be China. This is the last days of the Americans.”

I asked if they thought the Taliban would come back. “The Taliban?” said Mohammad Khan. “They are here already! At least after dark. Just over that pass.” He pointed in the direction of Gandamak and Tora Bora. “That is where they are strongest.”

It was nearly five in the afternoon before the final flaps of nan bread were cleared away, by which time it had become clear that it was too late to head on to the site of the British last stand at Gandamak. Instead, that evening we went to the relative safety of Jalalabad, where we discovered we’d had a narrow escape: it turned out there had been a huge battle at Gandamak that morning between government forces and a group of villagers supported by the Taliban. The sheer scale and length of the feast had saved us from walking straight into an ambush. The battle had taken place on exactly the site of the British last stand.

The following morning in Jalalabad, we went to a jirga, or assembly of tribal elders, to which the greybeards of Gandamak had come under a flag of truce to discuss what had happened the day before. The story was typical of many I heard about the current government, and revealed how a mixture of corruption, incompetence and insensitivity has helped give an opening for the return of the once-hated Taliban.

As Predator drones took off and landed incessantly at the nearby airfield, the elders related how the previous year government troops had turned up to destroy the opium harvest. The troops promised the villagers full compensation, and were allowed to burn the crops; but the money never turned up. Before the planting season, the villagers again went to Jalalabad and asked the government if they could be provided with assistance to grow other crops. Promises were made; again nothing was delivered. They planted poppy, informing the local authorities that if they again tried to burn the crop, the village would have no option but to resist. When the troops turned up, about the same time as we were arriving at nearby Jegdalek, the villagers were waiting for them, and had called in the local Taliban to assist. In the fighting that followed, nine policemen were killed, six vehicles destroyed and ten police hostages taken.

After the jirga was over, one of the tribal elders came over and we chatted for a while over a glass of green tea. “Last month,” he said, “some American officers called us to a hotel in Jalalabad for a meeting. One of them asked me, ‘Why do you hate us?’ I replied, ‘Because you blow down our doors, enter our houses, pull our women by the hair and kick our children. We cannot accept this. We will fight back, and we will break your teeth, and when your teeth are broken you will leave, just as the British left before you. It is just a matter of time.’”

What did he say to that? “He turned to his friend and said, ‘If the old men are like this, what will the younger ones be like?’ In truth, all the Americans here know that their game is over. It is just their politicians who deny this.”

The defeat of the west’s latest puppet government on the very same hill of Gandamak where the British came to grief in 1842 made me think, on the way back to Kabul, about the increasingly close parallels between the fix that Nato is in and the one faced by the British 170 years ago.

Now as then, the problem is not hatred of the west, so much as a dislike of foreign troops swaggering around and making themselves odious to the very people they are meant to be helping. On the return journey, as we crawled back up the passes towards Kabul, we got stuck behind a US military convoy of eight Humvees and two armoured personnel carriers in full camouflage, all travelling at less than 20 miles per hour. Despite the slow speed, the troops refused to let any Afghan drivers overtake them, for fear of suicide bombers, and they fired warning shots at any who attempted to do so. By the time we reached the top of the pass two hours later, there were 300 cars and trucks backed up behind the convoy, each one full of Afghans furious at being ordered around in their own country by a group of foreigners. Every day, small incidents of arrogance and insensitivity such as this make the anger grow.

There has always been an absolute refusal by the Afghans to be ruled by foreigners, or to accept any government perceived as being imposed on the country from abroad. Now as then, the puppet ruler installed by the west has proved inadequate to the job. Too weak, unpopular and corrupt to provide security or development, he has been forced to turn on his puppeteers in order to retain even a vestige of legitimacy in the eyes of his people. Recently, Karzai has accused the US, the UK and the UN of orchestrating a fraud in last year’s elections, described Nato forces as “an army of occupation”, and even threatened to join the Taliban if Washington kept putting pressure on him. Shah Shuja did much the same thing in 1842, towards the end of his rule, and was known to have offered his allegiance and assistance to the insurgents who eventually toppled and beheaded him.

Now as then, there have been few tangible signs of improvement under the western-backed regime. Despite the US pouring approximately $80bn into Afghanistan, the roads in Kabul are still more rutted than those in the smallest provincial towns of Pakistan. There is little health care; for any severe medical condition, patients still have to fly to India. A quarter of all teachers in Afghanistan are themselves illiterate. In many areas, district governance is almost non-existent: half the governors do not have an office, more than half have no electricity, and most receive only $6 a month in expenses. Civil servants lack the most basic education and skills.

This is largely because $76.5bn of the $80bn committed to the country has been spent on military and security, and most of the remaining $3.5bn on international consultants, some of whom are paid in excess of $1,000 a day, according to an Afghan government report. This, in turn, has had other negative effects. As in 1842, the presence of large numbers of well-paid foreign troops has caused the cost of food and provisions to rise, and living standards to fall. The Afghans feel they are getting poorer, not richer.

There are other similarities. Then as now, the war effort was partially privatised: it was not so much the British army as a corp oration, the East India Company, that provided most of the troops who fought the war for Britain in 1842, just as today both the British and the Americans have subcontracted much of their security work to private companies. When I visited the British embassy, I found that many of the security guards at the gatehouse were not army or military police, but from Group 4 Security. The US security contracts offered to Blackwater/Xe and other private security forces under Dick Cheney’s ideologically driven policy of privatising war are worth many millions of dollars.

Finally, now as then, there has been an attempt at a last show of force in order to save face before withdrawal. As happened in 1842, it has achieved little except civilian casualties and the further alienation of the Afghans. As one of the tribal elders from Jegdalek said to me: “How many times can they apologise for killing our innocent women and children and expect us to forgive them? They come, they bomb, they kill us and then they say, ‘Oh, sorry, we got the wrong people.’ And they keep doing that.”

The British soldiers of 1842 found the same reaction in their day. In his diary of his time with the British army of retribution, which laid waste to great areas of southern Afghanistan as punishment for the massacres on the retreat from Kabul earlier in the year, the young Captain N Chamberlain reported how his troops inflicted horrible atrocities on any Afghan civilians they could find. One morning he met a wounded Afghan woman dragging herself towards a stream with a water pot. “I filled the vessel for her,” he wrote, “but all she said was, ‘Curses on the feringhees [foreigners]!’ I continued on my way disgusted with myself, the world, above all with my cruel profession. In fact, we are nothing but licensed assassins.”

However, there are some important differences between Britain’s first defeat in Afghanistan and the current mess. In 1842, we were at least reinstalling a legitimate Afghan ruler and removing one who could genuinely be cast as an illegitimate usurper. Shah Shuja, the British puppet, was a former ruler of the Sadozai dynasty, from the leading Pashtun clan, and a grandson of the great Ahmed Shah Durrani, the first king of a united Afghanistan. As the traveller and pioneering archaeologist Charles Masson observed: “The Afghans had no objection to the match; they merely disliked the manner of the wooing.”

This time, we have been clumsier, and Nato has helped instal a former CIA asset accused by a high-ranking UN diplomat of drug abuse and of having a history of mental instability, with little to recommend him other than that he was once run out of Langley. Although Karzai is a Pashtun of the Popalzai tribe, under his watch Nato has in effect installed the Northern Alliance in Kabul and driven the country’s Pashtun majority out of power.

The reality of our present Afghan entanglement is that we took sides in a complex civil war, which has been running since the 1970s, siding with the north against the south, town against country, secularism against Islam, and the Tajiks against the Pashtuns. We have installed a government, and trained up an army, both of which in many ways have discriminated against the Pashtun majority, and whose top-down, highly centralised constitution allows for remarkably little federalism or regional representation. However much western liberals may dislike the Taliban – and they have very good reason for doing so – the truth remains that they are in many ways the authentic voice of rural Pashtun conservatism, whose views and wishes are ignored by the government in Kabul and who are still largely excluded from power. It is hardly surprising that the Pashtuns are determined to resist the regime and that the insurgency is widely supported, especially in the Pashtun heartlands of the south and east.

Yet it is not too late to learn some lessons from the mistakes of the British in 1842. Then, British officials in Kabul continued to send out despatches of delusional optimism as the insurgents moved ever closer to Kabul, believing that there was a straightforward military solution to the problem and that if only they could recruit enough Afghans to their army, they could eventually march out, leaving that regime in place – exactly the sentiments expressed by the Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, on his visit to Afghanistan last month.

In 1842, by the time they realised they had to negotiate a political solution, their power had ebbed too far, and the only thing the insurgents were willing to negotiate was an unconditional surrender. Today, too, there is no easy military solution to Afghanistan: even if we proceed with the plan to equip an army of half a million troops (at the cost of roughly $2bn a year, when the entire revenue of the Afghan government is $1.1bn – in other words, 180 per cent of revenue), that army will never be able to guarantee security or shore up such a discredited regime. Every day, despite the military power of the US and Nato and the $25bn so far ploughed into rebuilding the Afghan army, security gets worse, and the area under government control contracts week by week.

The only answer is to negotiate a political solution while we still have enough power to do so, which in some form or other involves talking to the Taliban. This is a course that Karzai, to his credit, is keen to pursue; he made it clear that his peace jirga at the start of this month was open to any Taliban leader willing to lay down arms, and that jobs and monetary incentives would be available to former Taliban who changed their allegiance and joined the government. It is still unclear whether the new Tory government supports this course; Barack Oba ma certainly opposes it. In this, he is supported by the notably undiplomatic US envoy to the region, Richard Holbrooke, described by one senior British diplomat as “a bull who brings his own china shop wherever he goes”.

There is something else we can still do before we pull out: leave some basic infrastructure behind, a goal we notably failed to achieve in the past nine years. Yet William Hague and Liam Fox oppose this policy – as Fox notoriously said in his 21 May interview with the Times, which infuriated his Afghan hosts: “We are not in Afghanistan for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th-century country.” The Tories could do much worse than consult their own newly elected backbencher Rory Stewart. He knows much more about Afghanistan than either Fox or Hague. As Stewart wrote shortly before he entered politics, targeted aid projects that employ Afghans can do a great deal of good, “and we should focus on meeting the Afghan government’s request for more investment in agriculture, irrigation, energy and roads”.

In the meantime, Obama has announced that he will begin withdrawing troops in July 2011. The start of the US withdrawal is likely to begin a rush to evacuate the other Nato forces located in pockets around the country: the Dutch have announced that they will be pulling out of Uruzgan this summer, and the Canadian and Danes won’t be far behind them. Nor will the Brits, despite assurances from Hague and Fox. A recent poll showed that 72 per cent of Britons want their troops out of Afghanistan immediately, and there is only so long any government can hold out against such strong public opinion. Certainly, it is time to shed the idea that a pro-western puppet regime that excludes the Pashtuns can remain in place indefinitely. The Karzai government is crumbling before our eyes, and if we delude ourselves that this is not the case, we could yet face a replay of 1842.

