‘From the Ruins of Empire’ by Pankaj Mishra: Interview and Review

Interview with Aljazeera

In the prologue to his new book From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia, award-winning author and essayist Pankaj Mishra writes:

“The West has seen Asia through the narrow perspective of its own strategic and economic interests, leaving unexamined – and unimagined – the collective experiences and subjectivities of Asian peoples… [This book] does not seek to replace a Euro-centric or West-centric perspective with an equally problematic Asia-centric one. Rather, it seeks to open up multiple perspectives on the past and the present, convinced that the assumptions of Western power – increasingly untenable – are no longer a reliable vantage point and may even be dangerously misleading”.

Focusing on the trajectories of two itinerant thinkers and activists, the Persian Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) and the Chinese Liang Qichao (1873-1929) – as well as various other Asian intellectuals and leaders – Mishra gracefully challenges the West-centric narrative, positing that “the central event of the last century for the majority of the world’s population was the intellectual and political awakening of Asia and its emergence from the ruins of both Asian and European empires”.

This thesis enables crucial and otherwise inaccessible insights into contemporary history, including phenomena ranging from the formation of al-Qaeda to the rise of China.

I had the opportunity to converse with Mishra by email about his book, the transcript of which interview appears below.

As for the potential fertility of present-day imperial ruins, populations accustomed to deflecting the “uncivilised” charge onto non-Westerners would do well to reflect on obvious parallels between, for example, the currentbehaviour of the US military abroad and Mishra’s description of Napoleon-era French soldiers, who “while suppressing the first of the Egyptian revolts against their occupation, stormed the al-Azhar mosque, tethered their horses to the prayer niches, trampled the Qurans under their boots, drank wine until they were helpless and then urinated on the floor”.

Belen Fernandez: You explain at the start of From the Ruins of Empire:

“The form of this book – part historical essay and part intellectual biography – is primarily motivated by the conviction that the lines of history converge in individual lives, even though the latter have their own shape and momentum. The early men of modern Asia it describes travelled and wrote prolifically, restlessly assessing their own and other societies, pondering the corruption of power, the decay of community, the loss of political legitimacy and the temptations of the West. Their passionate enquiries appear in retrospect as a single thread, weaving seemingly disparate events and regions into a single web of meaning.”

You’ve discussed your own intellectual formation and travels in previous writings, such as your bookTemptations of the West: How to Be Modern in India, Pakistan, Tibet, and Beyond. What convergence of events and experiences compelled you to embark on From the Ruins of Empire?

Pankaj Mishra: Many things over the last decade. I’ll speak only about two here. The first was surely my visit to the Muslim-majority valley of Kashmir in 2000, where I witnessed a military occupation by a nation-state, India, that claimed the moral prestige of secularism but was actually oppressively Hindu majoritarian in all significant ways – that’s how it was perceived by Kashmiris who had long belonged to a cosmopolitan and syncretic culture.

That’s when I began to wonder why many Asian nation-states had turned out to be often more violent than the European empires in Asia they had replaced. And that was when I began to wonder – and this is a major theme in the book – if the political and economic models Asians had adopted from the West in their struggle for self-determination and dignity were disastrously unsuitable.

The other thing that influenced me was the post-9/11 political climate in the West. How such a wide range of politicians, policymakers, journalists and columnists could re-embrace the delusions of empire – those you thought had been effectively shattered by decolonisation 50-60 years ago; how they could bring themselves to believe that the Afghans and the Iraqis were just longing to suck on the big sticks proffered to them by American soldiers, as [decorated New York Times foreign affairs columnist]Thomas Friedman inimitably recommended… I realised too that the post-colonial version of history I had grown up with – one that celebrated the nation-state’s emergence from foreign rule – was deeply defective and left out a lot of things.

All this was just staggering to me, and people like myself who share a reflexive suspicion of armed imperialists claiming to be missionaries.

So neither the neo-imperialist nor the post-colonial accounts of the world seemed accurate. Both had suppressed or neglected a whole range of ideas and personalities in the Asian realm, and I felt that it was time to look at them again, to see what they had to say to us.

BF: Last year, you reviewed Niall Ferguson’s Civilisation: The West and the Rest for the London Review of Books. This elicited a protracted tantrum from Ferguson, comprising libel accusations and a lawsuit threat.

How does the substance of your new book challenge the worldview of pseudo-scholars like Ferguson, who – as you point out - defined himself in 2003 as “a fully paid-up member of the neo-imperialist gang”, and endorsed neo-con Max Boot’s assessment that the US should endeavour to replicate in Asia “the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets”?

PM: I did not aim this book at the jodhpur-loving neo-imperialists or their arguments in favour of a renewed Western imperium. I have no interest in engaging with such absurd ideas, and, as we have seen in recent days, the pith-helmet fetishists can do a pretty good job of discrediting themselves.

I certainly didn’t want to get into a discussion about whether Western imperialism had its good side – the Asian thinkers and writers in my book share the simple assumption that a system that sanctifies large-scale violence, exploitation, slavery and racism is reprehensible, undesirable and, finally, unsustainable.

Most importantly, neo-imperialism has now exposed itself as strategically as well as morally bankrupt. It retains the potential to plunge the world into a terrible conflagration – an assault on Iran might provide the spark – but it cannot preserve American interests in a multi-polar world; it can only damage them beyond repair.

BF: There is a tendency, among members of the Western foreign policy establishment and intelligentsia, to reduce international phenomena to simplistic and ahistorical rhetoric and concepts – e.g. 9/11 = Muslims hate our freedom.

Were they to acquire a spontaneous interest in the matter, what might these characters learn from a study of al-Afghani, Liang and other late Asian thinkers that would better position them to interpret contemporary Islamic terrorism, the Arab Spring, the rise of China?

(The US ambassador to Afghanistan would presumably at least be spared further donations of $25,000 to the restoration of al-Afghani’s grave, which as you explain in the book occurred as a result of a fleeting post-9/11 conviction that the man represented an exemplary moderate, liberal and West-compatible Islam. You object: “The mercurial and brilliant al-Afghani was anything but this bland figment of sanguine imagination.”) 

One of the problems with these pseudo-culturalist and quasi-psychological accounts and binaries – these barbarians hate our freedoms etc, liberalism versus Islamofascism – is that they are unaware of their own long history.PM: Yes, a lot of money could be saved, and spent on worthwhile programmes in both the West and in Afghanistan, if the simple moral equations – mini-skirts versus Taliban beards – were replaced with an engagement with the history of the West in Asia, and the no less tormented history of post-colonial Asia.

Asians who felt the sharp edges of Western “values” such as liberalism-and there are many such figures in my book – knew very well these ideological tricks: foreigners justifying their brutal domination and racial humiliation of Asian peoples by pointing to their supposedly higher values of “civilisation”.

This is of course only one of the many things that Western policymakers could learn through reflecting on al-Afghani and Liang.

However, the most important and very simple lesson there for American and European commentators who for a long time have assumed that everyone in the world is just waiting to become like them is this: how Asians have conceived over the last century and a half of their place in the world dominated by a small minority of white men.

This is what my book seeks to describe. In this basic quest for dignity and equality and release from humiliation – so obvious yet so rarely discussed – are grounded all the events that you speak of, whether the Arab Spring or the rise of China.

So unless you grant that people have conceived of their own fates, made their own trysts with destiny, without regard for what the West wants or how the West sees itself and judges non-Western peoples, you’ll always be a little bewildered by everything that happens in the world today, and will end up falling for simple, self-flattering notions like “they must hate our freedoms”.

The book addresses this massive incompatibility of historical memory and self-perceptions between the West and Asia.

BF: You write: “Globalisation, it is clear, does not lead to a flat world marked by increasing integration, standardisation and cosmopolitan openness, despite the wishful thinking of some commentators.”

You then detail some of its pernicious effects in contemporary India, such as that “failed crops and spiralling debt drove more than a hundred thousand farmers to suicide in the past decade”, a phenomenon that has much to do with free trade and World Bank structural adjustment policies favouring global corporations like Monsanto.

How is it that, in the face of centuries worth of evidence soundly obliterating the possibility that free trade is a catalyst for general prosperity, the discoverer of the flat world [i.e. Thomas Friedman] has turned his discovery into a runaway bestseller, in which he imparts statistics such as that “any Indian villager” will confirm the need for enhanced globalisation?

PM: Every age has its false prophets, its pied-pipers, but what does it say about our own age that its most famous global sage should be a flat-worlder? The history recounted in my book makes it clear that the “free market” was the creation of powerful nation states in Western Europe and then America that had accumulated several advantages over other countries, largely through imperial conquest, and that this allegedly free market was imposed upon Asian peoples with the help of gunboats (and local elites or compradors).

So the coercion and profound inequality inherent in this practice of “free trade”, or the fact that it made a small transnational elite – foreign businessmen and their local collaborators – rich and impoverished many others, have always been obvious.There is of course a great deal of continuity in the Western discourse of free markets: from the British merchants who lobbied for an assault on China in the late 1830s to Woodrow Wilson saying we must “batten” down the doors of countries that do not practice free trade to Friedman who wrote that the invisible hand must necessarily conceal an “invisible fist” or it won’t work.

Why do so many people fall for grandiose moral claims – the ludicrous notion, for instance, that the free market is all about removing poverty?

I think to answer that one has to examine, in addition to individual trajectories of journalists like Friedman, the synergies that developed between politicians, businessmen, academics and journalists in recent decades: how each of these figures came to boost the other, how policymaking and opinion-making came to be complementary, how intellectuals came to be professionalised, Davos-ed and Aspen-ised and ended up whispering advice to power, and how defective but profit-maximising knowledge was produced and then widely disseminated.

BF: In the section of your book on Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore in East Asia, we learn: “For Bhudev Mukhopadhyay, perhaps the most comprehensive nineteenth-century Bengali critic of the West, the innate human capacity for love had stopped, in Europe, at the door of the nation-state”.

What is the state of love in the world in 2012?

PM: Our capacity for uncritical love has been expended recklessly in recent years on the free market rather than the nation-state. This was the false god we were instructed to worship during the era of globalisation and most of us duly obliged, even the least resourceful and economically underprivileged peoples, dazzled by our new goods and gadgets, the routinely updated models of mobile phones etc.

In 2012, after four years of a crisis caused by rampant greed and which nobody knows how to end, we can see more clearly how a tiny minority has enriched itself, leaving many others feeling cheated, and exposed to deprivation and suffering. Their anger and frustration is prone to violent eruptions – we already see this happening in places like India and China, not to mention Greece and Spain.

“Our capacity for uncritical love has been expended recklessly in recent years on the free market rather than the nation-state. This was the false god we were instructed to worship during the era of globalisation.”- Pankaj Mishra

BF: During a visit to Persia and Iraq in 1932, Tagore observed:

“[T]he men, women and children done to death there meet their fate by a decree from the stratosphere of British imperialism – which finds it easy to shower death because of its distance from its individual victims. So dim and insignificant do those unskilled in the modern arts of killing appear to those who glory in such skill!”

Can a study of Asian intellectuals help combat the empire-sustaining notion of a dehumanised “Other”?

PM: There is a lot more where that passage came from about the sacredness of the sky, the imaginative and philosophical meaning it has had for centuries to earth-bound humans.

The reason why I chose Tagore, who is not a systematic thinker or ideological system-builder and is better described as a poet and seer, was precisely these bits of writing – necessarily naïve and un-ideological and therefore so cognisant of modern horrors. Only someone with a rooted relationship with the world and a profound sense of the past could see the increasingly impersonal and brutal form of violence unleashed by “rational” men.

I can’t do better than quote some of Tagore’s own writings from this trip to the Middle East, which are particularly relevant to our Age of the Drone:

“There is a British Air Force station at Baghdad. The Christian chaplain of that force gave me the news that they were daily bombing some Arab villages. Old men, women and children were being killed indiscriminately from the upper regions of British Imperialism; it was easy to kill them because the principle of Imperialism obscures the individual. Christ has recognised men as the sons of God; but to the Christian chaplain of the Air Force the Father along with his Son have grown unreal, they can no longer be discerned from the altitude of Imperialism… Besides, the desert-dwellers can be killed so easily from the air and their powers of retaliation are so inadequate that the reality of their death too grows dim. For this reason, armed men of the West are very prone today to forget the humanity of those who have not yet learnt their scientific methods of homicide.”

Of course – and this was the horrific scenario Tagore was warning against – many more people have now figured out the “scientific methods of homicide” and the terrorists of the East showed on 9/11 how easy it is to kill thousands from the air.

BF: Was there anything that surprised you during your research for the book?

PM: Mostly, how little I knew about my subject. Particularly, these pre-colonial cosmopolitan worlds of Asia – when people, ideas, religions, goods, travelled vast distances. These worlds were shattered by Western imperialists, but the first generation of Asian thinker I describe still had a good memory of it, and drew upon this long experience in their criticisms of Western models of politics and economy.

BF: Why is the book’s epilogue titled “An ambiguous revenge”?

PM: Well, precisely because the rise of Asia and its assertion of dignity and equality before the long-dominant West, means nothing if Asian countries like India and China and Indonesia follow the same script: conquest, exploitation, an instrumental attitude towards nature, dispossession and the worldwide scramble for resources that produced vicious conflicts in the last centuries.

