A Matter of Mind by J. Kepler

<>< size=5 face=""><><>< src="http://www.sciy.org/ArtdepMindmap.jpg"><><><><>
<>< size=5 face=""><><>A Matter of Mind<><><><>
<><>< size=4>J. Kepler<><><>
<>< face="">At the core of much of the recent discussion and controversy in the < id=lw_1245814978_1 class=yshortcuts>Integral Yoga<> (IY) online community seems to lay the role of the mind and mental reasoning. Many statements from < style="BORDER-BOTTOM: #0066cc 1px dashed; CURSOR: hand" id=lw_1245814978_2 class=yshortcuts>Sri Aurobindo<> and Mother could be quoted both praising the essential, enabling contributions of the mind, as well as criticizing the mind’s obstinate, obstructing features and liabilities. This dual nature of their commentary itself may point us in the right direction. It’s the particular use made of the mental faculty in a particular context that determines its helpful or harmful status.<>
<>< face="">Few should deny that reason at its best – dispassionate, critical, balanced, is a light in human life that helps expel dubious truth claims and offers a comparatively refined and accurate lens of inquiry thru which to view ourselves and the world. It’s an invaluable tool against obscurantism, superstition, credulity, provincialism, ethnocentrism, inflexibility, and other ills of human cognition that stand in the way of real knowledge.<>
<>< face="">Left to itself however, reason tends to end in an agnostic and self-referential inability to determine anything in a definitive manner. Those with a sufficiently developed faculty of rational argumentation will tend toward the positions to which they are temperamentally inclined, and mount in favor of those positions an endless debate that can never be definitively resolved. Sri Aurobindo explains this situation as a result of the evolutionary status of reason as a cognitive power; its action is by nature a difficult struggle from ignorance toward knowledge. Reason only understands by analyzing things into parts which it cannot fully make whole again, ever unable to firmly or finally arrive at integral knowledge because of its inherent limitations, method of operation, and roots in the mud of the Inconscient. According to Sri Aurobindo, the mind must be illumined by inner and higher ranges of consciousness that inherently possess some fundamental aspect of truth and proceed from that self-possessed status of knowledge toward its expression and manifestation. It’s ultimately in this expression and manifestation of knowledge, rather than in the discovery and construction of knowledge, that the mind assumes its proper role.<>
<>< face="">Access to these ranges of consciousness that surpass reason is a matter of spiritual experience and realization. That Sri Aurobindo and Mother consider this a matter of concrete experience should be indisputable if one reads their words. They of course expressed their experience and knowledge in mental language so that others could develop some conception of the experiential path to be followed. This framework of expression evolved over time. When the <>Life Divine<> and the <>Synthesis of < id=lw_1245814978_3 class=yshortcuts>Yoga<><> were written in the <>< id=lw_1245814978_4 class=yshortcuts>Arya<><>, < style="BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none; BACKGROUND: none transparent scroll repeat 0% 0%; CURSOR: hand" id=lw_1245814978_5 class=yshortcuts>Sri Aurobindo<> had not yet articulated ideas that became central later: the psychic being and the overmind. In later years after Sri Aurobindo's passing Mother articulated new ideas like the superman consciousness, and the mind of the cells. Looking at the attitude they themselves adopted toward the evolving mental expression of their own spiritual experiences should shed light on the ideal all those turned to them will want to emulate.<>
<>< face="">Many quotes could be furnished where Sri Aurobindo and Mother state definitively that their teaching is a living spiritual path and not a set of fixed doctrines or dogmas to be religiously recited and referenced. But especially in documents that pertain to their own practice, in Sri Aurobindo’s case his <>< style="BORDER-BOTTOM: #0066cc 1px dashed; CURSOR: hand" id=lw_1245814978_6 class=yshortcuts>Record of Yoga<><>, in Mother’s case <>l'Agenda de Mère<>, and in other miscellaneous talks and letters by both of them, they exhibit a characteristic attitude and approach to mental formulation. <><>
<>< face="">This attitude is marked by a highly flexible and, one could even say, experimental approach to mental formulation of the vast spiritual experiences they passed through. In the <>Record of Yoga<>, Sri Aurobindo routinely considers the truth of the intimations he receives from higher sources to be provisional and tentative pending additional confirming experiences. He seems always open to new formulations and his method suggests a recognizably scientific approach to mastering the phenomena and powers of the < id=lw_1245814978_7 class=yshortcuts>higher consciousness<>. In <>l'Agenda de Mère<>, the extreme adaptability and flexibility of Mother’s language and conceptual structures when describing her sadhana of the body consciousness is impossible to miss. She seems ready to adopt new terminology and ways of looking at the phenomena and experiences (and leave old ones behind), on practically a daily basis as new experiences arrive and are assimilated.<>
<>< face="">Now one might counter that we are not Mother or Sri Aurobindo. No doubt few among us nowadays can claim possession of any of the fundamental realizations called for in IY, let alone blaze new trails at the farthest edges of human consciousness. But we do all possess reason and should be able to at least avoid any rigid dogmatizing of IY into a fixed set of doctrinal beliefs that can neither advance nor evolve. It’s natural that many turn toward Sri Aurobindo and Mother as the Divine and receive their spiritual help and protection in a straightforward way. Some of these are devotees who may not feel the need of a subtle and flexible understanding of their teaching. But any hardening of IY into doctrines that enforce conformity, or encourage harshness and cruelty toward others, obviously leads far away from the Light and Truth they have established and beckon us toward.<>
<>< color=#000000>< face="">< color=#000000>Considered in this light, the current Heehs controversy is perhaps best seen not as simply a flawed biography by a flawed ashramite who upset many devotees with his academic approach to evaluating Sri Aurobindo’s life. The controversy might also represent a stark and revealing light being cast upon the mental formations and constructions that have hardened among many associated with IY. All should be able to agree that the Mother’s approach is never a static one and she always seeks to propel us toward the future, breaking our comfortable habits of thinking and feeling as need be whenever our advance requires it. “her feet are rapid on the upward way.” – (<>< color=#000000><>< style="BORDER-BOTTOM: #0066cc 1px dashed; CURSOR: hand" id=lw_1245814978_8 class=yshortcuts>The Mother<> <><>< color=#000000>< style="FONT-STYLE: normal">by Sri Aurobindo<><>< color=#000000><>)<><><><>
<>< color=#888888>< face="">Kepler<><><>

Unending Desire: De Certeau’s Mystics

UNENDING DESIRE: DE CERTEAU'S 'MYSTICS'

Philip Sheldrake

THE LATE MICHEL DE CERTEAU was one of the most creative French intellectuals of the late twentieth century but, at the same time, one of the most difficult to summarize or to interpret definitively. This difficulty lies partly in the way he wrote and partly in the enigma of his own life. To begin with, de Certeau's writings consciously resist systematization. He also brought an extraordinary range of intellectual interests to every subject he examined. He drew extensively upon history, theology, Christian spirituality, cultural theory, philosophy, psychology, politics, social sciences, semiotics and linguistics. There was also an inherent ambiguity to de Certeau's life. In his later years he abandoned institutional Christianity and moved to the margins of religious belief, yet never formally resigned as a Jesuit priest and continued to be driven in strange ways by what might be called the 'Ignatian project'. Increasingly, de Certeau was preoccupied with exploring the idea that human identity and existence was a form of fluid and mobile 'practice' rather than a matter of being able to define the nature of an abstract 'self'.

 

Interiority and desire
Michel de Certeau's interdisciplinarity and eclecticism is readily apparent in his study of mysticism. A number of problems with his approach to the subject have been noted, 1 yet it cannot be denied that his originality has stimulated people to think of mysticism in new ways. True, his interest focused predominantly on sixteenth and seventeenthcentury Spanish and French mysticism, and on his perception that the period saw a significant move 'inwards'. There was a growing preoccupation during that period with the experiential and with the autobiographical. This conformed to de Certeau's own fascination with modem psychoanalysis. However, de Certeau's understanding of the meaning and role of 'mysticism' cannot be reduced to sheer subjectivity, interiority or individual experience in isolation. For one thing, he wrote in the context of a western European culture that had lost faith in the bedrock of an autonomous, clearly defined human subject – whether grounded in 'the soul' or in the Cartesian individual 'mind'. At the same time, de Certeau's interest in mysticism as a social practice rather than simply subjective experiences brought him close to the emphasis on mysticism as a way of life present in other recent commentators such as Bernard McGinn. z

For de Certeau, mysticism was bound up with desire. 'Desire' is a key word in his writings – one that he shared with such French postmodern philosophers as Foucault and Derrida but which also summarizes the heart of the Ignatian spiritual tradition to which de Certeau was so indebted. For both the mystic and the postmodern person, 'desire' expresses a certain kind of drivenness, an intensity and movement ever onwards inspired by what is not known, not possessed, not fixed or final.

They are, she [Hadewijch, the Beguine mystic] said, 'drunk with what they have not drunk': inebriation without drinking, inspiration from one knows not where, illumination without knowledge. They are drunk with what they do not possess. Drunk with desire. Therefore, they may all bear the name given to the work of Angelus Silesius: Wandersmann, the 'wanderer'.3

Desire is also expressive of embodiment in which an unstable and incomplete 'self' is continually being constructed in a movement outwards and in encounters with what is other than itself. For de Certeau, mysticism is inherently engaged with the punic world and is a form of 'social practice'. Indeed, one of de Certeau's central and most controversial views was that Christian mysticism is essentially radicaland disruptive, both religiously and socially.

 

The concept of “a mystical tradition”
In his early work and researches on 'mysticism' or 'mystics' (la mystique – his word for the study of the mystical life), Michel de Certeau can be more or less credited with establishing that 'mysticism' as a distinct category, associated with subjective religious experiences, originated in early seventeenth-century France. 4 Although de Certeau admitted that 'mysticism' in this sense began to emerge much earlier, in the late thirteenth century, especially with Meister Eckhart and the Beguines, he believed that the key point in its formalization was between the mid-sixteenth century and the mid-seventeenth century. 5

This paradigmatic period of mysticism proliferated in the context of what de Certeau refers to as 'a loss'. The various movements and writings were born (to use de Certeau's words) 'with the setting sun'. This 'sunset' was the gradual demise of a previously dominant Christian religious worldview. 6 De Certeau asserted that the 'dark nights' expressed in various mystical texts refer not merely to interior, subjective states of spiritual loss and absence but also to the 'global situation' of religious faith in western culture. 7

De Certeau was a first class historian. Consequently, he was fully aware that the change in mystical writings during the late sixteenth century and the seventeenth century towards an emphasis on interior experiences, detached from doctrine or Church life, eventually created the very concept of 'a mystical tradition'. The notion of a specific 'mystical tradition', stretching back from the post-Reformation period through the Middle Ages to the early Church, is an artificial construct. It involved a retrospective recruitment of earlier spiritual writings into a particular experiential framework – or what de Certeau referred to as 'experimental knowledge'. On the heels of the construction of a mystical 'tradition' followed the gradual psychologization of the study of mysticism, where private insights and special (even odd) experiences became the criteria for the presence and validity of 'the mystical'. This would reach its height in the late nineteenth century with the work of William James.