George Lawrence, a veteran of that war, issued a prescient warning in the Times just before Britain blundered into the Second Anglo-Afghan War in the 1870s. “A new generation has arisen which, instead of profiting from the solemn lessons of the past, is willing and eager to embroil us in the affairs of that turbulent and unhappy country,” he wrote. “Although military disasters may be avoided, an advance now, however successful in a military point of view, would not fail to turn out to be as politically useless.”

William Dalrymple’s latest book, “Nine Lives: in Search of the Sacred in Modern India”, won the first Asia House Literary Award in May, and is newly published in paperback (Bloomsbury, £8.99). His book on the First Anglo-Afghan War is planned for release in autumn 2012

Campaign of Mass-Distraction: A Review of Anne-Marie Brady’s Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China

Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, 232 pp.

Review by Marie-Eve Reny

 In Marketing Dictatorship, Anne-Marie Brady explores the role of political propaganda and thought work in post-1989 China, which she claims “have become the very life blood […] of the Party-State” (p. 1). Although those tools were also crucial for shaping public opinion and protecting the state’s image under Mao, the author argues that the CCP “has transformed itself from a revolutionary party holding power by right of ideology to that of a political party in power (zhizheng dang)” (p. 2). Underlying the latter is a logic aiming at ensuring the CCP’s ongoing legitimacy to rule, with greater emphasis on persuasion than repression. Mindful of the lessons of the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership realised that force could only constitute a short-term solution, and that long-term control required a “methodology of mass persuasion” (p. 71). As such, China’s leaders have used Western mass communications theory to master the methods of “engineering consent” (p. 3). While they’ve exploited the benefits of PR and the Internet, they’ve also developed software, introduced filters, and relied upon a well-informed police force to manage the “side effects” of information communication technologies (p. 145). Brady contrasts these modern propaganda strategies with those prevalent under Mao, including mass organisations (qunzhong zuzhi).

Furthermore, the content of public discourse between those two eras differs significantly. While downplaying Marxism-Leninism, some of the key themes that the central government has stressed in the past 20 years are economic liberalism, nationalism, and “selective anti-foreignism” (p. 3). Economic liberalism meant greater press freedom as far as reporting economy-related news was concerned. Nationalism was accompanied by the spread of patriotic education sites such as memorials and museums (p. 50), as well as pressure on journalists to publicly stress that Taiwan is a province of China (p. 103). Similarly, news about ethno-nationalist mobilisation in other parts of the world was censored for fear of inciting local ethno-nationalist groups to challenge efforts aimed at consolidating a Chinese national identity (p. 52). “Selective anti-foreignism” took the form of explicit critiques of the system of mass persuasion in modern democratic societies (e.g., Noam Chomsky’s books became references in China’s schools of journalism), and censorship of foreign information that could compromise the country’s image. The Central Propaganda Department established simple norms and objectives for public discourse: “think positive” (p. 95), “no bad news during holiday periods or sensitive dates” (p. 96), avoid raising problems that are hard to solve, speak of the economy, “demonize the United States” (p. 98), refrain from “promot[ing] the views of the enemy” (p. 99), and selectively report international news.

Brady’s book is groundbreaking in two ways. First, it provides a comprehensive institutional account of the inner workings of the propaganda system. It explains who is responsible for censoring what, and how organisations relate to each other. Additionally, it sheds light on who in that system gained or lost influence after 1989. For instance, while “the Propaganda Department of the General Political Office of the PLA ha[d] a history of making independent decisions in propaganda matters” (p. 26), since the 1990s, some important PLA figures have been punished for deviating from the Central Propaganda Department’s line (p. 27).

Second, Brady’s book helps fill an important gap in the literature on ideology and propaganda in China by situating the leadership’s censorship methods within the context of thought work strategies in other non-democratic and democratic societies. For instance, Brady emphasises that the party-state has drawn lessons from the propaganda mistakes of the Soviet Union. In the eyes of Beijing, Gorbachev’s move from glasnost in 1985 to an attempt to re-impose media censorship in 1991 was a recipe for disaster. Similarly, Chinese think tanks have analysed the rise and fall of long-term one-party states in countries such as Mexico, Japan, and Singapore (p. 182), and the potential role of propaganda in the latter. Finally, among other examples, the CCP has learned from the success of the United States in ensuring “patriotic education and respect for the flag” (p. 180), and has sought to apply similar methods for those same purposes.

Despite its significant contributions, the book has three weaknesses. First, beyond specific examples of topics or events that were completely banned for public discussion (e.g., the outbreak of SARS in 2003) or promoted by the CCP (e.g., the US bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999), there is no specific framework analysing the reasons for variance in the content of propaganda. Why are some matters constructed as threatening to the image of the CCP, and others not? How are the boundaries drawn between problems that can be openly discussed and those that cannot be?

Second, while Brady suggests that propaganda has played a major role in ensuring regime resilience in post-1989 China, the author does not articulate the mechanisms linking effective propaganda and the continuity of CCP rule. More precisely, Brady’s analysis offers no systematic explanation of the impact of thought work on public minds. Doing so would have required moving away from an exclusive focus on the propaganda system as the unit of analysis, and tracing the mechanisms through which formal institutions mould ideas, norms, and opinions within society, and/or the ways in which society reacts to institutions. The reader is thus left thinking that Brady is inferring the effectiveness of propaganda based on the institutional coherence of its apparatus. Existent studies suggest that the latter does not have a uniform effect on public minds, as implicitly suggested in Brady’s analysis. Béja provides an interesting account of the loopholes and contradictions in the propaganda system. He emphasises that a number of intellectuals, including Ding Dong and Li Hui, have developed alternative interpretations of the history of the People’s Republic that are sold today by official publishers in China.1 In a similar vein, Pils (2007) stresses that in recent years, many mainland lawyers have dedicated their work to the defence of legal rights (weiquan) and to the rectification of historical injustices,2 hence challenging the authorities’ own conception of rights and interpretation of history.

A potential way to address the effects of the propaganda system on public minds more explicitly could have been to pay closer attention to the significant role of education as a vehicle for thought work. The author unfortunately obscures much of this.

Finally, Brady could have situated the “propaganda” factor in the broader context of academic debates about the causes of autocratic regime resilience, in China and elsewhere. To what extent is propaganda more important than other factors stressed in the regime literature? How can it complement existent studies?

Anne-Marie Brady’s Marketing Dictatorship nonetheless remains a significant contribution that speaks to a wide range of studies, including those on Chinese nationalism and autocratic resilience. As yet, it is the first attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the institutional complexity of the propaganda apparatus in post-1989 mainland China.

1 Jean-Philippe Béja, “Forbidden Memory, Unwritten History: The Difficulty of Structuring an Opposition Movement in the PRC,” China Perspectives, No. 4, 2007, p. 98. 2 Eva Pils, “The Persistent Memory of Historic Wrongs in China: A Discussion of Demands for ‘Reappraisal,’” China Perspectives, No. 4, 2007, p. 99.


China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on US National Security

By Anne-Marie Brady

30 April, 2009

Overview of China’s Foreign Propaganda

The Chinese government puts a high value on propaganda work, describing it as the life blood (shengmingxian) of the Party-State in the current era. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has historically divided propaganda work into two categories: internal (duinei) and external (duiwai), meaning that which is directed toward Chinese people and that which is directed toward foreigners in China, Overseas Chinese, and the outside world in general. CCP propaganda specialists also divide propaganda into four types: political, economic, cultural, and social. Relevant offices within the Chinese Party-State administration take over responsibility for propaganda work related to their area of expertise.

China’s foreign propaganda experts are extremely critical of what they call the “Western media’s ideological assault on the rest of the world.” It is a matter of pride that in the current era, unlike the Mao years, China does not push its political ideology onto others. Unlike the Mao era, China’s post-1989 foreign propaganda tends to be defensive, reacting to external criticisms and aimed at upholding China’s political status quo. However foreign propaganda targeted at Overseas Chinese and the Taiwanese is essentially offensive in nature, with strategic goals in mind such as neutralizing support for anti-CCP forces and promoting Chinese reunification.

The audience for China’s foreign propaganda is not one and the same, so different messages are promoted at different groups. The main divide in China’s foreign propaganda is between Overseas Chinese and non-Overseas Chinese. The Taiwanese are targeted as a sub-category of China foreign propaganda targeted at Overseas Chinese. In the following sections I will discuss the themes, audiences, means of transmission, and institutional actors involved in China’s contemporary foreign propaganda, as well as China’s plans to expand foreign propaganda activities in the future.

Central Level Institutional Actors Involved in Foreign Propaganda

The Central Propaganda Department is in charge of all internal propaganda, while its brother organization, the Office of Foreign Propaganda, which is more commonly known by its other nameplate, the State Council Information Office, oversees matters relating to external propaganda. The two bureaucracies are closely linked and coordinated. In recent years, with the advent of the Internet and China’s increasing globalization and internationalization, the boundaries between the two categories of propaganda have been growing less and less obvious. For example the Office of Foreign Propaganda has been put in charge of monitoring the Internet both inside and outside China, while the News Department of the Central Propaganda Department also takes a close interest in developments in the same area, providing guidelines on the topic in its regular bulletins to propaganda workers around the country. In 2003, due to the increasing numbers of Chinese-speaking foreigners (either living in China or reading Chinese newspapers online outside China) and Chinese citizens who speak foreign languages and have access to foreign media sources, the Central Propaganda Department actually argued that internal propaganda should now be regarded as the same as external propaganda. This means that Chinese journalists must be mindful that they now have a foreign audience alongside their domestic audience.

The CCP Central Committee Foreign Propaganda Group which is a top level committee consisting of the heads of leading foreign propaganda outlets, has a central guiding role in setting foreign propaganda policies. These are implemented by the OFP/SCIO at the national level and by provincial level foreign propaganda offices at the local level. The OFP/SCIO and its local equivalents direct officials in various government departments and work units whose interests touch on foreign propaganda, such as foreign affairs; foreign trade; tourism; Overseas Chinese Affairs; radio and television; the print media; publishing; cultural, educational, and sporting institutions; as well as State planning, finance, State security, public security, customs, Taiwan affairs, and banking.

The Office for Foreign Propaganda/State Council Information Office (OFP/SCIO) is tasked with managing any sensitive news stories on the following topics: foreign embassies, diplomats in China, Overseas Chinese business people, foreign students, foreign travellers, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwanese residents, especially when they involve loss of life. They also guide the Chinese media during any major events regarding Tibet, Xinjiang, ethnic minorities, religion, human rights, democracy movements, internal and external terrorist activities, and Falungong. For extremely serious incidents, only Xinhua News Agency is allowed to report on them and all other Chinese media must use the Xinhua report word for word.