The model of the imperial nation-state that made a few Western countries so uniquely powerful and prosperous can only spell political and environmental disaster on a gigantic scale if populous countries like India and China adopt it. But that is what we are looking at in the new century.

Belen Fernandez is the author of The Imperial Messenger: Thomas Friedman at Work, released by Verso in 2011. She is a member of the Jacobin Magazine editorial board, and her articles have appeared in the London Review of Books blogAlterNet and many other publications.

 

 

From: The Daily Beast

The op-ed pages of major newspapers are littered with the bylines of formerly great journalists. Too often the sinecure of punditry causes writers to become enervated in their thinking, lazy in their prose. Tom Friedman—now a frequent subject of parody for his repeated quoting of foreign taxi drivers, his muddled metaphors, his bizarre neologisms—is a prime example of a once fine foreign correspondent gone to seed.

For that reason, I’ve had mixed feelings observing the rise of Pankaj Mishra in recent years. The Indian-born Mishra is among the best literary critics writing in English today, as well as a distinguished cultural historian and novelist. I’d read him on anything. But lately he’s strayed near the pundit zone, writing political op-eds for outlets like The Guardian andBloomberg View. To be sure, he acquits himself as well as anyone in the field. He’s a consistently sharp and independent thinker, unafraid, for example, to criticize the Indian government’s authoritarian tendencies and highlight the ways in which its economic boom has bypassed whole sectors of its population. But the road to membership in the technocratic elite is paved with this sort of well-remunerated pontificating, and one hopes that success doesn’t diminish, as The New York Timesrecently described it, Mishra’s “sometimes ferocious instinct for the jugular.

At first glance, Mishra’s latest book, From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia, is a sign of his commitment to the concerns that he’s addressed throughout his career. The book is a survey of Asian intellectuals in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and their role in pan-Asian, pan-Islamic, and anti-colonial movements. And it begins with a shot: the spectacular Japanese naval victory over Russia at the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905, which electrified Asians and Africans living under the yoke of colonialism and, in Mishra’s view, inaugurated “the recessional of the West” that continues to this day.

That the West is in some form of decline isn’t much in dispute. But Mishra advances the discussion by arguing that the West’s moral decline traces back a century, through two world wars, a horrific legacy of colonialism, and a failure to treat non-Western nations as equal partners. This moral decline matters, he claims, because it reflects how Western liberal democracy may not be suited to these societies. Instead, these nations have looked to other models—in earlier generations, Meiji Japan and post-Ottoman Turkey, and, more recently, quasi-Islamist Turkey and China’s one-party, hypercapitalist state. Given the West’s recent history of economic instability and military intervention in the Muslim world, this search for other models of development—ones that, for example, acknowledge the centrality of Islam in some cultures—takes on particular significance

The book focuses on three Asian intellectuals—Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97), Liang Qichao (1873–1929), and Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941)—with appearances by Ho Chi Minh, Mao, Lenin, Gandhi, and a host of less well-known Asian intellectuals and statesmen. Each of the three principles anchors one of the book’s sections, but Mishra doesn’t treat this as a group biography. That is at times a necessity (many details of al-Afghani’s life are lost or obscured), but From the Ruins also becomes strangely fragmentary, its protagonists disappearing for a while as Mishra describes Western powers’ carving up of China or the epochal disappointment of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

This is all too bad, as the book would benefit from a more cohesive narrative. Mishra is at his best when he’s able to tie his intellectual eminences to the battles being waged around them. But while we learn, for instance, that Liang Qichao traveled to the Paris Peace Conference, we read little about what he was doing there or his personal reflections on its outcome. The section on Tagore does offer some particularly fine moments, such as this bit from when Tagore was welcomed to Tokyo by a delegation led by Japan’s prime minister. Unimpressed, Tagore announced, “The New Japan is only an imitation of the West.”

Mishra’s critiques of Western attitudes toward Asia are persuasive and he does a fine job showing how al-Afghani and Liang struggled to be taken seriously by the reformers and statesmen they courted. Some readers will likely take issue with the prime role that Mishra is willing to delegate to Islam, but he forcefully argues for its importance in binding peoples together, especially beyond the mantle of nationalism. What’s more is that there are many Islams, political or otherwise, and one need only look at the relatively unchallenged influence of Christianity in contemporary American politics, as well as the attendant hysteria over sharia in states like Tennessee, to find pots calling kettles

Reviews of Hybrid Reality: Thriving in the Emerging Human-Technology Civilization By Parag Khanna and Ayesha Khanna

Hybrid Reality

by Parag Khanna and Ayesha Khanna

Review by R. Carlson

This book is an uncritical examinations of technology and culture in which the only conclusions the authors seem capable of drawing regards today’s complex global socio-economic reality are that almost all contemporary social and economic problems can be solved by participation in the borderless neo-liberal economy and a shared religious like faith in the technological innovation that it facilitates.

The fact that Ayesha Khanna is an advisor to the Singularity University many of whose faculty of techno-inititates hold an almost millennial belief in a “singularity” or an end of history like event after which it will become possible to digitize and upload human consciousness into “spiritual machines” certainly helps to explain the authors techno-zealotry.

Using the work of Alvin and Heidi Toffler as a jumping off point (one sees in the Khannas’ interpretation of “Future Shock” why the books is also a favorite of Newt Gingrich) the Khannas’ weave a narrative about the what a glorious future is in store for all those who learn to appropriate the new technologies to become aspiring entrepreneurs of the digital age.

The Khannas’ appear to view Asian authoritarian capitalism, such as practiced in China or Singapore, as role models for the Future Societies they envision. Not surprisingly those places are well served by technocratic regimes since the few voices of dissent within can be quickly extinguished through the security apparatus of the all seeing surveillance state that the new digital technologies – for all the good they may do – also enable.

While one expects an optimistic assessment of Technology from any TED talk or book, one has an expectation to at least see an attempt at a critical interrogation -or even a nuanced view- of what may be some other darker sides of the new “hybrid reality”. But, except for a few short paragraphs in which they mention such problems as those associated with the digital divide, or such that some Africans may have to toil to mine hazardous materials that go into electronic devices, that ariel drones may also be used by drug cartels, as well as  things like prenatal testing and gender choice,  this critique is largely absent from the book.

Although the Khannas’ underplay the hybrid-blowback of techno-capitalism, in each instance they encounter it their solution to what violence may have been caused by the colonizing regime of anglo-american free market “techniks” is even “more technology”

Moreover, although the new found glories of India’s participation in the global knowledge economy are duly noted, and they celebrate Bangalore turing from an agricultural city to a technological mecca in one generation, it is surprising for these authors of Indian decent fail to theorize the suicides of over 250,000 farmers in India over the past fifteen years during the tech-boom.  Although this event has in been credibly linked to the genetically modified seed (hybrid seed) industry) that poor farmers must now purchase from global corporations like Monsanto it is is seemingly beyond the scope of their psudo-intellectual model to integrate these harsh physical realities into it.

One in given a glimpse of hybrid reality through an uncritical gaze at no point do the Khannas’ stop to consider whether the increasingly economic disparity or digital gap between the haves and have nots coupled with the depravations of the actual “physical reality” of an increasing number of the world population maybe co-emergent with, or even a consequence of the very economic regimes that they advocate. That is to say they remain blind to the critical dimensions of the technological and socially engineer hybrid reality that they champion.

The authors intention seem to endorse an economic order of techno-capitalism in which the increasing disparity of wealth distribution upward towards a “virtual overclass” is an inevitable consequence.

The Naked and the TED


From: The New Republic 

Hybrid Reality: Thriving in the Emerging Human-Technology Civilization

By Parag Khanna and Ayesha Khanna
(TED Books, $2.99)

The Demise of Guys: Why Boys Are Struggling and What We Can Do About It
By Philip Zimbardo and Nikita Duncan
(TED Books, $2.99)

Smile: The Astonishing Powers of a Simple Act
By Ron Gutman
(TED Books, $2.99)II.

THE NEW PAMPHLET—it would be too strong, and not only quantitatively, to call it a book—by Parag and Ayesha Khanna, the techno-babbling power couple, gallops through so many esoteric themes and irrelevant factoids (did you know that “fifty-eight percent of millennials would rather give up their sense of smell than their mobile phone”?) that one might forgive the authors for never properly attending to their grandest, most persuasive, and almost certainly inadvertent argument. Only the rare reader would finish this piece of digito-futuristic nonsense unconvinced that technology is—to borrow a term of art from the philosopher Harry Frankfurt—bullshit. No, not technology itself; just much of today’s discourse about technology, of which this little e-book is a succinct and mind-numbing example. At least TED Books—the publishing outlet of the hot and overheated TED Conference, which brought this hidden gem to the wider public—did not kill any trees in the publishing process.

It might seem odd that Parag Khanna would turn his attention to the world of technology. He established his reputation as a wannabe geopolitical theorist, something of a modern-day Kissinger, only wired and cool. For almost a decade he has been writing pompous and alarmist books and articles that herald a new era in international relations. He has also been circling the globe in a tireless effort to warn world leaders that democracy might be incompatible with globalization and capitalism. And that the West needs to be more like China and Singapore. And that America is running on borrowed time. And that a new Middle Ages are about to set in. (“When I look at the 21st century, I reverse the numbers around and I see the 12th century.”) This is probing stuff.

All of these insights are expressed in linguistic constructions of such absurdity and superficiality (“a world of ever-shifting (d)alliances,” “peer-to-peer micromanufacturing marketplace”) that Niall Ferguson’s “Chimerica” looks elegant and illuminating by comparison. Khanna must be a gifted schmoozer, too: the acknowledgments sections of his books are primary documents of contemporary name-dropping. Almost everyone he quotes can expect effusive praise. As I.F. Stone once said about Theodore White, “a writer who can be so universally admiring need never lunch alone.”

Khanna’s contempt for democracy and human rights aside, he is simply an intellectual impostor, emitting such lethal doses of banalities, inanities, and generalizations that his books ought to carry advisory notices. Take this precious piece of advice from his previous book—the modestly titled How to Run the World—which is quite representative of his work: “The world needs very few if any new global organizations. What it needs is far more fresh combinations of existing actors who coordinate better with one another.” How this A-list networking would stop climate change, cyber-crime, or trade in exotic animals is never specified. Khanna does not really care about the details of policy. He is a manufacturer of abstract, meaningless slogans. He is, indeed, the most talented bullshit artist of his generation. And this confers upon him a certain anthropological interest.

The “technological” turn in Khanna’s “thought” is hardly surprising. As he and others have discovered by now, one can continue fooling the public with slick ahistorical jeremiads on geopolitics by serving them with the coarse but tasty sauce that is the Cyber-Whig theory of history. The recipe is simple. Find some peculiar global trend—the more arcane, the better. Draw a straight line connecting it to the world of apps, electric cars, and Bay Area venture capital. Mention robots, Japan, and cyberwar. Use shiny slides that contain incomprehensible but impressive maps and visualizations. Stir well. Serve on multiple platforms. With their never-ending talk of Twitter revolutions and the like, techno-globalists such as Khanna have a bright future ahead of them.

In their TED book, the Khannas boldly declare that “mastery in the leading technology sectors of any era determines who leads in geoeconomics and dominates in geopolitics.” Technology is all, the alpha and the omega. How to Run the World, which appeared last yearalready contained strong hints about what would happen once he embraced the shiny world of techno-babble with open arms (and, one presumes, open pockets). There we learned that “cloud computing—not big buildings and bloated bureaucracies—is the future of global governance,” and, my favorite, “everyone who has a BlackBerry—or iPhone or Nexus One—can be their own ambassador.” Of their own country of one, presumably.

Hybrid Reality contains few surprises. Khanna and his wife fashion themselves as successors to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, an earlier fast-talking tech-addled couple who thrived on selling cookie-cutter visions of the future one paperback, slogan, and consulting gig at a time. Today the Tofflers are best-known for inspiring some of Newt Gingrich’s most outlandish ideas as well as for popularizing the term “information overload”—a phenomenon which, as numerous scholars have shown, was hardly specific to 1970 (which is when Alvin Toffler mentioned it in Future Shock) and is probably as old as books themselves. To embrace the Tofflers as intellectual role models is to make a damning admission: that one is far more interested in inventing half-clever buzzwords than in trying to understand the messy reality that those buzzwords purport to describe. In a recent article in Foreign Policy on the Tofflers, the Khannas are unusually candid about what it is they admire about them:

Need we say more [about this prediction]? Even though it was written during the Carter administration, if you remove the dates from the passage above you have a template for most of today’s editorial columns on the aftermath of the current financial meltdown. It’s all here: the identity crisis of corporations, skyrocketing commodity prices, morally bankrupt economists, and currencies in flux and free-fall.

So the Tofflers have much to teach us about the origins or the consequences of the current financial crisis! This of course is laughable. The fact that, three decades later, their glib, abstract, and pretentious writings can still serve as a template for the likes of the Khannas says more about the state of public debate in America today than it does about the accuracy of Toffler-style futurism.

When the Khannas discuss the charms of their newly found profession in Hybrid Reality, the whole enterprise is revealed as a jargon-laden farce: “Futurism is a combination of long-term and long-tail, separating the trends from the trendy and the shocks from the shifts, and combining data, reportage, and scenarios.” It doesn’t sound like a very demanding job: “It helps to travel and be imaginative, but it is even more useful to observe children.” And why all this effort? So that we can better predict the apocalypse. “Avoiding civilizational collapse will require harnessing technologies that help us decipher complexity, overcome decision overload, and produce comprehensive strategies.” The Khannas have come to accomplish nothing less than the rescue of civilization.