 

Mysticism as subversion
The classic sixteenth- and seventeenth-century mystical texts that de Certeau studied did not attempt to replace an ailing intellectual system of theology by setting up new systems of knowledge or alternative fixed places of power. For de Certeau, mysticism subverted this way of thinking. Rather, mysticism pointed towards a quite different approach to the Christian tradition. This was to be not a set of structures or a body of doctrines, but a practice, an action. The language of movement implies a continual transgression of fixed points. This approach to Christianity as a journey, practice or action, with its emphasis on variety rather than organization or a dogmatic order, was explicitly drawn from de Certeau's membership of the Jesuit Order and original immersion in Ignatian spirituality. 8 There are clear echoes in de Certeau of Ignatius Loyola's language for the Jesuit way of life as nuestro modo de proceder, 'our way of proceeding'. 9 Precisely because mystic language tentatively engages with the absolute, it can only 'say' what is absolute or unbounded by, in de Certeau's words, 'erasing itself'J ° Because the object of mystical texts is infinite, such a text is 'never anything but the unstable metaphor for what is inaccessible'. So, for de Certeau, the modem discipline of 'mystics' 'only assembles and orders its practices in the name of something that it cannot make into an object (unless it be a mystical one)'. 11

For de Certeau, the subversive quality of mysticism is represented by the theme of perpetual departures. There is a close relationship between the post-Enlightenment emphasis on knowledge as objective and issues of power. Thus Michel de Certeau suggested that people whose lives spoke of the 'othemess' of an essentially mysterious God were outsiders to the 'modem' project.

Unbeknownst even to some of its promoters, the creation of mental constructs . . . takes the place of attention to the advent of the Unpredictable. That is why the 'true' mystics are particularly suspicious and critical of what passes for 'presence'. They defend the inaccessibility they confront.12

As early as the thirteenth century, that is, since the time when theology became professionalised, spirituals and mystics took up the challenge of the spoken word. In doing so, they were displaced towards the area of 'the fable'. They formed a solidarity with all the tongues that continued speaking, marked in their discourse by the assimilation to the child, the woman, the illiterate, madness, angels, or the body. Everywhere they insinuate an 'extraordinary' : they are voices quoted voices grown more and more separate from the field of meaning that writing had conquered, ever closer to the song or the cry. 13

De Certeau's interest in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century mysticism arose from the parallels he perceived between this period and his own time when the word, especially of Scripture, could no longer be spoken to believers in the old ways. The world was increasingly seen as opaque and unreadable. In response to this disenchantment the people we refer to as mystics sought to invent a different kind of place, that was not a fully formed or complete place at all. As de Certeau says himself, this 'is only the story of a journey' that is necessarily fragmented and ultimately defies conclusive investigation. In his somewhat opaque words, 'it overpowers the inquiry with something resembling a laugh'. 14 Mystic literature offers routes to whoever 'asks directions to get lost' and seeks 'a way not to come back'. 15

The various strains of mystics, in their reaction to the vanishing of truths, the increasing opaqueness of the authorities and divided or diseased institutions, define not so much a complementary or substitutive knowledge, topography, or entity, but rather a different treatment of the Christian tradition . . . they institute a 'style' that articulates itself into practices defining a modus loquendi and/or a modus agendi . . . What is essential, therefore, is not a body of doctrines (which is the effect of these practices and above all the product of later theological interpretation), but the foundation of a field in which specific procedures will be developed…16

 

Mysticism and social 'practice”
At first sight, the writings of de Certeau concerning mysticism appear to make it not only marginalized but also privatized. Indeed it is precisely an act of withdrawal from social 'place' that gives rise to a definable 'mystics'. 'A prophetic faith organized itself into a minority within the secularized state.' 17 Any ambition by the western Catholic tradition after the Council of Trent to, in de Certean's words, 'reconstitute a political and spiritual “world” of grace' ultimately failed. However, while de Certeau describes a movement by spirituality to the cultural margins, and its redistribution in mystic groups with new kinds of discourse, de Certeau's understanding of 'mysticism' is that it is always contextual and particular and consequently a social reality rather than a purely personal, interior one. In fact de Certeau differs from many other twentieth-century commentators in not stressing the individual 'mystical experiences' in isolation, but treating them as social phenomena. Mysticism is social not merely passively (that is, it reflects a particular historical context) but also actively, in that it affects and transforms the world, and even consciously in that the outstanding mystics set out to create new forms of discourse and new religious groups. 18

While the overall location or 'site' of mystic literature in this period should not be oversimplified, Michel de Certeau suggested that there were 'privileged places' for the development of mystical insight and practice, not least within certain social categories. These were people with little or no power in the public world. De Certeau noted that mysticism seemed to be closely related to forms of instability or social disinheritance. Thus the rise of mystic literature often reflects the decline of a society based on various ideologies of stability – social, economic and religious. Mystics tended to appear in the:

social categories which were in socio-economic recession, disadvantaged by change, marginalized by progress, or destroyed by war… Aside from a few mystics on the road to social promotion . . . the majority of them.., belonged to social milieux or 'factions' in full retreat. Mysticism seems to emerge on beaches uncovered by the receding tide. 19

Many mystics were people who existed socially, culturally or religiously on boundaries. De Certeau noted especially the sixteenth century Spanish mystical movement where an unusual proportion of the most significant figures came from the 'excluded' class of conversos or converted Jews. These include Teresa of Avila, Luis de Ledn and two figures central to the early Jesuits, Diego La~nez and Juan de Polanco. 20

Sometimes mystics actively associated themselves with contexts of 'nothing'. This was a serious response to a radical situation of loss. De Certeau mentions two features. First, some mystics made the symbolic gesture of entering a corrupt religious community to seek the seeds of a new beginning within the 'nothing' or, as de Certeau put it, 'a repetition of a founding surprise'. Thus Teresa of Avila entered a decadent Carmel and Ignatius Loyola committed himself to religious life even though overall it was an institution in decline. Second, some members of the spiritual and social elite (for example the circle of Brrnlle in seventeenth-century France) actively sought to associate themselves with the poor, the simple and the illiterate. As de Certeau put it, they sought to leave behind traditional sources of authority in order 'to turn to the exegesis of “wild” voices'. 21

 

Mysticism and Christian discipleship
We should recall the relationship between de Certeau's interest in mysticism and the way he understood himself to be speaking in a twentieth-century world where institutional Christianity was no longerthe place of definitive meaning. A critical question for de Certeau concerned how we can continue to believe in the absence of a  distinctively Christian place. In the end, after examining various models, he suggested that there is no theoretical construct available to describe Christian identity definitively. What is left is the age-old tension between discipleship (following), and conversion (change). The believer is one called to follow faithfully and to change.

As the ecclesial 'body of sense' loses its effectivity, it is for Christians themselves to assure the articulation of this 'model' with actual situations. This 'model' refers to the New Testament combination of 'following [Jesus]' and 'conversion'… The first term indicates a going beyond which the name of Jesus opens up, the other a corresponding transformation of consciousness and of conduct. 22

For de Certeau, the Christian call is to wander, to journey with no security apart from a story of Christ that is to be 'practised' rather than objectively stated. 23 This practice is profoundly disruptive of all systems. De Certeau characterized the whole Christian tradition, as well as specifically mystical withdrawal, as a 'way of proceeding' -not institutions but movements or pilgrimages across all fixed 'places' and fixed locations of power. Christian spirituality must avoid the temptation to settle down into a new and definitive 'place'.

The temptation of the 'spiritual' is to constitute the act of difference as a site, to transform the conversion into an establishment, to replace the 'poem' [of Christ] which states the hyperbole with the strength to make history or to be the truth which takes history's place, or, lastly, as in evangelical transfiguration (a metaphoric movement), to take the 'vision' as a 'tent' and the word as a new land. In its countless writings along many different trajectories, Christian spirituality offers a huge inventory of difference, and ceaselessly criticises this trap; it has insisted particularly on the impossibility for the believer of stopping on the 'moment' of the break – a practice, a departure, a work, an ecstasy – and of identifying faith with a site. 24

In de Certeau's terms, the particularity of the event of Jesus Christ is the measure of all authentic forms of Christian discipleship in the sense that they presuppose that event but are not identical repetitions. In a sense, the particularity of the event of Jesus Christ 'permits' the contextual nature and the particularity of all subsequent discipleship. There, too, God may eternally say 'yes' to us without condition. However, for de Certeau the primary symbol of discipleship is now an empty tomb. 25 'He is not here; for he has been raised, as he said . . . . indeed he is going ahead of you to Galilee' (Matthew 28: 6-7). God in Jesus cannot be pinned down to any here and there, this and that. The place of Jesus is now perpetually elusive. He is always the one who has gone before. To be in the place of Jesus, therefore, is literally to be disciples, to be those who 'follow after' in the direction of Jesus' perpetual departure.

Again, to adopt the language of de Certeau, discipleship simultaneously demands a 'place' and an 'elsewhere', a 'further', a 'more'. It is impossible to grasp the heart of de Certeau's perspective without detailed attention to his Jesuit roots and life-long preoccupation with the Ignatian mysticism of 'practice' or 'action', especially through the medium of the life and writings of the seventeenth-century Jesuit mystic Jean-Joseph Surin. This mysticism of practice offered de Certeau among other things the language of the magis, the semper maior, the always greater, the always more, the always beyond. Hence the values of movement and the transgression of boundaries, always exceeding limit in search of oikumene.

Within the Christian experience, the boundary or limit is a place for the action which ensures the step from a particular situation to a progress (opening a future and creating a new past), from a being 'there' to a being 'elsewhere', from one stage to another… A particular place – our present place – is required if there is to be a departure. Both elements, the place and the departure, are interrelated, because it is the withdrawal from a place that allows one to recognise the enclosure implicit in the initial position, and as a result it is this limited field which makes possible a further investigation. Boundaries are the place of the Christian work, and their displacements are the result of this work.

And again:
In order to pass from one place to another, something must be done (not only said) that affects the boundary: namely, praxis. It is this action which transcends, whereas speeches and institutions circumscribe each place successively occupied. 26

Thus, paradoxically, the radical social role both of Christian practice and specifically of mysticism is to become non-places, disruptive acts of resistance at the heart of all systems and attempts at definitive statements about the nature of reality.