The OFP/SCIO is also in charge of “clarifying and refuting” any stories which, while forbidden from being reported in China, have been reported on in the foreign media. Articles on foreigners are to be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for verification. Similarly, stories on Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwanese residents are to be sent to the Offices of Hong Kong and Macau, or Taiwan Affairs, while stories on Overseas Chinese businesspeople should be sent to the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry of Culture is in charge of China’s foreign cultural propaganda, under the leadership of the CCP Foreign Propaganda Group. Cultural exchanges are regarded as useful way to break through prejudice and establish warm feelings.

Overseas Chinese

Gaining influence over Overseas Chinese groups outside China in order to “turn them into propaganda bases for China” is a key task in foreign propaganda work. The student protests of 1989, which received strong support from the Overseas Chinese community, alerted the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the fact that many within the Overseas Chinese community were inclined to support democracy activities within China. Historically China’s revolutionary movements have always received considerable funding from the Chinese diaspora, and many Chinese revolutionaries found safe haven in Overseas Chinese communities when the political situation in China became too tense. At the same time, as China’s economic reform process continued to expand after 1989, and especially from 1992, China sought to tap in to the considerable economic resources of the Overseas Chinese as a source of investment and technological transfer.

After 1989 China’s propaganda targeted at the Chinese living outside China–whether they were PRC passport-holders or ethnic Chinese who had been residing abroad for generations–aimed to build patriotic sentiment towards the Chinese Motherland (zuguo), and support for the political status quo. The goal was to neutralize antagonism towards the CCP government, enhance antagonism towards anti-CCP forces within China and their adherents in exile, and at the same time, encourage a constructive attitude towards Overseas Chinese helping to make China “rich and strong” (fu qiang). These efforts have been remarkably successful.

The means by which China promotes its foreign propaganda towards the Overseas Chinese community include: the numerous local Chinese language newspapers, radio and television stations; the Internet, China’s own China Central Television channel aimed at Overseas Chinese CCTV 4; as well as through cultural activities; support for the teaching of Chinese language internationally which includes the rapid spread of Confucius Institutes; and special activities organized for the Overseas Chinese community such as conferences and “root-seeking” (xun gen) cultural tours.

China’s Xinhua News Service currently provides free content to the Chinese language news media outside China. Formerly Hong Kong and Taiwan-based news groups were the main source of news for Overseas Chinese, but in the last ten years they have basically been driven out of the market by a plethora of free Chinese newspapers which derive virtually all their content from the Mainland media. Few Chinese language newspapers outside China have the financial resources (outside of Taiwan, Singapore or pro-Falungong papers) to resist the offer of free content. The same goes for Chinese language radio and television stations abroad, they too now relay Mainland media programmes and exclude other Chinese language sources. Chinese embassy officials work closely with the Overseas Chinese media in order to ensure their continued compliance. It should be noted that in the current era, Xinhua reports are virtually indistinguishable from stories off the wire that might be available from say Reuters, with the exception that they represent a pro-PRC, pro-CCP viewpoint and match current propaganda guidelines on avoiding taboo topics. The PRC long ago stopped promoting revolution or its state ideology.

The Internet has become an extremely important means for China to build support with Overseas Chinese in the last ten years. PRC-based Internet sites are now the leading source of Chinese language and China-related news for Overseas Chinese. The Internet is also proving to be an extremely effective tool for guiding and organizing Overseas Chinese public opinion. An example of this was the role of the Internet in organizing popular protests by Overseas Chinese in 2008 against the perceived bias of the Western media in its coverage of unrest in Tibetan areas in March 2008 and, a month later, in organizing a series of worldwide demonstrations in support of China during the Olympic torch relay. These protests and the later demonstrations were genuine and popular, which shows the effectiveness of China’s efforts to rebuild positive public opinion within the Chinese diaspora, but it should be noted that they received official support, both symbolic and practical. This development matches the rise of popular nationalism within China since 1989, which has been fostered from the top down, but has a genuine resonance with the Chinese population.

Despite being genuine popular movements, the protests and demonstrations adopted the slogans of CCP foreign propaganda directed at Overseas Chinese such as “Ai wo Zhonghua” or “Love China.” Thanks to the Internet, even those who could not attend demonstrations could show their support for China by attaching a red heart moniker next to the word China to their avatars. This initiative was launched by MSN China and spread rapidly throughout the Chinese Internet in 2008. MSN’s involvement not only demonstrates how many Chinese companies respond to the CCP propaganda message on patriotism, but it is also is an indication of how these days the propaganda message is not just promoted directly from propaganda authorities; rather it is frequently relayed through intermediaries on to a wider audience.

During torch relay demonstrations in cities such as Canberra, San Francisco or Seoul in 2008, Overseas Chinese were not compelled to turn up and there were no consequences for not taking an interest, but those who did come were given free matching t-shirts, souvenirs, transport, and in some cases accommodation, all courtesy of local embassy officials and China-based donors. These demonstrations successfully drowned out the protests of anti-CCP groups such as Falungong, Tibetan activists and human rights groups who had hoped to use the Beijing Olympics as a vehicle to promote their criticism of the Chinese government.

Taiwanese

A sub-group of China’s foreign propaganda directed at Overseas Chinese is that directed towards the Taiwanese. The message aimed towards them also aspires to build feelings of patriotism towards the Chinese Motherland and support for the political status quo, but it is also designed to garner support for the reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese Mainland. These efforts have also been relatively successful in recent years.

Some of the means which China employs to promotes its views to Taiwanese audiences include: special television programmes directed at Taiwanese audiences on CCTV 4; the setting up in 2005 of Strait Star TV, a Fujian Province-based satellite station which beams towards Taiwan; study tours for the Taiwanese elite; joint conferences held on themes which help to build common interest such as Chinese heritage and Confucianism; and the hosting of large-scale events which promote notions of ethnic unity across the Taiwan Strait such as commemorations for the birth of Confucius, celebrations for the cult of Mazu (which is prominent in Taiwan and Fujian) and ceremonies in honour of the Yellow Emperor, the symbolic ancestor of all Han Chinese.

Foreign Propaganda Targeted at Non-Chinese

China’s foreign propaganda directed at non-Chinese audiences has undergone major reform in the last decade. These reforms are indicated by the Chinese media’s avoidance of the term “propaganda” in foreign language publications to discuss CCP media management, though the term “xuanchuan” (propaganda) continues to be used in Chinese. So for example, the CCP Central Propaganda Department (Zhongxuanbu) is now translated as Central Publicity Department by China Daily and Xinhua and they use terms such as “publicity,” “information,” “public relations,” “cross cultural communication” and “public diplomacy” to discuss activities which are still classified as waixuan (Foreign Propaganda) in Chinese language publications. As in its domestic propaganda, China now adapts many of the methods of public opinion management which originated in modern industrialized societies such as the United States.

China’s international image was considerably damaged in the eyes of non-Chinese foreign audiences after 1989. Since that date China has worked hard to build constructive international public opinion. The overall themes of China’s foreign propaganda work since 1989 and up to the present have been to promote the image of China’s social, economic, and political stability; as well as the continuance of China’s reform and opening up policies and CCP leadership over the political system. But in particular, promoting the Chinese economy and encouraging further foreign investment and trade has become the primary task of foreign propaganda work, particularly after 1992. Throughout the 1990s China was certainly successful in promoting awareness of its economic growth and enthusiasm for the opportunities which the Chinese market offered international investors, but perceptions towards the politics of China proved much harder to shift, at least among Western audiences. It should be noted that beginning in the 1990s and continuing up to the present day, China’s prestige began to grow in the developing world.

Promoting a new national image (guojia xingxiang) internationally was one of the key strategic goals of China’s 2008 Olympic bid. The new image aimed to allay international fears about China’s increasing political, economic and military power, at the same time as projecting awareness of China’s renewed strength and prosperity. The two weeks of the August 2008 Olympics were indeed a sporting and PR triumph for Beijing. Despite the controversies surrounding hosting the Olympics in Beijing–human rights, the environment, food safety and other issues–the Chinese government actually managed to increase its public approval in China and succeeded in re-shaping its image on the international scene.

There are multiple means adopted for the transmission of China’s foreign propaganda targeted at non-Chinese foreigners. These include PRC-based foreign propaganda outlets such as China Daily, CCTV-9, China Radio International, People’s Daily online published in translation in a number of languages, and china.org, the main portal for China’s foreign propaganda, as well as publishers such as the Foreign Languages Press; but they also include the foreign media and foreign VIPs who China targets to promote certain views. In the following section I will discuss some of these channels for transmission in more detail.

CCTV-9 was launched as a 24-hour channel in 2002, and from 2004, it began broadcasting in Spanish and French. In September 2005, the station was re-launched with much fanfare, though with little noticeable change to content or style of programming. The goal was to make CCTV-9 China’s equivalent to CNN, a global media presence with 24-hour news coverage. However, unlike CNN, which is not (formally at least) the mouthpiece of any particular government, CCTV-9 is most definitely the mouthpiece for the Chinese government’s perspectives on international affairs and the Party-line perspectives on China’s own affairs. The station has been granted substantial resources in terms of equipment; but has no editorial independence. CCTV-9 journalists are under constant pressure to present a positive account of China. In August 2005, a series of items reported factually on coal mining disasters in China; soon after the channel’s leaders received a warning from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that its reports were harming China’s international image. Following this incident, senior editorial staff and journalists were all forced to write self-criticisms. This is a classic example of the current relative lack of agency of Chinese journalists involved in China’s foreign propaganda activities aimed at non-Chinese foreigners. In many ways they are more constrained than journalists who write for Chinese audiences.

A further channel for China’s foreign propaganda is the Chinese PR Association, set up in the early 1990s, which works closely with the Central Propaganda Department towards the goal of “optimizing a pro-China international environment,” “establishing a positive image of China internationally,” and “packaging China.” One of the organization’s tasks is to act as an intermediary between foreign embassies and organizations in China with Chinese government departments. The association also takes a behind-the-scenes role in PR campaigns (targeted at the concerns of Western governments and NGOs) such as the high-profile anti-AIDS campaign of November – December 2002.

The CCP has a longstanding policy of utilising foreigners in its foreign propaganda work, this is called “using foreign strength to promote China” (liyong waili wei wo xuanchuan). Historically, pro-CCP foreigners have been extremely useful in producing a wide range of propaganda materials, ranging from books, films and poetry, to public and private lobbying. Soon after June 4, Jiang Zemin instructed foreign affairs personnel to step up their activities to garner the support of prominent foreigners “friendly to China,” to influence Western governments and get them to drop their sanctions against China. Henry Kissinger and George Bush Senior are commonly cited as being particularly helpful (behind the scenes) to blunt the effects of sanctions in this period. The foreign friends the CCP has come to value most in the post-1989 period are prominent foreign figures that can bring commercial and political advantages to China and the Chinese oligarchy.
Public agreement on China’s political positions is not required, though it might help business along a little.