 

TOFFLER-WORSHIP and futuristic kitsch aside, what does Hybrid Reality actually argue? There are several disjointed arguments. First, that technology—“technology with a big ‘T,’” as they call it—is supplanting economics and geopolitics as the leading driver of international relations. This means, among other things, that Washington deploys tools such as Flame and Stuxnet simply because it has the better technology—not because of a strategic and military analysis. It is a silly argument, but wrapped in tech-talk it sounds almost plausible.

For the Khannas, technology is an autonomous force with its own logic that does not bend under the wicked pressure of politics or capitalism or tribalism; all that we humans can do is find a way to harness its logic for our own purposes. Technology is the magic wand that lifts nations from poverty, cures diseases, redistributes power, and promises immortality to the human race. Nations, firms, and cities that develop the smartest and most flexible way of doing this are said to possess Technik—a German term with a substantial intellectual pedigree that, in the Khannas’ hands, can mean just about anything—and a high “technology quotient.”

Today, they believe, we are entering a new era, when humans will be so intricately dependent on technology that “human-technology coexistence has become human-technology coevolution.” This is what the Khannas mean by the “Hybrid Age”—a “new sociotechnical era that is unfolding as technologies merge with each other and humans merge with technology.” They proceed to outline its inevitable consequences. Designer babies? Check. Cloned humans? Check. Sex robots that “can be made to look like anyone you want”? Check. A paradise!

Any stretch of time that deserves a name of its own—an age, an era, an epoch—must have at least a few distinct characteristics that make it stand out from the past. The problem is that all the features that the Khannas invoke to emphasize the uniqueness of our era have long been claimed by other commentators for their own unique eras. The Khannas tell us that “technology no longer simply processes our instructions on a one-way street. Instead, it increasingly provides intelligent feedback.” How is that different from Daniel Boorstin’s bombastic pronouncement in 1977 that “the Republic of Technology where we will be living is a feedback world”? And the Khannas’ admonition that “rather than view technology and humanity as two distinct domains, we must increasingly appreciate the dense sociotechnical nexus in which they constantly shape each other”—how is this different from what Ortega y Gasset wrote more eloquently in 1939: “Man without technology … is not man”?

The idea of hybridity that the Khannas assume to be their sexy and original insight has been with us for a long time—long before social media and biotechnology. While some dismiss such theorists of hybridity as Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway, who have questioned the epistemological foundations of the modern scientific enterprise, as being on the wrong side of the Science Wars, hybridity is by no means a postmodernist idea. Here is Daniel Callahan—a respected bioethicist who can hardly be accused of PoMo transgressions— writing in 1971: “We have to do away with a false and misleading dualism, one which abstracts man on the one hand and technology on the other, as if the two were quite separate kinds of realities…. Man is by nature a technological animal; to be human is to be technological…. When we speak of technology, this is another way of speaking about man himself in one of his manifestations.”

For modern theorists of technology, hybridity is an ontological—not an emergent—property. They believe, to quote Callahan again, that “to be human is to be technological,” and that it has always been thus. As it turns out, this seemingly innocent assumption about the world can have serious implications for how we think about politics, morality, and law. It inspired Latour’s notion of “distributed agency”—in its crudest form, the idea that neither guns nor people kill people but rather a fleeting, one-off combination of the two. (The entity that shoots is a “gun-man.”) This is not meant to suggest that people no longer have to go to jail for murder. It is only to point out that, if we really want to explain a particular act of shooting, we need to account for factors like the material design of the gun, the marketing considerations of its manufacturers, the severity of anti-gun laws, and so on.

The latest technologies might make us more aware of this hybridity—of the techno-human condition, if you will—but to speak of the Hybrid Age makes as much sense as to speak of the Nature Age: the fact that climate change makes us more aware of the air we breathe or the water we drink does not fundamentally alter the dynamics of our dependence on these resources. To posit that we are moving into the Hybrid Age is to assume that there was once a time—according to the Khannas, it was just a few years ago—when such hybridity was not the case, when man and technology trod their separate paths. It is to believe that human nature changed sometime last year or so. This, of course, is nonsense—even if makes technology companies feel important. As the Dutch philosopher of technology Peter-Paul Verbeek puts it in his fine bookMoralizing Technology, “We are as autonomous with regard to technology as we are with regard to language, oxygen, or gravity.”

But still the Khannas roll dizzily along. “The Hybrid Age is the transition period between the Information Age and the moment of Singularity (when machines surpass human intelligence) that inventor Ray Kurzweil, author of The Singularity Is Near, estimates we may reach by 2040 (perhaps sooner). The Hybrid Age is a liminal phase in which we cross the threshold toward a new mode of arranging global society.” These are end times. The Hybrid Age is the preparation for the apotheosis of the Singularity— a Singularity-lite of sorts. (Ayesha Khanna serves as a faculty adviser to Singularity University.) This periodization of history is just a marketing trick. Those who believe in Kurzweil’s ugly and ridiculous thesis, which at TED conferences is probably the majority, have already grudgingly accepted the fact that a few unexciting decades will transpire before it comes to pass—and so the Khannas move in to claim these decades as their own, as their brand, while promising us that all the fun of the Singularity—who doesn’t fancy uploading his soul to the cloud so that it can commingle with the soul of Steve Jobs?—will happen even sooner than we think.

As the Hybrid Age sets in, inaction is not an option. “You may continue to live your life without understanding the implications of the still-distant Singularity, but you should not underestimate how quickly we are accelerating into the Hybrid Age—nor delay in managing this transition yourself.” Sinners, repent! The day of the Lord is nigh! And in case you wonder where you might turn for assistance in “managing this transition,” the Khannas are there to help. They are eschatological consultants. They run a for-profit consulting firm “providing insight into the implications of emerging technologies” that bears the proud name of the Hybrid Reality Institute. So far the firm’s main accomplishment seems to be convincing the TED Conference to print its verbose marketing brochure as a book. But perhaps this is what the Hybrid Age is all about: marketing masquerading as theory, charlatans masquerading as philosophers, a New Age cult masquerading as a university, business masquerading as redemption, slogans masquerading as truths.

 

THIS BOOK is not just useless piffle about technology; it is also an endorsement of some rather noxious political ideas. Those already familiar with Parag Khanna’s earlier celebrations of autocracies in Southeast Asia will not be surprised by some of the most outrageous paragraphs in his TED book. China is one of the Khannas’ role models. They have the guts to write that “a decade from now we will look back at China’s 12th Five-Year Plan as the seminal document of the early 21st century.” Take your pick: 12th Five-Year Plan or Charter 08. Somehow the latter never gets a mention in this book. Perhaps it is not seminal enough, or it is insufficiently driven by technology. And what makes the Five-Year Plan so seminal? “It pledges $1.5 trillion in government support for seven ‘strategic emerging industries,’ including alternative energy, biotechnology, next-gen IT, high-end manufacturing equipment, and advanced materials.” Would it really surprise anyone if in a few years some of that $1.5 trillion were to trickle down to the Hybrid Reality Institute?

The Khannas also heap praise on Singapore, “a seamlessly efficient cosmopolitan world capital of finance and, increasingly, innovation.” Alas, they do not explain how Singapore has become so “seamlessly efficient.” Perhaps this quotation from Lee Kuan Yew, its first long-time ruler—conveniently omitted by the Khannas—may shed some light: “Everytime anybody wants to start anything which will unwind or unravel this orderly, organized, sensible, rational society, and make it irrational and emotional, I put a stop to it without hesitation.” The Khannas approvingly note that Singapore is “the leading role model in city-state Technik for entities from Abu Dhabi to Moscow to Kuala Lumpur.” That all three aforementioned cities are situated in despicable authoritarian regimes—which might explain why they look up to Singapore—does not much trouble the Khannas. They recently announced that they are moving to Singapore. Good. The autocratic city and the apologists for autocracy deserve each other.

It only gets worse, as the Khannas proceed to profess their deep and inherently anti-democratic admiration for technocracy. That they can spit out the following passage without running any risk of being disinvited from respectable dinner parties and television shows is a sign of how well our debate about technology—a seemingly neutral and nonpolitical issue—conceals deeply political (and, in this case, outright authoritarian) tendencies:

Using technology to deliberate on matters of national importance, deliver public services, and incorporate citizen feedback may ultimately be a truer form of direct participation than a system of indirect representation and infrequent elections. Democracy depends on the participation of crowds, but doesn’t guarantee their wisdom. We cannot be afraid of technocracy when the alternative is the futile populism of Argentines, Hungarians, and Thais masquerading as democracy. It is precisely these nonfunctional democracies that are prime candidates to be superseded by better-designed technocracies—likely delivering more benefits to their citizens…. To the extent that China provides guidance for governance that Western democracies don’t, it is in having “technocrats with term limits.”

Things in Hungary are pretty bad, but to suggest that Hungarians would be better off with China-style governance is really reprehensible. And to imply that China’s technocrats have term limits is outright offensive.

In the domestic American context, the Khannas also celebrate the infusion of “experts such as Tim O’Reilly and Craig Newmark [who] … stepped in to advise Washington on Gov 2.0 technologies such as open-data platforms.” “Such citizen-technologists,” we are told, “are crucial … to [improving] government efficiency.” Once again, the technologists—and the technocratic agencies they are enlisted to support—are presented as objective, independent, and free of any ideological leanings. Nowhere do we learn that Tim O’Reilly runs a profitable corporation that might stand to benefit from the government’s embrace of open-data platforms, or that Craig Newmark is a committed cyber-libertarian who used to worship Ayn Rand. Or that Jimmy Wales, who is advising the British government, is so enthralled with Rand and objectivism that he named his daughter after one of the characters in a Rand novel. Nor do the Khannas tell us that the public embrace of “open-data platforms” is often accompanied by an increase in government secrecy or a growing reluctance to fund public journalism. (Why fund the BBC if “citizen-investigators” can now be asked to do all the digging for free?) The pursuit of efficiency alone cannot guide public policy—this is why we have politics; but technocrats rarely want to hear such truths. And the Khannas cannot be trusted to tell them.

 

AS IS TYPICAL of today’s anxiety-peddling futurology, the Khannas’ favorite word is “increasingly,” which is their way of saying that our unstable world is always changing and that only advanced thinkers such as themselves can guide us through this turbulence. In Hybrid Reality, everything is increasingly something else: gadgets are increasingly miraculous, technology is increasingly making its way into the human body, quiet moments are increasingly rare. This is a world in which pundits are increasingly using the word “increasingly” whenever they feel too lazy to look up the actual statistics, which, in the Khannas’ case, increasingly means all the time.

What the Khannas’ project illustrates so well is that the defining feature of today’s techno-aggrandizing is its utter ignorance of all the techno-aggrandizing that has come before it. The fantasy of technology as an autonomous force is a century-old delusion that no serious contemporary theorist of technology would defend. The Khannas have no interest in intellectual history, or in the state of contemporary thought about technology. They prefer to quote, almost at random, the likes of Oswald Spengler and Karl Jaspers instead. This strategy of invoking random Teutonic names and concepts might work on the unsophisticated crowds at Davos and TED, but to imagine that either Spengler or Jaspers have something interesting or original to tell us about cloning, e-books, or asteroid mining is foolish. “A new era requires a new vocabulary,” the Khannas proclaim—only to embrace the terminology that was already in place by the end of the nineteenth century. They may be well-funded, but they are not well-educated.

Their promiscuous use of the word Technik exposes the shaky foundation of their enterprise—as well as of many popular discussions about technology, which inevitably gravitate toward the bullshit zone. To return to Harry Frankfurt, the key distinction between the liar and the bullshitter is that the former conceals “that he is attempting to lead us away from a correct apprehension of reality,” whereas the latter conceals that he is not interested in reality at all. The bullshitter “does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.” To suggest that Parag and Ayesha Khanna—and numerous pundits before them—might be pursuing purposes other than describing—or improving—reality is almost self-evident. (A look at the website of the Hybrid Reality Institute would suffice.) The more interesting question here is why bullshit about technology, unlike other types of bullshit, is so hard to see for what it is.

It is here that the Khannas stand out. Technik, as they use this term, is something so expansive and nebulous that it can denote absolutely anything. Technik is the magic concept that allows the Khannas to make their most meaningless sentences look as if they actually carry some content. They use Technik as a synonym for innovation, design, engineering, science, mastery, capital, the economy, and a dozen other things. It is what fixes cities, reinvigorates social networking, and grants us immortality. Technik is every pundit’s wet dream: a foreign word that confers an air of cosmopolitanism upon its utterer. It can be applied to solve virtually any problem, and it is so abstract that its purveyor can hardly be held accountable for its inaccuracies and inanities.

It is Technik that makes much of the Khannas’ writing circular and simplistic. Take this highly confusing sentence: “Good Technik requires a combination of the attributes that deliver high human development, economic growth, political inclusiveness, and technology preparedness.” Translation: “Good Technik requires Technik.” As for the simplistic part, try this: “Technik unites the scientific and mechanical dimensions of technology (determinism) with a necessary concern for its effect on humans and society (constructivism).” If I read the Khannas correctly—and I cannot be sure, for they seem confused about the terms “determinism” or “constructivism,” at least as those are used in the philosophy of technology—their novel interpretation of the old German term Technik proposes to reveal that technologies are material and technologies have effects. Is this insight so profound that it needed a high German word to explain it?

