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AMORY LOVINS is a physicist, economist, inventor, automobile designer, consultant to 18 heads of state, author of 29 books, and cofounder of Rocky Mountain Institute, an environmental think tank. most of all, he's a man who takes pride in saving energy. The electricity bill at his 4,000-square-foot home in Old Snowmass, Colorado, is five dollars a month, and he's convinced he can do the same for all of us. his book winning the oil endgame shows how the united states can save as much oil as it gets from the persian gulf by 2015 and how all oil imports can be eliminated by 2040. And that's just for starters.
As told to Cal Fussman
When
I give talks about energy, the audience already knows about the
problems. That's not what they've come to hear. So I don't talk about
problems, only solutions. But after a while, during the question
period, someone in the back will get up and give a long riff about all
the bad things that are happening—most of which are basically true.
There's only one way I've found to deal with that. After this person
calms down, I gently ask whether feeling that way makes him more
effective.
As René Dubos, the famous biologist, once said, "Despair is a sin."
ENERGY
I
used to work for Edwin Land, the father of Polaroid photography. Land
said that invention was the sudden cessation of stupidity. He also said
that people who seem to have had a new idea often have just stopped
having an old idea. So I suppose if I bring something unusual to this
business, it's that maybe I find it easier to stop having old ideas.
I
can't point to any one moment in particular from my past that made me
who I am. It's been more like seeing the world through an evolving
lens. Gradually, I've learned to ask different questions and look at
problems from different angles than most people.
I'm probably
best known for having redefined the energy problem in 1976 with a
Foreign Affairs article titled "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?"
Until
then, the energy problem was generally considered to be: Where do we
get more energy? People were preoccupied with where we could get more
energy of any kind, from any sources, for any price—as if all our needs
were the same. I started instead at the other end of the problem: What
do we want the energy for?
You don't generally want lumps of
coal or barrels of sticky black goo. You want comfort, illumination,
mobility, baked bread, and so on. And for each of these end uses we
should ask: How much energy, of what quality, at what scale, from what
source will do the job in the cheapest way? That's now called the
end-use/least-cost approach, and a lot of the work we do at Rocky
Mountain Institute involves applying it to a wide range of situations.
End-use/least-cost
analysis begins with a simple question: What are you really trying to
do? If you go to the hardware store looking for a drill, chances are
what you really want is not a drill but a hole. And then there's a
reason you want the hole. If you ask enough layers of "Why?"—as Taiichi
Ohno, the inventor of the Toyota production system, told us—you
typically get to the root of the problem.
OIL
Let's start with one basic problem. Saudi Arabia has a quarter
of the world's oil reserves. It is the sole swing producer with
significant capacity to increase output, and therefore it controls the
world price.
Two-thirds of Saudi oil flows through one
processing plant and two terminals that are in the crosshairs of
terrorists. That stuff could go down any day for a long time. And that
would presumably crash both the House of Saud and the Western economy.
So for the bad guys it's a twofer. They would love to do that, and
they've already had a couple of cracks at it.
Now, this should make you uncomfortable. But we don't have to continue on our current path. We can go a different way.
Let's
look at oil through a historic analogy. Around 1850, the biggest or
second-biggest industry in America was whaling. Most buildings were lit
with whale oil. But in the nine years before Edwin Drake struck oil in
1859 in Pennsylvania and made kerosene ubiquitous, at least five-sixths
of the whale oil–lighting market had already been lost to competing
products made from coal. This was elicited by the relatively high price
of whale oil as the whales got shy and scarce.
The whalers were
astounded that they ran out of customers before they ran out of whales.
They didn't see this coming because they hadn't added up the
competitors. Oil fields can be like this today.
The United
States today wrings twice as much work from each barrel of oil as it
did in 1975. With even more advanced technologies, we can double oil
efficiency all over again at a cost averaging $12 a barrel. We can
replace the rest of our oil needs with advanced biofuels and saved
natural gas at a cost averaging $18 a barrel. Combined, these two
approaches average out at a cost of $15 a barrel. That's a lot cheaper
than the $61 per barrel oil was the other day or even the $26 that's
officially forecast for the year 2025.
How much cheaper than
$26 a barrel? Well, about $70 billion a year, plus a million jobs,
mostly in rural and small-town America. Plus a million saved jobs now
at risk, mainly in the automaking states.
We've got a choice:
Either we're going to continue importing efficient cars to help replace
foreign oil, or we're going to employ our own people to make efficient
cars and import neither the oil nor the car—which sounds like a better
idea.
WEIGHT
A
modern car, after 120 years of devoted engineering effort since
Gottlieb Daimler built the first gasoline-powered vehicle, uses less
than 1 percent of its fuel to move the driver. How does that happen?
Well,
only an eighth of the fuel energy reaches the wheels. The rest of it is
lost in the engine, drivetrain, and accessories, or wasted while the
car is idling. Of the one-eighth that reaches the wheels, over half
heats the tires on the road or the air that the car pushes aside. So
only 6 percent of the original fuel energy accelerates the car. But
remember, about 95 percent of the mass being accelerated is the car—not
the driver. Hence, less than 1 percent of the fuel energy moves the
driver. This is not very gratifying.