In the years since 1989, Beijing has worked hard to get foreigners to promote China. Foreigners based in China and Western China specialists are often approached by foreign affairs cadres to write articles on China for the Chinese media. Naturally, only viewpoints which are in accord with the current propaganda line can be published. China Daily specializes in featuring this type of material, although similar stories also periodically appear in the Chinese language media. Another tried and true practice in China’s foreign propaganda work is to bring in “prominent person” foreign delegations on all-expenses-paid tours of China, in the hope that they will go home promoting China’s point of view. Local propaganda officials are instructed to host foreign journalists and researchers; do thought work on foreign experts, students, tourists, Taiwanese, and Overseas Chinese; and increase sister-city exchanges; all in order to create an “international
army of friendly propagandists” for China.

In 1992, a meeting of foreign propaganda officials was held to discuss techniques for getting China’s propaganda materials published in the Western media. Since that meeting there has been a dramatic increase in materials published abroad. Between 1992 and 2000 over two thousand articles were published in Taiwan alone. China’s propagandists try to get foreign newspapers to do China’s propaganda work; this is called “borrowing foreign newspapers” (jieyong haiwai baokan). In order to achieve this, China’s local level foreign propaganda officials host approved foreign journalists, take them around approved sites and give them materials for their reports. Non-approved visits to sensitive sites (if found out) can have foreign journalists thrown out of China.

In early 2009 Beijing announced that it would invest a further phenomenal 45 billion yuan into its main media outlets to strengthen their international news coverage and global presence. As part of this, Xinhua News Service will increase their overseas bureaus from 100 to 186, almost enough to have one in every country in the world. The Global Times, an extremely popular People’s Daily-owned tabloid with a strong international focus, will soon set up an English language edition. And CCTV-9 will set up Arabic and Russian language services.

There are also concrete plans in the next two year to establish an Asia-based television station (Singapore or Thailand are the likely locations) that would beam global news to the world as told from a pro-PRC perspective. This new channel would take as its model Phoenix Television, which is beamed via restricted satellite to the Chinese elite within China and on paid satellite tv outside China. Phoenix is nominally privately owned; however its current main investor is the State-owned enterprise China Mobile.

Phoenix has long been regarded by Party propaganda insiders as “more loyal than CCTV.” The proposed new channel would similarly be “privately owned” and closely tied in to the CCP foreign propaganda agenda. If it were to follow the Phoenix Television model, which is that of a “loyal opposition,” this channel could well be more effective than CCTV-4 or CCTV-9 in building positive international public opinion for China. It certainly is likely to appeal to Overseas Chinese audiences as will focus on stories which are close to their interests and not covered elsewhere in such detail, while retaining the crucial impression of “objectivity” which CCTV-4 and CCTV-9 often lack. The new channel could also prove to be appealing to many viewers in the non-Western world such as Africa, the Middle East, South America and the South Pacific who are attracted to China’s alternative perspective of global affairs. As such this new initiative could well have a significant impact in strengthening China’s soft power internationally.

Alternative Modernity? Playing the Japanese Game of Culture by Andrew Feenberg


["Alternative Modernity: Playing the Japanese Game of Culture," Cultural Critique, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 107-138; also available in Alternative Modernity with additional material on the relation of Kawabata's novel to Nishida.]

ALTERNATIVE MODERNITY? PLAYING THE JAPANESE GAME OF CULTURE

by Andrew Feenberg

If games both fashion and reflect culture, it stands to reason that to a certain extent a whole civilization and, within that civilization, an entire era can be characterized by its games.

                  

  Roger Caillois, “Les jeux dans le monde moderne”

The writer’s irony is a negative mysticism to be found in times without a god.

                      Lukács, The Theory of the Novel

 

Introduction: Games as Rational Systems

       In 1938, the great Japanese novelist Yasunari Kawabata witnessed a turning point in the history of the game of Go. Kawabata was then a young reporter covering the championship Go match sponsored by his newspaper. Honnimbô Shusai, the “Invincible Master,” who had reigned over the world of Go for a generation, was pitted against a young challenger. So popular was Go that Kawabata’s newspaper could offer the players substantial sums for participating and pay all the expenses of the match. These were considerable as the match lasted many months.

       Kawabata felt he had witnessed the end of an era at that Go match in 1938. Many years later he brought out his old newspaper articles, added new fictional material, and published a novel called The Master of Go (Meijin). This novel is an elegy for the world the Japanese lost as they modernized. Kawabata’s rather sentimental traditionalism is not so simple as it appears at first; nostalgia is a moment in the structure of modern consciousness, and afortiori, novelistic form.  This is why his story has much to tell us about the nature and possibilities of modern society.

       It may seem strange that Kawabata’s most sustained investigation of modernity should be the story of a board game, but in fact games exemplify formally rational systems. Like markets, law, scientific and technical research, games break loose from the continuum of social life to impose a rational order on a sector of experience. Modern institutions too are characterized by explicit rules, unambiguous measures, defined times and places of action, equalization of participants’ positions. Their game-like structure, with its predictable procedures, absence of predetermined content, and simple principles of equity are all contrasted favorably in modernizing ideology to irrational, dogmatic and biased traditions.

       We will see how Kawabata, through his narrative of the great Go match, turns the argument around and develops an implicit critique of the particularity and bias of formal rationality. He accomplishes this by the peculiar literary technique of unfolding layer after layer of meaning in the moves of the game. The apparently neutral forms of play turn out to be loaded with social, cultural and historical content. The Go match can stand for the whole range of modern institutions invading Japan, each of which delivers far more in the way of social change than appears on the surface.

       In the concluding portion of this essay, I attempt to enlarge the scope of these reflections in two directions. I will first compare Kawabata’s literary technique with Lukács’ early theory of the novel. Using different means derived from his own culture, Kawabata achieved a form based on the same sort of layering and double meaning Lukács’ analyzes in terms of the category of irony. It is this form which enables Kawabata to carry through his critique of Western modernity. Secondly, I will discuss the larger implications of Kawabata’s novel for the question of modernity. Japan’s cultural specificity  is often mentioned as a factor in its rise to industrial power. Kawabata’s novel suggests a new way of thinking about why this might be so.

The Rules of the Game

       Millions of Japanese play Go much as Westerners play chess. Kawabata’s novel assumes a passing familiarity with the game and, unfortunately, we will not be able to discuss it without at least that degree of acquaintance. I must therefore ask the reader to bear with me for a brief description of the rules of the game.1

       Go is said to be more difficult than chess. Although the rules are simpler, the play is more complicated if only because the board is more than four times as “big” as a chess board. Black and white stones are placed at the intersections of a grid 19 by 19 lines. (See diagram 1.) The number of possible moves is the factorial of 361, more than the number of atoms in the galaxy.

       The aim of play is to capture territory and enemy pieces by surrounding them with one’s own pieces. Once placed on the board, pieces cannot be moved; they remain where they were played until they are captured. Every piece covers the intersection of two lines, which themselves intersect with other lines at four adjacent points. Each of these points counts as an “eye” or “breathing space.” Adjacent pieces of the same color share “eyes.” So long as a piece or a group of pieces has at least one such “eye” uncovered by the opponent, it is “alive.” Once all its “eyes” have been taken it is captured and the space it occupied belongs to the opponent’s count. (See diagram 2.)

       Because the board is so large, it is impossible to concentrate on any one portion of it for long without losing the initiative to a more mobile adversary. Thus contests begin all over the board and the players periodically return to one or another of them, advancing battles toward an eventual conclusion a few moves at a time. Beginners are bewildered by the frequent interruption of these apparently inconclusive struggles, but this is the essence of the game.

       The game moves through roughly three phases. At first territory is staked out by posting isolated pieces around the board. Gradually battles emerge around conflicting claims, none of which are entirely secure in the early phase of the game. Finally, the board is filled in, the last ambiguities removed, and the captured spaces and pieces counted. Until the last phase, there are always many incomplete conquests, broken lines, lost pieces left in place, and so on. Although significant stakes ride on clearing them up properly, these housekeeping tasks are generally left till the end while the players confront more significant challenges.

       The rules of Go are a model of simplicity and clarity, but they contain one logical flaw. An oscillating pattern can emerge in which both players have a disproportionately large incentive to repeat their last move. This situation occurs when the piece used to take an enemy piece is itself exposed to immediate capture, reproducing the status quo ante. (See diagram 3.) This situation is called a “kô,” from the Sanskrit “kalpa,” meaning an epoch or eternity. To prevent endless repetition, the second player is obliged to play away from the “kô” for a turn, breaking the pattern. Then the first player can fill it in. (If white plays in the space on diagram 3 indicated by the arrow after removing the black piece, the “kô” disappears.) We will have to return later to this idea of “playing away.”

The Way of Go: Autonomy and Reflection

       Go was introduced into Japan from China 13 centuries ago. In Japan, it gradually evolved into a discipline, a kind of sedentary martial art. As such Go came to be seen as a “dô” or Way of self-realization and not primarily as a contest of strength, although obviously the best player was honored. Kawabata writes, “The Oriental game has gone beyond game and test of strength and become a way of art. It has about it a certain Oriental mystique and nobility” (117). And he compares it to the Nô drama and the tea ceremony as belonging to “a strange Japanese tradition” (118).2 With this background in mind, one is less astonished to learn that the champion of the leading school of Go took Buddhist orders and was called the “Honnimbô.”

       This characteristically Japanese concept of Way has a two tiered structure. On the one hand, for an activity to support a Way, it must be abstracted from the contingencies of everyday life and constructed as an autonomous “field” with its own logic. Then, this field must become the locus of self-transformation for the agent engaged in activity on it.

       The autonomization of Go involves the following features which it shares with other board games:

       1. Every move in the game must conform to an explicitly formulated, unambiguous rule.

       2. Moves are stripped of semantic content and reduced to unambiguous acts that can be represented diagramatically with precision.

       3. The purpose of each move and of the game as a whole is clearly defined and immanent in the rules.     

       4. The game discriminates between winners and losers by a precise quantitative measure leaving no room for doubt about the outcome.

       5. Moves can always be clearly distinguished from other events in the social surroundings of the game, and can therefore be assigned a specific “space” and “time” of play.

       6. Insofar as the rules are concerned, players’ positions in the game are equivalent in every possible respect, the major and unavoidable exception being the first move.