But the Khannas do not want to abandon the simpler term “technology,” either, so they try to inflate it, too. Remember, “the Hybrid Age is the era when we renew our thinking about technology with a big ‘T.’” Sticking to the notion of “technology with a big ‘T’” yields insights such as this: “From the printing press to penicillin and now Twitter and genomics, technology ceaselessly demonstrates its transformative impact.” The printing press and penicillin and Twitter and genomics do indeed have transformative effects, but to assume that they all matter in the same way—which is the inevitable result of lumping them under the rubric of “Technology,” the one with its own rules, wants, and agendas—is as stupid as it is dangerous.

Perhaps, if one had to give a three-minute TED presentation about penicillin, Twitter, genomics, and the printing press—but why would anyone ever want to give such a talk?—a catch-all term such as “technology” might be of some help. But analytically it is useless, in the way that lumping Warhol, Chardin, hip hop, Chaplin, Haydn, and science fiction under the term “arts” is useless. At such a level of generality every fool can sound brilliant. The unfortunate thing is that, while few people would grant any substance to an argument that identifies a common meaning in Warhol, Chardin, hip hop, Chaplin, Haydn, and science fiction, we easily fall for grand theories that mysteriously connect humans and material artifacts to some grand narrative about the universe, be it the Singularity, Toffler’s Third Wave, or the Hybrid Age. When, fifteen years ago, Leo Marx accused technology of being “a hazardous concept” for leading precisely to this kind of addled thinking, he was too polite. In the hands of skilled hustlers such as the Khannas, technology is itself a counterfeit concept, which does little but make complex ideas look deceptively simple. Much like Glenn Beck’s magic blackboard, it connects everything to everything without saying anything significant about anything.

 

II.

I CAN SURMISE why the Khannas would have wanted to write this book, but it is not immediately obvious why TED Books would have wanted to publish it. I must disclose that I spoke at a TED Global Conference in Oxford in 2009, and I admit that my appearance there certainly helped to expose my argument to a much wider audience, for which I remain grateful. So I take no pleasure in declaring what has been obvious for some time: that TED is no longer a responsible curator of ideas “worth spreading.” Instead it has become something ludicrous, and a little sinister.

Today TED is an insatiable kingpin of international meme laundering—a place where ideas, regardless of their quality, go to seek celebrity, to live in the form of videos, tweets, and now e-books. In the world of TED—or, to use their argot, in the TED “ecosystem”—books become talks, talks become memes, memes become projects, projects become talks, talks become books—and so it goes ad infinitum in the sizzling Stakhanovite cycle of memetics, until any shade of depth or nuance disappears into the virtual void. Richard Dawkins, the father of memetics, should be very proud. Perhaps he can explain how “ideas worth spreading” become “ideas no footnotes can support.”

The Khannas’ book is not the only piece of literary rubbish carrying the TED brand. Another recently published TED book called The Demise of Guys: Why Boys Are Struggling and What We Can Do About It—co-authored by Philip Zimbardo, of the Stanford Prison Experiment fame, is an apt example of what transpires when TED ideas happen to good people. One would think that a scholar as distinguished as Zimbardo would not need to set foot in Khanna-land, but, alas, his book brims with almost as many clichés and pseudo-daring pronouncements. Did you know that “in porn, male actors have enormous penises,” and that “porn is not about romance”? The book’s main premise is that the Internet and video games are re-wiring the brains of “guys,” much to the detriment of civilization. Read and be terrified, especially if you are a “guy,” because “[guys’] brains are being catered to by porn on demand and by video games at a flick of the switch or a click of the mouse.” This is almost as good as Allan Bloom’s admonition in The Closing of the American Mind that Walkman headphones lead to parricide. The evidence presented is inconsistent and all over the map. As the science journalist Carl Zimmer has noted, The Demise of Guys gives a Daily Mail column as much credibility as a peer-reviewed paper. And a new TED book on the science of smiling—Smile: The Astonishing Powers of a Simple Act, by Ron Gutman—contains even more banality than the Khannas’ little masterpiece of TED emptiness—a remarkable feat. There one may read, for example, that “under certain conditions, when men see women smile at them they interpret that as a sign that the women think they are attractive.” This is what passes for advanced thinking.

When they launched their publishing venture, the TED organizers dismissed any concern that their books’ slim size would be dumbing us down. “Actually, we suspect people reading TED Books will be trading up rather than down. They’ll be reading a short, compelling book instead of browsing a magazine or doing crossword puzzles. Our goal is to make ideas accessible in a way that matches modern attention spans.” But surely “modern attention spans” must be resisted, not celebrated. Brevity may be the soul of wit, or of lingerie, but it is not the soul of analysis. The TED ideal of thought is the ideal of the “takeaway”—the shrinkage of thought for people too busy to think. I don’t know if the crossword puzzles are rewiring our brains—I hope TED knows its neuroscience, with all the neuroscientists on its stage—but anyone who is seriously considering reading Hybrid Reality or Smile should also entertain the option of playingAngry Birds or Fruit Ninja.

Parag Khanna’s writings on geopolitics never amounted to much of anything even before his turn to technology, but it is instructive to see how his presentation has changed now that he has embedded himself in the TED firmament. Save for a hackneyed nod to the “world’s chessboard,” he now makes only cursory references to power structures and strategic alliances. Instead he strikes all the right chords to elicit approval from the TED crowd—musing on genetics, neuroscience, synthetic biology—all in order to inform us that “our ability to augment ourselves” is growing by the minute. As is customary in such discourse, no mention is made of the fact that the Human Genome Project, for all the hype it generated a decade ago, has not accomplished much. Likewise, MRI scans are celebrated as if they offered direct and immediate access to truth. (“Harnessing fMRI mental scans, companies … are gathering the ‘unspoken truth.’”) The Khannas’ Japan—as packaged for TED consumption—is the land of cutting-edge technology: you would never know that 59 percent of Japanese homes still have (frequently used!) fax machines.

The Khannas are typical of the TED crowd in that they do not express much doubt about anything. Their pronouncements about political structures are as firm and arrogant as some scientists’ pronouncements about the cognitive structures of the brain. Whatever problems lurk on the horizon are imagined primarily as problems of technology, which, given enough money, brain power, and nutritional supplements, someone in Silicon Valley should be in a position to solve. This is consistent with TED’s adoption of a decidedly non-political attitude, as became apparent in a recent kerfuffle over a short talk on inequality given by a venture capitalist—who else?—which TED refused to release for fear that it might offend too many rich people.

Since any meaningful discussion of politics is off limits at TED, the solutions advocated by TED’s techno-humanitarians cannot go beyond the toolkit available to the scientist, the coder, and the engineer. This leaves Silicon Valley entrepreneurs positioned as TED’s preferred redeemers. In TED world, tech entrepreneurs are in the business of solving the world’s most pressing problems. This is what makes TED stand out from other globalist shindigs, and makes its intellectual performances increasingly irrelevant to genuine thought and serious action.

Another fine example of the TED mentality in the context of global affairs is Abundance, a new book co-written by Peter Diamandis, the co-founder of the Singularity University. He is a TED regular and the person who blurbed Khanna’s book as “an enormously important contribution to our thinking about how to create a better tomorrow.” (Singularity may rid us of death, but it won’t abolish backscratching.) Diamandis delivers an abundant list of pressing global problems accompanied by an equally abundant list of technologies that can fix them. Here, too, politics rarely gets a mention.

Given TED’s disproportionate influence on a certain level of the global debate, it follows that the public at large also becomes more approving of technological solutions to problems that are not technological but political. Problems of climate change become problems of making production more efficient or finding ways to colonize other planets—not of reaching political agreement on how to limit production or consume in a more sustainable fashion. Problems of health care become problems of inadequate self-monitoring and data-sharing. Problems of ensuring one’s privacy—which might otherwise get solved by pushing for new laws—become problems of inadequate tools for defending one’s anonymity online or selling access to one’s own data. (The Khannas are not alone in believing that “individuals [must] gain control over the value of their time, skills, data, and resources. We must be ruthless in earning from those who want our attention.”)

It is in the developing world where the limitations of TED’s techno-humanitarian mentality are most pronounced. In TED world, problems of aid and development are no longer seen as problems of weak and corrupt institutions; they are recast as problems of inadequate connectivity or an insufficiency of gadgets. According to the Khannas, “centuries of colonialism and decades of aid haven’t lifted Africa’s fortunes the way technology can.” Hence the latest urge to bombard Africa with tablets and Kindles—even when an average African kid would find it impossible to repair a damaged Kindle. And the gadgets do drop from the sky—Nicholas Negroponte, having spectacularly failed in his One Laptop Per Child quest, now wants to drop his own tablets from helicopters, which would make it harder for the African savages to say “no” to MIT’s (and TED’s) civilization. This is la mission civilatrice 2.0.

It is hardly surprising that the Khannas’ deep admiration of Singapore’s technocratic authoritarianism is well-received by the TEDdies—after all, they prefer to fix broken countries as if they are broken start-ups. That solving any of their favorite global problems would require political solutions—if only to ensure that nobody’s rights and interests are violated or overlooked in the process— is not something that the TED elite, with its aversion to conventional instruments of power and its inebriated can-do attitude, likes to hear. Politics slows things down; but technology speeds things up. TED’s techno-humanitarians—that brigade of what the Nigerian-American writer Teju Cole has dubbed “The White Savior Industrial Complex”—would defer to China’s “technocrats with term limits” and have them bulldoze entire villages in order to build another Foxconn plant rather than bother with the slow progress of political reform. The Khannas are on to something when they write that “the Hybrid Age … might also become a Pax Technologica,” but there are pitifully few reasons to believe that a Pax Technologica would do much good for the world. Techno-humanitarianism is much more techno than humanitarian.

The Web Shatters Focus, Rewires Brains by Nicholas Carr

 

The Web Shatters Focus, Rewires Brains

by

Nicholas Carr

From: Wired Magazine

During the winter of 2007, a UCLA professor of psychiatry named Gary Small recruited six volunteers—three experienced Web surfers and three novices—for a study on brain activity. He gave each a pair of goggles onto which Web pages could be projected. Then he slid his subjects, one by one, into the cylinder of a whole-brain magnetic resonance imager and told them to start searching the Internet. As they used a handheld keypad to Google various preselected topics—the nutritional benefits of chocolate, vacationing in the Galapagos Islands, buying a new car—the MRI scanned their brains for areas of high activation, indicated by increases in blood flow.

The two groups showed marked differences. Brain activity of the experienced surfers was far more extensive than that of the newbies, particularly in areas of the prefrontal cortex associated with problem-solving and decisionmaking. Small then had his subjects read normal blocks of text projected onto their goggles; in this case, scans revealed no significant difference in areas of brain activation between the two groups. The evidence suggested, then, that the distinctive neural pathways of experienced Web users had developed because of their Internet use.

The most remarkable result of the experiment emerged when Small repeated the tests six days later. In the interim, the novices had agreed to spend an hour a day online, searching the Internet. The new scans revealed that their brain activity had changed dramatically; it now resembled that of the veteran surfers. “Five hours on the Internet and the naive subjects had already rewired their brains,” Small wrote. He later repeated all the tests with 18 more volunteers and got the same results.

When first publicized, the findings were greeted with cheers. By keeping lots of brain cells buzzing, Google seemed to be making people smarter. But as Small was careful to point out, more brain activity is not necessarily better brain activity. The real revelation was how quickly and extensively Internet use reroutes people’s neural pathways. “The current explosion of digital technology not only is changing the way we live and communicate,” Small concluded, “but is rapidly and profoundly altering our brains.”

What kind of brain is the Web giving us? That question will no doubt be the subject of a great deal of research in the years ahead. Already, though, there is much we know or can surmise—and the news is quite disturbing. Dozens of studies by psychologists, neurobiologists, and educators point to the same conclusion: When we go online, we enter an environment that promotes cursory reading, hurried and distracted thinking, and superficial learning. Even as the Internet grants us easy access to vast amounts of information, it is turning us into shallower thinkers, literally changing the structure of our brain.

Back in the 1980s, when schools began investing heavily in computers, there was much enthusiasm about the apparent advantages of digital documents over paper ones. Many educators were convinced that introducing hyperlinks into text displayed on monitors would be a boon to learning. Hypertext would strengthen critical thinking, the argument went, by enabling students to switch easily between different viewpoints. Freed from the lockstep reading demanded by printed pages, readers would make all sorts of new intellectual connections between diverse works. The hyperlink would be a technology of liberation.

By the end of the decade, the enthusiasm was turning to skepticism. Research was painting a fuller, very different picture of the cognitive effects of hypertext. Navigating linked documents, it turned out, entails a lot of mental calisthenics—evaluating hyperlinks, deciding whether to click, adjusting to different formats—that are extraneous to the process of reading. Because it disrupts concentration, such activity weakens comprehension. A 1989 study showed that readers tended just to click around aimlessly when reading something that included hypertext links to other selected pieces of information. A 1990 experiment revealed that some “could not remember what they had and had not read.”