Well, the solution is
equally inherent in the basic physics I just described. Three-quarters
of the fuel usage is caused by the car's weight. Every unit of energy
you save at the wheels by making the car a lot lighter will save an
additional seven units of fuel that you don't need to waste getting it
to the wheels.
So you can get this roughly eightfold leverage
(three- to fourfold in the case of a hybrid) from the wheels back to
the fuel tank by starting with the physics of the car, making it
lighter and with lower drag. And indeed you can make the car radically
lighter. We've figured out a cost-effective way to do that so you can
end up with a 66-mile-per-gallon uncompromised SUV that has half the
normal weight, has a third the normal fuel use, is safer, and repays
the extra cost that comes with being a hybrid in less than two years.
PLASTIC
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FIBER HOT SEAT
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Henry Ford said you don't need weight for strength. If you did need
weight for strength, your bicycle helmet would be made of steel, not
carbon fiber. And if you want to know how strong a very light material
can be, try eating an Atlantic lobster with no tools.
The auto
industry needs to move toward ultralight, ultrastrong carbon-fiber
composites, almost certainly using thermoplastics that flow when heated
and that can be easily molded—instead of the more brittle, expensive
thermosets that need chemistry, baking, or some other change to set the
resin into its final hard form. Thermoplastics are incredibly tough.
They can absorb 12 times as much crash energy per pound as steel. So
even though your car will be only half as heavy as it was before, it
will still be safer when whacked by a heavier one.
With such
materials, you can decouple size from weight. You can make the car
big—protected and comfortable. But it won't be heavy—hostile and
inefficient. This can save oil and lives at the same time, and it turns
out you can greatly improve the economics of making the car because you
might have in a carbon SUV only 14 body parts—instead of 140 to 280 in
a steel auto body—each needing one low-pressure die set, instead of an
average of four high-pressure steel-stamping die sets in the steel
body. The parts snap together precisely in the right positions for
gluing, like assembling a kid's toy, so you don't need all those jigs
and robots. You basically get rid of the body shop this way, and then
by laying color in the mold, you get rid of the paint shop too. There
go the two hardest and costliest parts of making the car.
New
jobs come partly by having a vibrantly competitive car industry rather
than a failing one and partly due to the logical evolution of the auto
industry toward computerization. Imagine the aftermarket for improved
and customized software. The industry structure would be different, but
we don't think there would be a net loss of jobs. The jobs would be
safer, healthier, and better distributed. And the same revolution
that's coming to automaking from advanced materials also applies to
anything else that moves.
HYDROGEN
Many automakers are starting to understand that whoever goes ultralight first will take the lead in the hydrogen fuel-cell race.
The
winning strategy will be improving the physics of the car. They still
need to make a cheap, durable fuel cell. But if they can reduce the
fuel cell and the hydrogen storage volume by three times, the cost
reduces threefold.
That said, superefficient cars need hydrogen
a lot less than hydrogen needs superefficient cars. If you have, say,
an ultralight hybrid SUV burning gasoline at 66 miles per gallon, that
isn't so bad—at least not compared to a similar one getting 18.5 miles
per gallon on the road today.
If you then combine that with E85
fuel, which is 15 percent gasoline and 85 percent ethanol, you just got
a 320-mile-per-gallon SUV because the efficiency times the biofuel
saving of oil multiplies.
For that matter, if every car or light
truck on the road in 2025 is only as efficient as the best hybrid cars
and SUVs now in the showrooms, that would save twice as much oil as we
currently import from the Persian Gulf. So it's not a very ambitious
goal—and it doesn't even involve making vehicles ultralight.
Very
efficient vehicles can get most of the same benefits without hydrogen
by using today's gasoline/hybrid propulsion. However, once you have
such vehicles, there is a robust business case for running them on
hydrogen. Until you have those efficient vehicles, that business case
is not very convincing.
I think hydrogen will be an important if
not dominant energy carrier by 2050. In Winning the Oil Endgame, the
comprehensive strategy we've developed at Rocky Mountain Institute for
ending oil dependence, we see hydrogen as an optional add-on. It would
be the most profitable and efficient way to use and save natural gas.
But it's not necessary to get the country off oil at a profit; it's
just icing on the cake.
ELECTRICITY
A question I ask a lot is, What's the right
size for the job? I have a book called Small Is Profitable: The Hidden
Economic Benefits of Making Electrical Resources the Right Size. It
points out 207 benefits of distributed resources, such as solar and
wind power. When I begin to describe them, you'll find them really
obvious:
Renewables, such as wind energy, have less financial
risk from volatile fuel prices than fossil-fuel power plants because
they don't need any fuel.
Small resources like solar cells or
wind turbines have less financial risk than giant power plants that
take many years to build.
Portable resources like solar panels
have less financial risk than stationary power plants, because if the
system evolves differently than you'd expected and you'd rather put it
somewhere else, you simply stick it on a truck and move it.
This
is all blindingly obvious, yet it hasn't been taken into account by the
utility industry while buying its half trillion dollars' worth of
assets.