 

Mysticism as 'fable'
De Certeau wrote in terms of the 'mystic fable'. Mysticism is a fable because it cannot claim the status of definitive truth. It is a language without obvious power. Yet paradoxically, that is its strength. It calls into question strategically defined, and apparently definitive, systems of meaning. Believers in Christianity are called in this postmodern age to become once again wanderers who are always departing in answer to a call to follow, without the burden of power, authority or even secure identity. The Christian community carries the fabled tale of Christ, which subverts all our fixed places, across an alien territory towards the unnameable that we call 'God'. De Certeau suggests that any discourse, not least religious discourse, is always in danger of being shattered. 'Faith speaks prophetically of a Presence who is both immediately felt and yet still to come, who cannot be refused without a betrayal of all language, and yet who cannot be immediately grasped and held in terms of any particular language. '27

The intellectual assumptions of 'modernity' place a powerful emphasis on intelligibility, not least that of God language. Because of this, De Certeau sees those people whose lives affirm the elusiveness and essential 'othemess' of God as outsiders to the modern project. 28 Echoing de Certeau, the American theologian David Tracy suggests that mystics, like the mad, represent a kind of 'otherness' on the social margins. This 'otherness' has an active quality. It has the capacity to challenge traditional centres of power and privilege. 29 Perhaps this is why de Certeau was fascinated throughout his writings by Jean-Joseph Surin (whom he called 'my guardian'). Surin also was for many years profoundly disturbed psychologically, and consequently isolated and oppressed. 30 Because the way of 'knowing' present in mystical texts is based on union with God rather than on the power of human intellects to control reality, it bears some resemblance to the 'subjugated knowledges' spoken of by Michel Foucault. This resists dominant structures of power and knowledge and opposes established forms of discourse rather than simply offering a pleasing alternative. 31

 

The never-ending quest for 'the always more'
At the end of Michel de Certeau's life it appears that his approach to 'spirituality' in the broad sense eventually became completely detached from any sense of a divine Other as it dispersed into the 'practice of everyday life'. Spirituality was not so much the 'ecstasy' of a religious mystic but a more tentative self-transcendence experienced in a succession of fragmented encounters with everyday 'others'. Yet, is the poignant last page of the first volume of the unfinished The mystic fable merely a nostalgic lament for lost beliefs by one who no longer has any form of religious faith? Or was it, perhaps, that de Certeau was expressing, in a typically enigmatic way, the necessary pain of denial?

Was his 'agnosticism' that of the person who (like the mystics he studied) realizes that he cannot escape the never-ending journey of the human spirit beyond definable goals or desires that can be named? For if deep desire and a kind of faith remained at the heart of de Certeau, the inner logic of his thinking surely demanded that 'the Other' that we are continually to seek is necessarily 'absent' from the contingent world of the tangible and bounded. It is beyond what can be fixed or located. It can only be spoken about continually as semper maior – forever greater, always more.

He or she is a mystic who cannot stop walking and, with the certainty of what is lacking, knows of every place and object that it is not that; one cannot stay there nor be content with that. Desire creates an excess. Places are exceeded, passed, lost behind it. It makes one go further, elsewhere. It lives nowhere. 32


Philip Sheldrake is Vice-Principal and Academic Director of Saturn College, Salisbury and is also Honorary Professor in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Wales, Lampeter. He is the author of a number of books, most recently Love took my hand: the spirituality of George Herbert (Darton, Longman & Todd and Cowley Publications).

Citation for published item:
Sheldrake, P. (2001) 'Unending desire : De Certeau's 'mystics'.', Way supplement. 102, pp. 38-48.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://www.theway.org.uk/article.php

 

NOTES
1 See, for example, Bernard McGinn, The foundations of mysticism: origins to the fifth century
(London: SCM Press, 1992), 'Appendix: Theoretical Foundations', pp 310-313.
2 See McGirm, op. cit., 'General Introduction', pp xi-xx.
3 Michel de Certean, The mystic fable, English translation by Michael B. Smith (ET Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992), p 299.
4 Michel de Certeau, ' “Mystique” an XVIIe si~cle: Le probl~me du langage “mystique”' in L'homme devant Dieu: rndlanges offerts au Pkre Henri de Lubac (Pads: Aubier, 1964), vol 2, pp 267-291.
5 The essay 'Mystic speech' in Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: discourse on the other, translated by Brian Massimi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p 83.
6 'Mystic speech', p 80.
7 'Mystic speech', p 81.
8 A point noted by Luce Giard, one of de Certeau's closest collaborators and co-authors, in Michel de Certean, Luce Giard & Pierre Mayol, The practice of everyday life, volume 2 (ET Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp xxii-xxiii.
9 See comments by John O'Malley in his The first Jesuits (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), p 8.
10 'Mystic speech', p 81.
11 The mystic fable, p 77.
12 Ibid., p 5, but see the complete Introduction, pp 1-26.
13 Ibid., p13.
14 Ibid., p 13.
15 Ibid., p 14.
16 Ibid., p 14.
17 Ibid., p 20.
18 Ibid., 'Introduction', pp 1-26.
19 De Certeau, 'Mystic speech', ET in Graham Ward (ed), The Certeau reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p 191.
20 1bid., pp 191-192.
21 See 'Mystic speech', pp 85-86.
22 Michel de Certeau, 'The weakness of believing: from the body to writing, a Christian transit', ET in Graham Ward (ed), The Certeau Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p 226.
23 See, 'The weakness of believing', passim.
24 'The weakness of believing', p 236.
25 'The weakness of believing', p 234.
26 In 'How is Christianity thinkable today?' in Graham Ward (ed), Thepostmodern God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p 151.
27 Michel de Certean, 'Culture and spiritual experience', Concilium 19 (1966), pp 3-16.
28 The mystic fable, especially 'Introduction', pp 1-26.
29 David Tracy, On naming the present: God, hermeneutics and Church (New York: Orbis Books, 1994), pp 3-6.
30 See The mystic fable, passim but especially chapter 7, 'The enlightened illiterate'. De Certeau also edited the work of Surin, Jean-Joseph Surin: correspondence (Paris: Descl~e, 1963) and Jean-Joseph Surin: guide spirituel pour la perfection (Paris: Descl6e, 1963).
31 Michel Foucault, Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972-77 (ET London: Pantheon Books, 1980), p 81.
32 The mystic fable, p 299.

 

Ustad Ali Akbar Khan, Sarod Virtuoso, Dies at 87

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< class=caption>Ali Akbar Khan playing the sarod in New York in 2002, an instrument with 25 strings. <>
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< name=cccform action=https://s100.copyright.com/CommonApp/LoadingApplication.jsp target=_Icon>< href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/arts/music/22khan.html">< color=#330033 size=5>Ali Akbar Khan, Sarod Virtuoso, Dies at 87<><>< color=#330033 size=5>  <><_BYLINE type=" " version="1.0">
< class=byline>By < title="More Articles by William Grimes" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/william_grimes/index.html?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>WILLIAM GRIMES<><><><_BYLINE>
< class=timestamp>Published: June 19, 2009 <>
< id=articleBody><_TEXT>
<>Ali Akbar Khan, the foremost virtuoso of the lutelike sarod, whose dazzling technique and gift for melodic invention, often on display in concert with his brother-in-law < title="More articles about Ravi Shankar." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/ravi_shankar/index.html?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>Ravi Shankar<><>, helped popularize North Indian classical music in the West, died on Thursday at his home in San Anselmo, Calif. He was 87.<>
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< id=sidebarArticles>The cause was kidney failure, said a spokesman for the Ali Akbar College of Music.<><><>
<>Mr. Khan, who was named a national treasure by the Indian government in 1989, carried on the musical traditions of his father, Allauddin Khan, whose ashram in East Bengal produced some of India’s most celebrated musicians, notably Mr. Shankar, the flutist Pannalal Ghosh and the sitarist Nikhil Banerjee. <>
<>Unlike his father, a volatile and uneven performer, Mr. Khan maintained an austere demeanor onstage while coaxing passages of extraordinary intensity from his sarod, an instrument with 25 strings, 10 plucked with a piece of coconut shell while the remainder resonate sympathetically.<>
<>“He was not as flashy as Ravi Shankar, but he had the ability to play a single note, or a simple passage of notes, and draw out such amazing depth,” said John Schaefer, the host of “New Sounds” and “Soundcheck” on WNYC-FM in New York. “That’s why he was able to get a world of emotion and color out of ‘Malasri,’ which is often called a three-note raga. That, for me, stands as the calling card of the genius of Ali Khan.”<>
<>The violinist Yehudi Menuhin, who brought Mr. Khan to the United States in 1955, called him “an absolute genius” and “the greatest musician in the world.” <>
<>In 1971, Mr. Khan performed at Madison Square Garden with Mr. Shankar, Alla Rakha and Kamala Chakravarty on a bill with < title="More articles about Bob Dylan." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/d/bob_dylan/index.html?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>Bob Dylan<><>, < title="More articles about Eric Clapton." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/c/eric_clapton/index.html?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>Eric Clapton<><> and other rock stars at the < title="Performance clip from the Concert for Bangladesh" href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-66uz725Dzk">< color=#004276>Concert for Bangladesh<><>, a benefit organized by < title="" href="http://movies.nytimes.com/person/1548307/George-Harrison?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>George Harrison<><> and Mr. Shankar. The album and film of the two performances gave added exposure to Mr. Khan and North Indian music. <>
<>Mr. Khan, whose name is often preceded by the honorific Ustad, or master, was born in Shibpur, a small village in Bengal (now Bangladesh). He grew up in Maihar, where his father was the principal musician in the court of the maharajah. He began vocal training at 3 and, after studying the surbahar, sitar and tabla, focused on the sarod.<>
<>His father was a stern, sometimes brutal taskmaster, rousing his young son at dawn for several hours of practice before breakfast and continuing well into the evening of what were often 18-hour days. Allauddin Khan had elevated the status of instrumental music, previously regarded as inferior to vocal performance, by synthesizing various regional styles into a modern concert style. His son absorbed his encyclopedic knowledge of North Indian music and eventually outstripped him as an instrumentalist. <>
<>Mr. Khan’s younger sister, Annapurna Devi, who later married Mr. Shankar, developed into an equally accomplished master of the surbahar, but custom prevented her from performing in public.<>
<>At 13, Mr. Khan performed for a large audience for the first time, at a music conference in the holy city of Allahabad. By his early 20s he was music director of All-India Radio in Lucknow, broadcasting as a solo artist and composing for the radio’s orchestra. <>
<>“My father’s main purpose was to hear me play while he was living in Maihar, because I was always being broadcast,” Mr. Khan told Peter Lavezzoli, the author of “The Dawn of Indian Music in the West.” “If I played anything wrong, he would come the next day to Lucknow, straight from the train station, tell me to get my sarod and listen to me play and correct me.”<>
<>For part of a series of 78s that he recorded in Lucknow for HMV in 1945, he composed and performed the three-minute < title="Performance clip" href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7QLv628hupw">< color=#004276>Raga Chandranandan (“Moonstruck”),<><> a blend of four evening ragas, which became a national hit and a signature piece for Mr. Khan. He later recorded a 22-minute version for the album “Master Musician of India” on the Connoisseur label.<>
<>After a few years Mr. Khan left Lucknow to become the court musician for the maharajah of Jodhpur. He performed, often for hours at a time; gave lessons; and composed for the court orchestra. The post vanished after the maharajah died in a plane crash in 1948, and before long the chaos surrounding independence and partition put an end to the court system, which was already in decline.<>
<>Defying his father, Mr. Khan moved to Bombay and began writing scores for films, including Chetan Anand’s “Aandhiyan” (1952), < title="" href="http://movies.nytimes.com/person/107687/Satyajit-Ray?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>Satyajit Ray<><>’s “Devi” (1960) and Tapan Sinha’s “Hungry Stones” (1960). His father, a friend of the director of “Hungry Stones,” went to see the film and said: “My goodness, who composed the music? He is great.” On being informed that it was his son, the elder Khan sent a telegram of forgiveness.<>
<>By this time the younger Khan had grown frustrated with the limitations of film work and was eager to return to classical music, though he later composed the scores for “The Householder” (1963), the first < title="More articles about Ismail Merchant" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/ismail_merchant/index.html?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>Ismail Merchant<><>-< title="More articles about James Ivory." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/i/james_ivory/index.html?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>James Ivory<><> feature film, and < title="" href="http://movies.nytimes.com/person/81701/Bernardo-Bertolucci?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>Bernardo Bertolucci<><>’s “Little Buddha” (1993). His collaboration with Ray, in particular, had been less than satisfactory. “Ray was not a connoisseur of Indian classical music,” he told The Times of India in 2008.<>
<>Intent on exposing Westerners to Asian music, Menuhin brought Mr. Khan to New York in 1955 for a performance at the Museum of Modern Art, where Mr. Khan made what is believed to be the first long-playing record of Indian classical music in the United States, “Music of India: Morning and Evening Ragas,” for Angel. He scored another first when he performed on < title="More articles about Alistair Cooke." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/c/alistair_cooke/index.html?inline=nyt-per">< color=#004276>Alistair Cooke<><>’s television program “Omnibus.”<>
<>Western interest in Indian music soared after Harrison took up the sitar and Mr. Shankar began touring Europe and the United States. In 1967 Mr. Khan, who had founded a music school in Calcutta in 1956, started the < title="website of Ali Akbar College of Music" href="http://www.aacm.org/">< color=#666699>Ali Akbar College of Music<><>, now in San Rafael, Calif., with a satellite school in Basel, Switzerland. “Two or three generations of really fine Indian players — meaning performers of Indian classical music — have come out of that school,” Mr. Schaefer said.<>
<>Mr. Khan is survived by his wife, Mary; seven sons, including Aashish, a renowned sarod player; and four daughters. In 1989 he was awarded the Padma Vibhushan, India’s second-highest civilian honor, and in 1991 he became the first Indian musician to receive a < title="More articles about John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/macarthur_john_d_and_catherine_t_foundation/index.html?inline=nyt-org">< color=#004276>MacArthur Foundation<><> “genius grant.” <><><>