Even though the World Wide Web has made hypertext ubiquitous and presumably less startling and unfamiliar, the cognitive problems remain. Research continues to show that people who read linear text comprehend more, remember more, and learn more than those who read text peppered with links. In a 2001 study, two scholars in Canada asked 70 people to read “The Demon Lover,” a short story by Elizabeth Bowen. One group read it in a traditional linear-text format; they’d read a passage and click the word next to move ahead. A second group read a version in which they had to click on highlighted words in the text to move ahead. It took the hypertext readers longer to read the document, and they were seven times more likely to say they found it confusing. Another researcher, Erping Zhu, had people read a passage of digital prose but varied the number of links appearing in it. She then gave the readers a multiple-choice quiz and had them write a summary of what they had read. She found that comprehension declined as the number of links increased—whether or not people clicked on them. After all, whenever a link appears, your brain has to at least make the choice not to click, which is itself distracting.

A 2007 scholarly review of hypertext experiments concluded that jumping between digital documents impedes understanding. And if links are bad for concentration and comprehension, it shouldn’t be surprising that more recent research suggests that links surrounded by images, videos, and advertisements could be even worse.

In a study published in the journal Media Psychology, researchers had more than 100 volunteers watch a presentation about the country of Mali, played through a Web browser. Some watched a text-only version. Others watched a version that incorporated video. Afterward, the subjects were quizzed on the material. Compared to the multimedia viewers, the text-only viewers answered significantly more questions correctly; they also found the presentation to be more interesting, more educational, more understandable, and more enjoyable.

The depth of our intelligence hinges on our ability to transfer information from working memory, the scratch pad of consciousness, to long-term memory, the mind’s filing system. When facts and experiences enter our long-term memory, we are able to weave them into the complex ideas that give richness to our thought. But the passage from working memory to long-term memory also forms a bottleneck in our brain. Whereas long-term memory has an almost unlimited capacity, working memory can hold only a relatively small amount of information at a time. And that short-term storage is fragile: A break in our attention can sweep its contents from our mind.

Imagine filling a bathtub with a thimble; that’s the challenge involved in moving information from working memory into long-term memory. When we read a book, the information faucet provides a steady drip, which we can control by varying the pace of our reading. Through our single-minded concentration on the text, we can transfer much of the information, thimbleful by thimbleful, into long-term memory and forge the rich associations essential to the creation of knowledge and wisdom.

On the Net, we face many information faucets, all going full blast. Our little thimble overflows as we rush from tap to tap. We transfer only a small jumble of drops from different faucets, not a continuous, coherent stream.

Psychologists refer to the information flowing into our working memory as our cognitive load. When the load exceeds our mind’s ability to process and store it, we’re unable to retain the information or to draw connections with other memories. We can’t translate the new material into conceptual knowledge. Our ability to learn suffers, and our understanding remains weak. That’s why the extensive brain activity that Small discovered in Web searchers may be more a cause for concern than for celebration. It points to cognitive overload.

The Internet is an interruption system. It seizes our attention only to scramble it. There’s the problem of hypertext and the many different kinds of media coming at us simultaneously. There’s also the fact that numerous studies—including one that tracked eye movement, one that surveyed people, and even one that examined the habits displayed by users of two academic databases—show that we start to read faster and less thoroughly as soon as we go online. Plus, the Internet has a hundred ways of distracting us from our onscreen reading. Most email applications check automatically for new messages every five or 10 minutes, and people routinely click the Check for New Mail button even more frequently. Office workers often glance at their inbox 30 to 40 times an hour. Since each glance breaks our concentration and burdens our working memory, the cognitive penalty can be severe.

The penalty is amplified by what brain scientists call switching costs. Every time we shift our attention, the brain has to reorient itself, further taxing our mental resources. Many studies have shown that switching between just two tasks can add substantially to our cognitive load, impeding our thinking and increasing the likelihood that we’ll overlook or misinterpret important information. On the Internet, where we generally juggle several tasks, the switching costs pile ever higher.

The Net’s ability to monitor events and send out messages and notifications automatically is, of course, one of its great strengths as a communication technology. We rely on that capability to personalize the workings of the system, to program the vast database to respond to our particular needs, interests, and desires. We want to be interrupted, because each interruption—email, tweet, instant message, RSS headline—brings us a valuable piece of information. To turn off these alerts is to risk feeling out of touch or even socially isolated. The stream of new information also plays to our natural tendency to overemphasize the immediate. We crave the new even when we know it’s trivial.

And so we ask the Internet to keep interrupting us in ever more varied ways. We willingly accept the loss of concentration and focus, the fragmentation of our attention, and the thinning of our thoughts in return for the wealth of compelling, or at least diverting, information we receive. We rarely stop to think that it might actually make more sense just to tune it all out.

The mental consequences of our online info-crunching are not universally bad. Certain cognitive skills are strengthened by our use of computers and the Net. These tend to involve more primitive mental functions, such as hand-eye coordination, reflex response, and the processing of visual cues. One much-cited study of videogaming, published in Nature in 2003, revealed that after just 10 days of playing action games on computers, a group of young people had significantly boosted the speed with which they could shift their visual focus between various images and tasks.

It’s likely that Web browsing also strengthens brain functions related to fast-paced problem-solving, particularly when it requires spotting patterns in a welter of data. A British study of the way women search for medical information online indicated that an experienced Internet user can, at least in some cases, assess the trustworthiness and probable value of a Web page in a matter of seconds. The more we practice surfing and scanning, the more adept our brain becomes at those tasks. (Other academics, like Clay Shirky, maintain that the Web provides us with a valuable outlet for a growing “cognitive surplus”; see Cognitive Surplus: The Great Spare-Time Revolution

But it would be a serious mistake to look narrowly at such benefits and conclude that the Web is making us smarter. In a Science article published in early 2009, prominent developmental psychologist Patricia Greenfield reviewed more than 40 studies of the effects of various types of media on intelligence and learning ability. She concluded that “every medium develops some cognitive skills at the expense of others.” Our growing use of the Net and other screen-based technologies, she wrote, has led to the “widespread and sophisticated development of visual-spatial skills.” But those gains go hand in hand with a weakening of our capacity for the kind of “deep processing” that underpins “mindful knowledge acquisition, inductive analysis, critical thinking, imagination, and reflection.”

We know that the human brain is highly plastic; neurons and synapses change as circumstances change. When we adapt to a new cultural phenomenon, including the use of a new medium, we end up with a different brain, says Michael Merzenich, a pioneer of the field of neuroplasticity. That means our online habits continue to reverberate in the workings of our brain cells even when we’re not at a computer. We’re exercising the neural circuits devoted to skimming and multitasking while ignoring those used for reading and thinking deeply.

Last year, researchers at Stanford found signs that this shift may already be well under way. They gave a battery of cognitive tests to a group of heavy media multitaskers as well as a group of relatively light ones. They discovered that the heavy multitaskers were much more easily distracted, had significantly less control over their working memory, and were generally much less able to concentrate on a task. Intensive multitaskers are “suckers for irrelevancy,” says Clifford Nass, one professor who did the research. “Everything distracts them.” Merzenich offers an even bleaker assessment: As we multitask online, we are “training our brains to pay attention to the crap.”

There’s nothing wrong with absorbing information quickly and in bits and pieces. We’ve always skimmed newspapers more than we’ve read them, and we routinely run our eyes over books and magazines to get the gist of a piece of writing and decide whether it warrants more thorough reading. The ability to scan and browse is as important as the ability to read deeply and think attentively. The problem is that skimming is becoming our dominant mode of thought. Once a means to an end, a way to identify information for further study, it’s becoming an end in itself—our preferred method of both learning and analysis. Dazzled by the Net’s treasures, we are blind to the damage we may be doing to our intellectual lives and even our culture.

What we’re experiencing is, in a metaphorical sense, a reversal of the early trajectory of civilization: We are evolving from cultivators of personal knowledge into hunters and gatherers in the electronic data forest. In the process, we seem fated to sacrifice much of what makes our minds so interesting.

Adapted from The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains, copyright©2010 Nicholas Carr by W.W. Norton and Company in June. Nicholas Carr(ncarr@mac.com) is also the author of The Big Switch and Does IT Matter?

Relational Ecology and the Digital Pharmakon by Bernard Stiegler

RELATIONAL ECOLOGY AND THE DIGITAL PHARMAKON

by

Bernard Stiegler

From: The Culture Machine

In French as in English, attention is a word derived from the Latin attendere, ‘to shift one’s attention to’ or ‘to take care.’ The verb form has kept this sense in English: ‘to attend a patient’ means to take care of his or her illness. In French the verb attendre has today a temporal dimension, and in general attention supposes an expectation of some kind, be it positive or negative. Faire attention, like ‘paying attention’, is in this sense a synonym of taking care (prendre soin). This is why a philosophy of care assumes a philosophy of attention, especially in our epoch where an ‘attention economy’ dominates, one which puts to work relational technologies both analogue and digital.1

Toward the object of concern, the French say one is attentionné, that is, ‘thoughtful’. To be thoughtful means to be civil or urbane (in the original sense of the word). Although we normally take attention to be a mental capacity for concentration, it is nonetheless a social phenomenon. Être attentionné, in English ‘to be thoughtful’, also means to be pensive or reflective. Attention has a significance at once psychological and social, and the one does not work without the other. This is fundamentally what distinguishes attention from vigilance – something we share with animals. And this is why attention must be formed, which is the role of education. Attention has two inseparable faces, psychic and social, constituting a kind of interface for what Gilbert Simondon called psychic and collective individuation (2007). Without it, there is simply no longer any such individuation.

As attention forming, education is the modality through which the social being that is always also a psychic individual individuates itself at once psychically and collectively. Let us briefly recall here Simondon’s thesis:

1. A psychic individual is neither a stable state nor an identity but a phase in a process through which she never ceases to transform herself.

2. This process of psychic individuation is only truly accomplished to the extent that it is inscribed in a process of collective or social individuation.

It is in and through education that the link between these two inseparable dimensions of individuation is formed and concretised via what one could call attentional forms. The acquisition of these forms begins with the first moments of life, and according to Winnicott is built on the attention the mother gives to her child as the basis of all attention (2005, 14). They permit the individual to have her own experience, that is, to learn something by herself in her constant confrontation with the real.

It is only possible to have this apprenticeship on one’s own that we call experience on condition of knowing how to pay attention: individual experience, which is in effect the conquest of autonomy, supposes that one has received as heritage, through education, the lessons of collective experience out of which the attentional forms are elaborated. Collective experience itself comes from what were once individual experiences that have become collective through a process of transindividuation.

Education is the fruit of the accumulated experience of generations. It develops a patina over time like the pebbles rolling in the current along the riverbed that they themselves constitute. Education is the transindividuation of individual memories engendered by individual experiences, ones which, through being transmitted and developing a patina – that is, in being regulated, in forming a body of procedures, and sometimes in becoming formal regulations – have resulted in a collective memory constituted by the attentional forms of knowledge: knowhow, lifeskills, cognitive and theoretical knowledges.

Only a being that is educated can develop these faculties at once psychic and social that become the shared attentional forms of knowledge of how to live, to do things, as well as cognitive and theoretical knowledge. A being that has not been educated, whose attention has not been formed to any extent, firstly from lack of attention from its mother, does not know how to do anything, does not have a mind, and cannot theorise (that is, contemplate abstract concepts).

Consideration and concern in all their forms, affection of all kinds, amorous, ethical, religious, artistic attention, attention to theoretical, mathematical, scientific, philosophical objects and to objects of knowledge in general, and of practical forms of attention, dexterity, talents, motor skills, etc. – without this forming of attention, without an education in the forms that automate, ritualise, repeat and develop habits, in turn forming a habitus that constitutes the politeness and civility that is the essential basis of all relations, without this, the faculties of the individual, including the social ones at the heart of which individual particularities emerge (and in doing so re-form the social in return), remain latent, unexpressed and unknown.

The individual faculties, in developing and opening up the educated being to those knowledges connecting her to other beings educated in a similar manner, form and accomplish the process of an incessant collective individuation. As this strict correlation between the psychic and the collective of which it is the interface, attention is the heart of psychic and collective individuation. Every society is a type of psychic and collective individuation. All these types, that is, all societies, are characterised by types of attention: types of attentional forms and knowledges that are also types of concern, systems of care, of techniques for care of the self and of others, together constituting ways of life that characterise cultures and civilisations.

But this is only because the formation of attention in which psychic and collective individuation consists is conditioned by material techniques. As I will discuss below, today these have become industrial technologies. The memory of the human entity is essentially exteriorised, materialised and spatialised. It is spatially, materially and technically projected into what is constituted as a common space and time, projected if not out of time then at least beyond its own original temporality and in a certain way put into reserve in space, enabling it to become at once the memory of the individual and of the group. It is through this external memory, and as this exteriorisation that is a socialisation and an expression, that attention is able to constitute itself as interface between the psychic and the social. Attention always leads in one way or another to a (not necessarily verbal) expression through a mode of behaviour.

The technique of the spatialisation of memory is what permits the trans-formation of individual time into this social space where a society is constituted and individuated (that is, transformed). Social space, the support of social time, is ceaselessly re-run, recommenced, reformed, deformed and transformed by the individuals who re-temporalise it.