       7. The game is a collaborative performance requiring various forms of reciprocity, from the simplest–alternating and mutually responsive moves–to the most complex–attention to the competitor’s state of mind or physical needs.

       Two features of this list seem particularly significant. They are: the evident care with which ambiguity has been eliminated from the field of play through such means as explicit rules and quantitative measures: and the artificial equalization of the players who, in everyday life, are sure to be subtly differentiated in ways the game ignores.  These features of the game indicate its remoteness from the surrounding social world in which ambiguity and inequality are the rule. And by this very token, these features seem to echo strangely our modern notions of scientific and political rationality. We will return to this surprising coincidence.

       Autonomy is not an end in itself, but is linked to reflexivity. Because the game can be separated from its environment, its characteristic situations can be endlessly retrieved and studied. Self-criticism, repetition and practice can refine specialized abilities. Performance can be judged, play can be perfected, degrees of competence measured in matches.

       Reflection not only improves performance but also situates the autonomous game in the player’s life process. The act of play is a practice of self-realization modifying the player through discipline. This is the core of the notion of Way; in Western societies the idea of “vocation” plays a similar role, describing the effect on the subject of its own activity in a relatively autonomous domain.

       The recontextualizing practice of the game as a Way has the paradoxical effect of reinforcing its autonomy. The game is wholly absorbed in a way of life that is itself wholly absorbed in the game. As Kawabata says of the old Master, he was “a man so disciplined in an art that he had lost the better part of reality” (32).

       In effect, what Erving Goffman calls “rules of irrelevance,” that anchor attention on play and abstract it from the social surround, have taken over his whole life (1961: 20). This is a well known hazard of the game. There is an ancient Chinese tale of a woodcutter who comes upon two old men playing Go in the forest and stops to watch. Eventually the game ends and the players disappear into thin air. The astonished woodcutter discovers that his own hair has turned white during the play, and the handle of his axe has rotted through. For Kawabata the game has a demonic quality.

From the veranda outside the players’ room, which was ruled by a sort of diabolic tension, I glanced out into the garden, beaten down by the powerful summer sun, and saw a girl of the modern sort insouciantly feeding the carp. I felt as if I were looking at some freak. I could scarcely believe that we belonged to the same world (27).     

No-Mind: The Structure of Conflict

       The Way of the game is not about victory but about self-realization through discipline. Kawabata tells the story of two high ranking young players who ask the advice of a clairvoyant on how to win. “The proper method, said the man, was to lose all awareness of self while awaiting an adversary’s play” (42).

       One immediately recognizes here the Zen concept of “no-mind” as it appears in Japanese martial arts. It describes the peculiar form of self-forgetfulness involved in effective sport or combat. But this is surely an odd application of Buddhism, a religion of ascetic detachment from the world.  As Suzuki (1970) explains it, “non-attachment” can be extended down to the level of attentive processes, freeing the actor from inhibiting concentration on either self or other. This loosening of focus banishes hesitation and fear and improves fighting performance. ‘”From this absolute emptiness,” states Takuan, “comes the most wondrous unfoldment of doing”‘ (Herrigel, 1960: 104).3

       This is not the place to discuss the religious implications of no-mind. What interests me more in any case is the structure of the concept which is derived, by a subtle transformation, from the traditional Hindu and Buddhist notion of non-duality. According to the traditional notion conflict is illusory, as in Emerson’s famous poem, “Brahma:”

       If the red slayer think he slays,    

       Or if the slain think he is slain,    

       They know not well the subtle ways    

       I keep, and pass, and turn again (Suzuki, 1970: 207).

       Borges’ story, “The Theologians,” reaches a similar conclusion. Here is the heavenly coda to this account of a metaphysical dispute that ends tragically with one of the disputants burned at the stake: “In Paradise, Aurelian learned that, for the unfathomable divinity, he and John of Pannonia (the orthodox believer and the heretic, the abhorrer and the abhorred, the accuser and the accused) formed one single person” (1964: 126).

       These works appear to invite us to occupy a “third” position above the fray: the “I” of Brahma or the theologians’ God.  Presumably, if the swordsmen and the theologians could occupy this position themselves, their strife would cease and they would be reconciled in perfect understanding.

       The doctrine of no-mind agrees that apparent dualities reveal a more fundamental unity. But what makes it so interesting is the elimination of the third position. It is conflict itself which is shown to be prior to the parties it joins, an underlying unity of which they are mere projections.  True non-duality therefore cannot be achieved by observing the conflicts in which others are plunged, no matter how dialectically. Such an observer would still stand in dualistic opposition to its object.

       Rather, no-mind is a particular way of living duality, an existential position within it, and not a modality of knowledge transcending it.  Hence the Zen master’s reply to the impertinent question of how the enlightened deal with hunger and cold: “When hungry, I eat, and when cold I put on more clothes” (Suzuki, 1973: 75).

       This reply indicates why Zen turned out to be peculiarly available to the martial arts, and ultimately, I will argue below, to literature as well. For this doctrine, the goal is not to rise above conflict in reconciliation but to achieve total identification with the context of struggle in the very course of playing one’s own conflictual role. If conflict can be transcended, it must be from within, without setting up a third consciousness above the fight.

       The same point can be made in relation to Go. Insofar as the players identify completely with the situation of the board, i.e., with the “whole,” they can assume their role unreservedly and carry it out apart from any concern with survival or victory.  This no-mind is not a mystical unconsciousness, but a consciousness that has become one with the formal requirements of the activity frame and that sees its role within that frame as in some sense “logically” entailed rather than personally motivated.

       Good play thus has nothing to do with one-sided personal aggression; at the height of the most intense competition, the players are joined in harmony in the construction of the board, much as singers respond to each other in a piece of complex choral music. Their unity, expressed in their mutually responsive moves, takes precedence over their struggle. Ultimately, they “form one single person.”

The Pattern Disturbed

       In Japanese culture, the pursuit of self-realization through a Way manifests itself aesthetically, in this instance as the beauty of the board on which the dance of adversaries produces a magnificent and complex pattern.  Of course the aim of Go is to win, however, Japanese commentators always note that this aim is transcended by a higher interest in the aesthetic achievement of “harmony” and pattern. Go is the collaborative production of aesthetic form through competitive play. Both moments, collaboration and competition, are equally important for without struggle there is no beauty. The weak player who offers no resistance is incapable of collaborating in the production of a satisfying board, full of symmetry and surprise. There is thus a promise of aesthetic redemption contained in the hard fought game; Kawabata’s novel is the story of the betrayal of that promise by the modern focus on victory and defeat for its own sake.4

       That new focus becomes apparent in the climactic move of the great match of 1938. After many months of difficult play, interrupted by the illness of the Master, the game seems perfectly poised with no advantage to either side. A struggle breaks out in the center of the board that promises to be decisive. As the day comes to an end, the challenger, Otaké, seems unsure of his course. He writes his final play of the day–move 121–on a card and seals it in an envelope, to be opened by the referees the following morning, and with that the players retire. (See diagram 4).

       When the seal is broken at the next session, the move is not in the central battlefield at all, but strikes at the Master far away near the top of the board. Yet it compels at least a brief response of the housekeeping sort; it resembles the move the disadvantaged player makes away from a “kô” to distract the adversary with a sharp diversionary blow. Soon the players return to the center of the board where the Master plays poorly, making the mistake that costs him the game.

       What is the meaning of this incident? The organizers of the match granted each player 40 hours to consider their moves. Sealing the final move of the day is supposed to prevent the players from adding the time between sessions to this already generous total. But by tying the master up for a turn with his trivial sealed play, Otaké appears to have frozen the most important action so as to have a leisurely look at it overnight. The Master is convinced that Otaké used the sealed play to gain time to reflect on the difficult position in the center of the board, time he desparately needed as he was rapidly using up his allotment.

       Despite the suspicious appearance of move 121, it is not certain that the challenger actually used it to gain unfair advantage.  Although at one point the narrator says that Otaké “would avert defeat even if in the process he must chew the stones to bits,” he is not portrayed unsympathetically (178). He is even described as reading the Lotus Sutra to calm himself before playing. And the narrator, who is full of admiration for the Master, also respects his challenger and, at one point, intervenes effectively to prevent him from forfeiting the match.

       This ambiguous situation crystallizes the action of the novel.  And because the human significance of the climactic move is ambiguous, the specificity and the concreteness of the actual play persists even after the novel appears to assign it a meaning. It remains in fact a permanent stumbling block to final interpretation, an ambiguous intersection of the multiple codes that structure the novel.

       But whether Otaké made good use of the extra hours or not is ultimately irrelevant since the Master is so upset by the sealed play that he can no longer concentrate properly on the game. The challenger’s apparent thrust toward victory disturbs the pattern and undermines the spiritual significance of the game. It is as though the delicate work of producing the board, which has as its secondary consequence victory and defeat for the players, was interrupted by a mere tug of war in which participants have no conscious relation at all to the combined effects of their labors and no purpose other than winning. The incident brings out into the open the potential conflict between collaborative and competitive dimensions of the game and thus between its roles in supporting a Way and in discriminating between winners and losers.

       Because the Master is upset, his feelings come out momentarily in the presence of the reporter. Kawabata writes,

The Master had put the match together as a work of art. It was as if the work, likened to a painting, were smeared black at the moment of highest tension. That play of black upon white, white upon black, has the intent and takes the forms of creative art. It has in it a flow of the spirit and a harmony as of music. Everything is lost when suddenly a false note is struck, or one party in a duet suddenly launches forth on an eccentric flight of his own. A materpiece of a game can be ruined by insensitivity to the feelings of an adversary (164).

       Later the Master has his doubts or in any case is more reticent. His published account of the game, like that of the new champion, contains no criticism of this decisive move which, despite its odd timing, is perfectly ordinary in other respects. Thus the waves quickly cover over the suspicions that ruined the match; all rally around to protect the image of their art.

Meta-Rules: Etiquette or Equity

       Modernity does not introduce rationality into social life for the first time. Every culture has domains governed by formal rules. These rules can be considered “rational” in the sociological sense of the term on two conditions: first, that they employ tests of experience or impose principles of equivalence, implication, or optimization on action, and second, that they do so with an unusual degree of precision. So it is, for example, with accounting rules designed to insure the equality of income and outgo, or legal rules that affix punishments to crimes. Or the rules of Go that create a domain in which the difference between better and worse play is not open to dispute.

       Although the production of such domains is not characteristically modern but essentially human, modernity can nevertheless be clearly distinguished from every other type of society. In modern societies certain of these formally rational activities are liberated from recontextualizing strategies that reconcile them with traditional rituals and social distinctions. In the case of a game like Go, potential conflicts between the requirements of the one and the other are resolved in advance by what I will call “meta-rules” that regulate the social relations of the players congruent with the requirements of play.