Heterologies of the Spiritual and the Everyday: The Quest of Michel de Certeau

<2>< href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21375">The Quest of Michel de Certeau<><2>
<4>By < href="http://www.blogware.com/authors/879">Natalie Zemon Davis<><4>
<> <>
<3>1.<3>
<>Though in North America Michel de Certeau is known only in the university world, in France he was a celebrity, viewed as a major cultural critic, an innovative historian of early modern religion, and a religious thinker who in his life and work pursued a particularly engaged, open, and generous form of Catholicism. At his funeral in Paris in 1986, the strains of Edith Piaf's “Non, je ne regrette rien”—”No, I regret nothing”—wafted over the pews in the Jesuit Church of Saint Ignatius in Paris, and through loudspeakers to the hundreds of mourners crowded in the square outside. The song followed a reading of I Corinthians, where Paul says that “God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise,” and a poem by a seventeenth-century mystic about a “vagabond soul” seeking divine love throughout the world. These verses, requested by Michel de Certeau himself, suggest the unorthodoxy of his spiritual and scholarly vision.<>
<>Whether writing about madness and mysticism in the seventeenth century, South American resistance movements in the past and present, or the practice of everyday life in the twentieth century, Certeau developed a distinctive way of interpreting social and personal relations. In contrast to those who described societies by evoking what he called their homogeneities and hegemonies—what unified and controlled them—Certeau wanted to identify the creative and disruptive presence of “the other”—the outsider, the stranger, the alien, the subversive, the radically different—in systems of power and thought. He found it not only in the ways people imagined figures distant from themselves (as in Michel de Montaigne's famous essay on the “Cannibals” of the Amazon), but also in behaviors and groups close to home, in the ever-present tensions at the heart of all social life, whether in schools, religious institutions, or the mass media.<>
<>To be sure, notions of “otherness” were cropping up in literature, philosophy, and psychoanalysis in the 1960s and 1970s, when Certeau was gaining prominence, but he was original in the multiple ways he conceived figures of the “other” and how they functioned in many settings. He coined the term “heterologies” to describe disciplines in which we examine ourselves in relation to otherness; history and ethnography, for instance, could be “sciences of the other” if they confront the often disfiguring assumptions we bring to our understanding of different times and places. He wrote about centralizing institutions of the past so as to show how they defined themselves either by excluding divergent voices and beliefs or by swallowing them up.<>
<>And yet the state and church were never the sole source of power and authority in medieval and modern times. Certeau always saw vital alternatives to their rule, as in religious movements like mysticism or in stubborn popular knowledge born of local experience. His heroes are often wanderers, pilgrims, missionaries, and nomads, such as the seventeenth-century visionary Jean de Labadie, who began as a Jesuit, then preached his radical brand of Reformed religion across France and Switzerland, and ended up founding a Protestant community of saints in the Netherlands.<>Such a perspective and Certeau's life itself make interesting comparisons with two of his exact contemporaries, Michel Foucault and Joseph Ratzinger, whose work and thought have also been concerned with evaluating power and institutional boundaries. Foucault's intellectual daring was rewarded in 1970 by his election to a prestigious professorship at the Collège de France; in France Certeau had only short-term teaching posts until the last year and a half of his life, when he was invited to be a professor at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. Ratzinger, after his ordination and doctoral studies, rose through distinguished posts in theology faculties in Germany to become archbishop of Munich-Freising and cardinal in 1977, a few years later prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and since 2005 Pope Benedict XVI. Certeau pursued his wide-ranging Christian life as a Jesuit brother, holding no office in his order and sometimes wearing the clothes of a layman.
<>All three men were affected by the protests of 1968. Foucault and Certeau became more committed as men of the left, albeit in different ways. Power was the key concept in Foucault's understanding of social relations and communication; power inhered in central authorities—monarchs, medical experts, priests—and it reproduced its message in the individual mind and conscience. The process was unrelenting, enhancing discipline, control, and punishment, and meeting little resistance over time. Foucault's account helped people understand the institutions and practices that distributed power throughout societies, but gave little insight into how they might be eased or changed.<>
<>For Ratzinger, the 1968 student movements put a limit to his support for the liberalizing efforts in the Catholic Church associated with the Second Vatican Council, or Vatican II (1962–1965), and made him embrace the established Church hierarchy. In his view, the doctrine of the Church must not give way to the false influences of secularism, relativism, religious pluralism, subjectivism, and economic radicalism. Interpretation must rest in the hands of the master theologians of the Church, founded by Christ and guaranteed by apostolic succession. As Ratzinger wrote in <>Dominus Iesus<>, an encyclical he drafted in 2000 as Prefect of the Faith, “there exists a single Church of Christ, which subsists in the Catholic Church, governed by the Successor of Peter and by the Bishops in communion with him.” Whatever “gifts” possessed by other Christian communities or churches, any conversation with them is conditioned by this absolute claim to authority.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn1">< size=2>[1]<><><> Certeau's quest for connection with the “other” and his belief that boundaries between different communities and ways of thinking should be open were an alternative to Foucault's somber vision of power and domination and Ratzinger's certitudes. <>Certeau's views emerged out of decades of struggle, experiment, and writing.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn2">< size=2>[2]<><><> He was born in 1925 in the Savoy, whose mountain trails he climbed as a teenager bringing messages to the Resistance fighters against the German occupation. In 1944 he began his studies for the priesthood; in 1950 he joined the Jesuit order, writing to a friend, “I think God is calling me to China.” The famous Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin had earlier written his books of geology and theology from China; that country had been taken over by the Communists in 1949 and the Jesuits were being ordered to leave. This difficulty may have made going to China all the more appealing to Certeau, but he never did get there.
<>As it was, his studies brought him into the explosion of theological renewal led by Henri de Lubac, a hero of the Catholic Resistance, and Certeau became one of his favored students at Lyon. (In Germany Ratzinger was also inspired by Lubac's writing.) Lubac was shaking up rigid assumptions and challenging conventional boundaries at every turn. The Church's teaching was not fixed for eternity, he argued, but had changed over time; assent to its doctrine must come from a new historical study of Christian texts. Non-Catholic sources had something to teach as well: Lubac devoted a book to Buddhism, in which he drew an interesting comparison between Christ and Buddha. In a 1946 study tracing the changing meanings of the word “supernatural” from Augustine on, Lubac challenged the sharp distinction made by theologians close to the pope since the nineteenth century between, on the one hand, the realm of human nature and the natural world and, on the other, the supernatural order and the divine. The desire for God was “natural” in human beings, he wrote, but it was there because God put it there, a “divine requirement.”<>
<>Accommodating as this view may seem for Catholics, important members of the Vatican hierarchy feared it weakened the distinction between the spiritual Church and the worldly concerns of everyday life. In 1950, Pius XII ordered Lubac to stop public teaching and censured his book on the supernatural, but this did not stop Lubac from affirming—in a phrase that Certeau never forgot—that “the Church must always leave all its doors open through which people of different mind can arrive at the truth.”<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn3">< size=2>[3]<><><> <>
<>Certeau began to write in his seminary days, and his early publications show him making his first steps toward his “science of the other.” He put experience at the heart of religious life, but noted a deep gap between experience and spiritual desire: believers yearned to approach God, but often felt God was absent. Such alienation was inevitable. In Certeau's conception, God's presence could only be “imperfect and ephemeral”—but it could be recognized if one understood how human feelings shifted from minute to minute and human beings had to struggle for words to capture experience fully. Further, all religious experience, no matter how solitary, is suffused with the presence of others, whether in the history one has absorbed or in the language in which one thinks and prays.<>Certeau found that this quest was lived out in the spiritual diary of the early Jesuit Pierre Favre, written as he traveled around Europe preaching in the 1540s and seeking signs of God's love within himself. Translated from Latin and Spanish into French and edited by Certeau for his doctoral dissertation, Favre's interior pilgrimage exemplified for Certeau “the feeling of mystery which emerges in experience.”<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn4">< size=2>[4]<><><> But the mystery did not go far enough for Certeau. He was drawn to the “wild mystics,” the <>mystiques sauvages<>, of the seventeenth century, especially the Jesuit Jean-Joseph Surin, who became, said Certeau, his “companion,” “the ghost who haunted his life.”
<>Surin was not a quiet companion. A wandering preacher and director of souls, seeking signs of God among the humble, Surin was called to Loudun in 1634 to exorcise the Ursuline prioress Jeanne des Anges of the devils that possessed her. He succeeded in curing her, but at the cost, willingly offered, of his own fragile emotional balance. For almost twenty years, he suffered and remained silent in a Jesuit sickroom. In 1654 he emerged and became an impassioned writer on the mystic quest: “I would like the voice of a trumpet, a pen of bronze,” “I would like flames to flow from my pen,” he said. Certeau scoured libraries to find manuscripts of Surin's writings and his letters of personal confession and spiritual guidance, publishing them in 1963 and 1966, with extensive commentary and reflection.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn5">< size=2>[5]<><><> <>
<>The 1960s brought other discoveries to Certeau. Hoping to link theology and psychology, Certeau turned with a few other Jesuits to the study of psychoanalysis; in 1964, he became one of the founding members of Jacques Lacan's École freudienne de Paris. In his dense rhetoric Lacan elaborated the formal language of the “subject,” or self, and the other. He wrote of the infant's perception of itself as “other” when it first sees itself in a mirror and of the consequent emergence of the idea of otherness as something absent from or lacking in the self. He discussed the child's entry into the symbolic realm of language, which, he argued, gives structure to otherness, and the unending but impossible desire to close the gap between the self and the other.<>