The spatialisation of memory is the consequence of the technicisation of life. This is what humanity consists of in the view of André Leroi-Gourhan (1993), namely, the development of what I have called an epiphylogenetic memory (Stiegler 1998, 177). In humankind – and this is the difference from what characterises animal life – individual memory, the fruit of experience, is not lost to the species when the individual who has lived it disappears. The experience has been technically exteriorised in the form of the technical object. As such (as hypomnesic memory), it constitutes the hypokeimenon proton of culture, that is, its primordial support in the sense that the Presocratic thinkers used this term in relation to physis (nature). Culture is the intergenerational transmission of attentional forms invented in the course of individual experience which becomes collective because psychosocial memory is technically exteriorised and supported.

This intergenerational transmission crosses a threshold where humanity passes from prehistory to protohistory when the first techniques allowing the transmission of temporal contents appeared. These were symbolic and mental as such, that is, not only transmitted via a concretisation in the form of objects, but in the form of symbols, and as graphic recordings. The intermediary period known as protohistoric, commencing around 10,000 years before the beginning of settlements, led to the Great Empires which engendered the historical period by forming recording techniques that we still practice today, including tapping on the keyboards of our digital devices everywhere in the world at just this moment.

Alphabetical vocalic writing, which appeared between the 8th and 7th Century B.C., allowed the constitution of a singular attentional process which is the very basis of ancient Greek civilisation. They called it the logos. At the same time, an equally alphabetical, but consonant-based form of writing allowed the construction of the kingdom of Judea. When the two civilisations will meet through Paul of Tarsus, the West will be formed – and ceaselessly reformed, deformed and transformed as the process of psychic and collective individuation based on writing as the technique of the formation of  attention. This includes what are known as the Scriptures, which will come into their own with the printing press, inaugurating the attentional revolution which was the Reformation.

In this way the elements of what Katherine Hayles has called ‘deep attention’ came together – an attentional form allowing its own replacement by another form that she calls ‘hyper-attention’ produced by the digital technologies of attention capture (Hayles, 2007).

If we want to analyse and understand the stakes of this transformation (insofar as this is possible), we must analyse what, as process of ‘grammatisation’, leads us from the appearance of the writing of grammata up to the digital apparatuses and the new attentional forms that they constitute. For these inaugurate a new process of psychic and collective individuation that emerges at the heart of what must be understood as a network society of planetary proportions.2

Today we will only have time to examine the questions concerning the principles of such a genealogy of attentional forms, in order to get to the essential issue for our time, that I want to demonstrate resides in the question of the new forms of metadata and the original process of transindividuation that they allow us to envisage.

The process of grammatisation is first and foremost a process of making the continuous discrete, something prefigured in this respect by the first systems of counting in the epoch of hieroglyphics before the appearance of grammata. Grammatisation is firstly the making into discrete units of the elements constituting language. It is a breaking down which is done technically and not intellectually: it is not the grammarians who conceived of writing, but on the contrary it was writing which made grammar possible. The writing of the grammata enabled the spatialisation to the letter of the time of speech. What I mean by ‘to the letter’ here is that speech could be reproduced wholly without ambiguity, at least in its semantic dimension if not its prosodic one.

In this literal synthesis there is no loss of signification. It can be repeated, compared, analysed and criticised, becoming transmissible to the letter, along with the commentary upon it (also literal), from generation to generation, as the noetic experience of an individual becomes collective, forming in this way a logos – in the first case as what Husserl described in The Origin of Geometry as the experience of protogeometry (Derrida, 1989).

Geometry consists in the elaboration of a literal attentional form in just the same way as do law, philosophy, history, literature, geography, etc. These comprise an ensemble of mental disciplines that each constitute an attentional form furnished with its own particular rules. It is the concert and unity of this always diverse collection of literal techniques for the formation of attention that amounts to the deep attention that the Greeks named logos. These attentional forms generate the circuits of transindividuation that thread and weave together the process of collective individuation. The operations of this process never stop being transformed through the goings on of disciplinary sub-groupings where the conditions of transindividuation are ceaselessly redefined more or less locally.

Plato, however, condemned writing, that is, this exteriorisation of attention. It provoked, he said, short-circuits: it deceives those who believe they know something. As hypomnesis, it tends to atrophy what Plato considered to be the only worthwhile attentional form: anamnesis, that is, thinking within oneself (individuating oneself, which means here mentally, but through a collective individuation of which Socratic dialogue was the anchor).

This is why Plato had Thamus, king of Egypt, in dialogue with Thoth, god of arithmetic and writing, say that itwill produce forgetfulness in the soul of those who learn it because they will cease to exercise their memory and will put their trust in what is written when they remember (anamimneskomenous), in what is outside, in external print, instead of what is on the inside, in themselves; therefore it is not memory (mnemès) but reminding (hypomnesis) for which you have found the remedy. As to knowledge, it is only the semblance of it that you procure for your disciples, and not the reality (aletheian). (Phaedrus, 275a)

Obviously, this affirmation of the poisonous character of writing as remedy – that is, as pharmakon – of which the side effects here appear to be much worse than the ill that is the finitude of memory, does not mean that Plato condemns outright the practice of writing or of reading. He himself writes ceaselessly, and if he never stops noting that Socrates does not write, it is evident that Socrates was very well read. The reference to the alphabetized textuality and the consideration of discrete elements of language are constants in the Dialogues, and the entire dialectic that Socrates engages in across each of these dialogues is based on the Greek cultural heritage which itself is founded through writing.

Socrates is a citizen, which is to say he is a psychic individual in a specific relationship to the collective individuation he participates in literally. And through the law, which itself rules literally these two poles of individuation, like all citizens Socrates is constituted through reading and writing. This is the case in the whole of Greek antiquity since at least the sixth century B.C., which is why Henri-Irénée Marrou can write that

An institution like Ostracism, which was introduced by Cleisthenes in 508-507, entailed a written procedure of voting, assumes a knowledge of writing from the bulk of the citizens. … there can be no doubt that from the time of the Persian wars onward there existed a system of instruction in reading and writing: thus, in 480 … on the eve of Salamis, the Trezenians, in their kindness welcoming the women and children who had escaped from Athens, engaged schoolmasters to teach them to read at their city’s expense. (1956: 43)

In opposing what, in writing, could lead to a psychic disindividuation (that is, to false knowledge, or what Winnicott would call a false self), Plato opposed the Sophists who he accused of misusing writing: in their hands it became extremely poisonous precisely to the extent that it permitted them to short circuit the psychic individuation of anamnesis (Winnicott, 2005: 19). The literal attentional technique became with them a detouring of attention, and a deformation of it, through which collective individuation itself was threatened. For if it is true that there can be no psychic individuation if it is not pro-jected into a collective individuation where it weaves itself into circuits of transindividuation, the converse is also true: there is no collective individuation which holds together (which maintains its metastability, that is, its unity) without going through these psychic individuals, without being individuated and transindividuated by them.

I offer you this analysis of the origin of the attentional form that we call the logos so that we can pose a question about digital relational technologies – which today allow the capturing of attention in a destructive fashion and seem much more to deform than to form it if, as child psychiatrists Frederick Zimmerman, Dmitri Christakis and Andrew Meltzoff (2007) argue, there is a correlation between Attention Deficit Disorder and the hyperconnected mediated milieu, a hypothesis that Katherine Hayles also explores in her work (2007). If in fact an appropriate therapeutic response to this pharmacology of attention is conceivable and able to be transindividuated, then the question would be to what degree can and even must these digital relational technologies also give birth to new attentional forms that pursue in a different manner the process of psychic and collective individuation underway since the beginning of grammatisation; new forms that make this network society arrive at a new stage in the individuation of this plural unity of the logos where the attentional forms we recognise as our culture abound?

*

To pose this question properly I must now show exactly why and how the process of psychic and collective individuation always develops through the concretisation of circuits of transindividuation. (I would also note here that I am unable to take the time to recall how, in the twentieth century, analogue technologies were put into the service of the capturing of the attention of the masses, and of a massification of attention in which Adorno and Horkheimer (1986) already saw a deforming of attention that detoured the desire or attentional energy of the masses toward commodities.)

Apprehended in the midst of its unfolding, a process of psychic and collective individuation presents itself as a series of parallel processes of transindividuation. Each of these operates across the progressive convergence of phenomena of co-individuation. Thus, in the anamnesis which constitutes a Socratic dialogue, each interlocutor is individuated on one side while being co-individuated with the other.

At the very moment in the conference in Sweden at which the paper was delivered from which this text was prepared, I and the assembled participants co-individuated ourselves around the question of attention. But at the same time, other people, in Sweden, in Europe, and the rest of the world, if not for all we know on other planets and in other solar systems, also worked on this question. Trans-individuation is the trans-formation in the course of which psychic individuals, co-individuating dia-logically in this way, enter into a resonance with others who seem to be individuating themselves. Between these individuals and these groups of individuals circuits form through which they converge toward certain attractors: toward points of transindividuation.

What we call ‘truth’ is the privileged modality of a transindividution that is ideal – if not perfect, since it is always re-commencing. More generally, transindividual convergences (that Simondon calls significations) are produced by rules, some of which are explicit and apodictic, as in the case of geometry, while others are explicit but deictic, and others still are non-explicit. These convergences form metastable systems: relatively stable dynamic systems, and therefore also relatively unstable.

As I alluded to above, there can be no collective individuation if it is not incarnated in psychic individuals who individuate themselves in it and with it. Now, if we take seriously the Freudian theory of the psychic apparatus that appeared at the start of the twentieth century, we have to say that the psychic individuation that produces this attentional energy or libido can only be formed – as the formation of a psychic apparatus that constitutes the framework of all the attentional energies, constituting thus the attentional archi-form – to the extent that it goes through a process of idealisation.

This process of idealisation concerns the libidinal economy of the psyche, and it assumes a process of identification – primary identification with the parents firstly, then secondary identifications with objects of desire and, through all kinds of other instances, as identification with the obects of sublimation through which an authority of some kind or another is established: superego, index, author, institution, etc. It is only through these processes of identification and idealisation that a psychic individuation is projected, by and as a collective individuation.

In passing through idealisation and identification, the formation of the psychic apparatus makes the psychic individual pass through the circuits of transindividuation that weave and metastabilise collective individuation. The authorities established produce collective and social synchronisations of the psychic diachrony that is individuation, and it is through these synchronisations that the attractors of the process of psychic and collective individuation converge and are metastabilised. This convergence, however, can be produced in two opposing ways:

  • It can be accomplished when the common desires of psychic individuals converge on an idealised object – such as the truth of space from the triangle as theoretical object, or justice from the law, or language from poetry and literature, etc. At this moment, the convergence toward the attractor is achieved by the intensification of each person’s individuation, but inasmuch as each is turned toward the object of everyone’s attention, this attention converges on the object, constituting in this way an ideal object which tends toward universality in maintaining the diversity that it spans.
  • On the contrary, it can be a process of synchronisation through alienation, coercion, dependency, submission, short-circuit, and finally by a proletarianisation of psychic individuation by collective individuation (the extreme form of which has been called totalitarianism); in this regard, it concerns a process of disindividuation.This second way, posionous, engendered by a misuse of the pharmakon of the literal attentional technique, is what Plato denounces in the Sophistic practices. The problem is that this leads him to absolutise anamnesis, that is, to oppose it to the hypomnesis which is however its condition of possibility. This is why Derridean deconstruction is necessary – it shows that from Plato to Heidegger, all of the metaphysical oppositions are overdetermined by this opposition to the pharmakon.*I just mentioned that all the circuits of transindividuation produced by the attentional forms put to work rules of transindividuation which may be explicit or implicit. There cannot ever be a completely irregular process of individuation or transindividuation for the reason that I indicated at the beginning of this essay: an already there precedes the experience that it renders possible. This already there is transmitted: it is constituted by the attentional forms inherited from culture. Since Freud, we know that its acquisition is accomplished through the process of identification, and as idealisation.

    Language is a primordial attentional form. Husserl characterised it as a process of spontaneous ideation, that is, of generalisation through categorisation (constituting in this way for him the matrix of intentionality). And Winnicott teaches us (2005: 6) that its acquisition rests on play with the transitional object (play which, as an attentional space, is the first pharmakon). This primordial form never functions alone, and primordial does not mean here that it is the first, since the transitional object precedes language. But language prepares all the attentional forms that are post-transitional object and overdetermines them as a process of categorisation.

    The grammatisation of language also makes possible a liguistic activity of meta-categorisation forming what we call a metalanguage. As a language about language, all metalanguages are critical languages. It is from the transformation of the conditions of individuation by grammatisation, inasmuch as it produces metalanguages, that one can and indeed must distinguish critical processes of transindividuation from acritical ones.

    Critical processes of transindividuation always put their rules of transindividuation to work while putting into question the rules themselves, inasmuch as they constitute a synchronic unity. In other words, they put their rules to work in submitting them to a questioning of the experience they make possible. They put them to the test by making them work in a manner that is formal and explicit, whereas the acritical processes of transindividuation put to work rules not explicitly examined: their rules are known, but not recognised. This does not mean that they are not challenged. But when they are, this is not done in a reasoned manner.