       In the old Japan, etiquette inscribed agents’ identity in all their activities without exception. The constraints of etiquette were perhaps more strongly felt in this society than one can imagine in the West. True or not, only in Japan could the story be told of the feudal general who washed and perfumed his hair before battle in case, in the event of defeat, his decapitated head were to be presented to the victor and the ladies of his court.

       Etiquette recontextualizes formally rational activities to insure that they take a subordinate place in a world ordered according to quite different principles, e.g. ranking by age which relates all human activity to the mortality of the agents and their role in family life. Deference in this context not only expresses a social prejudice but contains the socially dangerous equalizing potential of formal rationality.5

       This cultural framework had completely enveloped Go in complicated quasi-religious rituals until the match of 1938. That match marks the breakdown of an older vision of the game as a spiritual discipline and the emergence of a new one in which it is essentially a test of strength. The processes of modernization that had been gnawing at traditional Japanese culture in every domain since the Meiji Restoration finally reached this odd holdout that had been ignored until  then.

       The modalities of this shift are linked to what I will call the textuality of Go as a board game. The decontextualized character of the play, which suits it to be a Way, also makes it possible to define the state of the game at any moment by simply recounting the sequence of moves. In fact games resemble writing in that they produce an object that can be separated from any particular material support, such as a piece of paper or a board, and circulated as a system of signs.

       The quasi-textual nature of the game suits it for dissemination through a newspaper. Like his earlier reporting, Kawabata’s novel dramatizes the Go match, the twists and turns of which it follows exactly despite the poetic license he took with many human details. This exactitude is in itself significant: the narrator is a reporter, like Kawabata, and the same kinds of charts that appeared in the newspaper articles are reproduced throughout the novel.

       The involvement of a newspaper in the championship match results in a significant shift in emphasis. The game, which used to be a unique spiritual performance, is reduced to a mechanically retrievable spectacle, a “match.” Of course there was always an element of show in it, but a transformation occurs when mediated mass spectatorship replaces the burdensome ritual of personally following the players to their meeting place and remaining silent in their presence. Newspaper readers are in immediate contact only with the contextless chart of the unfolding game, the thrust and parry of successive moves, the final drive toward victory, all of which can be printed exactly as played.  This change, made possible by the formal autonomy of the game, eliminates its “aura,” and diminishes interest in it as a Way, which now becomes a kind of folklore or ornament of the record in the press (Benjamin, 224-225).

       The newspaper and its readers are less interested in these traditional aspects of the game than in its fairness, so new meta-rules are introduced designed to ensure the victory of the better player. “The modern way was to insist upon doing battle under conditions of abstract justice, even when challenging the Master himself” (52). The uniformity of the game, in which nothing distinguishes the players but the color of their stones, must be reflected in their roles in play. The social institution that corresponds to this notion of equity is the contract, and the organization of the match is therefore settled contractually.

       Several of these new rules are imitated from Western chess, such as time limits on play, and sealed plays at the end of the day.  The players are even sequestered to prevent outsiders from contributing advice. Of this code, with its cold rationalism, Kawabata says “It later came to seem like a foreshadowing of death” (58).

       One could hardly object to such conditions, especially not if, as one of the players, he wished to receive the generous rewards for playing the game under conditions that would increase newspaper sales. Yet these new rules ran roughshod over precious Japanese sensitivities in their exclusive concentration on the question “Who is the best player?”

       Traditional etiquette prescribed not an equal but an unequal relationship between the older and the younger player, the champion and his challenger. Accordingly, the Invincible Master had the right to expect that his age and eminence would be recognized not merely through outward signs of respect but through obedience to his decisions about the play, the length and timing of sessions, and related matters. There is a certain conflict of interest implied in this arrangement, but the Master’s position is too visible and his responsibility too heavy for him to abuse his power. Considerations of honor limit the asymmetry between the players. Was it not rude then to place them both on an equal footing? Was it not demeaning to the art of Go to imply, by imposing these rules, that the players are mainly interested in victory? Was finding out who plays best important enough to excuse these offenses?

       In one sense the answer is obvious. Kawabata’s narrator is a good newspaperman and knows all the dirt, even on the Old Master. He does not hide from us that the Master abused his discretion to avoid a match with his challenger’s teacher, Suzuki, who might well have beaten him. One of his disciples is suspected of having whispered the winning move to the Master in a previous match. And worst of all, he treated his own position as “a commercial asset” and “sold his last match to a newspaper at a price without precedent” (53). So much for virtuous old Japan!

       And yet the narrator nevertheless describes the Master as “forever true and clean,” which he is by comparison with slick modern players (109). Kawabata explains that the disappearance of favoritism is not the innocent gesture it appears to be, for, “New rules bring new tactics” (165). And he notes, “When a law is made, the cunning that finds loopholes goes to work. One cannot deny that there is a certain slyness among younger players, a slyness which, when rules are written to prevent slyness, makes use of the rules themselves” (54). The sealed play containing move 121 is an example.

       Rules that claim universality in the equal treatment of all are applied in a world of particular circumstances. Far from standing above the struggle, they end up being instrumentalized in individual strategies as means to the end of victory. The shrewd grasp of loopholes in the new rules replaces the honest subtlety of the really insightful player. Thus the ideal of fairness as a quasi-mechanical equality between players is never achieved. Once again, therefore, one must rely on the force of honor to restrain abuse. But now honor has been weakened by the alibi of conformity to the letter of the rules which takes its place in the modern mind.

       There is a further unfortunate consequence of the introduction of the new rules: the loss of aesthetic values. Etiquette is of course extrinsic to the structure of play itself and as such may interfere with the logic of the game. But in fact the novel is not about the struggle between ascriptive values such as age, and a new achievement oriented ethos. Far from emphasizing the unfairness and distortions deference causes, the novel presents etiquette as a context of play uniquely suited to bringing out the aesthetic achievement of a truly heroic match. Meanwhile, it is the orientation toward success that is shown to distort play through introducing extraneous considerations that depend on mere technicalites. The narration thus deconstructs the opposition of ascription and achievement. 

       The novel lets us understand that the mere establishment of the bureaucratic framework already marked the Master for defeat. It is not just that he is bound to be less clever than a younger man at manipulating the system. No, it is more the distrust embodied in the very nature of the rules which was bound at some point to demoralize and upset him beyond endurance. Against this background some event was sure to cast doubt on the position and lead to the collapse of the Master’s spirit. Kawabata writes,

It may be said that the Master was plagued in his last match by modern rationalism, to which fussy rules were everything, from which all the grace and elegance of Go as art had disappeared, which quite dispensed with respect for elders and attached no importance to mutual respect as human beings. From the way of Go the beauty of Japan and the Orient had fled (52).

       Because etiquette privileges the collaborative over the competitive dimension of play, it opens up a space within which the aesthetic ideal of Way can flourish. But in the new Japan, the social context of play is a matter of simple fairness, abstracted from all personal considerations. Fairness projects other aspects of the game, such as equality and struggle, into the social environment. When social activity is treated as a mere competition, the structure of the game, with its clear decision between winners and losers, reaches out to simplify life itself.

Layers of Meaning

       Such ideas were accessible to many Japanese writers and intellectuals, caught in the midst of a modernizing movement they lived simultaneously as a response to both the Universal–scientific truth–and the Particular–Western power.  How  does Kawabata develop such a dialectic in his novel? The Master of Go is based on multiplying codes in terms of which to interpret an apparently simple move in a game. The order and connection of meanings at each level parallels that at the other levels. The same action can be identified at all levels, unchanged except in terms of its contextualization and significance. It is not possible to order these levels causally, to explain one level by another because each has its own “logic.” Such multi-layered entanglements are characteristic of formalized fields. Double or triple meanings can always be constructed around any act which has an aparently technical or formal motive in terms of its involvement with its social environment.6

       The novel is an attempt to understand and encompass the increasingly intrusive lower levels of the dialectic, privileged by modernity, in a higher aesthetic form. The game is a formal-rational system that can be isolated from its practical context as a set of spatial coordinates, a chart. Recontextualized as a performance, the abstract chart is animated by a practice of play; it becomes this particular game played by these players in a definite time and place. A completely self-sufficient account of the action is possible at the level of the game, its rules, and the strategy of play, and such an account is plausibly offered in official published descriptions of the game.

       Of course there is always more going on than is deemed fit for presentation in such publications. The novel takes us behind the scenes by revealing the psychological meaning of the player’s actions. At this level the game appears as a structure of social relations, mixing respect, fairness, aggression and anxiety in a surprisingly complicated narrative flow.

       But even this description is incomplete; it abstracts from a still wider context: the social background. The players, after all, are not isolated beings but members of a society. The game is thus further encompassed in the wider practical field of social, cultural and historical meanings animating the play. These meanings reflect the different meta-rules of etiquette and equity with their different emphases on Way and winning.

       The conflict between the newspaper’s rules and the old etiquette reflects a larger historical conflict dramatized in the match. The Honnimbô Shusai was not just a Go champion, but the champion of a dying civilization, the old Japan, a world in which a certain kind of aristocratic idealism and aestheticism prevailed over modern worries about success and money. For the Master, the game is the occasion for an aesthetic revelation beyond any merely personal contest. But in modern times there is no longer any “margin for remembering the dignity and the fragrance of Go as an art,” and the challenger plays simply to win (52).  As Kawabata writes, “The Master seemed like a relic left behind by Meiji” (63). In fact he died shortly after the finish of the match. His challenger, however decent a man, was the agent of the modern world. His victory would mean the end of the old Japan and the emergence of a new spirit, dominated by business and the media.

       For Kawabata the 1938 championship match was thus emblematic of the modernization of Japan. He repeats the usual contrast between modernity and tradition familiar from Japanese literature: the  struggle between ideals and interests, feeling and reason, beauty and power, etc. But despite the clichés, his narrator cannot entirely disapprove of the modern; it will bring, he says, “new vitality in the world of Go” (145).

       If the narrator is ambivalent, the novel as a whole tends, as we have seen, to soften the epochal differences between its two principle characters. No doubt we are intended to discount the rumours about the Master and to believe the worst of his challenger. But the ambiguities indicate that the problem of modernization is not just about psychology or ethics; the game has different potentialities that are reflected in historically typical forms of personality. The personal level thus depends on an underlying change in the place of the game in social life.7 A perfectly respectable move from one standpoint is an outrage from the other. The players are in effect playing different games. Their encounter must lead to a profound misunderstanding, a conflict of “doubles” in which each participant operates according to a different code.8

       It is the journalist narrator who carries the burden of explaining these larger implications. He can do so because he embodies in his person the very ambiguity of the match. On the one hand, just as the Master reduces himself to nothing before the game, so the narrator says “I reduced myself to nothing as I gazed at the Master” (115). On the other hand, his relation to Otaké is characterized by egalitarian affection and esteem. His doubleness reflects the doubleness of Japan itself (Pilarcik, 1986: 16-17).