<>Certeau used some of these ideas, especially in interpreting the yearnings of his “wild mystics” for God. But as Jeremy Ahearne shows in his insightful book <>Michel de Certeau: Interpretation and Its Other<>, Certeau developed his own social and historical concepts of “others” that went well beyond Lacan's rigid categories and examples. At Lacan's death in 1981, Certeau described him as one of the extravagant wanderers, at his best when expressing his ideas and practicing psychoanalysis, but a failure when caught in the angry feuds of the institutions he set up.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn6">< size=2>[6]<><><> <>Especially important in the 1960s were the changes instituted by Vatican II. The once-proscribed Henri de Lubac was summoned by Pope John XXIII to have a leading part in the council; Joseph Ratzinger attended the sessions and wrote approvingly of the Church's new openness to the laity and even to “elements of sanctification” outside the Church itself (to quote the phrase from the council's text <>Lumen gentium<>). From Paris, Certeau responded more radically. For him the reforms endorsed by the council were a creative “rupture” with the unbending hierarchical patterns of the past. They called for “multiple languages of faith” to express people's experience instead of remote clerical language. In his view, Vatican II should lead the Church to immerse itself fully in all the issues of the modern world and to recognize how much it still had to learn about these issues—about war and violence, about birth control, and what went on in the city streets and in the press and television.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn7">< size=2>[7]<><><>
<>This should be the Church's task not just in Europe, whose priests dominated the council, but elsewhere in the world. Such, he thought, had been the spirit of Ignatius Loyola and his fellow Jesuits in the early sixteenth century. And such would be Certeau's goal between 1966 and 1968 and for years afterward, as he went frequently to Latin America, especially to Brazil and Mexico, drawn to the liberation theology priests who were active in the neighborhoods of the poor and who believed the Church must fight against social misery as well as try to save souls. He was impressed with the forms of popular spirituality he observed during his travels, seeing in these messianic and ecstatic movements not aberrant behavior that had to be stamped out by the Church but “the inner voice of a continent still culturally Catholic.” He also wrote condemning the torture under the military dictatorship in Brazil.<>
<>In 1968, Certeau interpreted the student movement as another creative “rupture.” “Last May,” he wrote in a Jesuit periodical in the summer of 1968,<>
<>speech was taken the way, in 1789, the Bastille was taken. The stronghold that was assailed is a knowledge held by the dispensers of culture, a knowledge meant to integrate or enclose student workers and wage earners in a system of assigned duties.<>
<>As he saw seventeenth-century mystics struggling for a language to express their experience, and as he urged the Church to develop multiple forms of expression to give voice to modern spirituality, so now he heard students trying to enlarge the right to speak, some of them “putting the whole system into question.” Speech was soon “recaptured” by governmental and academic institutions, which, said Certeau, restored a hierarchical order rather than creating a more pluralistic structure “called for by the [May] events.” Still, he argued, the historian could keep hope for change alive by giving a lucid account of relations between the existing institutions and student “others.”<>
<>By the end of the 1960s, Certeau's teacher Henri de Lubac no longer sought further changes in the Church: for him the era of reform had come to a close. In 1970 Joseph Ratzinger published a book in which he decried the arrogance of those calling for extreme democratization of the Church, including elections and synods where laypeople would participate along with ordained clergy. The Church, he wrote, had “democracy” enough with its collegial structure of priests and bishops, and the pope at its head. Reflecting later on the Sixties, Ratzinger said that “many Catholics moved from a narrow, inward-fixed Christianity to an uncritical openness to the world.”<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn8">< size=2>[8]<><><> <>Openness to the world was at the heart of Certeau's position as a Christian. After 1970, his writings widened in scope and audience; his critical use of “heterologies” to describe religious and cultural practices won him support in France and abroad, and also adversaries. To start with, his theology shocked Lubac. Certeau was asked in 1971 to submit materials to the Institut catholique in Paris for a proper doctorate of theology (his existing doctorate was in religious studies); his essay on the meaning of Christianity was rejected, and rather than revising it to satisfy the institute's faculty, Certeau published it as <>La Rupture Instauratrice<>—”The Founding Rupture, or Christianity in the Contemporary World.” Other essays followed and even a radio debate with the Catholic socialist intellectual Jean-Marie Domenach.
<>Jesus Christ, Certeau argued, is the central figure, the Other, present but also absent; his coming and death founded Christianity, but the signifying event is not the crucifixion but the empty tomb; “the 'follow me' [of Jesus] comes from a voice which has been effaced, forever irrecoverable.” Still the Christian wants to believe, Certeau said; wants to take the risk and follows a way to Christ; but the character of the Christian life must be understood according to historical circumstances. In the secularized world of the late twentieth century, with nonreligious structures dominating everywhere, Certeau argued, Church institutions alone could not be the site for Christian intervention in the world. In fact, Christian belief and practices could no longer be associated with a place, or even with a single social milieu like “the poor,” but could be only an uncharted path, a wandering, without power: the person, armed with the “weakness of faith,” tries always to make space for others and to open closed systems to difference and plurality. One printed version of his radio debate with Domenach quotes Certeau as exclaiming, “Christianity is something particular in the totality of history…. It cannot speak in the name of the entire universe.”<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn9">< size=2>[9]<><><> <>
<>Lubac responded with a ferocious condemnation of Certeau's views and a defense of the universal Church and its hierarchy. He attacked his former student as a “Joachimite,” seeking, as had that medieval visionary, a golden age of pure spirituality without Church institutions or disciplinary institutions of any kind.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn10">< size=2>[10]<><><> In fact, Certeau did not desire a future without institutions. They were part of human life, as essential as the practices of “others” that diverged from their rules, though he regretted when, as with the post–Vatican II Church, institutions abandoned the chance for deep reform. Still, when Lubac was made a cardinal in 1983, Certeau wrote his teacher that he owed his own Christian calling to him and was glad his work “had received the seal of the Church.”<>
<>In Certeau's case, however, being a Christian meant “transcending membership.” He would remain a Jesuit willingly, but would not validate his views by his position in his order or church, or claim to be their spokesman. Rather he would stand on their margins, asking unorthodox questions and “confronting the corpus of Christian rites and texts with contemporary practices.”<>His <>L'Invention du quotidien<> (<>The Practice of Everyday Life<>) of 1980 applied this questioning to the world beyond the Church, writing of the ways that ordinary human behavior resisted institutional control. Here he was taking issue with Michel Foucault. Certeau wrote appreciatively of Foucault's close analysis of “discipline” in his influential <>Discipline and Punish<>, where the philosopher tracked the shift from the old regime, in which torture was used as a public spectacle, to the modern prison, in which coercion was used behind closed doors to “control” the body. But Certeau commented:
<>If it is true that the grid of “discipline” is everywhere becoming clearer and more extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society resists being reduced to it, what popular procedures…manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to evade them.<>
<>Certeau examined commonplace activities over which control could in principle be maintained by the institutional organization of space and language and suggested how in fact control was ignored or bypassed. People walk their own way through the grid of city streets, zigzagging, slowing down, preferring streets with certain names, making turns and detours, their own “walking rhetoric.” People read in ways that escape the social hierarchy and “imposed system” of written texts: they read in all kinds of places from libraries to toilets. They read with their own rhythms and interruptions, thinking or daydreaming; they read making gestures and sounds, stretching, “a wild orchestration of the body,” and end up with their own ideas about the book. “These procedures and ruses…compose the network of an antidiscipline.”<>
<><>The Practice of Everyday Life<> appeared in English in 1984, the first of Certeau's book-length studies to be published in this language. Since 1978 Certeau had been teaching at the University of California at San Diego, and both recent American publications on “popular cultures” and the collaboration of historians and anthropologists created a growing interest in his work in the United States, where it did not arouse the same controversies as in France. During the next fifteen years seven more books were published in English.<>
<>His translators faced a challenge. By 1970, Certeau's ways of thinking about the world had become increasingly elaborate and he sought a new style to accommodate them, but the expression of his thought in his later writing is sometimes opaque. Introducing his own inner dialogue about how to validate his religious belief other than through Church authority, Certeau says:<>
<>Feeling the Christian ground on which I thought I was walking disappear, seeing the messengers of an ending, long time under way, approach, recognizing in this my relation to history as a death with no proper future of its own, and a belief stripped of any secure site, I discover the violence of an instant.<>
<>Tom Conley, translator of three of Certeau's books, writes that he now heard in Certeau's work the rhythms of mystic speech, now psychoanalytic dialogue, and now Renaissance prose. It will help readers that Conley, Luce Giard, and other editors of these works have accompanied them with commentaries.<>
<3>2.<3>
<>Though writing on many subjects, Certeau always identified himself primarily as a historian. As a practitioner of that craft myself, I find especially rewarding his work on seventeenth-century spiritual life, its agonies and achievements, of which <>The Possession at Loudun<> can serve here as an example. In the 1630s, the town of Loudun—some 170 miles southwest of Paris—bore the marks of the religious wars; Protestants were still in the majority there, but the Catholic reform was making strong headway, with the newly established teaching order of the Ursuline nuns one of its main forces. In 1632, in the wake of a devastating plague, the prioress, Jeanne des Anges, and several members of the congregation were found to be possessed by devils: they twisted and writhed indecently, tried to vomit up the eucharistic wafer, and, when questioned, uttered blasphemies using the voices and names of devils.<>
<>Physicians, priestly exorcists, and theologians were summoned from near and far, to be joined by judges and royal officials. Rites of exorcism were performed publicly by the priests before an ever-growing number of visitors from France and abroad. The devils soon named the eloquent, elegant, and womanizing priest Urbain Grandier as the sorcerer behind the possession. He was tried, convicted, and finally executed late in August 1634, maintaining his innocence, even under torture, to the very end.<>
<>And still the possessions continued. At the end of 1634, a team of Jesuits arrived, including the mystic Jean-Joseph Surin. Much preferring private discussion to public exorcism, Surin devoted himself to turning the soul of Jeanne des Anges toward God. Two and half years later, the last devil left the body of the prioress, while a devil had entered the body of Surin and started a war within his soul that drove him to insanity, from which he recovered years later. Jeanne des Anges promptly became known as a miraculous figure, receiving angelic oracles and offering spiritual advice.<>
<>Certeau is at his most engaging telling this tale, his language well translated by Michael B. Smith. With all their ambiguities, the possessed women of Loudun illustrated perfectly Certeau's belief that “history is never sure.” The sources were abundant—letters, court records, pamphlets, memoirs—and since Certeau's original French edition was part of a series of primary documents, he could prepare a book with different voices and thereby capture a “heterological” perspective: his own from the present, and those from the past, “each of [the] halves say[ing] what is missing from the other.”<>