    It is hypomnesic exteriorisation that makes critique possible; but what Plato tells us is that this also makes the de-formation of attention possible, a deformation he describes as a short-circuiting of memory. This is a short-circuiting of the process of individuation as process of interiorisation in this critical process of identification and idealisation that for Plato is the city, that is, public and political space ruled by the logos.3

    The circuits of transindividuation, which go through the processes where identification is

    collective individuation, cannot therefore be purely anamnesic. They only form to the extent that they produce at the neurological level of the psychic individual circuits of transindividuation that go on to thread the nervous system of the psychic individual in a mirroring of the threads that form in collective individuation. This is what Zimmerman, Christakis and Meltzoff show in their analysis of infantile synaptogenesis (2007).

    In other words, the neurological system and the brain form a surface of inscription of the processes of transindividuation. In the course of this inscription, however, transformations of these processes are produced: these are the phenomena of diachronisation. If in effect experience is preceded by the transindividuated attentional forms, nonetheless each of us has on each occasion a singular experience. This is because the singular memory of each individual makes different selections from the singularity of their experience, which is never totally transindividuated and absorbed by collective individuation.

    Each of us lives the same event differently. For example, at the moment I delivered the conference talk from which this essay was prepared, each person listening heard something specific because each interpreted my words from their own experience, that is, from their own memory – even if we can understand each other because we share transindividual significations.

    A discipline tends to constitute a process of transindividuation which comes to metastabilise the collective rules across which this variability is not eliminated, but finds itself submitted to the conditions of evolution shared by all. We saw at the start of this essay that it is because memory is always exteriorised that psychosocial individuation is possible. That said, what we must retain from the Platonic critique of the pharmakon is the thought that all exteriorisation leads to the possibility, not only for knowledge but for power, to take control of these processes of transindividuation by mastering the development of categorisation. In particular, since the formation of the Greek logos, what is key here is taking control of meta-categorisation, the production of a metalanguage, as all rational disciplines in our societies, and more generally all forms of deep attention, rest on these metalanguages. formed, and which link up therefore tocollective individuation, cannot therefore be purely anamnesic. They only form to the extent that they produce at the neurological level of the psychic individual circuits of transindividuation that go on to thread the nervous system of the psychic individual in a mirroring of the threads that form in collective individuation. This is what Zimmerman, Christakis and Meltzoff show in their analysis of infantile synaptogenesis (2007).

    In other words, the neurological system and the brain form a surface of inscription of the processes of transindividuation. In the course of this inscription, however, transformations of these processes are produced: these are the phenomena of diachronisation. If in effect experience is preceded by the transindividuated attentional forms, nonetheless each of us has on each occasion a singular experience. This is because the singular memory of each individual makes different selections from the singularity of their experience, which is never totally transindividuated and absorbed by collective individuation.

    Each of us lives the same event differently. For example, at the moment I delivered the conference talk from which this essay was prepared, each person listening heard something specific because each interpreted my words from their own experience, that is, from their own memory – even if we can understand each other because we share transindividual significations.

    A discipline tends to constitute a process of transindividuation which comes to metastabilise the collective rules across which this variability is not eliminated, but finds itself submitted to the conditions of evolution shared by all. We saw at the start of this essay that it is because memory is always exteriorised that psychosocial individuation is possible. That said, what we must retain from the Platonic critique of the pharmakon is the thought that all exteriorisation leads to the possibility, not only for knowledge but for power, to take control of these processes of transindividuation by mastering the development of categorisation. In particular, since the formation of the Greek logos, what is key here is taking control of meta-categorisation, the production of a metalanguage, as all rational disciplines in our societies, and more generally all forms of deep attention, rest on these metalanguages.

    Scientific and academic disciplines are communities of peers: all the scholars belonging to them are in principle equals. But in reality they are not equal. For in fact, some of them individuate themselves more intensely than others, and in doing so contribute more than others to the collective individuation which is, in this case, meta- categorisation. This means there is no knowledge which does not establish, in the form of institutions, power.

    Such power produces a meta-noetic activity that is synchronising and normative, defining the institutional criteria by which such activity retains its influence. This production of criteria is produced in a ‘top down’ fashion. This does not mean there are no ‘bottom up’ activities, but that there are more or less centralised organs which have de facto control over the circuits of transindividuation through which noetico-psychic individuations participate in principle in the collective individuation that an academic discipline is fundamentally.

    These institutional organs, the authority of which can be legitimate (when, that is, the de facto control they exert coincides with the actual superiority of the psychic individuations that constitute the institution), these organs exercise their power over knowledge by controlling directly or indirectly the metalanguage-producing sites: journals, publishing houses, peer review boards, etc.

    If this is true of academic institutions which claim as their first principle the equality of all their members, this ascendancy of the authorities, through which a body of knowledge is sometimes reduced to the power of influence, is much greater in other social spheres where processes of individuation are also in train. The criteria produced in these are translated into norms, laws, theorems, rules, models and prescriptions of all kinds.

    These institutional controls and the criteria that produce them all come in one way or another from something equivalent to what in the current terminology of relational and attention technologies we call metadata. Today, however, transindividuation has become the object of industrial technology, based on a social engineering, where attention and relational technologies develop via folksonomies, that is, collaborative metadata, the reputation technologies of social networks, etc. This social engineering has as its goal the grammatisation of the social relation itself – and through that the capacity to render it industrially discretisable, reproducible, standardisable, calculable andcontrollable by automata.

    This development is extremely complex if one considers the fact that the rolling out of reputation technologies comes to modify radically the constitutive conditions of what the ancient Greeks called kleos. It was in the name of kleos that Socrates decided to drink the hemlock, allowing him to ‘dine with Homer, Hesiod and Orpheus’ after his death (Apology, 41a). It is what Hegel will call recognition, with all that this term implies, and in particular what Freud will think as narcissism, identification and idealisation.

    I cannot go into any depth on these points here. In moving toward a conclusion, then, I would say that a crucial issue emerges from these analyses. As I tried to demonstrate recently, metadata first appeared in Mesopotamia and, in general terms, the production of metadata has been the principal activity of those in power from the time of the protohistorical empires right up to today (Stiegler, Giffard and Fauré, 2009: 25). To generate metadata is also of course to grammatise and vice versa, since each is to meta-categorise. The production of metadata happens, therefore, in all the fields of grammatised transindividuation. The powers that be take control of the circuits of transindividuation – and all the forms of knowledge – through the hegemonic production of this metadata.

    Today, something extraordinary is happening in this regard. With collaborative, that is, ‘bottom up’ processes, each and every person suddenly seems able to participate in the production of metadata. The pure ‘bottom up’ data that the digital networks produce en masse is unexploitable: it is always necessary to ‘re-top down’ it and this is what the collaborative production of metadata makes possible. (I am leaving to one side here the question of metadata that comes from the semantic web, that is, from the autonomisation of grammatisation, and I am speaking only of the social web.)

    The problem is that the exploitation of collaborative metadata is not itself collaborative in any way, and it is never made the object of a critical scrutiny through which these collaboratively transindividuated knowledges would become precisely critical knowledges. That is, they are not coupled with the processes of psychosocial individuation through which deep attention is produced.

    This concerns at once a general organology and a cultural therapeutic, that is, the forming and organisation of the care and attention through which a particular kind of social existence is developed.

    The entire organology of the contemporary social web is constructed to smooth out the diachronies and singularities of psychic individuals in order to agregate them through relational technologies with the aim of unilaterally controlling the fruits of the collaborative production of metadata. But this situation is absolutely contingent. It can and indeed must be transformed by an organological invention that puts into motion critical collaborative instruments. In particular, these should permit the formation of collaborative spaces of discussion which produce conflicts and critical debates that are made formally explicit in and through transindividuation.

    This organological invention itself requires the activation of explicit rules of transindividuation, based on a pharmacological critique, and constituting the therapeutic of this pharmakon that is the space of digital relational technologies.

    The principal objective of the Institute for Research and Innovation is to contribute to the conception of psycho-social techniques capable of supporting digital processes of critical transindividuation. The project of a pharmacological critique governs Ars Industrialis’ programme of activities, and in particular the ‘Relational Technologies’ group and its work with ‘skholé.fr’ on education in the digital age, and the Epineuil School of Philosophy whose activities can be found on www.pharmakon.fr. The School’s task is to explore new conceptual models that could contribute to an organological development of heuristic digital instrumentalities.

    The stakes of these activities are those of ‘digital studies’ around which the whole scholarly and academic project of the university has to be rethought – if it is true that the digital is the contemporary form of writing when writing will have been the organological support of the logos as attentional form.

    *

    To theorise the digital organology of contemporary knowledge in all its forms requires one to study and take account of the organologies which, down through the ages, from the very beginning of hominisation, will have always conditioned forms of knowledge. If anthropogenesis is a technogenesis, with the digital this process arrives at a new stage where the techno-logic of knowledge as such must become central both to the reconsideration of the history of established knowledge in the light of the contemporary moment andto the interrogation of the new forms of knowledge that digitisation brings forth.

    Digital organology profoundly affects contemporary physics and experimental sciences more generally as much as it does the human sciences. For example, as an applied quantum mechanics, nano- physics is only constituted through the digital organon of the scanning tunneling microscope. It therefore reanimates the questions that Gaston Bachelard posed in the 1930s concerning a ‘phenomenotechnics’, questions that confronted him in the face of the new scientific instrumentation and its relation to the new physics (Bachelard, 1968). Similarly, genomics and biotechnologies, which presuppose that the nucleotides that form life develop as digital information-processing organs, encounter similar questions about how to theorise the place of what Bruno Bachimont (1992) calls an ‘artefacture’ in what Georges Canguilhem described as the form of technical life characteristic of humans (2009).

    At the same time, these are questions posed by the cognitive sciences, questions which must be revisited and redefined in a context where, for example, paedopsychiatry and neuroscience provide evidence of the effects on the cerebral organ of its being inserted into the psychic apparatuses of the networked milieux that characterise the analogue and digital epochs (this is one of the themes of Nicholas Carr’s The Shallows). Accompanying the emerging mental (dis)organisation there are also the effects on social organisations which seem to be transformed and sometimes overturned by what we increasingly apprehend today as attentional technologies (in relation to which research into the micro- economics and cognitive process of attention has emerged).

    Technologies of attention can be described as both cultural and cognitive technologies and, in what in France is called the science and technology of the digital, the coupling between societies, technologies, bodies and psychic apparatuses becomes a common question for most of the disciplines, which concern themselves with all kinds of social agents (from industrialists, judges and political representatives to doctors, artists, parents and citizens etc.). At the heart of this is emerging the broad themes of an engineering philosophy and a ‘web science’ in the sense that Tim Berners Lee envisages, in light of which the fundamental questions about rational knowledge should be reposed (www.webscience.org). These new fields of research are articulated with recent advances in neuroscience in a context in which new social practices appear thatseem to proceed in an essential fashion from the specifics of digital organology in such a way that both human and social sciences (and artistic practice) find themselves intimately affected. They reactivate and illuminate anew questions which appeared in cognitive science through the work of Edwin Hutchins (1995) and Larry Chalmers and Andy Clark (1998) under the names of ‘situated cognition’ and ‘extended mind’. They also reactivate Lev Vygotski’s research at the start of the twentieth century.

    But what is also at stake is the status and the social relevance of research: digital technologies allow for new forms of research – a contributive research linking the academic and scientific research of actors who are not themselves professional researchers. Here the questions put by Kurt Lewin under the name of ‘action research’ are reposed – but also the question of knowledge or wisdom outside of the university. Kant, in discussing the ‘Republic of Letters’, had already envisaged this issue in The Conflict of the Faculties (1979) when he emphasized the specific question that the knowledgeable communities and the amateurs of his epoch posed to the ‘corporate experts’ (the professors).

    Thank you for your attention.

    Translated by Patrick Crogan. Endnotes

    1 I refer here to the thesis of Jeremy Rifkin (2000), but also and above all to the recent analysis of these issues by Christian Fauré of Ars Industrialis (Stiegler, Giffard and Fauré 2009).

    2 This is not to ignore that beyond these social relations, grammatisation is what henceforth affects the living, as genetic code, and inert matter, through the manipulation of atomic structures at qauntum scales.

    3 This word, interiorisation, is clearly dangerous and tricky. It seems to suggest that something found on the outside is passed into the interior. What is the origin, however, of this interior? Is it the exterior? Certainly not, for if that was the case, it would mean that one could have an experience that is not preceded by any attentional form, something which I challenged at the outset. So there must be a third term, which is neither interior nor exterior, and which isindicated in what Winnicott calls the transitional object. At the origin of the interior there is an object of desire, of which the transitional object is a precursor. It is an object which is neither interior nor exterior, because it is expected – and an object of attention in this regard – and that much more expected to the degree that it does not exist. It is not the infinite object, for the infinite does not exist. This object, so anticipated, object of an infinite expectation that sometimes produces that infinite patience that sustains all deep attention, is always what attention leads towards inasmuch as it is both psychic and social. It is this that Lacan, after Freud, called the Thing.

    References

    Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. (1971) Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: Verso.

    Bachelard, G. (1968) Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

    Bachimont, B. (1992) Le contrôle dans les systèmes à base de connaissances: contribution à l’épistémologie de l’intelligence artificielle. Paris: Hermès.