       The profound ambiguity of the narrator’s identity opens a space that encompasses all the lower fields in a sort of literary no-mind. In his Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, Kawabata endorses such a view of his writing. He quotes the poet Saigyô: “Confronted with all the varied forms of nature, his eyes and his ears were filled with emptiness. And were not the words that came forth true words” (1969: 42)? And he concludes, “My own works have been described as works of emptiness…”(1969: 43).

Aestheticism, East and West

       The Master of Go represents a type of aesthetic critique in which Japanese spirit survives outside of history, as a peculiar and quite contingent doubt haunting triumphant modernity and revealing its limits. Perhaps this is the sort of thing Tanizaki foresaw already in 1933 when he wrote his famous essay In Praise of Shadows. Despairing of the survival of traditional Japanese culture under the brightness of electric light, he writes,

I have thought that there might still be somewhere, possibly in literature or the arts, where something could be saved. I would call back at least for literature this world of shadows we are losing. In the mansion called literature I would have the eaves deep and the walls dark, I would push back into the shadows the things that come forward too clearly, I would strip away the useless decoration. I do not ask that this be done everywhere, but perhaps we may be allowed at least one mansion where we can turn off the electric lights and see what it is like without them (42).

       The aestheticism of these Japanese writers has interesting similarities with the early Lukács’ theory of novelistic irony as a kind of “negative mysticism.9 The coincidence is important because it suggests a still wider context for Kawabata’s critique of modernity: the novelistic tradition. Furthermore, Lukács’ theory indicates a way of distinguishing  Kawabata’s novels, as aesthetic forms, from mere sentimental nostalgia for the past.

       According to Lukacs, the novel is the original and most profound critique of modernity. That critique, at least in the French and Russian novels Lukacs took for typical, is aesthetic rather than moral or political. These novels are the product of an irony that is half within, half without the conflicts of the world. The novelist neither stands in polemic opposition to modern society on the ground of tradition or passion–usually exemplified in the hero–nor justifies modernization and its costs with a “grand narrative” ending in the present or leading to a shining future. Indeed, were the writer to identify purely and simply with either the world or the hero, the novel would lapse into the pamphlet or the lyric.

       Novelistic irony is thus peculiarly ambivalent. On the one hand, it demystifies modernity’s claim to universality by revealing the contrast between the facade and the realities of economic, political and legal institutions. Often (in Dickens or Balzac, for example) this leads to a certain sentimentalizing of tradition. But, on the other hand, the novel’s ironic structure subverts any idea of a return to the past by showing how deeply tradition has been intertwined with modernity. Indeed, tradition, like other hopeless ideals the heroes oppose to modernity, serves primarily as a marker for an impossible transcendence which can only be indicated from within the tensions and oppositions of society. The novelist may seem to take sides but his irony nevertheless situates him in what Lukacs calls a “transcendendental place” from which alone the whole is visible.

       Formally, this ironic stance resembles the consciousness of Way, the no-mind that plays its role to the fullest while identifying with the whole to which it contributes its conflictual share. Just so, Kawabata’s narrator sides nostalgically with the old Master and yet manages to depict the contradictions of Japanese tradition and Western modernity in a way that avoids tendentious polemic. He is a mysteriously neutral observer of the real struggle of the book, which produces the aesthetic patterns suitable to literary representation, the graceful move and countermove in a conflict of cultures. To depict this struggle in a “work of emptiness” is to transcend the opposition of tradition and modernity aesthetically. Lukacs’ remarkable intuition of the novel’s religious content is confirmed by this echo from another culture.10

       There is however an important difference between Western and non-Western forms of ironic consciousness of modernity. In the West, one typical heroic type embodies ideals out the past that are doomed by social advance. But the old Master, a similar heroic type depicted in a non-Western setting, exemplifies not merely the tragedy of  historical lag, but a contemporary clash of cultures. That clash takes place in the context of Western cultural imperialism in which Japan appears doomed to defeat, not so much because its time has come as because it has met a superior force that has acquired a corresponding but perhaps undeserved prestige. The later development of Japanese society shows how important it is not to overlook this difference.

       Today, in a world in which Japan has become a leading industrial power, we can ask whether the continuing signs of the vitality of Japanese culture do not refute the aestheticizing pessimism of Japanese authors such as Tanizaki and Kawabata. Their position belonged to the period of cultural trauma that began with the Meiji restoration and culminated in the Occupation.

       The novel prospered as a literary form during this period. It opened a space within which Western modernity could be exposed in its particularity without regression to discredited theological or ideological prejudices. Its structure was thus modern even though the surface message was often traditionalist. But if the novel, an imported form after all, could achieve such critical distance from its Western origins, why despair of the possibility that similar adaptations and amalgams might occur in other spheres, giving rise to a specifically Japanese form of modern society?

       This speculation recalls a rich tradition of reflection on the possibility of alternative modernities that has been invoked since the 1930s to explain how Japan can preserve its cultural originality inside the modern project rather than through reactionary retreat (Nishida, 1958; Ohashi, 1992). Despite Kawabata’s despair over the apparent defeat of this prospect, it can find an ambiguous support in the underlying structure of his novel. It shows us that modernity too is a culture, or, as we will see, several possible cultures confronting each other through a process of generalized “contamination” (Vattimo, 1991: 158).

Cultural Genealogy

       What is meant by the notion of an alternative modernity, and is it really plausible?  What I will call the “content approach” to alternative modernity emphasizes such ethnic and ideological differences as the kinds of food people eat, the role of family or religion, the legal forms of property and administration, and so on. These distinctions are weak bases for an alternative because modernization, as we have learned since Weber at least, consists precisely in erasing or incorporating such ethnic and ideological contents in a convergent model of civilization. The universalist view, which uncritically confounds Westernization and modernization, is still persuasive compared to this.

       If there can be an alternative modernity, it must be based not on such contents but on deeper differences in cultural forms. Nietzsche’s “genealogical” method suggests an approach because it succeeds in following the progress of a way of life from one historical periods to the next. Judeo-Christianity in this Nietzschean sense is not a particular religion but a way of being in the world that can reappear in different ideological and institutional guises over thousands of years of history. Nietzsche would claim that this form is still active in the West as capitalism, socialism and democracy.

       Inspired directly or indirectly by Nietzsche, other philosophers such as Heidegger and Derrida have developed farreaching models of the most fundamental metaphysical assumptions of Western culture. These philosophers tend to assume tacitly that modern institutions and technical rationality are essentially incompatible with other cultures.11 As “postmodernity” or “multiculturalism,” this view leads to a revalorization of tradition and ethnic particularity, and in the worst case collapses back into the content approach Nietzsche should rather help us to transcend.

       The Master of Go practically invites such a traditionalist reading, at least to Westerners who tend to see in it a struggle between Japanese particularity and the universality of modern culture. On those terms, Kawabata  would be arguing that etiquette, self-realization and aesthetics are substantive ends that must be sacrificed for instrumental efficiency in a modern society.

       This interpretation of the novel agrees with a commonplace universalist view of Japanese culture as different precisely insofar as it is still essentially feudal. These survivals presumably will dissipate as modernization proceeds (Morley, 1971: 19). Of course it is harder to believe this today than it was when the theory was originally proposed by Marxists in the 1930s. Now that Japan is the most advanced capitalist country, it seems unlikely that feudalism could be alive and well there, but the universalist view is still widely held by many observers who find Japanese culture oppressive and authoritarian.

       Kawabata’s novel appears deceptively compatible with the universalist framework because the old Japanese values it endorses share the pathos and fragility of the Master whose defeat marks the entry of Japan into modernity. But despite this the novel is incompatible with the Weberian framework. Its Japanese elements are not merely substantive “contents” sacrificed to formal rationality since they include a specific strategic practice of the game. Thus the fateful necessity of the outcome does not flow smoothly from an Enlightenment grand narrative of progress, even in Weber’s disillusioned form.

       In sum, it is not easy to fit Kawabata’s novel into the currently fashionable paradigm of ethnic protest against totalitarian rationality. I believe that Kawabata is not so much a defender of particularity against universality as he is a critic of the pretensions of false universality. In this too he is true to the novelistic tradition as Lukacs defined it.

       The reorganization of Go around Western notions of fairness is not a move from particular to universal but merely shifts the balance of power in favor of a new type of player.  As deference falls, it carries down with it the values of self-realization and aesthetics that flourish in the context of traditional etiquette. Henceforth Go will be played more as a business than as a spiritual discipline. The best player, in the sense of the one who produces the most perfect game, will be replaced by the player who is best at winning–not precisely the same thing as we have seen.

       Reflection on Kawabata’s novel thus shows the limits of the identification of rationality with Western culture and offers starting points for a genealogy of non-Western cultural forms investing the process of modernization and altering its direction. From that standpoint the progress of Japanese modernity would roughly parallel Western developments, which saw the emergence of new secular expressions of basic cultural forms amidst the gradual decline of the feudal-Christian tradition that had once been a vigorous expression of that same culture (Dore, 1987).

       Admittedly, given the recentness of the opening and modernization of Japan, there inevitably hangs a certain ambiguity over its situation. It is difficult to decide the relative importance of survivals as opposed to the more basic cultural forms.  That ambiguity emerges as a central theme of Kawabata’s novel. I want to turn now to the task of unraveling it.

The Culture of Place

       To this end, I will focus briefly on the category of “place” which plays such an important role in Japanese philosophy and social thought.12 This notion underlies the concept of no-mind which we have seen at work in Kawabata’s novel. As a general cultural phenomenon, it articulates an everyday experience available to every member of the society. This is the experience of seeking one’s “place” in the system of social relations in which one finds oneself.

       It would be easy to assimilate this category to the notion of social status and to treat it as evidence of the persistance of hierarchy in Japanese culture. This is Chie Nakane’s famous theory of the tate shakai (vertical society) which is proposed to explain Japan’s success in the modern world (Nakane, 1970). This theory has come in for much criticism because of its implicit appeal to culture to justify submission to authority (Dale, 1986: 44-45). It is tempting to reject the whole notion of place as an artifact of an ideologically contaminated cultural theory, a pseudo-traditionalism in the service of rampant exploitation.

       The ambiguities of Nakane’s social theory are similar to those we encountered in The Master of Go. In both cases a quasi-feudal deference is joined to the rational manipulation of a formal system (economics, Go). But if anything the novelist is a more provocative observer than the social theorist. He enables us to see clearly the unique formal rationality that is already present in traditional Japanese culture. This raises the question of whether values and practices linked to that rational dimension of the traditional culture might survive the disappearance of the old deference and accomodate themselves to modern conditions.