<>Certeau placed the Loudun events against a background of major shifts in the location of power in seventeenth-century France and the uncertainties produced by these changes. As Certeau saw it, power in regard to the sacred—power to define truth about God and human life—was passing from the various religious institutions that had been at the heart of medieval society to the political institutions of the monarchy, with Cardinal Richelieu appointed as Louis XIII's chief minister. The Church still carried on its traditional functions and ceremonies, but its clerics were increasingly drawn upon for roles in social life and royal politics. Meanwhile the French monarchy was taking ever more initiative and acting decisively in regard to sacred matters. Genuine religious experience and spiritual struggle were carried on, then, in a more personal way, underneath liturgical ceremonies and behind the institutional structures of the Church and the monarchy. At their most experimental, they took the forms of possession, on one hand, and mysticism on the other.<>
<>This momentous shift fractured coherent belief systems, according to Certeau, and the fight about “truth” at Loudun expressed the anguish of uncertainty. Were these women really possessed by devils? Some physicians said their behavior could be explained simply by melancholy humors. Other observers thought the women were just lovesick or that their imagination had led them astray and their errors were confirmed by misguided confessors. Against such doubts, the presence and power of the devil were affirmed. Certeau describes the public exorcisms as a theater in which the priests could command the devils to speak before the people; the priests would thus demonstrate their ecclesiastical control over truth, even though that control was in fact slipping away from them. <>By itself, this spectacle could not silence a troubling worry: the devil was the fount of lies, and yet the accusation against Grandier came exclusively from devils. The judges of Louis XIII's royal courts had to step in with their own procedures to establish the truth, and the principal judge in the case was happy to target a priest whose local supporters stood in the way of Cardinal Richelieu's plans for royal expansion. One of the exorcists, himself soon to become possessed, finally admitted his limits: “The demons can only be driven out by the power of the [king's] scepter and…the [bishop's] crosier would not suffice.”
<>Certeau also interprets the story from the inside, that is, from the point of view of the women. He does not see them as mere victims, either of devils or of priests and authorities around them, even though they were sometimes treated quite brutally in the public exorcisms. Rather he talks about the “gap”—or tension—between the ordered rule of the Ursuline convent, with its teaching activities and other works, and a “wild” inner life of desire and hidden malice. In such a situation, the nuns had doubts about the religious life, and the theological language of the time supplied them possession by devils as a means to express their despair. The public exorcism allowed them both to declare to the world what they secretly were and yet be assured by priests that they were something else.<>
<>Further, says Certeau, in that century of upper-class women performing as “Amazons”—in convents, at court, in politics, in salons, in the vernacular press—the public exorcism offered further occasion for female rebellion. “Go carry your beggar's bag back to your Limoges,” snaps the voice of one devil speaking through a nun to a mendicant friar, and to the king's own representative, “You have till now fooled so many people, but now you've been exposed.”<>
<>Of course, the public exorcisms ultimately did not dispel the demons, and the execution of Grandier did not achieve “the cohesion of a cosmos” that the ecclesiastical activities sought through sacrificing the deviant “other.” Certeau ends his account by showing the limits of institutional power and the inexhaustibility of human inventiveness, no matter how ironclad the restrictions. On the one hand, the King's men could now readily demolish Loudun's fortifications, leaving the town and its Protestants more vulnerable to royal control. On the other hand, Grandier's death left a void, one of those “gaps” or “absences” that for Certeau invites response. An enormous literature about the case emerged in the next years, some of it fostering opposition to royal and ecclesiastical policies that seemed to have triumphed in 1634.<>
<>In Jeanne des Anges's relation with Jean-Joseph Surin, Certeau sees a model of spiritual conversation that both serves as a psychoanalytic “talking cure” and prepares a believer to embrace mysticism. Surin prays for her and with her incessantly, expressing willingness to take on her suffering and her devils and urging her gently to reveal to him and to God the depths of her heart. Jeanne des Anges does spiritual exercises under his direction; she is patiently urged to look inward, and comes to see that she has long got her way through “little dodges,” that she has thought more about the impression she was making on others than on her inner life and God's intentions for her—and that she herself has given some openings to the devils to take possession of her. Both of them tell this story in writing, she in an autobiography, he in letters. After his years of madness, they correspond frequently, Surin remarking toward the end of his life that she was “the only person” with whom he “feels the confidence to say…[his] deepest thoughts.”<>Certeau's account of the links between madness and mysticism modifies Michel Foucault's earlier argument in <>Madness and Civilization<>, which assumed that insanity was given an exclusively negative cast in the seventeenth century, with preachers describing it as a descent into animality. But Certeau's own vision of long-term historical change has its limits. His schema—centuries of a coherent cosmos, with religious power at its center, losing unity in the early modern period with the ascension of political power—becomes untenable when we recall the place of political power and religious conflict in medieval times and how new religious institutions, including Protestant ones, acquired legitimacy in early modern times. A remarkable new book on possession and mysticism throughout Europe, Moshe Sluhovsky's <>Believe Not Every Spirit<>, revises and deepens our understanding of these phenomena and the role of women in them.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn11">< size=2>[11]<><><> But Certeau's Loudun stands as a pioneering ethnography of human relations and spiritual practices in the seventeenth century.
<>Certeau's <>The Mystic Fable<> continues this exploration of creative life on the margins. In some of his richest but most difficult writing, he develops the idea of “mystics,” referring here not to a group of people but to a science of spiritual experience and language (as “physics” is a science of nature). Certeau also makes his argument through stories, such as that of Surin's meeting with an unlettered lad, a baker's son from Normandy, during a three-day coach trip in 1630, when Surin was in the third year of his Jesuit novitiate. Surin described it in a letter that was later to be widely circulated:<>
<>[The young man] had never been instructed by anyone but God in the spiritual life, and yet he spoke to me about it with such sublimity and solidity that all I have read or heard is nothing compared to what he told me.<>
<>Surin went on to detail the “marvelous secrets” that God had communicated to this man of great simplicity.<>
<>Certeau also responded to unexpected encounters. In 1979, <>Le Nouvel Observateur<> published a ten-part series on the life of Saint Teresa by the graphic novelist Claire Bretécher, whose irreverent but affectionate portrait of Teresa—efficient money-raiser for her convents, possessed writer who wants to sell her books at a good price, addressing God with love but sometimes with irritation—aroused a storm of correspondence. Some readers were indignant at the vulgarity of this “hysterical virago”; others, including Christians, applauded Teresa's dynamism and said that she herself would have laughed.<>
<>The editors asked Michel de Certeau to comment and he obliged, siding with those who thought Teresa would laugh.<>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fn12">< size=2>[12]<><><> Theology did not just belong to theologians; its deep questions were for everyone to ponder. As much as Claire Bretécher, he saw Teresa as the “Carmelite Amazon, great hunter of dreams and desires.” His lyrical portrait of Teresa draws from his favorite themes: she is a wanderer, creating convents across Spain for “lovers of God”; immersed in daily affairs, she can pass in an instant to ecstatic connection with the beloved Other; she accepts the reality of institutions, but her books, with the dialogues they open, run counter to the lies institutions impose. Certeau's generous legacy of books is an invitation to continue dialogue in every direction.<>
<5>Notes<5>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr1">< size=2>[1]<><><> Ratzinger's evolution and views are discussed by Anthony Grafton in “Reading Ratzinger,” <>The New Yorker<>, July 25, 2005, and in “A 'Dictatorship of Relativism?' Symposium in Response to Cardinal Ratzinger's Last Homily,” <>Common Knowledge<>, No. 13 (2007), pp. 337–455.<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr2">< size=2>[2]<><><> In his huge book <>Michel de Certeau: Le marcheur blessé<> (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), François Dosse follows Certeau in his many itineraries in Europe and the Americas—friendships, scholarship, religious exploration, and political inquiry.<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr3">< size=2>[3]<><><> Quoted by Certeau in an appreciation of Lubac written shortly before his own death and published several years later in <>Le Monde<> (“La Mort du cardinal de Lubac,” September 5, 1991).<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr4">< size=2>[4]<><><> “L'Expérience religieuse, 'connaissance vécue' dans l'Église” (1956), edited by Luce Giard, in <>Le voyage mystique: Michel de Certeau<> (Paris: Recherches de Science Religieuse, 1988), pp. 27–51; Pierre Favre, <>Mémorial<>, translated and edited by Michel de Certeau (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1960).<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr5">< size=2>[5]<><><> Jean-Joseph Surin, <>Guide spirituel<>, edited by Michel de Certeau (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1963), p. 60; <>Correspondance<>, edited by Michel de Certeau (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966).<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr6">< size=2>[6]<><><> Michel de Certeau, <>Histoire et psychanalyse entre science et fiction<>, edited by Luce Giard (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), Chapter 8, “Lacan: une éthique de la parole.”<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr7">< size=2>[7]<><><> Certeau's reactions to Vatican II were published in the Jesuit periodical <>Christus<>, Nos. 12 (1965), pp. 147–163, and 13 (1966), pp. 101–119; summary in François Dosse, <>Michel de Certeau: le marcheur blessé<> (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), Ch. 8.<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr8">< size=2>[8]<><><> Joseph Ratzinger, “Demokratisierung der Kirche?,” in Joseph Ratzinger and Hans Maier, <>Demokratie in der Kirche: Möglichkeiten, Grenzen, Gefahren<> (Limburg: Lahn-Verlag, 1970), pp. 7– 46. Later quotation given in Grafton, “Reading Ratzinger.”<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr9">< size=2>[9]<><><> Several of Certeau's major publications on Christian belief are reprinted in a posthumous book, <>La Faiblesse de croire<>, edited by Luce Giard (Paris: Seuil, 1987). A translation from this collection is found in <>The Certeau Reader<>, “The Weakness of Believing. From the Body to Writing, a Christian Transit.”<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr10">< size=2>[10]<><><> Henri de Lubac, <>La Posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore<> (Paris, 1978– 1980), Vol. 2, pp. 447–449.<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr11">< size=2>[11]<><><> Moshe Sluhovsky, <>Believe Not Every Spirit: Possession, Mysticism, and Discernment in Early Modern Catholicism<> (University of Chicago Press, 2007).<>
<><>< href="http://www.blogware.com/iframesrc.html#fnr12">< size=2>[12]<><><> “Thérèse d'Avila, ou le chemin pour se perdre,” <>Le Nouvel Observateur<>, No. 771 (August 20–26, 1979).<>