    Canguilhem, G. (2009) Le normale et la pathologique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    Chalmers, D. J. & Clark, A. (1998) ‘The Extended Mind’, Analysis 58 : 10-23.

    Derrida, J. (1989) Edmund Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry: An Introduction. Trans. J. P. Leavey, Jnr. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

    Hayles, N. K. (2007) ‘Hyper and Deep Attention: The Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes’, Profession 13: 187-199.

    Hutchins, E. (1995) Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Kant, I. (1979) The Conflict of the Faculties. Trans. M.J. Gregor. New York: Abaris.

    Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1993) Gesture and Speech. Trans. A. Bostock

    Berger. Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press.

    Marrou, H. (1956) A History of Education in Antiquity. Trans. G. Lamb. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

    Rifkin, J. (2000) The Age of Access: The New Culture of Hypercapitalism. New York: Putnam.

    Simondon, G. (2007) L’individuation psychique et collective. Paris: Aubier.

    Stiegler, B. (1998) Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. Trans. R. Beardsworth and G. Collins. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Stiegler, B., Giffard, A. & Fauré, C. (2009) Pour en finir avec la mécroissance. Paris: Flammarion.

    Winnicott, D. W. (2005). Playing and Reality. New York: Routledge.

    Zimmerman, F., Christakis, D. & Meltzoff, A. (2007). ’Media Viewing by Children Under 2 Years Old’. Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 161 (5), May: 473-479.

Steven Pinker’s Liberal Humanist Blind Spot by R. Carlson

Steven Pinker

Pinker’s Blind Spot (a review of the Better Angels of Our Nature)

by R. Carlson

This review of Steven Pinker’s the Better Angels of Our Nature is extended from a review of an article I did by the economist Hazel Henderson who uses Steven Pinker’s findings to bolster her view in support of progressive human evolution or mass species learning capabilities that can be found at the P2P Foundation……

Steven Pinker’s “Better Angels of Our Nature” is a precarious support for a view of “progressive human evolution” or of a species advance in mass learning capabilities that New Age thinkers like the economist Hazel Henderson or the integral theorist Ken Wilber use to champion their optimistic perspective on a future evolution of humanity

Pinker’s linear narrative of human progress in which he employs the extensive use of statistical charts and graphs to make his quantitative case for the per-capita decline of violence in human history is formulated as a proof that the values system derived from the European Enlightenment namely those of reason and scientific inquiry have made us into better human beings.  (note: The aggregate number of deaths by violence has continued to rise through the past centuries -the 20th century has been the bloodiest- as did the worlds population)

What is disconcerting in ones reading of Pinker is not so much what he includes to support his contention of declining per-capita violence but is what he omits in his study. The most glaring omission is that he lacks a comprehensive definition of what violence actually is. Pinker also does not consider the work of scholars who have documented the replacement of the systematic deployment of physical violence  by the state and its institutions as a means to subjugate populations to methods of cohesion that control populations by invoking subtler disciplinary tactics.

The shift in the use of violence as a means of controlling populations was well documented by Michel Foucault. Pinker ignores the evolution of disciplinary techniques in which a centralized all seeing Panopticon operates within the spaces of institutional enclosures to oversee the molding of docile bodies and facilitates the self-disciplining of subjects who move from one institutional enclosure to the other, such as the school, factory, barracks, hospital, and  especially the prison, under the all seeing authoritarian gaze of the state or institutional apparatus. This new form of discipline through centralized monitoring replaced the need for the actual assertion of physical violence as wielded by the Sovereign in the pre-modernist “Societies of the Sovereign”.

Gilles Deleuze extends this analysis of the replacement of violence by other means in his Postscript on Societies of Control. In it he describes the evolution of control from an analog to a digital world. Deleuze describes how extremely rapid decentralized free floating and continuous forms of control that rely on information technology under the sign of the Corporation allow for the supervision of individuals (dividuals) in more open non-structured environments. In contemporary society electronic monitoring replaces the need for the centralized gaze of a State or Institutional apparatus to compel our behavior. In control societies people even freely surrender their privacy to corporations and the state who tag and track their movements as they travel across a cybernetic landscape.

Bernard Stiegler performs a similar analysis of this evolution from disciplinary to control societies –although the two actually overlap- in “From Bio-power to Psycho-power”…. http://antwerp.academia.edu/NathanVanCamp/Papers/360709/From_bio-power_to_psycho-power._The_pharmacology_of_disciplinary_technologies

In his study of violence and violent crimes Pinker fixates on murder as his main yardstick because it is something that can be measured to neatly support his progressive liberal humanist narrative. But does the reduction of per capita murders or per capita violent crime rates mean we should congratulate ourselves for our evolutionary expertise? I would argue that would be a false conclusion to draw.

Among other the things Pinker refuses to admit as violence, are those phenomena that are actually credited in most instances as its instigator namely: social inequality, societal neglect and inescapable poverty. Nor does he take into consideration the present incarceration rates in the American prison-industrial complex, –the vast majority of whose inmates are African Americans  - that is unprecedented in history.

These incarcerations themselves stem from inequality, neglect, poverty and its resultant despair. According to the New Yorker: “In 1980, there were about two hundred and twenty people incarcerated for every hundred thousand Americans; by 2010, the number had more than tripled, to seven hundred and thirty-one….. No other country even approaches that. Six million people are under correctional supervision in the U.S. more than were in Stalin’s gulags”

http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik#ixzz25K8Nec00

Pinker would perhaps cheer the fact that so many potential violent offenders are no longer on the street and would seem to support the very policing efforts that have led to the incarceration of so many at the lower end of the socio-economic strata as consistent with liberal humanist values. In the following quote he seems to endorse programs like the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) “stop and frisk policy” which in especially targeting young African American and Latino males result in a disproportionate number of them imprisoned for minor possession of street drugs like marijuana. Pinker writes:

“A regime that trawls for drug users or other petty delinquents will net a certain number of violent people as a by-catch, further thinning the ranks of the violent people who remain on the streets.”

Moreover in detaching violence from its causes Pinker fails to account for the injustices that are the consequences of liberal humanist economics. Although world poverty figures have been incrementally reduced over the past three decades there has also been an exponential acceleration of the increasing gap in wealth between the rich and the poor.  Consider:

- In 1900, people in the ten richest nations earned nine times as much per capita as did people in the ten poorest nations. This gap increased to thirty to one in 1960 and to seventy-two to one in 2001.

- The top fifth of nations possess 86 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, 68 percent of direct foreign investment, and 74 percent of the world’s telephone lines.

- The richest 20 percent of the world’s people receive at least 150 times more income than the poorest 20 percent.

- The top 20 percent consume 86 percent of the world’s goods and services, while the poorest fifth consumes only 1 percent.

- The three richest people on Earth have wealth that exceeds the combined economic output of the 47 least-developed countries. The richest 200 people have more money than the combined income of the lowest 40 percent of the world’s population, or about 2.4 billion people.

http://www.angelfire.com/nv/verbigerate/poverty_and_wealth.html

Even if world poverty has been incrementally receding over the past 30 years it is not diminishing as rapidly as the wealth of the rich and super rich has been increasing.  Consider the extent of poverty in the world today:

Total Percentage of World Population that lives on less than $2.50 a day            50%

Total number of people that live on less than $2.50 a day            3 Billion

Total Percentage of People that live on less than $10 a day            80%

Total percent of World Populations that live where income differentials are widening            80%

Total Percentage of World Income the richest 20% account for            75%

Total Number of children that die each day due to Poverty            22,000

Total Number of People in Developing Countries with Inadequate Access to Water            1.1 billion

Total Number of School Days lost to Water Related Illness            443 million school days

http://www.statisticbrain.com/world-poverty-statistics/

Might then the increase in economic disparity, in which the wealthy grow exponentially wealthier while all too many of the poor still wallow in poverty and despair also be considered a type of violence?

Moreover, isn’t debt itself and form of it that has been imposed on the world by the Austrian-Anglo-American economic model of neo liberal capitalism also a form of violence? Coupled with the indebtedness of so many it may just be that the forms of violent crimes have merely shifted to what we now refer to as non-violent or white collar crimes such as those that are the result of crony capitalism inebriated by the streaming steroids of information networks. Since the amount of money that have been lost in the past few years are in the trillions of dollars -which is also unprecedented in human history- shouldn’t we credit our liberal humanist heritage with the lack of “mass learning capabilities” for these as well?

Pinker’s championing of the Enlightenment and liberal humanism as somehow the pinnacle of civilizational progress also ignores the consequence of its civilizing mission that contains the specter of colonialism, genocide, totalitarianism, not to mention the very development and application of technologies of mass destruction that have made the past century the actual bloodiest on record.

Even if Pinker skirts the issue of the past century largely by talking in terms of per capita rather than aggregate deaths or the sheer numbers of people killed in such a short time in both world wars (50 to 70 million alone in the six years of WWII) indicates that a linear analysis of per capita violence in human history is insufficient to yield a result that is meaningful in anticipating the future or for championing a “advance in mass species learning”.

In fact human history is better describes as non-linear. Perhaps the evolution of human reason may constrain our impulse toward violence but its instrumental application that allows it to harness the power of nature through technology has created an arsenal of weapons that if ever were deployed on a planetary scale could end the evolution of humanity once and for all.

The question that follows from this fact cant be subsequently ignored namely, is the advance of liberal humanist values along with its program of scientific progress actually making the world a more dangerous place?

There are two very good counters to Pinker which I will provide links to here the first by John Gray includes in his response to Pinker’s claims that increasing standards of Western wealth can be directly correlated with the decrease in violence, is critiqued as follows:

“The formation of democratic nation-states was one of the principal drivers of violence of the last century, involving ethnic cleansing in inter-war Europe, post-colonial states and the post-communist Balkans. Steadily-growing prosperity may act as a kind of tranquilliser, but there is no reason to think the increase of wealth can go on indefinitely — and when it falters violence will surely return. In quite different ways, attacks on minorities and immigrants by neo-fascists in Europe, the popular demonstrations against austerity in Greece and the English riots of the past summer show the disruptive and dangerous impact of sudden economic slowdown on social peace”

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/john-gray-steven-pinker-violence-review/

The second review by Ben Law called “Against Pinker’s Violence” takes issue with the very definition of Pinker applies to Violence as well as the way he uncritically applies it to societies that existed hundreds and Thousands of years before ours. Here he also quotes Foucault:

What do we achieve by placing our morality and values onto the Romans, Greeks, Egyptians, Victorians, Byzantines, Mayans etc? Is it attempting to compare the incomparable? But, is this not, how a misguided history beings? It assumes that ‘words have kept their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas retained their logic, [and it ignores the fact that] the world of speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys.’ [8] Indeed, to comprehend and interpret the ideas of a period we have to stare into the face of the singularity of individual events — without sating that tempting urge for finality, for grand themes across the evidence.  “

http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=702

Finally, the violence that humans have inflicted on the planet and its environment since the Enlightenment should be tallied in any quantitative assessment of human violence, since the destruction of our habitat also impinges on human well being as well as its future development.  So lets also consider humans are in the process of causing the sixth great extinction of other species in the history of the planet:

Mass extinctions include events in which 75 percent of the species on Earth disappear within a geologically short time period, usually on the order of a few hundred thousand to a couple million years. It’s happened only five times before in the past 540 million years of multicellular life on Earth. (The last great extinction occurred 65 million years ago, when the dinosaurs were wiped out.) At current rates of extinction, the study found, Earth will enter its sixth mass extinction within the next 300 to 2,000 years.”

http://www.livescience.com/13038-humans-causing-sixth-mass-extinction.html

“The world’s oceans are faced with an unprecedented loss of species comparable to the great mass extinctions of prehistory, a major report suggests today. The seas are degenerating far faster than anyone has predicted, the report says, because of the cumulative impact of a number of severe individual stresses, ranging from climate warming and sea-water acidification, to widespread chemical pollution and gross overfishing.”

http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/oceans-on-brink-of-catastrophe-2300272.html

During the past 40 years, close to 20 percent of the Amazon rain forest has been cut down—more than in all the previous 450 years since European colonization began. The percentage could well be far higher; the figure fails to account for selective logging, which causes significant damage but is less easily observable than clear-cuts. Scientists fear that an additional 20 percent of the trees will be lost over the next two decades

http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_mitigation.pdf

The concentration of the gas in the atmosphere has jumped 40 percent since the Industrial Revolution, and scientists fear it could double or even triple this century, with profound consequences.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/science/earth/01forest.html?pagewanted=all

It is not surprising that Pinker ignores the violence humans have inflicted on the natural world. The humanist values derived from the European Enlightenment that Pinker celebrates in his study on violence bestows on humanity  a central place in the natural world and ascribes to it a universal essence to humans that privileges humanity above all other forms of life in the natural world. It also champions a view of the human as a rational agent operating  with free will in the world. These uncritical perspective of Humanism have long been undermined by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger who was critical of Humanism’s metaphysical pretensions as well as by psychologist such as Sigmund Freud whose work demonstrated that humans are as much driven by unconscious irrational desires as their actions are structured by reason.

The uncritical use of Pinker’s statistical study of human on human violence by those championing liberal humanist values or by those spouting new age ideologies in support their view of a progressive species evolution may serve to puff up our collective egoism but like all forms of egoism they ignore its co-dependent blind spot, an area of darkness that undermines the peaceful coexistence of humanity with itself and with nature .