Here's what happened: For the first century of the
electricity business, the power plants were costlier and less reliable
than the grid, so it made sense to build a bunch of big power plants
backing each other up through the grid. Well—surprise—over the last 20
years, power plants have become cheaper and more reliable than the
grid. Ninety-nine percent of our power failures originate in the
grid—mostly in distribution. So now if you want to deliver reliable,
affordable electricity, you need to make it at or near the customer's
location.
Many people didn't notice this happening. But
despite the market's not yet recognizing the benefits, the
decentralized low- or no-carbon generators turn out to be greater in
capacity and output than nuclear power worldwide. David already beat
Goliath, but nobody noticed.
The nuclear advocates frequently
state that only nuclear is big and fast enough to deal with global
warming. Well, five years from now the official industry forecast
suggests that decentralized low- and no-carbon generators will be
adding 160 times as much capacity as nuclear will add up to that year.
So those who think that the decentralized generators are small, slow,
and futuristic or have an unacceptable risk of not being adopted at
scale in the market have some serious explaining to do.
WIND
If I
could do just one thing to solve our energy problems, I would allow
energy to compete fairly at honest prices regardless of which kind it
is, what technology it uses, how big it is, or who owns it. If we did
that, we wouldn't have an oil problem, a climate problem, or a nuclear
proliferation problem. Those are all artifacts of public policies that
have distorted the market into buying things it wouldn't otherwise have
bought because they were turkeys.
We have more than enough
cost-effective wind power just on available land in the Dakotas to meet
the United States' electricity needs. We wouldn't necessarily want to
do it all in two states, and there are cheaper combinations of other
technologies to do the whole job, but it's an enormous resource.
Germany
and Spain each install over 2,000 megawatts of wind power every year.
That figure exceeds the average global net addition of nuclear power
every year in this decade. Denmark is now one-fifth wind powered;
Germany, about a tenth.
Wind power is doubling every three years
worldwide and solar power every two, and not because some countries
subsidize it strongly. In fact, the subsidies are being phased out
slowly in Germany and rapidly in Japan because they have achieved their
purpose of creating world-class industries that will be able to make it
on their own.
If everything competed solely on merit, wind
energy in the United States would be a lot better off. It gets
subsidized less than its competitors, and its subsidies are temporary,
while its competitors' are permanent. In other words, the fossil and
nuclear subsidies—nuclear being the biggest—are permanent, while
renewable subsidies are temporary.
Congress's brief and
irregular renewals of the tax credit for wind power have several times
bankrupted wind-turbine manufacturers in the United States. Similar
misguided policies have diminished the solar-cell industry. Half of the
solar cells sold in the United States a decade ago were domestically
made. Now that figure is only 8 percent.
DEFENSE
A major player in our energy future will be the Pentagon. Here's
why: Trailing behind every half-mile-a-gallon Abrams tank—a peerless
fighting machine if you can get it there—are two unarmored fuel trucks.
Guess what the bad guys shoot at?
This is a very teachable
moment—when the Pentagon becomes acutely aware of the cost and the risk
of delivering fuel on the battlefield. They obviously need much
lighter, more agile, radically more fuel-efficient forces.
A
military transformation will have a much bigger payoff, in exactly the
same way the Pentagon's research and development created the Internet,
global positioning systems, the modern microchip industry, and advanced
aero engines.
If you align military science and technology
investments to capture this enormous improvement at a tactical,
operational, and strategic level, guess what? You thereby transform the
car, truck, and plane industries to get the country off oil, so we
won't need to fight over the oil because we won't be using it. Mission
unnecessary.
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BANANAS
When
we designed the research facilities at Rocky Mountain Institute, we
didn't plan on having a banana farm inside. We're up 7,100 feet in the
Rockies, and it has gotten as low as –47 degrees in the winter.
We
planned about 900 square feet of jungle space with five different kinds
of energy collection: heat, hot air, hot water, light, and
photosynthesis. The arch that holds it up has 12 different functions,
but I paid for it only once. The whole building exemplifies design
integration: getting multiple benefits from single expenditures. It
saves about 99 percent of the normal need for space- and water-heating
energy, about 90 percent of the household electricity, and half the
water. All that efficiency paid for itself in 10 months—and that's with
1983 technology! Now we can do a lot better.
Anyway, we weren't
planning on growing bananas here, but somebody who owed me something
gave me a banana tree to settle the obligation. He said it would grow
to six feet and never fruit—but he forgot to tell the tree. When it got
12-year-old horse manure, it went bananas, grew to 25 feet, put out
nine crops in the first year and a half, and tried to go through the
roof. Then it tried to eat the fishpond.
I was afraid of a
hydraulic disaster, so we chopped it down, dug it up, and put a steel
fence between what was left of the root-ball and the fishpond. But it
grew back and put out another 18 crops. Eventually, a few years ago, it
wore out at twice its designed life, so we took it out for good and put
in a variety of young banana trees. We've also done mangoes, grapes,
papayas, and passion fruit—here in the Rocky Mountains.
The tangled tale of the banana tree offers a very simple lesson: Be open to possibilities.
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