Postsecular Interrogations: AsiaSource Interview with Talal Asad

 

 

 

Talal Asad is a Professor of Anthropology at the City University of New York. In his self-description, “I am interested in the phenomenon of religion (and secularism) as an integral part of modernity, and especially in the religious revival in the Middle East. Connected with this is my interest in the links between religious and secular notions of pain and cruelty, and therefore with the modern discourse of Human Rights. My long-term research concerns the transformation of religious law (the shari'ah) in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Egypt with special reference to arguments about what constitutes secular and progressive reform.”

Asad looks at the phenomenon of modernity as a discourse in Foucauldian terms, marked by the rise of the secular public sphere and the disciplinary institution and apparatus of the nation-state. The inevitable subjugations and investments in ideological choices rooted in the history of the European Enlightenmnt that this implies have led, in his opinion, to our present fractured and violent postcolonial world, where contested uniformities assert their right over the ubiquitous disciplinary space of nation states. But Asad's analyses don't stop short at stating the obvious in a sophisticated language or taking sides either with apologists of religious militancy or secular normalcy. Asad's call is for a dialogic engagement, interrogating the biases, provincial limitations and arbitaray choices within post-Enlightenment modernity through the critiquing of its doxa and nomos by alternate cultural histories, while probing these pre-modern formations for pluralities of interpretation and internal resources of human emancipation.

He thus envisages a postsecular world, in which individuals and groups may co-exist not through the policing of the boundaries of a public sphere by the nation-state, but through the development of alternate social realities of human emancipation. Asad's views are germane to the present situation in India, with the rise of a majoritarian uniformalist Hindutva at the national level and the percolation of its ideological nomos into ashrams such as the Sri Aurobindo Ashram. The following interview with AsiaSource correspondent Nermeen Shaikh brings a number of his insights to the front.


 AsiaSource Interview with Talal Asad (December 16, 2002)


December 16, 2002

Talal Asad has conducted extensive research on the phenomenon of religion (and secularism), particularly the religious revival in the Middle East. Professor Asad is the author of Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). His new book, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity will be published by Stanford University Press in February 2003.

Professor Asad is Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center.

In this interview with AsiaSource, Professor Asad discusses, among other things, religious revivalist movements, human rights, Shariah law and the modern state.

You have suggested in your essay “Religion, Nation-State, Secularism” that the term religion is often used anachronistically. Why is it that the term religion does not exhaust all the components — the practices, the ways of being — that comprise it? How did this understanding of the term come about and why is it that you place such emphasis on an alternative conception of the term?

I think there is a slight misunderstanding here. I'm not really concerned to give another definition of religion. I am not concerned to say that we can get a more comprehensive, a more dynamic conception, and so on. I wish only to point to the fact that religion as a category is constantly being defined within social and historical contexts, and that people have specific reasons for defining it one way or another.

Religion is associated with various kinds of experience, various institutions, with various movements, arguments and so on. That is what I am pointing to. In other words, it is not an abstract definition that interests me. People who use abstract definitions of religion are missing a very important point: that religion is a social and historical fact, which has legal dimensions, domestic and political dimensions, economic dimensions, and so on. So what one has to look for, in other words, is the ways in which, as circumstances change, people constantly try, as it were, to gather together elements that they think belong, or should belong, to the notion of religion. People use particular conceptions of religion in social life. This has really been my concern.

My concern in the Genealogies of Religion was to trace some of the ways in which this notion has come to be constructed historically, rather than to provide a cross-cultural definition of religion that can be applied to any society. This is what I have been trying to say.

It has frequently been argued that processes of modernization should culminate in the retreat of religion to the private sphere, so that wherever religion manifests itself in public life, this can be attributed to an incomplete or failed project of modernization, or as the vestiges of tradition forestalling the inevitable triumph of the modern. How would you respond to this?

Well, certainly that is the theory, but, of course, for a long time it has been recognized that this is not the way history has gone. Indeed, it is not even clear that the so-called “retreat of religion” has been quite a simple thing even since the beginning of the 19th century. The way in which people have thought about secularism – that is, the separation between state and religion – has in fact been adapted to very different kinds of state.

Let's think of three examples of states in the West that are supposed to be liberal, democratic and secular: France, Britain and the United States. What you have in France – very schematically speaking – is a state that is secular and a society which is secular. In England, you have an established religion and you have a very secular society. In the United States, you have a very religious society and a secular state. There are therefore very different ways in which the negotiation between religion and politics works itself out. There are different kinds of sensibilities, even in these three modern states and societies. There are different kinds of reactions that people have towards what is a transgression against “secular” principles.

For example: such sensibilities are found in the debate in France (l'affaire du foulard) about whether Muslim girls should be permitted to wear the veil in public schools. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that this has led to a negative reaction by secularists whereas wearing a yarmulke to school has not. What is it that makes the wearing of the veil a violation of secular rules of politics and not the yarmulke? My point is not that there is unfair discrimination here, but that even in a secular society there are differences in the way secular people evaluate the political significance of “religious symbols” in public space. Or take America. There are clear rules in the United States about the separation of state and religion, but that doesn't prevent “non-secular” interventions in the politics of the present regime. As we all know, the Christian Right is at the heart of the Bush government. It is an anti-Semitic ally of the Zionist organizations in America, and its political imagination embraces the coming war against Iraq as a step towards Armageddon. A “secular” war is supported by them for “religious” reasons. Again, I say this not in order to express my disapproval of the Religious Right (although, of course, I do dislike them) but to point to the fact that a secular state can without difficulty accommodate such politics.

So to come back to the question of what is modern and what is not, and what ultimately is expected of a liberal, modern state: I think one has to recognize, first of all, that the transformation of societies in what is called a modern direction, included all sorts of accommodations and all sorts of changes, all sorts of re-adjustments as well as concessions. The “secular” politics that is emerging is partly the result of these changes. And in that sense modernization/secularization is not really a simple story.

I myself am very skeptical of the notion that modernity is some kind of straightforward destiny for everybody. There is a sense in which modernity can be thought of as a historical periodization, as temporality, but also of particular ways in which people live – must live. I am not at all sure that the “modern” necessarily presupposes everything that people in one or other of the so-called liberal, secular states want or think it should be.

Secularism has always been considered a crucial component of the process of modernization. How would you define the relationship between religion and secularism?

I have a book coming out in February 2003 called Formations of the Secular in which I try to look at questions of sensibility, of experience, of the embodied concepts which orient subjects' sensorium and guide public understandings of truth. I also look at the political doctrine of secularism itself, and at the secularization of law and morality in modernizing states. I think these are complicated questions. I think we don't understand fully what all the implications of the secular modes of everyday existence are for secular politics. I think we need to think about such matters far more deeply in the human sciences than we have done so far.

Secularism as a political doctrine I see as being very closely connected to the formation of religion itself, as the “other” of a religious order. It is precisely in a secular state – which is supposed to be totally separated from religion – that it is essential for state law to define, again and again, what genuine religion is, and where its boundaries should properly be. In other words, the state is not that separate. Paradoxically, modern politics cannot really be separated from religion as the vulgar version of secularism argues it should be – with religion having its own sphere and politics its own. The state (a political entity/realm) has the function of defining the acceptable public face of “religion”.

It has been argued elsewhere that religious revivalist movements — such as (but not limited to) ones in the Muslim world — are not in fact atavistic or premodern, but that the very condition of possibility of these movements is the modern. Would you agree with this?

I think to some extent this is certainly true. I would agree if, in “the modern condition of possibility” you include the nation-state, and the ambitions of the nation-state. It seems to me that both kinds of movements – both militant movements as well as the liberal forms of Islam that have emerged since the 19th century – are adjustments to the fact that the state has ambitions regarding the formation of subjects and the regulation of entire populations, of their life and death. These things were the concern of various other agencies previously – including what one might call the religious – or there was no such function at all. But now a single political structure, the modern nation-state, seeks to deal with them.

I think it is true that, if you like, both the radical forms of religious movements as well as the liberal forms are accommodations to the modern state. The liberal ones obviously because they represent attempts to adjust to that overarching political power and the spaces it authorizes – to the forms of privacy and autonomy that it enables and legitimizes. The radical ones too belong to the same modern world because what is at stake for them primarily is the state since that is the seat of power determining all sorts of things in ways that previously were left unregulated.

So in that sense, yes, these movements are modern. They are also of course modern in the sense that there are all sorts of modern techniques that are now available and employed by them (electronic techniques of communication, scientific forms of knowledge, the various means through which knowledge is produced and circulated, etc.). So it is quite true: various aspects of these movements are constituted in a modern way. At the same time one should not forget that they draw on traditions of reform and reinterpretation that are part of an old history – a history of disagreement, dispute and physical conflict – that is drawn on and re-presented.

Can or should contemporary Islamist movements make us rethink Western conceptions of secular modernity?

On the whole, neither radical Islamist movements nor liberal Islam appear able to make people rethink Western conceptions of secular modernity. In part this is because many of their projects, in so far as they are modern, have taken over modern assumptions of politics. In part also it is because there is an enduring antipathy in the West towards Islam and ideas coming from the Islamic tradition. And of course the mere fact of the enormous disparity in power between apparently successful Western societies and evidently weak Muslim societies also plays a part.

But I think that the phenomenon as a whole – that is the phenomenon of Islamism – as well as comparable religious movements elsewhere in the world ought to make us rethink the accepted narratives of triumphant secularism and liberal assumptions about what is politically and morally essential to modern life. The very existence of these phenomena should make us rethink our assumptions about what is necessary to modernity.

There has been much discussion recently of the fact that Islam is antithetical to liberal democracy and all it entails (equality, individualism, human rights, pluralism, tolerance and so on). How would you respond to this claim?

This is connected to the previous question. If you think of Islam and the Islamic tradition as fixed, as having a certain kind of unchangeable essence, then it might well be argued that Islam is antithetical to liberal democracy: what is modern is not really Islamic and what is Islamic cannot really be modern. So it's a Catch-22 situation that many critics insist on putting Muslims into.

Of course there are people who are trying to rethink the Islamic tradition in ways that would make it compatible with liberal democracy. But I am much more interested in the fact that the Islamic tradition ought to lead us to question many of the liberal categories themselves. Rather than saying, “Well yes we can also be like you,” why not ask what the liberal categories themselves mean, and what they have represented historically? The question of individualism, for example, is fraught with all sorts of problems, as people who have looked carefully at the tradition of individualism in the West know very well. The same is true of the question of equality. We know that the equality that is offered in liberal democracies is a purely legal equality, not economic equality. And the two forms of equality can't be kept in water-tight compartments. Even political equality doesn't necessarily give equal opportunity to all citizens to engage in or contribute to the formulation of policy. What do Islamic ideas about the individual, equality, etc., tell us about Western liberal ideas?

These are questions worth pursuing, I think. So instead of leaping up and saying, “Ah yes, we can all be liberal,” I think it is more important to ask, for example, “What exactly does the liberal mean by tolerance?” It is easy enough to be tolerant about things that don't matter very much. That tends to be the rule in liberal societies. Increasingly what you believe, what you do in your own home, whether you stand on your head or decide not to, is up to you as an individual in liberal democracies. So who cares? The liberal tolerates these things because the liberal doesn't care about them. Yet tolerance is really only meaningful when it is about things that really matter. Even in ordinary language we talk about “tolerating pain”. In other words, the kind of tolerance that really matters is something we ought to be exploring, thinking more about – and the ways in which the Islamic tradition conceives of tolerance (however limited that might be) helps to open up such questions.