       This is not a question that occurs to Kawabata, but I would like to consider whether the logic of place may not be independent of traditional authoritarianism. It seems to be built into the structure of Japanese culture and language at a much more basic level than differences in prestige or power and signifies a far wider range of distinguishing attributes attached to the various “places” occupied by the individuals. Perhaps, like Western individualism, it is a cultural form in the broad genealogical sense capable of reproducing itself across epochal institutional changes, including changes in the distribution and exercise of authority.

       There is considerable evidence for this interpretation. For example, the Japanese language (like several other Asian languages) requires one to choose pronouns, verb forms and forms of address which reflect differences in age, gender and status that might be signified only tacitly, for example by dress, in the West. There is a clear enough distinction between the way in which men and women speak–one of the most important differences of place–that some grammar books actually offer dialogues in both male and female versions. Masculine and feminine speech no doubt reflect gender hierarchy, but they are experienced as exemplifying the whole range of connotations of masculinity and feminity, not merely an authority relation. A similar observation applies to formal language which persists despite the rapid softening of distinctions in social rank (Miller, 1971).

       Linguistic coding appears to add tremendous force to social differences or perhaps reflects an unusual force present in social reality. The Japanese belong to a culture in which you have to know your place in the social setting in order to open your mouth. This can be quite inhibiting for them when they first arrive in the West and speak a language like French or English that does not offer any obvious way of signifying place.

       The notion of place does not imply unquestioning submission to the authority of social superiors. In institutions such as companies and government agencies a good deal of attention is paid to building consensus through group discussion. When things go smoothly, such consensus building is a two way street that constrains the authorities as well as subordinates.

       Naturally, things do not always go smoothly. Self-assertion is necessary in many situations, and while it is often more restrained than it would be in the West, the Japanese certainly did not have to await the arrival of Western individualism to discover it. It is already present in their own culture, but qualified and concretized by the demands of place rather than conceived, as typically it would be in the West, in universal terms as role transcendence. Place is thus not about whether one plays one’s own game, but about who one is and how, accordingly, that game must be played.

       Place not only shapes everyday speech and social relations but also religion  and art. As we have seen, Japanese martial arts have evolved into spiritual disciplines in part under the impact of this concept, reinterpreted through the Buddhist concept of no-mind. The combatants are trained to concern themselves less with winning than with immediately and swiftly interpreting their place in the system of moves so as perfectly to fulfill situational requirements.  In aesthetic terms, each gesture of combat is part of a pair, the other part of which must be and can be supplied only by the adversary. Every move in the game is in some deeper sense an element of a larger pattern produced through the collaborative competition of the players. In these artistic and religious applications of place, it is especially clear that traditional authority relations overlay a more fundamental cultural form that could perhaps survive without them.

Place and Alternative Modernity

       Something like this martial approach to place is at work in Kawabata’s depiction of the traditional game of Go, with its emphasis on the values of self-realization and aesthetics. He contrasts a way of life based on playing out one’s position in a larger system, with the Western focus on fairness and winning.

       The difference between the two is not that one is tradition-bound while the other concentrates on the logic of play. Both are totally involved in the logic of play; both are therefore “rational” in the broad sense, although one emphasizes aspects of play most relevant to a culture of place and the other aspects that complement an individualistic culture.

       The novel shows us two alternative ways of playing Go constructed around different formal dimensions of the game. Both ways aim at victory but under different aspects. The Western emphasis on equality stems from the equivalence of “sides” in the game, which does indeed conflict with traditional deference. But the Japanese concern with aesthetics is not opposed to the formal rationality of the game; it realizes another immanent dimension of it, the essential dependence of the players exemplified in the thrust and parry of struggle.

       The aesthetic values that predominate in traditional Japanese play are thus not extrinsic to the essence of the game but rather represent dimensions of it that only appear clearly in a non-Western context. Nor are these values merely particularistic. Aesthetics is usually understood as a matter of subjective taste, but  mathematical and technical systems have aesthetic qualities rooted in objective rationality. A glance at any Go textbook immediately shows this to be true of games as well. The aesthetics of Go flow from the conditions of formally rational action just as rigorously as the values of the young challenger while fulfilling a very different cultural agenda.

       Here modernity defeats tradition not because it is more rational, but because it is better at manipulating the new meta-rules set up to institutionalize rationality, because it is more ruthlessly oriented toward winning at any price, even if it means sacrificing the intrinsic rationality of the game, i.e. the production of a unique sequence of optimal moves in terms of the position of the pieces on the board. Kawabata reestablishes the symmetry between tradition and modernity by showing that success as such is no more rational than deference. Both are external to the inner logic of play, differing primarily in which aspects of that logic they privilege.

       In sum, certain traditional values possess at least as much “universality” as the supposedly modern value of fairness. In a sense what the novel achieves, perhaps without entirely intending it, is to present two alternative types of rationality, each of which is a candidate for modernity although only one is triumphant, only one actually organizes a modern society.

       We have here a model for thinking about alternative modernity. Japan is a good test case because it combines a very alien culture and a very familiar technology and institutional framework. As rational systems, technologies, markets, democratic voting, and so on, resemble the game of Go: they too can be practiced differently in different cultural settings. In this context, Japanese culture is not an irrational intrusion but rather differs by its emphasis on  different aspects of technical rationality which, as we have seen, includes self-realization and aesthetics as well as the narrow pursuit of success ethnocentrically identified with it in the West.13  So, in Kawabata’s match each move obeys the same rules but has a different significance in the different systems that invest it. Different cultures inhabit the board and influence its pattern of development.

       Perhaps all modern institutions and modern technology itself are  similarly layered with cultural meanings. Where a vigorous culture, whether it be old or new, manages to take hold of modernity, it can influence the evolution of its rational systems. Alternative modernities may emerge, distinguished not just by increasingly marginal features such as food culture, style, or political ideals but by the central institutions of technology and administration.

       Perhaps Kawabata’s elegy was premature and something like this is already beginning to occur in Japan. A number of experts have attempted to show that the Japanese economy draws on unique cultural resources to achieve extraordinarily high levels of motivation and effectiveness (Dore, 1987). They point to the importance in Japan of ideals of belonging, service, quality, and vocation by contrast with which the individualistic West appears ethically handicapped.

       Unlike certain forms of deference which seem to be in the sort of steep decline Kawabata deplored, these ideals are not survivals doomed by the process of modernization; rather, they are the specific forms in which Japanese culture invests modernity. Indeed, the prevalence of these values may account for both the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese model. Industrial societies too can use a maximum of vocational self-consciousness, attention to the whole, collaborative competition. But modern political systems function best when they rid themselves of the conformism and deference that still characterizes the essentially bureaucratic ethos of the Japanese state. Hence the peculiar combination of effective economics and mediocre politics that characterizes this model (Van Wolferen, 1989).

       What remains to be seen is how far the process of culturally specific modernization will go and how much transformation the Western technical heritage will suffer as Japan liberates itself more and more from its original dependency on the Western model of modernity.

Notes

1. For more on Go, see Korschelt (1965).

2. For Kawabata’s relation to this tradition, see his Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (1969), and Petersen (1979): 129-132.

3. The reader interested in the concept of no-mind should consult Suzuki (1973), the chapters on swordsmanship in Suzuki (1970), and Herrigel (1960). See also Loy (1988), especially p. 123 for the issue of the “third” point of view discussed below.

4. It is important not to miss the specific emphasis on winning characteristic of traditional play. Ritual is of course significant for it to a degree that differentiates it from modern play, but it would be wrong to describe it as formalistic in opposition to a modern instrumental interest in victory. One would have the same problem distinguishing formal from instrumental motives in evaluating bull fighting. And the same confusion Kawabata describes would arise, but in a ridiculous form, if a new style were introduced that consisted in shooting the bull.

5. Other recontextualizations are of course possible. For example, in the course of history, technical systems have frequently been incorporated into social life through guilds. Socialism might be interpreted as the demand for a similar recontextualization of modern technology in democratic forms. See Feenberg (1991), chap. 7.

6. Cf. Latour (1987): “If you take any black box and make a freeze-frame of it, you may consider the system of alliances it knits together in two different ways: first, by looking at who it is designed to enrol; second, by considering what it is tied to so as to make the enrollment inescapable. We may on the one hand draw its sociogram, and on the other its technogram” (138). “Black box” here refers to facts and artifacts produced by scientific and technological research and development. They have an inextricably intertwined social and scientific-technical logic. (The equivalent in Go would be the results of a match.) In my book, I called this a “double aspect” theory (1991: 81-82).

7. Pilarcik (1986) offers a skillful analysis of the various ways in which characterization is used to express the epochal transition. See especially her description of the players use of time (12-13) and their strategies (14-15). Cf. Thomas Swann (1976: 105-106). But for a novel in which the same transition is treated as essentially a matter of changing character, compare Endo (1980).

8. The concept of doubles employed here derives from René Girard. For more on his approach, and applications to the role of economics in the novel, see Feenberg (1988).

9. “The writer’s irony is a negative mysticism to be  found in times without a god. It is an attitude  of docta ignorantia towards meaning, a portrayal   of the kindly and malicious workings of the  demons, a refusal to comprehend more than the  mere fact of these workings; and in it there is  the deep certainty, expressible only by form-giving, that  through not-desiring-to-know and  not-being-able-to-know he has truly encountered,  glimpsed and grasped the ultimate, true substance, the present, non-existent God.  This is why irony is the objectivity of the novel” (Lukacs, 1968: 90). For an extended discussion of this passage, see Bernstein, 1984, pp. 195 and ff.

10. In the larger context of contemporary world literature, the novelistic turn is reached by different peoples at times reflecting comparable levels of development and carried out with means supplied by their cultures. Thus behind the similarity of the Hungarian Lukács and the Japanese Kawabata, writing a generation apart, lies a deeper cause in the rhythms of modernization in different parts of the world. It is perhaps no coincidence that the Iwakura Mission, which visited Europe from 1871-1873 in search of insight into how to modernize Japan focussed on the example of Hungary, a country which seemed to point the way. Their report notes: “The various nations who today are delayed in their enlightenment will be deeply impressed by studying the circumstances of Hungary” (Soviak, 1971: 15). The artistic and theoretical opening made possible by the novel corresponds to a moment of critique in a process of development undergone by both countries.

11. For a useful evaluation of related issues, see Johann Arnason (1992).

12. See, Nishida (1958) and (1990); Abe (1991); Watsuji (1987); Berque (1986).

13. For more on the different moments of technical rationality, see Feenberg (1991), chap. 8.

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