So we ought to be thinking about questions like that instead of simply – and rather defensively – saying, “There are Islamic traditions that are very liberal, you know. We can also become liberal.” It is in fact much more interesting to ask, “What does liberalism mean by tolerance, or by pluralism? Is the meaning of individualism totally clear, is it totally desirable? Does an exploration of Islamic traditions give us a deeper, more critical understanding of individualism, or tolerance, or pluralism?” I would like to see more of this kind of questioning, rather than people trying to prove their liberal credentials.

How would you explain why there are infinitely more reports of human rights violations in the “Third World” than there are in the Euro-American world?

One reason for this is of course the fact that there are quite a lot of dictators in power in the Third World. This applies to Latin America, to Africa, and to China – not only to the Muslim world as the media would have us believe. But I think that there is something more that interests me in this whole question of human rights. Very often, many of the assumptions underlying human rights have to do with ways of life that are recognized as Western. Many things are found insufferable in the Third World merely because they are in the Third World. Things in the West are not found quite so insufferable simply because they are part of a different (more prestigious) way of life.

I was reminded of this again when I was reading the Christian Science Monitor recently. There was a long article on Qatar, which is said to be relatively liberal and tolerant, and so on. Qatar is portrayed as a progressive society, therefore as one of the more interesting societies in the region. The examples given to support this claim, quite unselfconsciously, are that Doha has Starbucks' cafes, that people eat Subway sandwiches, that there are malls. And of course they are also America's crucial military allies in the region at a time when Saudi Arabia is shuffling its feet in the coming war against Iraq. I am not trying to trash Qatar, of course. What I am saying is that the conception here, automatically and quite unselfconsciously put forward, is that “they are becoming more like us”. “Us” here refers explicitly to Americans, not even to Europeans (which the Europeans are discovering now much to their frustration).

There is another important aspect to this human rights issue, one that has international dimensions. Many of the conditions of disenfranchisement in the Third World are due not only to brutal dictators but also to the way in which these societies are connected to the global system. The point is that conditions inside a country are not thought of as being anybody's responsibility but that of the national government.

The trouble with the way human rights violations are conceived is that they invest the sovereign state with legal responsibility for all the sufferings of its people. There is some reason for this, historical as well as political, but increasingly around the world this notion makes nonsense of the way in which the violation of people's rights should be understood. The notion that lack of education, poverty and misery of various kinds has only to do with those countries themselves is absurd. Of course (it is grandly conceded) we in the West have an obligation to give aid and they in the Third World have an obligation to follow the sound policies urged on by the IMF and the World Bank that lend them money. But beyond that each Third World country is responsible for its own miseries – and its own human rights abuses.

In other words the responsibility cannot lie here with Western countries as far as any human rights violations in the Third World are concerned. So it is that as well. There are really a number of different things that contribute to people thinking in particular ways about human rights violations, and therefore to more violations “there” than “here”.

Some Muslim states such as Nigeria and Pakistan have attempted in various ways to implement Shariah law, attempts that have frequently been contested and criticized, since there is a prevailing belief that Shariah law is “backward” and anti-modern. Would you agree with this? Is it possible for Shariah law to be accommodated by the centralized and coercive system of law that is so crucial to the modern state?

Can it be accommodated? Aspects of it cannot be accommodated, and have not been accommodated of course since the 19th century – commercial law particularly, but also procedural law, and so on, have long been abandoned in most Muslim countries. Criminal law as well but that has less to do with how the modern capitalist state works than with certain kinds of liberal values (for instance, ideas of what is really cruel and insufferable and what is not). There is a rejection of punishments that have to do with the body, they are anathema to the liberal sensibility. I happen to have the same sensibilities but logically Shariah punishments are not inconsistent with the demands of a “centralized and coercive system of law so crucial to the modern state”.

As far as family law is concerned, it is quite clear that this has been adjusted and accommodated in and by modern states in all sorts of ways. And now there is increasing demand for equality on the part of women in relation to particular kinds of laws that discriminate against them. Here the Shariah has come under pressure.

Again I would stress that there are movements of re-interpretation going on among various Muslims who are keen to introduce liberal values into the Shariah, who would like to re-write the Shariah from its foundations, as it were, so that it has both some kind of attachment to the historical tradition but at the same time is more palatable to a Western liberal sensibility. In principle, I do not see why this is impossible, and indeed, it may very well happen to a greater or lesser extent. In this country, there is for instance an interesting woman, Azizah Al-Hibri, a lawyer and a law professor at Richmond University, who has been very concerned to develop liberal interpretations of the Shariah in this country. Surely there are movements of this kind and they will be accommodated by a liberal democratic state.

What is the relationship between modern forms of power and the way in which questions about religion and human rights and secularism are framed?

This is a large question. And short of repeating myself, I would only say that many of the things claimed about liberal tolerance should be questioned. There are various kinds of intimidation and coercion that go on both covertly and overtly to make things acceptable to liberal sensibilities. Power is exerted not only in the ways people are allowed to speak or not speak, but in what it is that makes sense to them. Rather than thinking of power only in terms of the question of freedom of expression and its limitations, we should also pay attention to the kinds of power that go into the formation of listening subjects, of subjects who can open their minds to something that is strange or uncomfortable or distasteful.

I think we need much more investigation of what people regard as poppycock and of what they are willing to open their minds to. Secularism has tended to regard religious traditions as either making nonsensical claims about public knowledge or as having dangerous consequences when they are allowed to enter the political realm. William Connolly, for instance, has been trying in many of his writings to re-theorize the political arrangement of secularism as it is has been understood historically so that a more compassionate, open-minded attitude can be invited into modern politics.

You have been accused of sympathizing with nativism, “Islamic fundamentalism”, and the like. Recently one critic charged you (along with others) of cultivating an “aura of authenticity”. How would you respond to such a charge?

My first reaction would be to say that I only answer charges in a court of law!

I find this rather disappointing, frankly. It is a reflection of much of the careless thinking that is going around in the human sciences these days. It is the kind of carelessness which has some rather unfortunate and worrying moral implications. The people who say this are not unlike Bush who says, “You are either with us, or against us,” and not unlike people who condemn attempts at understanding disturbing events as nothing more than attempts at excusing. I do not think quite honestly that anybody who has read my work carefully could think that I am for irrationality and for the kind of fanaticism that is associated with fundamentalism (a term I prefer not to use for theoretical reasons as well as political ones).

I know also that at least one critic has said that I have endorsed an “aura of authenticity” – and that, in his eyes, is clearly a great political failing on my part. What I have to say in response to this is not only that the person concerned has not read my work carefully but also that he has not read Walter Benjamin carefully, from whom the expression “aura of authenticity” is derived, particularly from his essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”.

Many people in cultural studies and anthropology who invoke that text do not seem to have noticed that Benjamin had a very ambivalent attitude towards “authenticity”. If you re-read that essay, you will see that on the one hand, he looks forward with approval to a time when certain kinds of authority are undermined, he particularly expects the end of religious authority with the collapse of cultic aura and envisages a consequent enhancement of freedom that the technique of mechanical reproduction will make possible. We know, of course, that this optimism has not been justified.

At the same time, Benjamin's idea of authenticity and aura is a very complex one. It is also a notion that relates to historicity, to the historicity of the authentic thing. It is precisely because a thing is authentic, because the same thing moves from one time to another that it acquires, as it were, certain qualities of ancientness and genuineness, an aura. Its authenticity as an ancient thing guarantees its historicity. Benjamin recognized ambivalently that the undermining of aura, in the complex sense in which he was talking about it, might also mean the undermining of historicity. Thus it is precisely the fact that certain ancient documents are authentic documents, that they show, as it were, the “real” wear and tear of their historical experience, which makes it possible to use those documents to construct a reliable historical account of something. In other words, Benjamin had a notion of aura not only as essential to modern concepts of historicity but also as intrinsic to “tradition”. This lends his work a productive tension because it is not straightforwardly progressivist.

I find that what Benjamin has to say there is much more complicated and dialectical, much more suggestive, than is often vulgarly assumed by progressivists. So I would say that whoever accused me of sympathizing with fundamentalism because I'm supposed to have endorsed the idea of “aura of authenticity” that Benjamin dismantled, has done a rather superficial reading not only of my own work but of Benjamin's as well.

You have spoken of self-criticism within the Middle East. For strategic reasons, the US has now also discursively complicated its reading of Islamic tradition; it speaks of a plurality (or rather, a duality – the regressive and the modern) of traditions within Islam, and declares its aim to be to encourage the more modern, democratic element. What is the difference between your appreciation of the complexity of Muslim tradition and the US schema? Is there any commonality between the forces that the US seeks to encourage, and the sources of criticism that you gesture towards? Where would you locate, and how would you read a possible emancipatory politics today?

Well first of all, let me distance myself from US policy, and say that clearly, as I read it, US policy is only concerned to find tendencies in the Middle East and the Muslim world, whether they are religious or secular, with which it can ally politically. That does not interest me of course. Secondly, these US policymakers have a teleological conception of regional developments, and I touched on that when we talked about Benjamin. In other words, people like the patriotic journalist Thomas Friedman evaluate these movements by reference to what “we” in the US are. Because that, of course, is what all civilized human beings should become – and if this is not obvious to everyone in the world then clearly there's something terribly wrong with them.

I do not see it that way at all. I hope that things will not develop that way. In my more pessimistic moments, which are now increasingly frequent, I think that regardless of what one would like, one may end up with a world that the Friedmans of this country want. In other words, we may see a world that is more dominated and hegemonized by a singular power pushing us in a singular direction, with less and less possibility for a multiplicity of experiences, and so on. I see power as being more and more polarized, I see cultural options becoming narrower – even though individuals might have more things to consume, more ways to amuse themselves, more ways to aestheticize their personal lives. I would like to see something else, but what I like is neither here nor there, so I distinguish between how I see things as desirable and how I see things as probable. This is what I fear: a homogenization which may well lead to a victory for the kind of world US policymakers have in mind. So in that sense Friedman and I might agree, but I with sadness and he with great delight.

But then history is full of surprises; that is the one thing I console myself with. The best-laid plans of mice and men go wrong. People who confidently predict particular outcomes of historical developments are often mistaken. I hope that I will be wrong too. What might emerge as this century proceeds is in the end very difficult to say. I think that what kind of emancipatory politics makes sense will depend very much on what emerges. I am not in favour of talking confidently about what kind of politics is emancipatory. We have had too many programs of this kind in the past that have been dismal failures. Clearly one can try to resist oppressive power in various ways, some big, and some small; one can resist morally, one can resist politically. But I don't think academics have quite as much impact on politics as they sometimes think – except if you happen to be a Kissinger of course. Then you are a public intellectual integrated into the ruling apparatus. So I don't know, quite honestly, if I have anything useful to say on this subject. All I can say is that certainly politics has always had an oppositional dimension. So we ought to try to make our arrogant rulers uncomfortable at the very least, and insecure, at best. Whether we can do more than that I doubt. In the end it is up to the younger generation that has both a greater imagination and a stronger sense of commitment to fellow-human beings to decide what to do and how to do it. At present I see large uncertainties around. We are all in a sense much more in the dark than we think we are.

Interview conducted by Nermeen Shaikh of AsiaSource.

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